Market impacts and global implications of U.S. shale development and hydraulic fracturing: an economic, engineering, and environmental perspective by Umweke, Maduabuchi Pascal
MARKET IMPACTS AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. SHALE DEVELOPMENT 
AND HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: AN ECONOMIC, ENGINEERING, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVE
By
Maduabuchi Pascal Umekwe, B.Eng., M.S.
A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in
Petroleum Economics and Policy Management 
University of Alaska Fairbanks 
May 2018
APPROVED:
Jungho Baek, Committee Chair 
Shirish Patil, Committee Member 
Robert Perkins, Committee Member 
Douglas Reynolds, Committee Member 
Jungho Baek, Chair
Department o f Economics 
Mark Herrmann, Dean,
School o f Management 
Michael Castellini, Dean o f the Graduate School
Abstract
The United States oil industry is experiencing a revolution because of significant oil production 
from tight oil plays since the mid-2000s. Advancements in horizontal well drilling and hydraulic 
fracturing are powering this new chapter in oil development. Increased oil production has 
brought billions of dollars of new revenue to oil companies involved in tight oil exploration and 
production, new jobs in the oil industry, and more tax revenue to oil regions around the U.S. 
However, tight oil resources do not only exist in the U.S. An understanding of the U.S. tight oil 
development experience could bring value to stakeholders within and outside the United States, 
and provide lessons and templates applicable in other tight oil regions. This research examines 
the U.S. tight oil experience and draws lessons for aspiring tight oil regions on the engineering, 
economic, and environmental fronts.
On the economic front, I have examined an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model on key 
oil industry macroeconomic data (West Texas Intermediate oil price, tight oil production, and rig 
count) from 2007 through 2016, and the impact of oil price on tight oil development for the 
Bakken, Eagle Ford, Niobrara, and Permian tight oil plays. The results show that oil companies 
in different plays react differently to oil price signals and do so in relation to oil field 
development characteristics. In addition, oil production and drilling intensity in the Eagle Ford 
play is found to be most responsive to oil price increases than the Permian, Bakken, or Niobrara 
oil plays. The Permian play was most resilient during the 2014 through 2016 oil price plunge. Oil 
production does not fall in response to a decrease in oil price, equally as it rises in response to oil 
price increase. Tight oil operators are quicker in bringing drilling rigs to service as prices rise 
than they take them away in response to falling oil prices, but do reduce drilling significantly in 
response to an oil price plunge. These results have significant ramifications for operators and 
assets in the respective oil plays or future plays with similar development characteristics.
On the engineering front, I used petroleum engineering oil production forecasting Decline Curve 
Analysis techniques, the Drillinginfo Software, and historical development data of U.S. plays, to 
conduct oil production forecast for seven U.S. tight oil plays. Forecast results are shown to be 
comparable to forecasts by the Energy Information Administration (EIA). Building on previous 
EIA geologic studies on non-U.S. tight oil plays, and by selecting best analogues from within
iii
U.S. tight oil plays, I have completed an economic assessment and uncertainty analysis for 10 
non-U.S. tight plays using a simple fiscal tax regime. The results indicate that the Eagle Ford 
play in Mexico, the Vaca Muerta play in Argentina, and the Qingshankou play in China rank 
highest among the plays studied. Of oil price, royalty rate, discount rate, well cost, extraction tax, 
and recovery factor parameters evaluated, results indicate that oil price and well cost are among 
the biggest drivers of profitability in these plays.
On the environmental front, I conducted case studies on the busiest U.S. tight oil plays (Bakken 
and Eagle Ford) and examined the impact of tight oil development on the environment. Local 
solutions to environmental challenges alongside environmental regulations are discussed and 
presented as possible templates for other aspiring plays. Since securing freshwater sources 
alongside wastewater management emerge as major issues in tight oil development, a cost 
comparison is conducted for reused water disposal versus one-use water disposal options, for a 
hypothetical development. Results indicate that on a cost-per-well basis, the reduction in water 
disposal volume from subsurface frack flowback retention improves water reuse economics; the 
water reuse option is preferable to one-use water disposal for U.S. oil plays. This result points to 
potential cost savings for reused water disposal in regions such as the Bakken with few disposal 
wells.
iv
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CHAPTER 1. THE U.S. SHALE REVOLUTION
1.1. Introduction
Oil and gas production in the United States has increased significantly, thanks to petroleum 
resource development in shale and other tight plays. U.S. oil production recorded an 88% 
increase from 2008 through 2015, and natural gas production increased by over 50% from 2005 
through 2015 (IOGCC, 2016). Tight oil production has become a backbone of U.S. oil 
production and now contributes 52% of U.S. total crude oil production (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), 2017a). The impact of this new era of oil production is seen in different 
aspects of the U.S. oil industry and the nation’s economy in general. It has led to renewed 
revenue streams for mineral property owners, and increased tax revenue for local counties, state, 
and the federal government. The level and mix of U.S. crude import has also been affected. In 
2014, domestic oil production broke a 20-year record by exceeding imported crude (IOGCC,
2016).
New levels of U.S. crude oil production have also led to structural changes in the global oil 
market. The U.S. constitutes a significant share of global crude oil consumption. Over the last 20 
years the U.S. consumed over 20% of global crude oil supply (BP, 2016a). For the last decade, 
U.S. oil production has grown to cover a larger fraction of U.S. consumption. Thanks to tight oil 
production, the U.S. ranks first in gas production since 2011 and crude oil liquids production 
from 2013 through 2015 (EIA, 2016a). Crude oil and condensate production growth in the U.S. 
from 2010 through 2015 constituted over 75% of the net new barrels added into global oil 
production (IOGCC, 2016).
Prior to the U.S. tight oil revolution, U.S. production had been on a decline and the lifeline of oil 
production rested mostly on marginal wells and enhanced oil recovery operations in ageing 
fields. Marginal wells are wells that are not sufficiently profitable to keep online as a result of 
very low oil rates or very high costs of production (IOGCC, 2016). In 2005, over 70% of wells 
operated in the U.S. were marginal wells (IOGCC, 2016). Examples are wells that are far from 
the transportation (including roads, railways or pipeline) necessary to bring their product to 
market. Stripper wells, which constitute wells that have oil production under 10 barrels of oil per
1
day (bopd), or 15 barrels of oil equivalent (boe) (EIA, 2010), for a period of one year, also fall 
under the marginal well category (IOGCC, 2016). From 1995 through 2009, over 80% of the oil 
wells in the U.S. produced under 15 barrels of oil equivalent per day (EIA, 2010). These wells 
are costly to produce and require high oil prices to become profitable. As a result, regulatory 
changes alongside major, targeted state and federal tax breaks have been designed to sustain oil 
production from marginal wells. For example, in the state of North Dakota, marginal wells pay 
no production tax and EPA laws provide selective regulatory relief to this category of wells 
(EPA, 2000; ND Century Code, 2017a). The contribution of marginal well production to total 
U.S. oil production has declined from 14% in 1992 to 8% in 2015, thanks to production increases 
recorded due to tight oil resource development (Figure 1; IOGCC, 2016).
Trends on Tight Oil Production and Marginal Wells Contribution 
to Total U.S. Production
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Figure 1. Impact of Tight Oil Production on U.S. Marginal Well Contribution to Production 
(EIA, 2017a; IOGCC, 2016)
Enhanced oil recovery has also been another pillar supporting U.S. oil development. For ageing 
fields that have undergone reservoir pressure enhancement techniques (e.g. waterflooding) other 
enhanced techniques are applied to keep production ongoing. The third tier of techniques
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(tertiary/enhanced oil recovery (EOR) techniques) is typically aimed at altering the viscosity of 
the fluid or properties of the rocks containing hydrocarbons so as to increase the ability of the 
fluid to flow and be produced. These are typically costly techniques and often times the benefits 
are marginal. Examples are chemical flooding, polymer flooding, and carbon dioxide flooding. 
Examples like carbon dioxide flooding have been in use by the industry for over three decades 
and have also provided the twin incentive of furthering oil production and partially sequestering 
the CO2 that is used. Policy makers and stakeholders of this idea have even pushed for a 
nationwide CO2 pipeline network to further increase CO2 EOR and carbon dioxide sequestration 
ambitions (IOGCC, 2010). But this has not worked so far and is likely to be delayed or pushed 
off consideration as a result of options requiring less effort in terms of public policy and 
infrastructural spending and delayed profitability compared to tight oil development in the U.S..
Tight oil development in the last decade has been powered mainly by technological leaps in two 
areas: horizontal well drilling and hydraulic fracturing (Financial Times, 2015; Maugeri, 2013). 
Horizontal drilling refers to a practice of drilling wells that target petroleum resources vertically 
into the ground until a specified depth and then deviating and continuing to drill horizontally 
within the rock formation, mostly in a 90 degree angle from the vertical direction. Hydraulic 
fracturing, on the other hand, is a well completion technique whereby water or other fluids 
containing chemicals and solid proppants are injected at high pressures down a well and into 
rocks, to fracture and extend fractures encountered within the zone a well has drilled through. 
Hydraulic fracturing is crucial to the development of oil because of the nature of the rocks that 
have powered this new era of U.S. production. The goal of the hydraulic fracturing technique is 
to allow the sand particles to fit into fractures and ‘prop’ or keep the rock spaces open to allow 
for the flow of petroleum liquids or gas from the rock formation into the well. That is why the 
solids mixed in hydraulic fracturing fluid are referred to as proppants. The rocks being fracture- 
stimulated are referred to as tight rocks because of their low permeability, and a good example of 
this category of rocks is shale.
Shale is a category of sedimentary rocks, known for its role as source rock for most petroleum 
basins. Shale contains organic matter that has existed under high pressure and temperature for 
millions of years and is buried sufficiently deep enough to transform into kerogen and then into
3
petroleum oil and or gas. Shales are known for low permeability, or limited ability to allow fluid 
flow through them. They are not the only low permeability rocks that exist, so this category of 
rocks is referred to as tight rocks. Examples of other tight rocks are fine-grained sandstones, 
carbonates, mudstones, and siltstones. Rock permeability refers to the ability of rocks to allow 
fluid to flow through them and tight rocks are characteristically of low permeability. Compared 
to conventional rock formations that range from 5 millidarcies to over 1000 millidarcies, tight oil 
formations are typically below 0.1 millidarcy and could go as low as a few hundred nanodarcies 
(100 x 10 "9) (Slatt, 2006). As a result of their low permeabilities, tight rocks require enhanced 
techniques to improve rates of oil or gas production and ultimately increase the quantity of 
petroleum oil or gas that could be recovered from the accessed formations.
The wide scale application of new horizontal drilling techniques derives from the use of better 
technology to position wells within thin layers of formation thousands of feet under the ground 
with greater precision, and the ability to drill for longer distances, oftentimes over two miles, 
horizontally within the rock. Additionally, hydraulic fracturing breakthroughs have enabled oil 
exploration and production companies to open up tight rocks that have been previously ignored 
due to difficulties in drilling within the layers or the very low and uneconomic production rates 
that result when these rocks are drilled. Low permeability rocks are considered tight because 
they don’t allow oil and gas to flow at rates that could quickly provide a revenue base and make 
the business venture worthwhile. The ability to open these rocks further (stimulate the rocks) 
through hydraulic fracturing has increased production rates by several fold leading to greater 
profitability.
Tight formations have always existed in the U.S. and other places in the world. These formations 
are rocks like fine-grained sandstone, siltstone, and shale. These rocks are considered tight 
because of their characteristic low permeability which enable them serve as barriers to oil and 
gas flow and constituting development targets for oil and gas explorers. Shale makes up a 
significant share of tight rocks and is considered a source rock for all petroleum systems. In the 
presence of adjacent conventional or more permeable formations, hydrocarbon oil and gas 
migrate naturally until meeting some barrier, where it aggregates within this trap system and 
becomes a petroleum reservoir target for exploration. In tight formations, these resources do not
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migrate at all or far enough and are still very much associated with the shale rock in which they 
formed or in other tight rocks closely associated with shale (Jarvie, 2012). Tight formations exist 
in several other nations across the world. The U.S.has 48 billion barrels of technically 
recoverable shale oil resources and alongside China, Argentina, Algeria, Canada, and Mexico 
make up over 65% of globally available technically recoverable shale gas resources (EIA/ARI, 
2013). In 2015 the U.S. produced 4.9 million barrels of tight oil daily, and in the same year 
exceeded 13 trillion cubic feet of tight gas production (EIA, 2016b; EIA, 2016c).
Tight oil development is different from previous oil development waves in that, previously, oil 
development occurred in conventional rocks. Among other differentiating characteristics, 
conventional rocks are more permeable and do not require extensive stimulation to enable them 
produce economically. As a result of this relative ease in development, the number of associated 
business activities stimulated by conventional onshore resource development were less compared 
to tight oil development. Due to the resource intensive nature of tight oil development, other 
businesses involved in the logistics of sand and water supply are required to sustain the massive 
completion activities required for each tight oil well. Tight oil and gas development, because of 
hydraulic fracturing operations, require vast amounts of water during the completion stage of the 
well. A typical hydraulic fracturing operation requires between two to six million gallons of 
water and thousands of gallons of chemicals (Fracfocus, 2016). This water requirement leads to 
logistical challenges that include truck transportation of water among the other necessary 
activities that constitute drilling operations. This resource spread, energy involvement, and 
operational footprint has drawn criticism from environmental activists and the public.
Tight oil and gas wells typically experience faster decline especially in the first few years of 
production. Maugeri (2013) noted decline rates as high as 50% in the first year of production 
compared to the rate of production during the first month. The second and third years also see 
another annual rate decline of approximately 30% (Maugeri, 2013). As a result, maintaining 
healthy production from any asset requires continually drilling new wells. This is different from 
conventional oil and gas development where, after the initial capital outlay in wells and facilities, 
relatively minor capital and operating expenditures are required to maintain production over a 20 
to 30-year field life. Since typical well costs are historically higher for tight resource wells than
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conventional wells, while production is more sustained in conventional wells, the economics of 
tight oil and gas wells relies on a smaller margin, shorter cycle projects with more turn over to 
stay profitable.
1.2. US Tight Oil Development Success Story
The implications of successful tight oil and gas production have been vast for the U.S. this past 
decade. Besides returning the U.S. to first place status in hydrocarbon liquids and gas production, 
oil and gas development activity has resulted in increased employment across the country and 
especially among the states where oil exploration is extensive. From 2005 to 2011, with shale 
development leading the oil and gas industry expansion, upstream oil and gas jobs grew by over 
120,000 (Brown & Yucel, 2013). This excludes the support industries that have spun from 
activities powered by the upstream sector of the oil industry. The Oil and Gas industry 
contributes approximately 2.7% of non-farm employment in a state like Texas (Texas State 
Government, 2015). In 2011, thanks to the shale boom, the U.S. oil and gas industry contributed 
1.6% to the U.S. GDP (Brown & Yucel, 2013).
The implications for tight resource development have also been global. The U.S. has consumed 
over 20% of the crude oil consumed globally since 1965 (BP, 2016a). As a result, the U.S. has 
become a dependable market for crude oil around the world. Strong shipping routes have been 
forged from major producers and producer blocs like the OPEC into the U.S. (BP, 2016a). The 
rise of shale and other tight oil production within the U.S. has been, simply put, disruptive to the 
world oil system as it was forged over the last half a century. Many OPEC nations that were 
major exporters of crude oil to the US, such as Nigeria, have seen remarkable loss of U.S. market 
share, due to the replaceability of those barrels by tight oil barrels (EIA, 2016j). Following this 
dire turn of events, new routes of oil transport are forged towards other global population centers 
and energy intensive economies in Asia, such as China, India, and developing economies like 
Brazil.
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Due to advances in tight oil development, from 2011 to 2012, the U.S. recorded an annual crude 
oil and lease condensate reserve increase of 4.5 billion barrels, the largest yearly increase in oil 
reserves in over 35 years (EIA, 2014a). Petroleum reserves refer to those quantities of petroleum 
resources that can be produced with current technology and are economical to produce (PRMS, 
2011) and a growth in reserves is the surest way of ensuring future oil production. Reserves also 
mean increased valuation of companies that hold those assets in their portfolio. Reserve reports 
for 2014 show another year-on-year increase in reserves for the sixth year in a row bringing U.S. 
reserves to over 39 billion barrels, driven by growth in tight oil development (EIA, 2015a).
Tight oil and gas development has also led to a surge of capital in the U.S. oil and gas industry. 
The EIA (2013a) reported that 73 deals in shale oil and gas plays, from 2008 through 2012, 
injected over $130 billion into tight resource development. In 2014 alone, over 40,000 wells 
were drilled and $120 billion invested in oil and gas production in the U.S. (BP, 2015). These 
investments mean organic and inorganic growth of companies, wealth for shareholders, benefits 
to support industry and revenue to state and local governments in major oil and gas regions of 
the country.
1.3. Motivation for the Research
For the last half a century, shale rocks have been the rocks to avoid by drilling engineers while 
pursuing conventional targets. This is as a result of the huge instability of the rocks and the 
potential of losing the entire drilled wellbore upon an unplanned encounter with shale rocks 
downhole during drilling operations. In placing a range on porosity and permeability, the science 
of petroleum engineering considers porosity levels in the single digits and permeabilities of 
~0.01 millidarcies as poor (Slatt, 2006). These characteristics have become almost axiomatic in 
the development of oil for almost a century. But following progressive changes in the technology 
of oil and gas development, this is the first period in the life of the oil and gas industry where 
these forgotten resources have been targeted systematically with astounding results.
In Oct 1970, the U.S. produced over 10 million barrels of oil per day on average thanks to 
multimillion dollar projects all across the finest rocks in the country and in the Gulf of Mexico
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(EIA, 2017c). By year 2000 the local production had dropped to 5.8 million barrels of oil per day 
with a majority of that coming from over 400,000 marginal wells struggling at production rates 
of less than 20 barrels of oil a day around the country (EIA, 2010; EIA, 2017c; IOGCC, 2016). 
Following almost half a decade of successful shale gas development, by 2012 a new chapter was 
being written in the renaissance of oil production in many shale and other U.S. tight oil plays. By 
2015, the amount of U.S. oil production contributed specifically by tight oil development 
reached 50% (EIA, 2017b). While tight oil development has seen some pilot projects and limited 
successes in places like Canada and China, only the U.S. has sustained a production momentum 
reaching up to 4.9 million barrels of oil per day from these tight rocks (EIA, 2017b). It is in the 
interest of most stakeholders of the industry to understand the new phenomenon cutting across 
the U.S. and this is the motivation for this work; also, to understand the possibilities and 
limitations to transferring this success to other regions with these same resources.
1.4. Statement of Problem
The rise of U.S. oil production has had global ramifications on oil production, supply, and trade. 
Crude oil and refined petroleum products imported from 2000 to 2012 amounted to over 2.8 
trillion dollars in trade deficit for the U.S. (CFR, 2014). Rebounding oil production translates 
into reduction in importation of crude oil of similar quality, reduction in national spending to 
overseas oil producing nations and major rebalancing in foreign trade. This also places some 
downward pressure on oil and gas prices locally, reduces spending on fuels in local 
manufacturing operations and increases profitability of businesses within the country.
Several nations around the world with tight oil resources similar to the U.S. would benefit from a 
similar reinvigoration of their economies, especially nations with high energy-intensive 
economies. The success of the U.S. in harnessing tight oil and gas, therefore, raises a wide range 
of questions in the minds of global stakeholders in the oil and gas industry. These questions 
range from the nature of the rocks and technology that yielded this windfall to the systems that 
have enabled it to thrive. And since several nations possess these same resources, the natural 
question that follows is: what key lessons can the U.S. experience provide for tight oil 
development in other countries?
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While geologic understanding and engineering leaps have contributed to the tight oil revolution, 
the economic and regulatory dimensions of the tight oil experience have been no less 
contributory to the success of the phenomenon. With ramifications that spill into different sectors 
of the economy, questions into the nature of the success of the U.S. tight oil experience are best 
discussed within an unrestricted framework. As a result, this work explores the engineering, 
economic, and regulatory dimensions of the U.S. tight oil revolution.
1.5. Research Scope and Focus Questions
To investigate the many sides of the U.S. tight oil experience, several questions and schools of 
thought are developing. This work addresses a single theme: What are the factors that have 
enabled the U.S. tight oil revolution which could help others keen to replicate this success story? 
To discuss this central theme the ensuing chapters discuss the geologic formations, the economic 
conditions, and environmental regulations that have enabled the U.S. to emerge successful in 
developing tight oil resources. Ialso investigate the impact of oil prices on the development of 
tight oil resources and the economic viability of tight oil development projects in other regions in 
the world that have significant quantities of tight oil resources.
1.6. Structure of Research
This research is structured in six chapters. Chapter one introduces the research issue, the problem 
statement and the research scope. Chapter two discusses the U.S. crude oil industry and the 
systemic pillars that have enabled this major shift in this industry. This chapter concludes with a 
summary of the specific factors that have contributed to the flourishing of tight oil development. 
Chapter three introduces oil production forecasting techniques that are applied in planning and 
development of tight oil. This chapter conducts a tight oil production forecast for the US, and 
conducts an economic assessment of non-US tight oil plays, highlighting potential non-US 
regions where tight oil development could occur. Chapter four investigates the impact of oil 
price on oil development within an econometric framework, using the Autoregressive 
Distributive Lag model (ARDL) technique. Chapter five examines the evolving environmental
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regulatory efforts that support tight oil development in some of the key U.S. oil plays. This 
chapter also shows cost assessment for two water disposal scenarios. The last chapter, chapter 
six, summarizes the key findings in this research and concludes on the possible future of tight oil 
development outside the US. This chapter also highlights areas of the research that would be 
relevant to the analysis, which are currently outside the scope of this work.
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CHAPTER 2. THE U.S. PETROLEUM SYSTEM AND THE BIRTH 
OF U.S. TIGHT OIL DEVELOPMENT
2.1. Introduction
Petroleum resources are classified as conventional or unconventional resources based on the rock 
formations in which the resource is found or the flow properties of the resource. Most petroleum 
resources developed to date fall under the conventional category and the methods used in their 
extraction have come to be the conventional methods. Conventional oil and gas resources are oil 
and gas resources that have good viscosity or flow properties and exist in rocks with good 
porosity and permeability. The porosity of a rock is the amount of pore space the rock contains 
as a percentage of the rock volume; rock permeability refers to the ability of a rock to let fluids 
pass through it. Porosity is measured in percentages while permeability is measured in units 
called darcies. Formations with porosity values above 20% and permeability values above 100 
millidarcies are considered of good quality (Slatt, 2006).
Another consideration in classifying conventional oil is the ease with which oil flows. This 
property is referred to as the viscosity of the fluid. Fluid viscosity also refers to the fluid’s 
internal resistance to flow and is measured in units called poise or centipoise (cp) (Tarek, 2001). 
Rock porosity and permeability, alongside fluid viscosity are important properties for any oil and 
gas play because without that ability for fluids to flow easily or sufficient porosity and 
permeability of rock formations, the oil extraction process becomes more energy and cost 
intensive. Oil development in rocks with low permeability and porosity, such as is experienced in 
tight oil plays, or highly viscous fluid, constitutes unconventional resource development. Figure 
2 shows a grouping of conventional versus unconventional resources.
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Figure 2. Classification of Oil and Gas Resource Types (Modified from Slatt, 2006)
Tight oil and gas development entered the U.S. mainstream conversation in the mid-2000s with 
the successful shale gas production operations in the Appalachian Basin, east coast of the United 
States. Other plays in the South, such as Haynesville, Woodford, Fayetteville, Barnett, and Eagle 
Ford rank among the top gas plays in the US. The experience gained in gas developments was 
quickly applied in plays containing hydrocarbon liquids and in hybrid plays that included both 
conventional and unconventional formations (Financial Times, 2015). Resource development in 
conventional plays provided a pivot from which to test and push the boundaries of tight oil 
development while maintaining profitable ventures in areas where the producers were already 
comfortable and had sufficient understanding. The successes of operators like EOG Resources 
Inc. and Brigham Exploration in drilling wells that produced at economic rates in low quality 
rocks shone the light on tight oil development, which has now become central to U.S. oil 
production (Financial Times, 2015).
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2.1.1. Tight Oil Resources
Tight oil is petroleum crude oil found in low porosity and permeability rocks. These rocks are 
typically very fine-grained sandstones, siltstones, mudstones or shale. The permeability of shale 
formations is in the tens to hundreds of nano-darcies and the crude oil in these rock formations 
cannot be released without the help of well stimulation technology such as hydraulic fracturing 
(Medeiros et al., 2008). Unlike sandstones and siltstones, shale rocks are the most abundant 
clastic sedimentary rocks (EIA, 2015b) and are different because, for most of the history of oil 
development, they have served two key functions, as petroleum source rock and reservoir seal 
(Selley, 1998). Shale is the source rock from where hydrocarbons are generated because they 
contain large quantities of organic material. Also, shale rocks are renowned petroleum reservoir 
seals or traps because of their relatively low permeability and their ability to block continuous 
flow of fluid hydrocarbons through more permeable sandstone and other reservoir rocks, after 
hydrocarbons are generated.
Once generated and liquefied through millennia of pressure and heat, under subsurface pressure 
differentials and structural changes in rock, petroleum oil and gas migrate out of shale rock into 
more permeable rocks (Selley, 1998). Because of barriers to fluid flow posed by structural, 
lithological or stratigraphic changes in rock formations, oil and gas is trapped in portions of the 
formation known as reservoir traps. These trap locations become conventional targets for oil and 
gas exploration and development. In the case of tight oil, very little or no migration of petroleum 
occurs after it is generated in the shale rocks (Jarvie, 2012). For this reason, in tight oil 
development, the source rocks are closely associated with the reservoir rocks or are themselves 
the reservoir rocks (Jarvie, 2012).
Due to the role of shale in the origin of crude oil and its association with tight oil plays, most of 
the early literature on tight oil development referred more to shale oil development. And even 
other sources confused shale oil with oil shale (Maugeri, 2013). Oil shale is different and also a 
significant energy resource estimated at over 0.5 trillion barrels of globally recoverable volumes 
(Selley, 1998). But oil shale rocks cannot produce oil without being heated. The difference 
between oil shale and shale oil, according to Chaudhary (2011), is that oil shale contains solid
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organic-rich kerogen which has not reached the thermal maturity required to generate liquid or 
gaseous hydrocarbon phases. On the other hand, shale oil is crude oil produced from shale or 
mudstone rocks that are rich in organic matter. Shale is just one among other tight rocks that are 
part of the U.S. oil production boom (EIA/ARI, 2013). The focus of this work is on tight oil, 
which is largely contained in shale rocks, but also in other tight sandstones, siltstones and 
carbonates. After drilling a well to access this resource, the technique of hydraulic fracturing is 
required to produce crude oil that is trapped in tight rocks.
Hydraulic fracturing is an operation carried out after the well is drilled into the oil-bearing 
formation, for the purpose of creating, extending, and maintaining fractures adjacent to the path 
the well has drilled through, to enable more fluids from the rock to flow to the well (Figure 3; 
EPA, 2016a). The process uses millions of gallons of water and mainly sand grains called 
proppants, to prop open the fractures, and thousands of gallons of chemicals to facilitate the 
operation. Water and sand make up over 95% of the fluid mixture. Hydraulic fracturing 
operations are carried out for both tight oil and tight gas development and over 60-80% of wells 
drilled in the next 10 years in the U.S. will require this operation (Fracfocus.org, 2010).
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Figure 3. Overview of Hydraulic Fracturing Process (Modified from EPA, 2016a)
While the availability of tight oil resources and the application of hydraulic fracturing 
contributed to the increase in U.S. oil production, several other factors enabled the flourishing of 
tight resource development in the US. The next section investigates the systemic and direct 
drivers of tight oil development in the US.
2.1.2. The U.S. Crude Oil System and Drivers of U.S. Tight 
Oil Development
Sustained U.S. tight resource development began in the mid-2000s and has changed the face of 
the U.S. oil and gas industry. Since the last decade, the U.S. tight oil industry has seen a steady 
expansion, even amidst fluctuations in production resulting from oil price fluctuations. To 
understand the inception, expansion and fluctuations in U.S. tight oil development, it is 
important to review the workings of the U.S. petroleum system. Since oil and gas is a global 
resource, some elements of the U.S. petroleum system will trace linkages to the global petroleum 
system. This section discusses the U.S. petroleum system as foundational to any structural shifts
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in the U.S. petroleum industry, such as the birth of tight oil development. While in the last 
decade that shift was in the development of tight oil and gas, it is important to note that, the 
petroleum system is shown to broadly underpin potential future developments within this 
industry. Figure 4 is an illustration of the relationship between the U.S. petroleum system and the 
drivers of U.S. tight oil development.
Figure 4. The U.S. Crude Oil System and Drivers of U.S. Tight Oil Development
2.2. Pillars of the U.S. Petroleum Crude Oil System
To understand the tight oil revolution that has sustained U.S. oil production in the last decade, it 
is necessary to review the functioning of the U.S. petroleum system. According to the EIA
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(2017m) seven drivers of crude oil prices include (1) OPEC supply, (2) Non-OPEC supply, (3) 
OECD demand, (4) non-OECD demand, (5) crude oil spot prices, (6) crude oil stock or inventory 
balance, and (7) financial markets. While these may explain oil price movements, together with 
other factors they form the building blocks of the U.S. petroleum crude oil system. It is hard to 
consider the U.S. as a separate segment of the global oil market because of the integrated nature 
of the global oil system. For example, the U.S. oil industry is a price taker and so is influenced 
by global prices. For this reason, while the U.S. is a non-OPEC and an OECD nation, feedback 
from OPEC supply and Non-OECD are included in the list of components of the U.S. oil system 
as part of a global integrated system.
A more comprehensive picture of the U.S. crude oil system includes upstream, midstream and 
downstream sections of the oil industry. As a result, in addition to the EIA factors, other factors 
that constitute the U.S. crude oil system discussed in this chapter include crude oil transportation, 
crude oil refining and U.S. demand as a separate segment of OECD demand. These, therefore 
constitute 10 pillars of the U.S. petroleum crude oil system: (1) U.S. crude oil production, (2) 
U.S. crude oil transportation, (3) U.S. crude oil refining, (4) U.S. crude oil consumption, (5) 
crude oil inventory balance, (6) financial markets, (7) OPEC supply, (8) Non-OPEC supply, (9) 
OECD demand and (10) Non-OECD demand. The framework established by understanding the 
linkages within the U.S. system will facilitate assessment of the drivers within this system that 
enabled tight oil development. This understanding is necessary to discuss the potential workings 
of other petroleum states and their ability to sustain tight oil or other unconventional oil resource 
development.
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Figure 5. Ten Pillars of the U.S. Petroleum Crude Oil System
2.3. Ten Pillars of the U.S. Crude Oil System
2.3.1. U.S. Oil Production
The U.S. petroleum industry is made up of a beehive of producers ranging from family-owned 
oil firms, small independents, majors, supermajors, and oil servicing firms. This host of oil 
industry participants are purely profit driven and uncoordinated, resulting in an almost perfectly 
free market situation in the U.S. where competition is fierce and innovation is a tool of 
competition. This was not always the case; in the past, U.S. government regulations introduced 
imperfect market elements into the U.S. crude oil system. The height of U.S. federal involvement
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in the oil industry could be traced to 1973, when the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act 
instituted pricing systems that subsidized crude import and restricted the price of crude oil from 
already-producing fields as opposed to the price of crude from new fields, so as to control 
product prices during the Arab oil embargo (EIA, 2002). But over the years, with the absence of 
nationally-controlled oil and gas companies, and the flourishing of free market participation, oil 
production in the U.S. has been unrestrained driven by the innovation, creativity, and 
competition among several oil and gas producers.
US oil production is also supported by the U.S. federal governmental system where the nation’s 
mineral rights ownership is not unified under a central government. As a result of this mineral 
ownership arrangement, states exist where individuals own mineral rights, and can forge 
commercial arrangements with willing operators to produce oil and gas resources (Maugeri, 
2013). In most OPEC and some other major non-OPEC nations, this is not the case; oil 
production is coordinated around major National Oil Companies (NOC) and a slew of small 
contractors that orbit around its needs, and mineral rights are reserved to the national 
government. U.S. oil producers of different sizes and strategic interests provides a flexible, agile, 
and robust base, which is opportunistic and reactive to global oil production trends. Supported by 
this oil producing community, the U.S. currently produces approximately 13% of global crude 
oil production (BP, 2016a).
2.3.2. U.S. Crude Oil Consumption
The recent rise in U.S. oil production often reduces attention on U.S. consumption as a defining 
part of the U.S. crude oil system. For the last 50 years, the U.S. has consumed at least 20% of 
global crude oil production and U.S. consumption constitutes approximately 40% of total 
consumption by the 34-nation OECD group (BP, 2016a). This level of consumption is also 
sustained by growth in population and income (BP, 2016b). As a result of this outsized appetite 
for crude oil, the U.S. is a major and reliable market for the world’s crude oil. Therefore, events 
that impact oil consumption or oil trade in the U.S. are important to the world’s producers.
Policy or technological shifts that replace imported crude with locally produced crude oil, for 
example, also impact oil trade outside the US, as these producers reroute production to other
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markets often leading to a downward pressure on global crude oil prices. This has been the case 
for the years 2014 through 2017, especially coupled with weaker global crude oil demand 
growth. The IOGCC (2016) estimates that over 2.5 billion barrels of crude oil imported annually 
for consumption in the U.S. could be replaced by local production.
Consumption of crude in the U.S. comes mainly from the making of gasoline, diesel, heating oil 
and other products, and major consumption centers exist in the East and West coasts of the US. 
Major consumer industries of produced oil are the refining, airline and petrochemical industries. 
An energy outlook report by BP (2016b) projects U.S. crude oil consumption to decrease through 
2035. This is mainly driven by reduced energy intensity of U.S. power and manufacturing and 
increased fuel efficiency of the transportation and other sectors (BP, 2016b). But the possibility 
of reduced U.S. consumption may still not be reflected in refinery consumption levels. This is 
because without restrictions to the export of crude oil products, the refinery crude feedstock 
intake may remain high since crude oil products could be exported for sale in foreign markets. 
And this reliable consumption base gives the U.S. a systemic advantage in controlling shifts in 
global crude oil energy development.
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Figure 6. U.S. Share of Total OECD Consumption (BP, 2017)
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2.3.3. U.S. Refining Capacity
The U.S. refinery system is partitioned into five petroleum administration and defense districts 
(PADDs), and the U.S. refines over 18 million barrels of crude oil per day (BP, 2016a). These 
PADDs have different refining capacities. The PADD 3, located in the U.S. Gulf Coast has 45% 
of U.S. refining capacity and is the largest of all the five PADDs (Figure 7; Congressional 
Research Service [CRS], 2014; EIA, 2016h). Refineries in all the PADDs receive feedstock from 
crude oil fields via pipelines, rails, barges and in a few cases through trucks. The U.S. holds 
almost 20% of refining capacity in the world and produces over 20% of oil refining products 
(BP, 2016a). With this massive refining capacity, the U.S. could potentially maintain very high 
levels of crude oil import and processing and product export long after energy intensity and 
efficiency have reduced U.S. actual oil utilization.
Crude oil refiners can buy both local U.S. crude which is priced based on the West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI) crude as benchmark, or foreign crude oil benchmarked by the North Sea 
Brent crude oil. Margins of interest for refiners are the profitability margins referenced by the 
price of crude oil compared to the price of crude oil products, and also the margin between WTI 
and the Brent crude oil prices (EIA, 2017m). Better refiner margins result from the ability of 
refiners to buy crude oil at lower prices and sell crude oil products at higher prices. The Brent 
crude oil-WTI crude oil margin also affects profitability of refiners depending on what feedstock 
they use in making petroleum products. According to the EIA (2017m), crude oil products track 
the global crude oil benchmark, Brent crude, and when the WTI sells at a discount to Brent, 
refiners whose plants are set up for processing WTI use WTI crude as feedstock and are able to 
secure higher profitability margins. These margins were most pronounced before U.S. crude 
production increased significantly. Increase in U.S. crude oil production has led to improvements 
in U.S. crude oil transportation infrastructure and debottlenecking of supply infrastructure that 
has brought about cheaper transportation of U.S. crude from inland oil fields to coastal refineries 
(EIA, 2017m). These infrastructural improvements have reduced the Brent-WTI margin. Also, to 
improve refining margins, U.S. refiners could retrofit local refineries to be able to use heavy oil 
from sources like Venezuela, or improve utilization of light oil from local tight oil plays (EIA, 
2017m).
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The U.S. refining capacity therefore is another major advantage of the U.S. crude oil system.
Due to this huge refining capacity, and the fact that the U.S. mostly serves as its own market for 
crude oil products, the U.S. refining system has been instrumental to the U.S. tight oil production 
growth in the last decade. U.S. refining is a major tool in the U.S. crude oil system that ensures 
its robustness and flexibility, because refiners have shown the ability to adjust refining capacity 
to suit emerging crude oil types from within or outside the US. In addition, the ability of U.S. 
refiners to export products in meeting foreign and domestic product demands has enabled the 
U.S. to continually mop up increased local tight oil production and support U.S. tight oil 
development.
Figure 7. U.S. Crude Refining System Segmentation through Petroleum Administration for 
Defense Districts (PADDs) (Modified from EIA, 2012)
2.3.4. Crude Transportation
The U.S. crude oil transportation system allows the U.S. to take advantage of its vast network of 
fields, refineries and crude consumption network. Crude transportation in the U.S. is through
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pipeline, tankers, barge, trucks and rails (Figure 8). The U.S. has the largest pipeline network in 
the world (Pipeline 101, 2017). There are 200,000 miles of crude oil, natural gas liquids and 
crude oil product transmission pipelines in the US, about a third of which constitute crude oil 
product pipelines (Figure 9; Association of Oil Pipelines [AOPL], 2015). Rail transportation has 
also been on the increase since 2005 due to tight oil development. Barge transport typically 
complements transportation by pipeline or rail especially in the PADD1 and PADD 2 (EIA, 
2013c).
The availability of pipeline infrastructure has given several regions more advantages in oil 
development by reducing the cost of transport and eliminating crude oil discounts otherwise 
suffered by producers. The EIA (2017m) observed that high oil prices in 2009 through 2013 
increased U.S. tight oil and Canadian oil sands production and transportation to Cushing, 
Oklahoma, backing out volumes that were normally moved from the Gulf coast to Cushing, 
leading to a glut at the Gulf coast. This new accessibility of tight oil at Cushing required Brent 
crude imports to the Gulf coast to sell at near discount prices to WTI, hence closing in the Brent- 
WTI margins that had grown in the past (EIA, 2017m). With increased connectedness of oil 
fields to transportation hubs, operators and royalty owners in these areas do not have to suffer 
from reduced resource value due to higher cost of transportation. This enables projects that 
would have been marginal in more aloof fields to become more economic.
The economics of crude transport also influences the quantity of crude oil transported by 
different means, and the cost of crude oil transport varies across locations and means of 
transport. The cost of crude shipment by tankers from foreign crude oil locations to the U.S. Gulf 
and Atlantic coasts ranges from $1 to $2.5 per barrel, while crude pipeline transport costs $5 per 
barrel and rail transport cost ranges from $10 to $15 per barrel (CRS, 2014). Pipelines 
transported between 13 and 16 billion barrels of crude oil and products from 2010 through 2014 
(AOPL, 2015). Pipeline transport contracts typically require 10 to 15 year contract terms which 
operators could find burdensome to commit to due to highly volatile oil prices (CRS, 2014). This 
disadvantage could price out small independents who require nimbleness in response to market 
signals to operate profitably.
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Transportation of crude oil within the continental U.S. has experienced dynamic shifts 
historically and more so with the recent increase in tight oil production. While pipeline transport 
remains the main source of refinery crude oil receipts (Figure 8), regionally, the major means of 
transport could be different. Rail transport handled 70% of Bakken crude and 64% of Niobrara 
crude and reaching over 140,000 railroad miles, became one of the fastest growing means of 
crude transport from 2010 through 2015 (CRS, 2014; EIA, 2015f). Rails transported 
approximately 300 million barrels of crude in 2013 (CRS, 2014). And refineries in PADD 1 have 
historically depended on waterborne transportation of foreign crude until more recent rail 
transported crude from the Bakken, following production increases in the Bakken (EIA, 2015f). 
The cost savings afforded PADD1 refiners due to rail transport has led to a preference of Bakken 
crude over more costly West African crude, and improved the competitiveness of these refiners 
against their Gulf Coast counterparts who use lower cost crude feedstocks (CRS, 2014). 
Railroads are generally deregulated except in situations where specific routes have significant 
market dominance and attract oversight by the U.S. Surface Transportation Board (CRS, 2014). 
Total crude oil movements by rail in the U.S. peaked in 2014 to over 380 million barrels (EIA, 
2017n). Crude transport by rail typically provides more flexible transport terms, such as 1 to 2- 
year contract terms, which provide flexibility to oil producers, especially smaller independents, 
to adjust to market signals (CRS, 2014). Rail transport also provides more scalability to 
transporters and is faster to construct with potentially less upfront impact and environmental 
scrutiny and hurdles. However, crude oil transport by rail has been found to be riskier than 
pipelines and has led to several spill incidents in the past, such as the Lac Megantic, Quebec fire 
incident in 2013 (CRS, 2014).
In summary, the spread, variety and economics of the crude transportation options that make up 
the U.S. crude oil transportation network, enables the U.S. to adjust to local and global dynamics 
of the oil and gas industry. The ability to grow different means of transport to better serve 
regional demands also affords the U.S. the robustness and flexibility to give platform to oil 
industry shifts. An example of this phenomenon is the growth of rail transportation in the wake 
of tight oil production in the Bakken.
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Figure 8. Alternative Means of U.S. Domestic Crude Oil Transportation to Refineries (EIA, 
2017p)
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Figure 9. U.S. Crude Oil and Products Transportation System (EIA, 2017q) (A: Crude oil 
pipeline and Waterway for petroleum movement; B: Petroleum product terminals; C: Petroleum 
product pipeline; D: Crude oil rail terminals)
2.3.5. U.S. Crude Oil Inventory
The U.S. crude oil inventory or stocks is another significant but less visible pillar of the U.S. 
crude oil system. Since excess crude oil needs to be stored, the availability of a reliable and well- 
managed storage system is key to a steady crude oil market. This crude oil storage system 
provides the pulse of demand and supply of crude oil and crude oil products. U.S. crude oil stock 
constitutes the volume of commercially available crude oil held by U.S. firms that can be traded 
in response to demand, and the U.S. Energy Information Administration tracks this data weekly 
(EIA, 2017m). This oil inventory volume is different from the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve 
(SPR), which is crude oil kept by the U.S. government in meeting its strategic objectives. The 
total U.S. storage capacity for commercially available crude oil and crude oil products, excluding 
the 727 million barrels of the SPR, is over 2.1 billion barrels, approximately 30% of which 
constitutes storage capacity for crude oil only (EIA, 2017o). Following the experience of the
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Arab oil embargo of 1973, the US, together with the International Energy Agency members hold 
over 1.5 billion barrels of crude oil for emergency response (EIA, 2017m). The EIA also 
publishes biennial reports of working storage capacity for select facilities and crude products in 
different PAD districts (EIA, 2017r).
The fluctuation of inventory levels is also tied to U.S. and global crude oil supply and demand, 
and the commodity markets. The utilization rate of working crude oil and products storage 
volume informs crude oil analysts of the condition of the market since storage could be costly 
when the storage utilization rate is high and available storage capacity is slim (EIA, 2017m). 
Slimming storage capacity may signal bloating supplies and/or weak demand and increase the 
premium paid for storage, while drawing down inventories would imply tightening of the market 
and may lead to higher prices. The signals provided by movements in U.S. crude stocks informs 
analysts on the direction of the crude oil market and affects trading on the crude oil futures and 
financial markets. The EIA (2017m) also observed that inventory levels may increase when there 
is the expectation that prices will be higher in the future and that higher inventory levels are 
associated with market contangos (lower current prices and higher future prices) while low 
inventory levels indicate backwardation (higher current prices and lower future prices).
This crude oil stock or inventory system is important to the management and stability of the U.S. 
crude oil system. For example, U.S. stocks have climbed to record levels since the onset of 
strong tight oil production (EIA, 2017t,Figure 10). The last two years of reduced oil prices has 
highlighted the value of oil inventory in the life of the U.S. oil industry as prices are often seen to 
respond to the weekly data on inventory levels and utilization rates (CNBC, 2017). The increase 
of oil stocks often causes short term negative expectation of financial markets on the 
performance of operating companies, leading to lower market valuations. The EIA (2017m) also 
noted that the lag, insufficiency or absence of inventory data by most non-OECD nations injects 
more uncertainty into the market, heightens the game of expectations and impacts oil prices. 
While there is agreement as to the value of near real time data through the weekly tracking of 
crude inventory and the possibility of this transparency to have helped smoothen would-be major 
shocks, one could argue, this data could have also resulted in jittery market overreaction to 
inventory fluctuations as has been observed in the last few years. Overall, the presence of this
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crude oil and products storage and management system provides a stabilizing force to crude oil 
marketing, and affords the U.S. oil industry a nimbleness that could sustain shifts in the local and 
global oil industry.
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Figure 10. U.S. Crude oil inventory/stocks (EIA, 2017t)
2.3.6. OPEC Oil Supply
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) consists of 14 countries with 
disproportionately large oil reserves and oil production and local economies strongly tied to 
crude oil production. As a result, these countries have a high stake in favorable oil prices. As of 
June 2017 OPEC member states are: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Venezuela, Qatar, Algeria, 
Libya, Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, United Arab Emirates and Ecuador (OPEC,
2017). OPEC was formed in 1960 and has as its mission to “co-ordinate and unify petroleum 
policies among member countries, in order to secure fair and stable prices for petroleum 
producers; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a 
fair return on capital to those investing in the industry” (OPEC, 2017). OPEC produces 40% of 
global oil production, and its volumes constitute 60% of international traded crude (EIA,
2017m). Through its activities in controlling supply, OPEC has influenced oil prices, and in 
some cases oil geopolitics, for several decades. Oil in most OPEC nations consists of crude oil in 
the light oil category and are less costly to produce compared to other non-OPEC nations, giving 
OPEC countries a cost of supply advantage (EIA, 2017m).
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As a result of international coordination across OPEC member states, and because of the 
disproportionate supply power wielded by the group, OPEC has significant price-setting power 
in the world crude oil market. This makes the U.S. crude oil system especially attentive to 
feedback from actions by the OPEC. By a production quota system, OPEC assigns quotas to its 
members and ensures a curtailed supply to the world oil market. Another axis of OPEC power is 
the fact that it maintains significant spare production capacity that enables it to react to supply 
disruptions around the world. According to the EIA (2017m), spare capacity refers to the 
quantity of production that could be brought to the market in 30 days and sustained for a period 
of 90 days, and the absence of spare capacity tightens the market leading to oil price hikes. Saudi 
Arabia is the biggest OPEC supplier and has the largest spare capacity, and can affect world oil 
prices through its decisions on crude supply (EIA, 2017m).
Actions of the OPEC are outside the sphere of U.S. control but such actions are always closely 
monitored by the U.S. financial markets, U.S. oil industry, and U.S. policy makers. The U.S. has 
often responded by policy actions such as the institution of the Crude Oil Strategic Reserves, the 
crude oil export embargo and support for the institution of the International Energy 
Administration to coordinate response to energy issues among mostly OECD nations (EIA,
2002). Another response of U.S. oil and gas policy to OPEC actions, in the recent past, is the 
lifting of export restrictions in 2016.
U.S. tight oil production has affected and been affected by OPEC activities. The slow growth of 
crude oil supply, strong growth in global economy and crude oil consumption, and the resulting 
tight spare capacity contributed to high oil prices between 2003 through 2008 (EIA, 2017m).
This period provided the backdrop against which the new and costly technology of tight oil 
recovery attained successful field trials and rapid expansion. Tight oil production growth across 
more U.S. plays continued to displace U.S. import, most of which comes from OPEC nations, 
hence increasing OPEC spare capacity. This situation required OPEC to decide between cutting 
back production, like it did often in the past, or maintaining production levels and risk collapse in 
global oil prices. Since a reduction in OPEC production could be filled by other non-OPEC
29
producers leading to a loss in OPEC market share, the OPEC members decided to continue 
producing at high levels in Q3 of 2014 leading to a precipitous fall in oil prices.
The actions of OPEC surprised many and has drawn several interpretations. According to an 
MIT (2017) study, OPEC’s decision came against a backdrop of falling shale breakeven costs 
and weakening global demand. The study further noted oil consumption growth of less than 1 
million barrels per day in 2014 and underwhelming global GDP numbers below IMF 
expectations, structural changes taking effect due to improving energy efficiency. Spencer 
(2017) further explained OPEC actions in line with its mission, as a stabilizing force for short 
term changes in the market and not for longer term structural changes, like that characterized by 
tight oil development. He explained that just like OPEC was not effective in supporting prices in 
the 1980s with the opening up of North Sea productions and strong volumes from Alaska, 
OPEC’s refusal to cut volumes in 2014 was more in line with lessons drawn from past 
experiences and the group picking the scope within which it was most effective. OPEC’s actions 
could also be understood within the context of Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the next largest 
OPEC reserve holders, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait and UAE. According to Reynolds & Guthrie (2011), 
on crude oil supply policy negotiations with the world, Saudi Arabia, whose actions largely 
define OPEC’s stance on crude oil supply issues, is truly negotiating with the greatest threats to 
its market power, such as Iran. While Iran’s production still reflected the impact of sanctions in 
2014 when the oil price crash began, oil prices hit their lowest point below $28 per barrel in Feb 
2016, partly due to further increase in productions from Saudi Arabia meant to discourage the 
reintroduction of high Iranian oil volumes following the end of international sanctions on Iran 
(BBC, 2016). A reverse decision by OPEC to reduce supply in November 2016 is widely seen to 
have stabilized oil prices albeit at a lower price range of $45 to $55 per barrel (CNN, 2016; The 
Economist, 2016).
The price-setting power of OPEC, therefore, remains a critical factor important to the U.S. crude 
oil system and to structural changes in the U.S. oil industry such as tight oil development within 
and outside the US. And in the absence of the resilience to continue to improve the economics of 
tight oil development, making it comparable to lower cost light oil alternatives in OPEC and
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other nations, the activities of OPEC will continue to be a key variable for tight oil developers 
across the globe.
2.3.7. Non-OPEC Oil Supply
Crude oil supply from Non-OPEC sources make up 60% of global oil production although just 
40% of internationally traded crude (EIA, 2017m). These producers consist of nations like 
Russia, US, Brazil, Canada, Norway, and the UK. Some non-OPEC producers have major state- 
owned or state-directed producing companies, while others operate a purely free market with 
little or no state involvement. Examples of non-OPEC state oil players include Russia’s Rosneft 
oil company and the Norwegian Statoil oil company. Other non-OPEC producers like the U.S. 
and the UK have no state-owned producers and operate mostly as free markets with hundreds of 
independent oil companies, and dozens of international majors.
The presence or absence of state-owned oil producers often impacts the involvement of non- 
OPEC oil producers in the oil and gas industry. Non-OPEC suppliers like Russia often 
coordinate with OPEC in exerting price-setting power on the market. Countries like the U.S. 
have no such abilities and typically remain as price takers. This has not always been the case. In 
much of the 20th century, the U.S. government restricted supply from Texas giant fields and with 
tight-fitting policies, attempted to control prices, support downstream sectors and maneuver 
adversarial policies from OPEC suppliers in the wake of the Arab oil embargo (EIA, 2002). 
These actions affected the supply of crude oil from the US.
Non-OPEC supply is also characterized by higher cost oil sources (EIA, 2017m). Examples of 
high cost oil sources in non-OPEC countries includes tight oil in the U.S. and oil sands in 
Canada. As a result of poorer rock quality and less abundance of light oil, the cost of oil supply 
from non-OPEC nations is higher, making oil production less profitable. As a result, lower prices 
more easily erode profitability of oil and gas business in these nations than in most OPEC 
nations. Historically, non-OPEC producing countries like the U.S. have sought to incentivize oil 
production through petroleum and tax policy actions such as tax credits and deductions with 
some success. In situations where supply fluctuations from non-OPEC sources is completely
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covered by spare capacity from the OPEC, the loss of such supply has less impact on the oil 
market (EIA, 2017m). In the absence of complete coverage, for example if supply disruptions 
occurred in non-OPEC sources like Russia, the impact on the market could be more severe 
leading to higher prices, all things being equal, with palpable impacts within the U.S. crude oil 
system. And since oil prices are global, other non-OPEC supplies remain an important piece of 
the U.S. energy system and tight oil development decisions around the world.
Since the U.S. is among non-OPEC nations and the effect of crude oil supply fluctuation in some 
non-OPEC nations could be significant, this pillar is also important in the U.S. crude oil system.
2.3.8. The Financial Industry/Markets
The U.S. financial industry has always been part of U.S. crude oil development through bank 
lending. Given the capital-intensive nature of oil and gas development, this relationship has been 
necessary to kick-start or continue the expansion of several oil and gas operation ventures. The 
relationship between crude oil and the financial industry turned another chapter when crude oil 
futures trading started. The West Texas Intermediate (WTI) joined commodities trading on the 
New York Mercantile Exchange in 1983. This allowed oil suppliers and consumers to hedge risk 
and effect contracts for large volumes of crude oil transfer.
Crude oil and gas operation financing has also broadened past traditional bank lending channels 
and has played a pivotal role at every stage in tight oil development. For example, private equity 
funding typically enables the exploration and appraisal stage, reserve based lending and public 
bonds offerings have been applied to the development and production stage, while bank loans or 
internally generated cash flow enable the expansion stage of oil development operations 
(Brogan, 2014). The nature of tight oil development puts the development of the resource within 
appraisal-expansion mode for most of the project life (Brogan, 2014). Unlike conventional plays, 
the variability of the rock within and across tight oil plays and the steep decline in tight oil wells 
requires consistent drilling capital to maintain the productivity of petroleum assets. This 
character of tight plays translates to more wells being drilled, and a protracted season of
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expansion stage than in conventional plays, requiring businesses to seek revolving doors of credit 
to ensure constant capital supply when needed.
The financial markets also serve as a hub of analysis and an information connection of U.S. 
industries with the world. This is because traditional financial institutions and traders constantly 
analyze and react to oil demand and supply signals from major and minor supply hubs like the 
Middle East and Africa or consumption hubs like Asia. This information is synthesized and 
affects capital availability and operation decisions of U.S. firms almost in real time. This value of 
the financial markets has affected the birth and sustenance of the U.S. tight oil industry, and 
continues to be a major pillar in the U.S. crude oil system for the future. And since other nations 
operate financial markets that are in many ways linked with one another, tight oil development in 
other non- U.S. nations will continue to have the financial markets as a source of information and 
capital.
Fattouh (2014) agrees that the existence of well-functioning markets, cheap credits, and liquid 
futures are among the unique advantages of U.S. tight oil development. Furthermore, this 
character of the market is seen through the following three elements of the U.S. financial 
industry: private equity, the design of risk instruments, and other novel funding mechanisms that 
kicked off within the last decade.
2.3.8.1. Private Equity Funding Industry
The world of private equity funding is linked but in many ways different from the traditional 
U.S. financial market. This is because of the increased role it has played in the development of 
ideas and business across the US. Private equity funding has under-written some of the major 
deals in the U.S. tight oil and gas industry. While most of the NOCs, IOCs, and integrated oil 
and gas companies are awash with financing from national government budgets or banks or 
through corporate bonds, this is very different for small independents who make up a larger share 
of oil development companies in the US. These companies often own single assets within single 
plays and are willing to be the test ground for technological innovations in search of the slightest 
edge. In partnership with small and large servicing companies, the small independents have 
applied novel techniques in drilling and completion and engineered different fluid samples that
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helped power the tight oil revolution. In addition to technological innovations, these companies 
are characterized by financing difficulties and typically turn to private equity funds; large and 
small.
Private equity funds are typically manned by entities experienced in oil and gas investment deals 
or participants who were previously part of large oil and gas companies. They receive funds from 
limited partners and sponsors who typically require 7-8% return on capital per annum each 
(Fallon et al., 2017). The sponsors are more involved in decisions about the deployment of the 
capital and major decisions about the venture and upon a successful business, in addition to the 
previous percentage return they get an additional 20% share of the profits from the venture 
(Fallon et al., 2017). As a result of these layers of returns, private equity funding could be quite 
costly for oil and gas operators, but nonetheless provide much needed capital that would not 
otherwise be possible.
Some private equity funds in the U.S. are owned by private individuals or families or groups of 
investors willing to take the risk of funding projects requesting high returns in exchange. Some 
of these projects are typically too risky for banks beholden to shareholder institutional investors 
with more conservative investing philosophies. The private equity funds are typically more 
accessible to small independents, get more creative and are willing to develop an understanding 
for the business that allows them to adjust more rapidly to the ever-changing environment of the 
petroleum industry.
2.3.8.2. Price Hedging Financial Instruments and Derivatives
The U.S. financial industry has also developed products that have increased risk management 
within the tight oil development industry. Examples of these are oil futures and options. Oil 
futures are legal contracts that give the buyer and seller the obligation to exchange a set amount 
of crude at a specified price at or before a specified date (CME Group, 2013). Options are legal 
contracts that give the owner the right but not the obligation to take delivery of a given amount 
of crude on or before a set date (CME Group, 2013). Options and futures are sold at a premium 
and the buyers and sellers decide on what price they can afford to pay that allows them to make a 
profit. For example, when the maturity date of these contracts arrives, for put options, the
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upstream oil and gas agent has the right to weigh his option of selling at the contracted price, or 
if the spot price at that date is high enough, pay the agreed premium and make higher profit in 
the spot market. These instruments have allowed producers and consumers to hedge risk and also 
enabled speculators to speculate on prices profitably.
A Put option, for example, is a variety of the options that give the owner the right to sell a set 
quantity of crude at a pre-arranged price. This instrument is useful to oil producers because, 
based on the amount of production that they have hedged, they eliminate the oil price uncertainty 
involved in planning, focus on cost reductions and could go on producing with assured 
profitability. The ability of oil producers to purchase oil futures or put options has enabled them 
sanction medium to long term projects based on contracted prices and manage price uncertainty 
effectively. As a result of these financial instruments, oil producers can proceed with projects, 
based on contracted prices for crude delivery, assured that future changes in price will not affect 
their operations or point forward decisions. In the oil and gas industry this is very valuable, as 
that amount of crude oil that is hedged factors into the amount of reserves the company can 
claim and also into its market valuation.
A call option gives the owner the right to buy a set amount of crude at a specified price before or 
at a given date (CME Group, 2013). This instrument has helped refiners and other major 
consumers of crude to lock in costs and stay profitable. Through the purchase of futures and call 
options on futures, refiners have also been able to secure products at prices that allowed them 
manage the cost of crude oil feedstock which constitutes input costs for their production 
processes (Stermole & Stermole, 2012).
These hedging instruments offer the U.S. crude oil system the flexibility to support the high risk 
involved in petroleum exploration and production. In managing risk, U.S. oil operators are able 
to manage the significant upside and downside potential that come from structural shifts in the 
local and global petroleum industry.
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2.3.8.3. Other Funding Mechanisms
During the last decade, a new and more flexible funding scheme is also making inroads into 
official funding channels for oil and gas projects. This is crowdfunding. In 2012, the U.S. 
Congress passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act which directed the SEC to 
remove prohibitions to general solicitation and advertising for business capital which was passed 
in the 1930s alongside the Securities Act (SEC, 2013). Currently, this funding style is rivaling 
traditional lending sources for capital needs of small independent oil and gas operators (Racusin, 
2017). This funding practice is approved by the SEC through Title II of the JOBS Act in 
September, 2013, and is projected by the World bank to reach $90 billion by 2020 (Racusin, 
2017). These multiple funding channels reduce the barrier to entry into high cost ventures and 
allow small operators to focus on oil production (Racusin, 2017).
2.3.9. OECD Crude Oil Demand
Nations in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are 
developed nations with large economies that have historically consumed a large share of global 
oil production. According to the EIA (2017m) these nations constituted 53% of total crude oil 
consumption in 2010, declining from higher levels of consumption10 years prior. The advances 
in OECD economies have led to development in sectors that consume less energy such as 
movements away from the heavy manufacturing base to a more service base of the 21st century. 
As a result, economic growth or GDP growth of OECD nations is not correlated with high crude 
oil consumption (EIA, 2017m). OECD nations also propagate oil efficient technologies which 
reduce global crude oil demand and consumption. In circumstances where global GDP growth is 
sustained by economic growth in these nations, the age-old tie between oil consumption and 
economic growth is not honored due to the structure of these developed economies. Non- U.S. 
OECD demand is expected to grow by ~0.6% annually through 2040 (IOGCC, 2016). Lower 
OECD demand, all else being equal, leaves more crude oil unused and will constitute a 
downward pressure on oil prices in the future. Lower oil prices negatively impact U.S. oil 
production due to the high cost of developing aging U.S. fields, and also impedes the expansion 
of high cost tight oil development. This impact of low oil price on tight oil production was
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visible in the contraction and of the tight oil industry over the 2014 to 2017 period. Therefore, to 
the extent that crude demand in these 33 developed non- U.S. economies affects global crude oil 
system, this is significant to the U.S. Crude oil system.
2.3.10. Non-OECD Crude Oil Demand
Crude oil demand by non-OECD nations constitutes a large share of global crude oil demand 
growth in the last decade. The IOGCC (2016) noted that crude oil demand within this block of 
nations is expected to grow by 1.9% annually through 2040. And according to the EIA (2017m) 
non-OECD consumption grew by 40% from 2000 to 2010 and, for the next 25 years, is expected 
to constitute all the net increase in global oil consumption. For example, a non-OECD nation like 
India, according to the IEA (2016), is projected to increase its consumption by 6 million barrels 
per day through 2040.
Most non-OECD economies still rely on a huge manufacturing sector and economic growth in 
these countries is more directly linked to more crude oil consumption. To maintain high demand 
for crude oil and an upward pressure on oil price, a booming global economy sustained by 
economic growth in non-OECD nations is necessary. For example, the U.S. exports crude oil 
products to non-OECD nations in South America. These products provide fuel for industry and 
transportation services. Strong crude oil consumption from non-OECD countries and lower 
energy efficiency contribute to stronger global prices.
The impact of a strong dollar on non-OECD economies also affects crude oil consumption within 
this block of nations. Typically, non-OECD nations have less developed economies with 
currencies generally weaker than the U.S. dollar. A stronger dollar implies that more of the local 
currencies would be required for oil purchase which is traded in the U.S. dollar. This relationship 
should translate to less demand for crude oil. But the EIA (2017m) counters this view point by 
pointing to the fuel subsidies provided by most non-OECD nations, leading to a price 
insensitivity by consumers in these economies. Another impact of a stronger dollar is that it 
reduces most non-OECD demand for other capital goods and raw materials that are traded in the 
global market in U.S. dollars, leading to a potential slowdown in manufacturing economies.
37
Reduction in demand for these products suggests reduced demand for crude oil which serves as 
fuel for power generation or other manufacturing processes (EIA, 2017m). This indirect impact 
is relatively less in OECD economies which typically have currencies that are in par with (Euro 
zone nations), or stronger than the U.S. dollar (Britain).
The impact of non-OECD demand on crude oil prices is important for tight oil development in 
and outside the US. Higher oil prices, sustained by strong non-OECD demand, provide the 
capital and profit margins required to try new technologies in frontier fields. Strong signals of oil 
demand growth in non-OECD countries, powered by faster growing populations and economies, 
decreasing production from conventional oil sources, is a good sign for crude oil prices in the 
future and for unconventional resource development.
Policy actions by the U.S. government play a major role in the interaction among the pillars of 
the U.S. crude oil system. And in recent history, besides the U.S. Energy Policy Act of 2005, the 
lifting of the U.S. crude oil export embargo instituted in 1970s is the most significant policy 
change that could affect the working of the U.S. crude oil system. The next section discusses this 
policy shift and its potential impact on U.S. tight oil development.
2.4. U.S. Crude Oil System and U.S. Energy Policy Shifts: The 
Lifting of U.S. Export Restrictions and Potential Impact on the 
Global Oil Market
As a result of increasing production in the U.S. from 2005 through 2015, petroleum exports from 
the U.S. have increased from approximately 1.2 million barrels per day to over 4.5 million 
barrels (IOGCC, 2016). This is mostly crude oil products like distillate fuels and natural gas 
liquids. This level of export was possible while the U.S. export restrictions were in place. While 
the 10 pillars discussed in the previous section are important in understanding the dynamics of 
the U.S. crude oil system, for much of the last 30 years U.S. government policy has kept this 
system largely insular, with respect to crude oil export. This resulted directly from crude oil 
export restrictions put in place in the 1970s. As a result of these restrictions, crude oil could not 
be exported from the mainland US.
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In 1973, the Arab oil embargo curtailed oil import from Arab nations to the U.S. leading to a 
sudden rise in crude oil and oil product prices. The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 
was passed to place price controls that incentivized new and marginal production while keeping 
a price ceiling for lower cost oil (EIA, 2002). In 1975, the U.S. Congress passed the Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) that restricted crude oil exports. This bill was introduced in 
Feb 1975 by Henry Jackson and enacted by the U.S. president in December of the same year 
(Civic Impulse, 2017). This Act effectively banned the export of all crude oil produced in the 
U.S. and the outer continental shelf and allowed only the export of Alaskan North Slope Oil or 
oil of foreign origin (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2013). According to the U.S. Department 
of Commerce (2013), the Act eased exports based on conditions that met the U.S. national 
interest and in the following years, based on presidential findings, granted licenses to 
increasingly more exports. Export purposes that received this easement still required licenses 
from the Bureau of Industry and Security. In 1985, oil from the Cook Inlet of Alaska was 
allowed for export; in 1988, oil exports to and for consumption within the borders of Canada was 
also allowed; in 1992, exports from California and other exports in accordance with U.S. 
international energy supply agreements, and exports determined to be in line with national 
security interests were allowed.
In 2016, in the wake of low oil prices, the U.S. congress passed a law that lifted the crude oil 
restriction put in place 40 years prior. The low prices from the third quarter of 2014 were 
because of actions by OPEC to keep oil supply levels high despite sluggish growth in global 
consumption. Most experts agree that this was in response to OPEC losing more and more share 
of the global market to non-OPEC oil.
Higher oil prices from 2012 through 2014 had enabled technological advances in the U.S. that 
enabled higher cost oil in the U.S. and other non-OPEC countries to compete vigorously with 
low cost OPEC oil. Although margins were higher for OPEC producers under higher prices, this 
situation meant that markets like the U.S. oil market that historically consumed about a fifth of 
global daily production were no longer as dependent on imported OPEC crude as before. This 
reduction in U.S. crude oil demand creates more free capacity for OPEC and the need to source 
for other markets. So, at least for the U.S. market, it could be said that the major threat to loss of
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market share for OPEC was U.S. production itself, bolstered by high productivity of tight oil 
plays due to technological innovations underwritten by high oil prices.
As oil prices plummeted in 2014 following OPEC’s actions to increase production levels, the 
U.S. was also experiencing a glut due to record high levels of production. The argument among 
U.S. policy makers and the oil industry weighed more towards the opening of the global oil 
market to U.S. crude producers, so as to improve U.S. crude prices and not stymy the high levels 
of economic activity caused by an active oil industry. This change in U.S. policy is a major 
turnaround for the U.S. oil industry and was pushed for many reasons. The EIA (2015e) noted 
that fast increasing U.S. production, bolstered by tight oil development, could lead to the WTI, 
the U.S. benchmark for oil, selling at a larger discount to the Brent oil, if export restrictions were 
not removed. The EIA (2015e) also found that a WTI-Brent margin of $6-$8/bbl represents the 
cost of shipping WTI to overseas markets in which Brent crude sold. As a result, any WTI-Brent 
margin greater than $6-$8/bbl would create an arbitrage opportunity for U.S. oil marketers to sell 
overseas, and that opportunity would be lost if the ban was not lifted. Others hoped that the U.S. 
producers would also gain from current deals that allowed local and foreign refiners to pre­
finance oil production (The Economist, 2015). More supporters of the lifting of the export ban 
believed that the superior light crude from the U.S. would be more competitive than the heavier 
Brent which is a cocktail of crudes, and that U.S. shippers could forge similar relationships with 
foreign refiners that will allow special crude blends from the U.S. that were tailored for specific 
refiners (The Economist, 2015). It is also possible that since businesses always preferred 
multiple sources of raw materials to diversify risk, the U.S. shipper, even in a tight global supply 
market would provide the premium of a stable supply to foreign refiners, especially if such 
refiners previously depended on crude from other less stable sources, such as some sources in 
Africa. In addition, more generally, by lifting the export ban, if global economic growth 
improved or non- U.S. supply is choked by some geopolitical event or other arbitrage 
opportunities exist, U.S. suppliers are not locked out of the race for profitable transactions 
around the world.
On the other hand, U.S. environmentalists contended that the lifting of the export ban would only 
exacerbate the problem of global warming if it encouraged more drilling for oil within the U.S.
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(The Economist, 2015). Besides objections from environmentalists, other economists challenged 
the economic merit of the bill acclaimed by the bill’s advocates. They believed that if the export 
ban reduced the Brent-WTI differential below a $6 - $8/bbl margin to say, zero, at least it would 
cost $3 to ship U.S. crude to European refineries, thereby eroding the competitiveness of U.S. 
crude to the foreign refiners (The Economist, 2015). This implies that a $3-dollar buffer would 
protect European crude from the U.S. producer and unless WTI sold at a discount to the Brent, it 
was not possible for U.S. crude to compete in Europe. Proponents of the bill to lift the U.S. crude 
export ban successfully passed the bill in an omnibus package for government spending that 
included credits for Wind and Solar energy, thereby reducing the challenge that would have 
otherwise been encountered from environmentalists.
In all, the lifting of the U.S. crude oil export ban creates an opportunity to test theories on oil 
marketing and market response rather than a gentle unfolding of some mapped response. Already 
in 2016, U.S. crude export, previously 92% to Canada, dropped to 58% and export destinations 
climbed to 26 countries in South America, Europe and Asia (EIA, 2017s). Lifting the export ban 
potentially opens a new chapter for the U.S. crude oil exploration and exploitation industry. And 
several new dynamics will be tested, including the dynamic within the 10 pillars of the U.S. 
Crude Oil System and the new relationship with the global oil benchmark, Brent. Lifting of the 
export ban increases the degrees of freedom in U.S. crude oil industry and improves 
opportunities for arbitrage around the world for U.S. producers. Following this policy change, 
and the increase in competition for crude oil trade around the world, there is potential for 
increased efficiency in oil logistics and transport.
The pillars of the U.S. crude oil system discussed in more general terms the framework within 
which oil production, conventional or unconventional, has historically occurred within the U.S. 
or how oil resource development could occur in the future. It is within such framework that the 
tight oil development of the last decade has occurred. In addition to that framework are direct 
drivers of the tight oil boom that began in the U.S. in the mid-2000s. These factors will be 
discussed in the next section.
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2.5. Key Drivers for U.S. Tight Oil Development
Several researchers have reviewed the reasons for the tight oil boom in the US. Maugeri (2013) 
pointed out the persistence of drilling, the innovative technology, and managerial efficiencies 
that have supported the rise of oil production in shale plays. Fattouh (2014) highlighted the 
mineral rights ownership, dynamic private sector, rig availability, capital markets, and cheap 
credit as contributing factors. This section reviews and expands on the factors that have 
supported tight oil production increase in the U.S. in the last decade (Figure 11).
Figure 11. Factors that led to tight oil development in the US
2.5.1. Availability of Tight Oil Resources
The development of any resource depends, firstly, on the availability of the resource. The 
dominance of the Middle East and specifically Saudi Arabia in conventional oil production for 
several decades is chiefly driven by the fact that that region has the largest deposits of 
economically recoverable conventional crude oil. It is the presence of the unconventional 
resource in the U.S. that provides the bedrock on which enabling factors lead to shale oil
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production. It is this same factor that raises the promise of similar or some commercial 
development in other nations with significant shale resources as well.
A study by the U.S. Energy Information Administration in conjunction with Advanced 
Resources International in 2013 generated estimates for total shale oil and gas in place and total 
technically recoverable volumes for 43 countries (Figure 12 andFigure 13; EIA/ARI, 2013). This 
report placed U.S. total technically recoverable shale oil resources at 47.7 billion barrels (14% of 
global recoverable shale oil) and estimated U.S. technically recoverable shale gas resources at 
approximately 1.2 Tcft. This does not imply such volume is commercially recoverable, since 
commerciality depends strictly on market conditions and permits and contracts in place, but it 
places the U.S. as a major force in global shale oil prospects.
Proved reserve estimate in Saudi Arabia, owner of the world’s largest light oil reserves, are just 
over 260 billion (BP, 2016a). While the global estimate of shale oil appears quite significant, at 
334 billion barrels (EIA/ARI, 2013), the need for costly and extensive drilling to achieve those 
volumes typically pushes development of these resources towards the high end of the cost curve. 
Hence, compared with nations that own reserves that are easier to produce, without other 
enabling factors, resource availability alone does not easily translate into serious developments 
in shale.
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Technically Recoverable Shale Oil (Billion barrels)
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Figure 12. Technically Recoverable Shale Oil by Regions (EIA/ARI, 2013) 
Technically Recoverable Shale Gas (Trillion cubic ft)
■ Africa ■ Asia ■ A ustra lia  ■ Europe ■ N o rth  A m erica  ■ South A m erica
Figure 13. Technically Recoverable Shale Gas by Regions (EIA/ARI, 2013)
Availability of shale resources in itself does not make a region prospective for oil and gas 
development. The properties of the region must be conducive for development. The EIA/ARI
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(2013) isolated five main properties that focused their analysis of global shale plays for 
prospectivity: (1) the total organic content of shale, (2) the maturity index, (3) reservoir pressure, 
(4) clay content, and (5) depth of the formation.
Total Organic Carbon (TOC)
The carbon content of rock is crucial to determining its hydrocarbon potential. Total Organic 
Carbon (TOC) refers to the amount of organic material present in shale rock. TOC is measured 
in weight percent of the rock sample and direct measurements are made using the Leco carbon 
analyzer while indirect measurements could be made through pyrolysis or well logs (Sorkhabi, 
2016). During the process of sedimentation and rock formation, organic material is trapped in 
rocks and could be broken down by bacteria or spared depending on prevailing conditions. If this 
material is preserved, it contributes to the organic richness of the rock. Rocks with TOC ranging 
between 2% to 10% are good targets for exploration (Alexander et al., 2011; EIA/ARI, 2013). 
Sorkhabi (2016) concurs that for shale rocks, TOC ranging from 2 through 5 and above is 
excellent, while in carbonate rock, a good TOC range is 0.5% through 2% and above. Rocks that 
make up major U.S. plays fall within suitable TOC ranges (Table 1).
Maturity Index
Maturity/reflexivity Index or vitrinite reflectance is a measure of maturity of hydrocarbon source 
rocks by their level of reflectance, due to the amount of vitrinite they contain (Alexander et al., 
2011; Sorkhabi, 2016). Thermal maturity indicates the extent of transformation of organic 
material into hydrocarbons (EIA, 2017g). According to Alexander et al. (2011) vitrinite is plant 
tissue transformed by heat and its standard measurement records the reflectivity of at least 30 
grains of vitrinite from a rock sample. During the formation of petroleum, the effect of heat on 
organic matter transforms it into kerogen, further cracking its complex molecules into oil and 
finally into gas (EIA, 2017g; Sorkhabi, 2016). More thermally mature rocks have higher vitrinite 
reflectance values. This is a function of the temperature and pressure window in which the 
formation exists. Immature rock vitrinite reflectivity ranges from 0-0.6%, oil bearing rock 
reflectivity values range from 0.6-0.8%, and wet gas reflectivity values range from 0.8-1.1% and 
gas rock measures above 1.5% with maximum values at 3% (Alexander et al., 2011). The EIA
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(2017g) also agrees that vitrinite reflectance values between 0.6-1.1% are associated with oil 
formation window, 1.1-1.4 with wet gas, and 1.4 -  3.2% with dry gas formation.
For rock samples that are older than the Devonian geologic age, beyond which plants did not 
flourish on earth, rock maturity is measured through bitumen reflectance values, thermal 
alteration index or by calculating hydrogen index, oxygen index or transformation ratio using 
parameters obtained through pyrolysis (Process by which rock sample is heated in the laboratory, 
in the absence of oxygen, to a point of decomposition to measure organic richness) (Sorkhabi, 
2016). For example, thermal maturity in the Utica play is measured by bitumen reflectance (EIA, 
2017g). Rocks that make up major U.S. plays fall within suitable maturity range (Table 1).
Reservoir Pressure
Reservoir pressure remains a crucial factor in productivity of conventional or unconventional 
formations. The pressure gradient of normal formations containing fresh or low salinity water is 
estimated at 0.433 pounds per square inch of pressure (psi) per foot of depth. Formations at 
specific depths are estimated to exist at pressures near or corresponding to normal pressure 
gradient of 0.433psi per ft. Rock strata with pressure, greater or less than would be determined 
by the 0.433psi/ft relationship, when compared to their depth of burial, are considered 
abnormally pressured. Reservoir pressure is also important because it determines the 
effectiveness of fracture clean up after a well is hydraulically fractured and for the productivity 
of formations. Over pressured rocks are considered to be more prospective for shale oil 
development purposes (EIA/ARI, 2013). This is because as wells produce, pressure is depleted, 
and while in conventional oil and gas operations formation pressure can be replenished through 
water or gas injection, in tight formations this is a major challenge. So, as pressure declines, gas 
molecules trapped in oil are released. These gas molecules compete for flow within the tight rock 
thereby reducing the amount of oil that can be produced. As a result of this relative permeability 
phenomenon, overpressured formations are more prospective as they offer a wider pressure 
buffer that allows more oil to be produced prior to gas coming out of solution. The key U.S. tight 
oil plays such as the Bakken and Eagle Ford and Permian are over pressured (Table 1).
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Clay Content
The clay content of formations is important to shale play development, due to the impact of clays 
on the effectiveness of hydraulic stimulation. Clay or other mineral content of rock results from 
the depositional environment, the rock forming material brought into the basin through geologic 
time and the geologic processes such as diagenesis (change in rock composition after 
sedimentation). Non-marine depositional environments form plays that are typically more clay- 
rich than marine plays (EIA/ARI, 2013). This is because non-marine plays contain much smaller 
quantities of brittle rock minerals like quartz, feldspar and carbonates than marine plays 
(EIA/ARI, 2013). In clay rich environments where these minerals are less abundant, the rocks 
are more plastic and less likely to yield during fracking operations. As a result, just smaller 
segments of rock beyond the immediate vicinity of the well are contacted and fractured. With 
fewer fractures formed, the formation lacks the extensive and complex fracture networks that 
increase the pathways through which oil and gas get to the well for higher productivity. On the 
other hand, carbonates are more amenable to hydraulic fracturing. Of the U.S. plays studied in 
this research, the Utica play with approximately 70% clay content, is the most clay-rich (EIA, 
2017g). On the other hand, most U.S. plays have low to medium quantities of clay and are more 
productive than the Utica (Table 1).
Depth
Formation depth is also important in determining prospectivity of shale plays. The depth of a 
formation impacts the cost of drilling and overall economics of play development. All things 
being equal, it is costlier to drill deeper wells than shallower wells. The well architecture may 
alter this to some extent; wells could be equally deep but longer laterals could make one costlier 
than the other. The Bakken is an example where wells are drilled approximately 21,000ft 
including 10,000ft of lateral, as opposed to shorter wells in the Eagle Ford play. According to the 
EIA/ARI (2013), depths between 3000ft and 12,500ft are optimal; shallower prospects are more 
likely to have higher water saturation while deeper prospects are much less permeable. The 
average formation target for U.S. plays fall within this range (Table 1).
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Added to the availability of shale resources in the US, the suitability of the rocks in major U.S. 
plays, in terms of total organic carbon, maturity, reservoir pressure, clay content, and depth make 
U.S. plays prospective for tight oil development.
Table 1. Petroleum Properties of U.S. Shale Plays
Basin
Play Recovery Factor (%) TOC
Ro
(%)
Depth (ft) Clay Pressure(psi/ft)
Williston Bakken 8.4 10 0.8 10,000 low 0.6
Maverick Eagle Ford 9 4.24 0.85 6,000 low 0.6
Permian Wolfcamp 3.4 9.33 0.92 9,300 low 0.6
D-J Niobrara 4.6 2.69 0.7 10,000 medium 0.433
Appalachian Utica 2.1 1.96 0.8 6,100 high 0.75
EIA/ARI (2013) 
EIA/IHS (2016) 
USGS (2005)
Arthur M. (2013) 
Pollastro et al. (2012)
2.5.2. Availability of Rigs
Tight oil development is a drilling intensive development for two main reasons. The low 
permeability of the rocks means a single well drains a smaller area than wells drilled in more 
permeable formations. And because wells drain a small area and are not pressure-sustained like 
conventional wells through waterflooding or gas flooding, the nature of the production profile of 
tight oil wells shows a steep decline in production early into well life. This implies that to 
maintain high enough volumes of production from any asset, new wells need to be continually 
drilled. Sustained by the number and early productivity of new wells, the EIA (2016i) reported 
that approximately 50% of U.S. oil production in 2015 came from wells drilled in 2014. Due to 
this reliance on number of wells that could be drilled, the availability of drilling rigs is crucial to 
drill the many wells required. The oil field servicing company, Baker Hughes Inc. started 
generating rig counts in Canada and the U.S. since 1944 and globally since 1975 (Baker Hughes 
Incorporated [BHI], 2015). For most of the four decades since 1970, over 50% of the global rig 
count were rigs operating in the U.S. (Figure 14; BHI, 2015). Due to the drilling intensity 
required by shale development, the availability of rigs places the U.S. in a very suitable position
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for global dominance in drilling the most number of tight oil wells. As a result, new wells are 
able to offset declining production and sustain the boom. This is a factor in tight oil development 
that very few nations can replicate.
Ratio of U.S. Rig count/Total Rig count (1975 to 2015)
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Figure 14. U.S. Share of Historical Global Rig Count (BHI, 2015)
In addition to number of rigs available, the capability of rigs has also improved. The success of 
developing resources in tight formations is mainly supported by new technologies in directional 
and horizontal well drilling. This is because horizontal wells allow a longer portion of the well to 
be drilled in the pay zone to access the most resources. New rigs are equipped to drill horizontal 
wells and old rigs are retrofitted, when possible, with similar abilities. Gulen et al. (2013) 
reported that horizontal well growth in the Barnet shale play moved rapidly from less than 1% in 
2001 and 2002 to 8.5 % in 2003, 67% in 2005 and up to 92% by the year 2007. More than 75% 
of wells drilled in the U.S. are horizontal wells (Figure 15; BHI, 2015).
The availability of capable rigs also has the impact of reducing the cost of drilling in the U.S. as 
opposed to drilling in other places in the world.
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Weekly percentage of rig/well types (Jan 1991 to March 2015)
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Figure 15. Well Types Drilled in the U.S. from 1991 through 2015 (BHI, 2015)
2.5.3. Mineral Rights Ownership
In most countries, mineral rights are owned by the state. In these countries, the development of 
mineral resources is impacted by the difference in investment philosophy of governments as 
opposed to private investors. Governments define successful business relationships more broadly 
than in monetary terms and the best interest of state entities is not always measured in 
profitability metrics. The best interest of a sovereign may also include general welfare of its 
people, care for its environment and its national interest. As a result, development is often 
slowed by several considerations of the many interests that constitute the wellbeing of the public 
and the need to pursue and balance other strategic development goals. This is often different 
from the goals of a private individual or enterprise which is typically measured by personal 
interests, shareholder value or more near term corporate strategic benefits. These circumstances 
affect mineral ownership and the pace and focus in the development of mineral resources.
The individual ownership of mineral rights in some states of the U.S. has contributed 
significantly to sustaining shale resource development. Private land ownership in the states of 
Texas and North Dakota exceed 95% (Rogers Oil and Gas Consulting, 2015;Figure 16,Table 2). 
This mineral rights structure has potentially facilitated negotiations, contracts and lease
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acquisitions in these states. This is because there is high individual incentive for development. 
And since smaller independent oil and gas companies may not need a wide range of staff to help 
them navigate the intricate leasing procedures of mineral states, these companies can easily close 
deals with individual land owners. Also, it is easier for companies to form and to acquire oil and 
gas assets. This low transaction cost for lease ownership has contributed to much of the speed of 
development of shale oil and gas resources in the US. More broadly, the nimble, opportunistic 
and risk-taking character of small independent oil and gas businesses and the autonomy of 
individual mineral right owners to partner with them, has been a strong driver of shale resource 
development in the US.
Figure 16 Land Ownership in a Few States in the U.S. (USGS, 1970)
Table 2. Distribution of Land Ownership in Select States in the U.S. (Rogers Oil and Gas 
Consulting, 2013)
U.S. State Federal State Private
California 40 .10 % 2.35% 57 .55 %
Colorado 35 .46 % 4.39% 60 .15 %
Louisiana 4 .97% 2.67% 92 .36 %
M ontana 29 .28 % 5.58% 65 .14 %
N ew  M exico 29 .42 % 11 .20% 59 .38 %
North Dakota 3.11% 1.84% 95 .05 %
Texas 1.43% 0.49% 98 .08 %
W yom ing 48 .43 % 6.22% 45 .35 %
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2.5.4. Availability of Water
Water availability is crucial to the success of shale resource development. This requirement is 
especially important during the completion stage of every tight oil well when it is hydraulically 
fractured. A typical hydraulic fracturing operation for each tight oil well requires 3-5 million 
gallons of water (Arthur et al., n.d). University of North Dakota (2013) researchers place a wider 
range of 1-5 million gallons for Bakken wells. This water is sourced from surface water bodies; 
operators prefer locations close to operation sites and in many cases will truck water to fracking 
locations. Freshwater is the preferred water quality although some reports have shown that 
brackish water could also be treated and re-used (Trent, 2016). But the cost of 100% recycle of 
produced water is prohibitively high. Trent (2016) noted that at a cost of $5 to treat a barrel of 
produced water, and associated cost of disposing the salt bi-product, producers in some counties 
in Oklahoma considered disposal a cheaper option. This suggests that the logistical challenges of 
aggregating and treatment of produced water far outweigh the cost of acquisition of freshwater 
and disposal after use. The economic preference for disposal as opposed to full reuse, points to 
the continued need for freshwater to satisfy tight oil development requirements in the US. Beck 
(2011) estimated that by 2019, demand for water in the Bakken play, ND would grow to over 16 
billion gallons.
Zeihan (2014) points out the importance of geography and the presence of water as a key factor 
in the development of nations. The availability of water has contributed to tight oil and gas 
production rise in the US. The contiguous U.S. mainland has 2,110 watersheds draining the U.S. 
mainland into thousands of streams and lakes (Figure 17; ND SWC, 2014). The nation is drained 
by major rivers like the Mississippi, the Missouri, Delaware, Columbia, Colorado and thousands 
of small rivers and streams that make up over 3.5 million miles of rivers and streams covering 
the U.S. landscape (EPA, 2016b). These water bodies provide a good supply of freshwater that 
has contributed to alleviating the challenge of sourcing for hydraulic fracturing water.
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Figure 17. Water Resource Regions in the U.S. encompassing over 2000 watersheds/drainage 
basins (USGS, 2016b)
2.5.5. Technology and Skills
Shale formations have always existed in the US, even in the years of dwindling local production 
and heavy dependence on imported oil. It required improvements in well position and logging 
technology, by which formation characteristics are effectively matched with completion methods 
to improve oil and gas productivity (Mullen et al., 2010). Besides improvements in well logging, 
it took the combination of advancements in horizontal drilling and well completion technology, 
specifically hydraulic fracturing, to unlock the huge potential in shale plays across the country. 
These two technological leaps enable the accurate positioning of wells within specific formations 
for thousands of miles to access more resources and the opening of rocks that have been 
bypassed for over a century.
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Besides the key developments in drilling and hydraulic fracturing there have also been a wide 
array of minor technological shifts that have supported the tight oil boom. They range from the 
use of big data to optimize the search of land titles by oil and gas landmen, to the use of drill bit 
vibration data to better place hydraulic fracture stages (Constas, 2017). According to Constas 
(2017), put together, this level of innovation has led to over 700% higher new well productivity 
between 2007 and 2015, as tracked by the EIA’s drilling productivity report. There have also 
been improvements in drilling rig capabilities, seismic acquisition and processing technology, 
and water chemistry formulation that have enabled operators to move rigs quickly and drill 
faster, image rocks more clearly, and pump proppants into fractures more effectively -- leading 
to more economic development of tight resources.
The existence of a huge industry base has also enabled the training of personnel to sustain the 
U.S. shale oil and gas development. This has been a combination of learning by doing, 
development of new products and rapid field testing with a quick feedback loop for 
improvements. The existence of several small companies all looking for a small edge above the 
competition has also given room for faster field attempts of new technology. With quick 
penetration of companies into new plays and expansion of firms within plays, new job 
opportunities have been created that lead to easier mobility of skills. As a result, successful 
practices have quickly spread from play to play contributing to more production. Technology and 
skills have been a significant driver for the ongoing tight oil revolution.
2.5.6. Dynamic Business Environment
The dynamic business environment in the U.S. undergirds almost every industry but especially 
so for tight oil resource development of the last decade. This factor could be broken down into 
three key areas: ease of starting a business, accessibility of a market, and financing.
The United States ranks third among 140 nations in the World Economic Forum’s 2016 global 
competitiveness index ranking (World Economic Forum [WEF], 2016). This ranking aggregates 
disparate rankings in 12 categories that summarize the potentials within a nation to support a 
thriving economy. Among the sub categories in this ranking, the U.S. ranks first in ‘efficiency
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enhancers’ which includes market size, labor market efficiency, and financial market 
development. The oil industry is among the key industries where this strength is apparent. The 
U.S. has consistently consumed approximately 20% of the world’s crude oil energy for over two 
decades and built significant refining and crude oil products consumption capacity, and as a 
result provides a reliable and sizeable crude oil market for oil exporting countries. With this 
advantage, the production of tight oil resources could easily find a market.
The availability of venture capital financing contributed to the success of tight oil development 
in the US. The U.S. ranks fifth among 140 nations in the ease of accessing financing for start-up 
businesses (WEF, 2016). The pioneers of the U.S. tight oil development were hardly the major 
E&P companies. These were small companies that grew into medium-sized independents, e.g. 
Petro Hawk, EOG resources, and Continental Resources, and were mostly funded by private 
equity capital.
As part of the dynamic business environment in the US, is the ability to re-start businesses. This 
opportunity is afforded by U.S. bankruptcy laws. As a result of these laws, the failing 
entrepreneurial venture is allowed to restructure, raise new capital and return to profitability. 
From January 2015 to August of 2016, Haynes and Boons LLP (2016) tracked more than 100 oil 
and gas E&P bankruptcy filings. Following the plummeting of oil prices since late 2014, these 
bankruptcies largely affected company operations in high cost tight oil plays. While bankruptcy 
filings include a loss to equity and some debt holders of a company, often this legal protection 
allows a company the opportunity to reorganize and stay in business either as the same entity or 
with a parent entity. This factor fuels the risk-taking needed to maintain a vibrant business 
environment.
2.5.7. Economies of Scale and Other Efficiencies
Progress in shale development over the last few years has also led to other efficiencies that are 
driving increase in production. A good example is pad drilling. In the past, single wells were 
drilled and completed before moving to other wells. But currently, more creative and cost- 
efficient solutions are being applied. During pad drilling, for example, six wells may be drilled at
55
once. After drilling the vertical section of one well, the rig is skidded about 25ft away to drill 
another vertical portion and so on, while casing is being run in all the vertical portions. After 
which the rig moves back to the first well to drill the build section and horizontal portions of the 
well. As a result of this practice, materials are bought in bulk and servicing crews are used more 
efficiently, leading to significant economies of scale benefits. Such pad drilling used by the 
biggest operator in the Bakken, Continental Resources, led to a savings of as much as $7.5 MM 
and 73 days in drilling six wells (Continental Resources, Inc., 2012). The wells are also fracked 
together leading to significant savings in cost of mobilizing the frack fleet and improved 
productivity (Jacobs, 2014). According to Jacobs (2014) the adoption of the zipper frack style, 
where operators frack wells concurrently rather than completing all fracturing stages in one well 
before moving to another has led to reduced costs and increased productivity for some operators.
2.6. Summary of Key Drivers of Tight Oil Development in the U.S.
Tight oil production in the U.S. has rejuvenated the U.S. oil industry. This new era was made 
possible by the general pillars of the industry such as U.S. crude oil production base, 
consumption, price impacting factors like (1) OPEC and Non-OPEC activities, (2) OECD and 
non-OECD demand factors, (3) Crude oil transportation, refining, storage system, and (4) U.S. 
financial markets. But more specifically, tight oil development was supported by availability of 
(1) shale resources of prospective quality, (2) mineral ownership, (3) the availability of drilling 
rigs, (4) availability of water for hydraulic fracturing, (5) the availability of the required 
technology and skills, (6) a dynamic business environment, and (7) Management efficiencies.
In addition to the factors discussed, two key factors require separate handling: Regulatory 
environment and Oil prices. These will be discussed in the next chapter. While the overall impact 
of oil price on the industry has been manifested in the change in rig counts and response of 
production, this general trend obscures the individual impact on different plays and the lessons 
for other plays around the world. Also, the overall increase in production and the speed of 
development activity takes attention away from the framework of regulation and laws that are 
required to make this development sustainable. These are the factors studied in the next chapter.
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2.7. Major U.S. Tight Oil Resources
Tight oil development in the U.S. comes from several plays. Some examples are the (1) 
Monterey (CA), (2) Austin Chalk (LA & TX), (3) Granite Wash (OK & TX), (4) Woodford 
(OK), (5) Marcellus, Haynesville, Niobrara-Codell (CO, WY), (6) Wolfcamp (TX & NM 
Permian), (7) Bonespring (TX & NM Permian), (8) Spraberry (TX & NM Permian), (9) Bakken 
(MT & ND), (10) Eagle Ford (TX), and (11) Yeso-Glorieta (TX & NM Permian) (EIA, 2017e). 
Oil production from these plays has led to reduced oil import. The EIA (2015c) noted that over 
55% of reduction in crude oil imports from 2011 through 2014 was due to reduced light oil (oil 
above 35 API gravity) import, while importation of oil of heavier quality has increased slightly 
(EIA, 2016j). This is because, at the right price, heavy oil imports are still attractive to U.S. 
refineries that possess the coking capacity to process heavier crude (EIA, 2015c). Of these tight 
oil plays, seven have provided more than 90% of total U.S. tight oil (EIA, 2016d; Figure 1; 
Figure 18). This section discusses geological and development characteristics of the different 
plays.
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Figure 18. Seven Key U.S. Shale Plays (EIA, 2016d)
2.7.1. Bakken Play
The Bakken shale play is part of the Williston Basin that stretches from North Dakota, Montana, 
and Saskatchewan in Canada. This play covers an area of 200,000 square miles, ranges from 
3,000 to 11,000 feet in depth and is considered the largest oil accumulation within the contiguous 
U.S. (Halliburton, 2017). It is deepest in the center of the basin and rises to 4500 feet towards the 
eastern edge reaching ~3100ft in the Canadian section of the play ( U.S. ACE, 2013). This play 
contains 4.75 billion barrels of recoverable oil, more than 75% of which is within the U.S. 
portion of the play (Halliburton, 2017).
The Bakken is a very prospective oil play evident by the properties of the rock formation. The 
Bakken play consists of two layers of shale rocks that sandwich a middle siltstone layer. The 
National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) observed that the middle Bakken rocks contain 
dolomite, calcite and quartz while the shale members showed a more diverse mineralogy
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dominated by quartz (5-85%), carbonate (5-40%) and clay (2012). The dolomite sections of the 
rock have higher porosity and permeability and provide sweet spots and enhanced well 
performance. The upper shale member is known to be siliceous and more suitable for hydraulic 
fracturing, and the NE-SW fault trend and NW-SE well placements contribute to better 
performance of wells (NETL, 2012). Rocks that make up this play are of the upper Devonian and 
lower Mississippian geologic age. The formation has a vertical depth of 10,000 -  11,000 feet, 
with temperatures that go as high as 300F and pressure of above 7000psi in some areas (Cramer, 
1986). High temperatures and pressures within this formation contribute to downhole challenges 
faced while drilling through this rock.
Below the Bakken is a secondary target for development, the three-forks formation, which 
underlays over 60% of the State of North Dakota ( U.S. ACE, 2013). It averages ~250 ft in 
thickness and is thought to contain ~1.9 billion barrels of technically recoverable oil, mostly in 
the 10-20 feet layer that overlays it, called the Sanish zone ( U.S. ACE, 2013).
Private land ownership and access to freshwater are among the pillars sustaining tight resource 
development in the Bakken. Over 95% of the land ownership in North Dakota is private (Rogers 
Oil and Gas Consulting, 2013). This is important because it implies reduced transaction cost of 
lease acquisition and minimal bureaucratic red tape during development. Private owners 
typically negotiate with operators and speedily develop the resources within their acreage. 
Royalty rates within Bakken leases range from 12.5 to values above 20% (Drillinginfo, 2017; 
North American Shale, 2013). The State of North Dakota has access to surface and ground water 
sources that sustain freshwater demands for well stimulation. The Missouri river is the main 
source of surface water while ground water aquifers are primarily charged by glacial drift and 
other bed rock aquifer formations (Beck, 2011). The oil and gas sector also shares water 
resources with several other sectors like irrigation for farming and cattle.
Oil is the target resource for development in the Bakken (Figure 19). Oil production in the 
Bakken peaked in 2014 to over 1.2 million barrels of oil produced daily (EIA, 2016d). Bakken 
wells are typically 20,000ft in length and are estimated to cost approximately $7.1 million 
(EIA/IHS, 2016).
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Figure 19. Rig count in the Williston Basin, North Dakota showing primarily oil development 
(BHI, 2017)
Crude oil produced in the Bakken is transported by way of trucks and tankers to pipeline 
terminals and by rail cars. Recently, ongoing efforts have been directed towards constructing 
pipelines because pipelines are considered to be the safest and least expensive form of 
transporting crude oil and crude oil products ( U.S. ACE, 2013). Tankers could be as large as 
3,300 to 6,600 gallons while rail cars range from 5,500 to 82,500-gallon capacity ( U.S. ACE, 
2013). Eight crude oil loading facilities existed in North Dakota by 2011 and the crude take-off 
capacity is estimated to now exceed 300M BOPD ( U.S. ACE, 2013). Other estimates put rail 
capacity at over 700,000 BOPD costing more than a quarter of a billion dollars to install (Federal 
Reserve Bank Minneapolis, 2013). Increased transportation capacity improves the economics of 
projects in North Dakota and frees up the supply glut that typically resulted in operators selling 
off their crude at a discount.
2.7.2. Eagle Ford Play
The Eagle Ford play stretches from the Western US-Mexico Border in Texas up into North East 
Texas. The play is 50 miles wide and 400 miles long in the western gulf basin (Railroad 
Commision of Texas [RRC], 2016a). This play contains oil, condensate, and natural gas sections. 
Some estimates put the gas potential of this play at 150 trillion cubic feet (Halliburton, 2017). 
Tight oil reserves for the play are estimated at over 4.2 billion barrels (EIA, 2017f).
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The Eagle Ford tight oil play lies below the Austin chalk and above the Buda limestone. Rocks 
in this play were deposited in a marine environment during the late cretaceous geologic age, and 
consist of organic-rich calcareous mudrock (RRC, 2016a). The thickest sections of the play are 
in the Maverick Basin (EIA, 2014b). The rocks are rich in carbonate (40-90%), show clay 
contents that range between 15-30% and consist of 15-20% of silica (EIA, 2014b). The rocks 
targeted for development lie between 4000ft and 14,500ft total vertical depth, with oil sections 
shallower in the west, 4000ft -  6000ft and deeper in the east, ranging between 6000ft and 9000ft 
(EIA, 2010; EIA, 2014b; Halliburton, 2017). According to the EIA (2014b), the total organic 
carbon content ranges between 2-12% and thermal maturity ranges from 0.45% in the oil rich 
sections to 1.4% in the gas rich segments of the play. The Eagle Ford formation is slightly to 
highly over-pressured with pressure gradient values ranging between 0.5 to 0.8 psi/ft (EIA, 
2014b).
Due to the high carbonate-richness of the rocks, the Eagle Ford shale is amenable to hydraulic 
fracturing (RRC, 2016a). Being over-pressured is important for oil recovery because as oil 
production continues, reservoir pressure declines until it drops past a pressure threshold referred 
to as the bubble point pressure and gas production increases and starts impeding further oil 
production. So, higher original pressures allow for a longer period prior to significant oil 
production impairment resulting from gases that come out of solution when pressure reduces 
below bubble point pressure. Another advantage of this play is that shallower oil sections reduce 
drilling time and cost of drilling, and the presence of carbonate-rich tight rocks, which are easier 
to fracture, contribute to lowering the cost of well stimulation. Gas producers also find this play 
attractive because of the condensate (light oil produced alongside natural gas), which is more 
valuable than dry natural gas (Figure 20; Allen, 2013). In all, high carbon content, ease of 
fracturing, and the presence of wet gas (in addition to significant oil reserves) contribute to the 
attractiveness of this play to oil producers (Allen, 2013). However, due to its relatively greater 
value, oil is the main resource targeted by producers in the Eagle Ford play (Figure 21).
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Figure 20. Eagle Ford Play showing oil, wet gas and dry gas resource windows
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Figure 21. Eagle Ford Rig Count Showing Mainly Oil-targeted Drilling (BHI, 2017)
Besides the geologic and reservoir attractions of the Eagle Ford play, land ownership is another 
factor influencing developments in this play. Over 95% of land ownership in Texas, including
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mineral rights ownership, is by private individuals (Rogers Oil and Gas Consulting, 2013). This 
contributes to lower transaction costs and speedy development of resources within the state.
Also, the high concentration of oil and gas expertise within the state of Texas, following over 
half a century of conventional resource development, contributes to making this state the 
backbone of oil development within the US. The presence of significant conventional plays 
within the state has led to decades of experience and the development of a supportive 
environment for tight oil development within the Eagle Ford play. The robust service industry 
presence within the state of Texas also leads to more competition and quicker implementation of 
new oil and gas technology.
A typical Eagle Ford well requires approximately 4.8 million gallons of water for drilling and 
completion, mostly drawn from the state’s municipal water supplies, wastewater or ground water 
sources, or surface water bodies (Allen, 2013). Ninety-five percent of the required water volume 
for well development goes into hydraulic fracturing leading to concerns about tight oil 
development (Allen, 2013). South Texas, where the Eagle Ford play is located, is known for very 
dry conditions which often raise concerns on the use of vast volumes of water for well 
development in this area.
In addition, well lengths vary widely in the Eagle Ford play because of the presence of both oil 
and gas targets which are located at different depths. Shallower wells in the North-west sections 
of the play are 6000ft deep while wells in the South-east of the play show higher gas-oil ratios and 
are about 15000ft in length (EIA, 2014b). Eagle Ford wells are estimated to be 12000ft on average 
and cost $7.6 million (EIA/IHS, 2016). Eagle Ford oil production rose from 15000 bpd to a peak 
of over 1.5 million bpd in 2015 and more than 16000 wells have been completed in this play (RRC 
2016b; RRC 2016c).
2.7.3. Niobrara Play
The Niobrara formation covers the NE parts of Colorado, SE of Wyoming, SW of Nebraska and 
NW of Kansas states. The Niobrara formation produces from organic-rich naturally fractured 
carbonate reservoir sections with thickness ranging between 50ft to 200ft, and sometimes up to
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400ft thick (USGS, 2005). Some estimates put the formation thickness up to 1500ft thick in 
some sections and its organic content between 1 to 5 percent (Halliburton, 2017). The reservoirs 
lie 1200ft to 10,000ft deep and the natural fractures in the Niobrara formation contribute to 
improved reservoir performance for this play (Halliburton, 2017; USGS, 2005). The Niobrara 
formation is underpressured and records pressure gradients of 0.25 to 0.4psi/ft (USGS, 2005). In 
underpressured tight oil formations, oil production is quickly impeded by the production of 
associated gas which contributes to lower productivity for wells in this play.
On the other hand, during completion operations, low pressure formations may not require costly 
proppants of high crush resistance to stay sufficiently propped (Yu & Sepehrnoori, 2013). This 
low-pressure characteristic of the play potentially translates to lower proppant cost and 
ultimately lower well completion costs. Using comparable cost per foot and completion costs 
from the EIA/IHS (2016) study, Niobrara wells at 15000ft in total length are estimated to cost 
approximately $6.3 million. And operators in this play show estimated ultimate recovery for 
wells in the 400 to 600 MBOE range (Anardako Petroleum Corporation, 2017).
Colorado contains the largest portion of this play, and over 60% of land ownership in Colorado, 
and 45% of land ownership in Wyoming is privately owned (Rogers Oil and Gas Consulting,
2013). This play is not among the foremost oil development plays within the U.S. but still 
contributes significantly. While the play offers both oil and gas targets, oil production has 
become the primary focus of this play (Figure 22; BHI, 2017). By December 2015, the Niobrara 
play was producing approximately 470,000 barrels of oil per day (EIA, 2016b).
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Figure 22. Niobrara Rig Count Showing Largely Oil-targeted Drilling (BHI, 2017)
2.7.4. Utica and Marcellus Plays
The Utica shale formation is part of the Appalachian basin and underlays the states of Ohio and 
West Virginia. It covers an area of 115,000 square miles (EIA, 2017g), lies 6000ft deep and is 80 
to 700ft thick (ODNR, 2011a). The Utica play is underlain by a more productive layer called the 
Point Pleasant formation, which runs for 108,000 square miles (EIA, 2017g). The Point Pleasant 
play has oil-rich sections towards the NW where it ranges in depth from 4000 to 8000ft, and has 
deeper sections in the SE which mainly consist of gas (EIA, 2017g). The Utica is carbonate rich 
and has higher clay content than the Eagle Ford (ODNR, 2011a). The plastic character of clay is 
known to reduce the effectiveness of hydraulic fracture operations and constitutes a disadvantage 
to well completion and development in this play. The Utica shale contains 10 -  60% of calcite 
and TOC values of ~3.5% while the Point Pleasant formation, which contains 40 -  60% 
carbonate, is more organically rich and has TOC values of 4-5% (EIA, 2017g).
Among the seven major oil producing plays that contribute over 90% of U.S. tight oil production 
(EIA, 2016d), the Utica play ranks among the lowest. On the other hand, this play is a more 
significant gas producing play (Figure 23).
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Figure 23. Utica Play Showing Play Extent and Formation Thickness (EIA, 2017g)
The Marcellus shale lies between 3200 to 5500ft deep across several states including Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Maryland (ODNR, 2011a). Other estimates put this play at 
4000ft to 8500ft deep, 95000 square miles wide and 50 to 200ft thick (Halliburton, 2017). This is 
a major gas play in the U.S. although there have been interests in some of the liquids rich regions 
of the play. Although the Marcellus shale ranks low among the big U.S. tight oil plays, there has 
been a flurry of activities in this play even in the low-price periods of the recent years. Company 
mergers and acquisitions in the Marcellus increased eight-fold from 2015 to 2016 recording asset 
transfers of over $7 billion (Young, 2017). This play is comprised of a more organic rich lower 
Marcellus layer and an upper Marcellus layer and areas around SW Pennsylvania, West Virginia 
and SE Ohio that are more liquid rich (Figure 24; EIA, 2015d).
66
Th ic k n e ss  m a p  of the M arce llu s  fo rm atio n
Figure 24. Marcellus Play Showing Extent and Formation Thickness (EIA, 2015d)
According to Halliburton (2017), the main challenges with development in the Marcellus play 
include the challenging terrain and difficulty in sourcing water for stimulation operations. By 
December 2015, the Marcellus and Utica plays were producing approximately 40000 barrels per 
day and 76000 barrels per day of oil, and 16 billion cubic feet and 3.4 billion cubic feet of gas 
per day respectively (EIA, 2016b). The EIA/IHS (2016) estimated well costs in the Marcellus 
play to be approximately $6.1 million. Using average drilling and completion costs for plays at 
different depths presented by the EIA/IHS (2016), the cost of a generic 10000ft well in the Utica 
play was estimated at $5.6 million.
The key economic drivers for development in the Utica and Marcellus plays are NGL and dry 
gas prices, and development efficiencies of operators within the plays (Hart Energy, 2015). 
According to Hart Energy (2015), while gas production was the priority in developing both 
plays, especially the Marcellus play, operators have shifted development within the oil window
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to target wet gas portions in response to high oil prices, and moved off those regions when the 
cost of treating the wet components of gas was prohibitively expensive compared to the product 
prices. Also, drilling efficiencies and the presence of pipeline access to help move product easily 
are always factors at play in development within this area (Hart Energy, 2015).
2.7.5. Permian Play
The Permian basin spans 59 counties in West Texas, and stretches for 250 miles wide and 300 
miles long (RRC, 2016d). This basin contributes 50% of hydrocarbon liquid production in Texas 
and made up 18% of U.S. total production in 2013 (EIA, 2014c; RRC, 2016d). It contains both 
conventional and tight oil reservoir targets. Six formations within the Permian play have 
contributed most of the production surge in the last decade and three of them are shale-rich tight 
formations namely: Spraberry, Bone Springs, and Wolfcamp formations (Figure 25; EIA,
2014c). The Permian produces from formations as deep as 25000ft (RRC, 2016d) and most 
active horizontal oil wells in the basin target the Wolfcamp and Bone Springs formations. A key 
advantage of oil development in this basin is the existence of a thick reservoir column that 
extends for over 4000 feet, which creates multiple targets for individual wells (EOG Resources, 
2017c). The USGS (2016a) estimates prospective (undiscovered technically producible) 
resources of approximately 20 billion barrels in the Wolfcamp Shale. This resource estimate 
highlights significant potential for this play, and the thickness of the formation provides 
operators with significant opportunity for more reservoir targets and the ability to grow reserves 
once they secure mineral position within the basin. This growth in reserves due to formation 
segments that could be developed in the future directly translates to company future production 
and market valuation. In December 2015, Permian tight oil production was approximately 2 MM 
bpd (EIA, 2016b). Permian wells are estimated at 12000ft in total length and cost $7.2 million 
(EIA/IHS, 2016). Major operators in tight oil regions of this play include Anadarko E&P onshore 
LLC and Cimarex Energy Company (Drillinginfo, 2017).
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Figure 25. Permian Basin Showing SubPlays (EIA, 2014c)
The lack of sufficient transportation capacity for crude oil from the Permian basin to refining and 
sales centers in the U.S. Gulf Coast and other areas resulted in supply glut and discount prices of 
crude in this region in 2010 through 2014 (EIA, 2017h). The price discount between the West 
Texas Intermediate crude at Midland, Texas and the West Texas Intermediate crude at Cushing, 
Oklahoma almost reached $7/bbl in 2014 but has since narrowed to less than 10 cents by 2016 
due to increases in pipeline capacity (EIA, 2017h). Over 700,000 bopd in pipeline capacity is 
expected in the 2017-2018, alongside other opportunities for gathering systems within the play 
(EIA, 2017h). These infrastructural modifications alongside premium oil and gas acreage 
composed of stacks of conventional and unconventional play targets within the Permian basin 
make the Permian a crucial player for tight oil development in the US.
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2.7.6. Haynesville Play
The Haynesville shale play stretches across the Northwest of Louisiana, Southwest Arkansas and 
East of Texas. It is primarily a shale gas play of thickness between 200ft to 350ft, and producing 
from depths of 10000 to 14000 ft (Bureau of Economic Geology, 2016). Rocks that make up the 
Haynesville play were deposited in the Jurassic geologic age, and cover an area of approximately 
9000 sq miles (Halliburton, 2017). There are several challenges to development in this play.
High downhole temperatures of up to 380F and hydraulic fracturing pressures that go as high as 
10000 psi present challenges in drilling and completion in this play (Halliburton, 2017). These 
conditions translate to the need for costlier specialty fluids and more hydraulic fracturing 
horsepower and therefore higher drilling and completion costs. Other challenges faced by 
operators in this play include the loss in productivity due to poorer conductivity of fractures to 
the producing wellbore (Halliburton, 2010). This is caused by high pressures that crush and 
embed proppants into the formation. Another challenge is that of large water volumes which 
could be costly to procure or dispose (Halliburton, 2010). In December 2015, the Haynesville 
shale formation contributed approximately 50000 bpd and 3.6 bcf per day of gas (EIA, 2016d). 
Using comparable drilling cost per foot and completion costs from the EIA/IHS (2016) study, 
Haynesville wells at 15000ft in total length are estimated to cost approximately $6.3 million.
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Updated Way 2€ 2011
Figure 26. Haynesville Shale Play (Universal Royalty Company, 2017)
The plays discussed in this section are the most significant tight oil plays in the U.S. and contribute 
the majority of tight oil production within the U.S. (Figure 27). And as previously discussed, some 
of the plays, while primarily providing targets for oil, develop both oil and gas, such as the Eagle 
Ford. Others develop primarily gas targets, such as the Haynesville, Marcellus, and Utica plays 
(Figure 28). The following section discusses the significance of these plays in the U.S. tight oil 
story.
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US Tight Oil Production
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Figure 27. U.S. Tight Oil Production (EIA, 2016b)
*Others include: Granite Wash (OK & TX), Woodford (OK), Marcellus (PA,WV,OH &NY), 
Haynesville, Niobrara-Codell (CO, WY), Wolfcamp (TX & NM Permian), Bonespring (TX & 
NM Permian), Yeso & Glorieta (TX & NM Permian), Delaware (TX & NM Permian), Utica 
(OH, PA & WV).
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Figure 28. U.S. Tight Gas Production (EIA, 2016c)
*Other include Antrim (MI, IN, & OH), Bakken (ND & MT), Woodford (OK)
Generally, while current production is the focus of the industry, the future production outlook for 
the U.S. oil and gas industry, which depends on crude oil reserves, drives industry long term 
activity. The central method used in determining crude oil reserves is by oil production 
forecasting. Oil production forecasting could be conducted at the well, reservoir, or regional 
level. The next section reviews the literature on oil production forecasting techniques. These 
techniques are important for new tight oil regions within and outside the U.S. because they 
determine how few data points from new wells can help shape the outlook for tight resource 
plays. Oil production forecasting is also important for operators as they grapple with questions 
about the character of frontier tight oil regions and the crude oil reserves that is important to their 
market valuation.
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CHAPTER 3. TIGHT OIL PRODUCTION FORECASTING FOR 
MAJOR U.S. PLAYS: ENGINEERING PERSPECTIVE
3.1. Introduction
Production forecasting refers to the practice of determining future production in the life of a 
petroleum asset using current and historical production performance of the asset. The volume of 
production expected from an asset guides the sizing of tangible production assets such as 
processing plants. Oil and gas operators also conduct oil production forecasting to ensure reliable 
planning of investment and revenue. For this reason, oil production forecasting is at the center of 
overall petroleum asset management. The basis of oil production forecasting lies in classical 
production forecasting models that have been in use for over half a century.
Classical Production Forecasting Models and Arps Decline Curve Analysis (DCA)
Several methods have been proposed in forecasting production in oil and gas wells. Topical 
works done by Arps (1945) and advanced by Fetkovich (1980) are known and used throughout 
the oil industry. Arps (1945) described three different forms of decline trends for production 
from a well or reservoir: exponential, hyperbolic, and harmonic decline. He developed equations 
that use an initial production rate, a decline rate and a b-exponent to fit a trend on historical 
production and to determine future production. These equations have had wide use in the oil 
industry and are applied in understanding and forecasting production trends and in estimating 
producible volumes from reservoirs based on historical production volumes.
Arps (1945) observed that oil rates in some wells decline exponentially with a constant decline 
rate (D) or a constant loss ratio (1/D). The exponential decline shows a production profile where 
the rate of decline does not change over time. The decline rate is calculated as follows (Poston & 
Poe, 2008):
ln —
Decline rate, D =  —q2 (1)
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And the production rate at any time could be described by the decline rate and the initial 
production rate as follows:
Rate, q 2 = q te -D t (2)
And the cumulative production over a period is estimated thus:
(3)
The theoretical maximum cumulative production exists at infinite time where e -Dt becomes 
zero and Qp becomes qi/D. But this is not practical because production continues until a point 
where the well stops paying for the expense of keeping it on production. That point is referred to 
as the economic production limit. Hence in calculating the actual cumulative production, one 
takes into consideration the oil rate at which the operator shuts in the well because it cannot keep 
up with the expense of producing it, a rate q2. So, the practical cumulative production in a well 
that declines exponentially is calculated as follows:
Arps (1945) also described production profiles where the rate of decline of production changes 
over time; wells whose oil rate profiles show a hyperbolic decline. Arps (1944) explained that 
the loss ratio of these wells showed an arithmetic progression and the difference between loss 
ratio at each time step was approximately the same. The curvature of the production profile in 
the decline equation is governed by the size of a non-zero b-exponent representative of well 
operating conditions. The production at any point for a well that declines hyperbolically is 
calculated as follows:
(4)
(5)
And cumulative production from this well is determined thus,
Theoretical maximum cumulative production for wells showing hyperbolic decline,
0  = — ——Di(l-b) (6)
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As stated earlier, the theoretical maximum cumulative production is reached when the well is 
allowed to produce until it stops flowing (q2=0), which is not practical in real life due to well 
operating costs. Where the actual rate when the well will be shut in is known (q2 ^ 0) the 
cumulative rate is calculated as follows:
q.— a (1—b)
t v  = 3‘S^  <7>
Arps (1945) also described oil rate profiles that showed a harmonic decline. For this category of 
wells, the b-exponent value is 1. Production rate at any point in calculated thus:
q 2 =  (8)^ 2  1  +  Di t v ’
Cumulative production over a period where rate changes from an initial rate, qi to a new rate, q2
Qv = |  f t * ©  (9)
Arps (1945) simplified these equations with the observation that the b-exponent ranges between
0 and 1 (0 < b < 1). With that definition, for exponential decline, b=0; for hyperbolic decline, 
0<b<1; and for harmonic decline, b=1. But, a b-exponent of 1 or greater describes an infinite 
reservoir with infinite drainage radius which is physically impossible (Poston & Poe, 2008). 
Hence, while b could take values 0 < b, for the solution of rate and cumulative production to be 
bounded, b should be strictly less than 1 and within the range 0 < b < 1.
Fetkovich et al. (1987) grounded empirical models developed by Arp’s within an analytical 
framework. Through solutions to the diffusivity equation, Fetkovich linked Arps’ observations to 
the physics of fluid flow and reservoir engineering (Clark, 2011). He posited that the b exponent 
has a physical significance tied to the reservoir production mechanism. Clark (2011) reported 
analytical findings of Fetkovich that associate b-exponent of zero to single phase liquids, weak 
waterfloods or formations with low gas permeabilities, b-exponents of 0.3 and 0.4 for solution 
gas drive and gas wells, and 0.5 b-exponent for water-drive and gravity drainage wells.
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The b-exponent is also positively related to reservoir heterogeneity, as measured by the Dykstra- 
Parsons coefficient (Clark, 2011; Walsh & Lake, 2003). The Dykstra-Parsons coefficient is a 
measure of permeability heterogeneity and ranges from zero, for homogenous systems, to 1, for 
highly heterogeneous systems (Walsh & Lake, 2003). Poston and Poe (2008) also agree that 
highly heterogeneous systems or systems where prolonged crossflow occurs, from tight zones to 
the wellbore through highly permeable zones, result in high b exponents. This suggests that 
hyperbolic decline will be observed in layered reservoir systems, where production persists from 
less permeable layers long after more permeable layers are depleted, resulting in a long-sustained 
tail in the production profile, such as tight oil wells.
Tight oil wells yield hyperbolic declines (Harris & Lee, 2014). Since these wells produce with 
characteristically hyperbolic declines, the b-exponent values required to match well performance 
is above 1, which mathematically leads to a prediction of impossible, infinitely large reserves 
(Duong, 2010). Since hyperbolic declines generate unrealistic reserve estimates, petroleum 
engineers have warned against using these b values (Fetkovich, 1980); or more specifically, 
against using the values in predicting flow throughout the life of the well (Duong, 2014).
3.2. Oil Production Forecasting in Tight Rocks: How are 
Classical Models Deficient?
Decline curve analysis by Arps (1945), Fetkovich (1980), and Fetkovich et al. (1987) simplified 
understanding of production decline around some assumptions. In a well that produced a slightly 
compressible fluid phase under the same operating conditions for its entire duration of 
production, over a fixed drainage area and constant productivity index, specific characteristic 
profiles could be observed in its production rates (Poston & Poe, 2008). The absence of these 
conditions leads to inaccurate application of classical decline curve analysis models, causing 
errors in reserve estimates or forecasted production rates. Tight oil production flouts most of the 
conditions necessary for applying classical decline curve analysis models (Duong, 2010; Duong 
2014; Poston & Poe, 2008).
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For oil wells drilled in conventional reservoirs, when production begins, the pressure change 
experienced at the well bore quickly travels through the rocks and reaches the farthest extent 
within the influence of the well, its drainage boundary (Poston & Poe, 2008). When this happens, 
continued production occurs under conditions referred to as boundary dominated flow 
conditions. During boundary dominated flow, the well is in a steady or pseudo steady state. 
During this time, production is sustained by pressure from a defined boundary of the well, 
enabling a smooth profile of production behavior to be traceable. This is typically not the case 
for tight reservoirs where it takes a very long time for pressure changes at the well bore to reach 
the boundary of the well (Duong, 2010). And the pressure transience, due to very low 
permeability of the rocks, keeps expanding for a long time in the life of the well. According to 
Duong (2010) flow in shale and other low permeability formations does not stabilize for the 
entire life of the well. This observation in tight oil wells makes them unsuitable for the use of 
classical forecast models like the Arps model. Other transient flow models have been advanced 
to predict tight oil production when flow is still in the transient period. When production flow 
gets into the boundary-dominated phase, the classical models are applied (Duong, 2014). Since 
periods of erratic flow also exist in tight oil wells, to reduce errors in forecasting reserves, 
production forecasters use flowing pressure data or other means to identify periods of transient 
flow, for which transient flow models are applied, and periods for which the switch could be 
made to classical models (Anderson et al., 2012; Lacayo & Lee, 2014; Anderson & Mattar, 
2003).
3.2.1. Tight Oil Flow Regimes Identification
Tight oil wells experience flow regimes that are different from what is observed in conventional 
wells (Figure 29). For conventional wells, a brief transient period and a more prolonged 
boundary-dominated flow period are observed. In forecasting production in conventional wells, 
it is best practice to exclude the brief transient phase, as this symbolizes a period of instability in 
the well’s productive life, which if included may lead to erroneous forecasting of future 
production rate or ultimate recovery.
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Forecasting production rates for tight oil wells is different. After well stimulation through 
hydraulic fracturing, there are at least three reservoir segments created by this operation, leading 
to distinct flow regimes (Akoun, 2011; Duong, 2014; Figure 30). The hydraulic fractures, now 
packed with sand proppants, have better permeability than the rock matrix itself and provide a 
flow path to the wellbore. Next, there is the segment of rock in the immediate vicinity of the 
fracture which is impacted, weakened, or cracked by the force that led to the creation of the 
hydraulic fracture. Many authors have referred to this segment as the stimulated reservoir 
volume, which is characterized by enhanced permeability from the original permeability of the 
unaltered rock (Section B in Figure 30, with Permeability Ks r v ) (Duong, 2014; Lee, 2014; 
Mayerhofer et al., 2010). Finally, there is the portion of the formation around the well which is 
unaltered by the fracturing operation known as the unstimulated rock volume or the unaltered 
formation matrix (Section A in Figure 30). Akoun (2011) referred to the three linear flows 
occurring simultaneously through all three segments of the reservoir early in the well life as 
compounded linear flow.
The models developed to describe flow in tight oil wells assume that negligible or no flow goes 
directly to the well and all flow into the wellbore goes through the hydraulic fractures (Duong,
2014). This is because tight formations permit very little flow without stimulation, and also 
because hydraulically fractured wells are typically cased hole completions, and the only 
openings from the wellbore to the rock is through perforations from which hydraulic fractures 
emanate or from where hydrocarbons from the rock flow into the wellbore. Duong (2014) 
referred to flow from the unaltered rock into the stimulated rock region as influx while flow from 
the stimulated rock into the fractures as inflow. He also determined an influx-inflow ratio which 
is governed by the rock formation permeability anisotropy (difference in rock permeability when 
measured in different directions), but also the well spacing and fracture spacing which could be 
optimized to improve production contribution from different rock segments.
The transient phase in tight oil wells is prolonged and the flow regime at this time is generally 
referred to as transient flow. It consists of all flow that occurs, from the fracture to the wellbore 
or from the unstimulated rock to the stimulated rock volume, prior to any interference by 
neighboring fractures or the boundary of the well (Lee, 2014). Akoun (2011) noted that flow
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regimes during the transient phase could be (1) fracture linear flow, going from within the 
fracture to the wellbore (typically unobserved in well tests because of its brevity); (2) formation 
linear flow, fluid flow going from the rock volume towards the fractures; and (3) bilinear flow, 
which occurs when the previous two linear flows occur simultaneously in a low conductivity 
fracture. While bilinear flow is observed in low conductivity (finite conductivity) fractures, only 
formation linear flow occurs in highly conductive (infinite conductivity) fractures, because in 
formations with highly conductive fractures, fracture linear flow is too brief to measure (Khanal 
et al., 2015). Infinite conductivity fractures discharge fluids they contain quickly to the wellbore 
and are theoretically understood to mean fractures within whose length there is no pressure drop. 
This suggests that fluids that enter infinite conductivity hydraulic fractures are quickly 
discharged into the wellbore, making that flow duration insignificant and unnoticeable when 
compared to the flow of fluids from the rock formation into the fractures themselves. At the end 
of transient flow phase, there is a transition phase that follows as some boundary effects become 
apparent due to interference from neighboring hydraulic fractures, referred to as the boundary- 
influenced phase (Lee, 2014). Finally, there is a boundary dominated flow phase at the later life 
of the well when the entire drainage area of the well is being drained. This means, the well is 
now draining from the farthest location in the formation within its capacity to drain. The 
engineer’s ability to identify these regimes is central to any endeavors to apply the right models 
in the process of forecasting production in a tight oil or gas well.
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Figure 29. Flow Regimes in Tight Oil Formations (Akoun, 2011; Lee, 2014)
Figure 30. Illustration of Wellbore and Hydraulic Fracture Showing Segments Governing Flow 
Regimes (Modified from Lee, 2014)
The recognition of flow regimes is key to production forecasting in oil wells when applying the 
Decline Curve Analysis technique. This is important because it enables the forecaster to move 
from mere curve-fitting to applying the right models for the right sections of well history. For 
example, it is through these methods that wellbore storage effects, fracture fluid flow or some 
restricted flow can be noticed. Recognition of flow regimes is achieved using several plots that
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expose trends characteristic of known reservoir and well phenomena. These graphs are referred 
to as diagnostic plots. Some of the popular diagnostic plots are discussed next.
3.2.1.1. Log Rate Vs Log Time Plot
This is a graph of the production rate plotted against time on a log-log scale. A negative half 
slope of this plot is characteristic of linear flow in the rock, while a negative quarter slope 
indicates bilinear flow (Akoun, 2011; Alotaibi et al., 2015; Sharma & Lee, 2016). The portion of 
the graph that makes this slope represents transient flow regime which is typically a dominant 
flow regime for tight oil wells.
3.2.1.2. Log Rate Vs Log Material Balance Time Plot
This is a graph of the production rate plotted against the ratio of cumulative production to 
production rate (referred to as material balance time (MBT)) on a log-log scale. A negative unit 
slope on this plot is diagnostic of the onset of boundary dominated flow (Sharma & Lee, 2016). 
This plot also helps identify and exclude outliers. For example, Sharma and Lee (2016) showed 
that to easily exclude data that falls away from the trend of normal data or data resulting from 
production shut in times, it was necessary to use only points where MBT and time increased 
simultaneously. Harris and Lee (2014) advised that this plot could be made more accurate if the 
production rate is normalized for pressure changes by using a ratio of production rate (q) to 
pressure drawdown [which is the reservoir pressure (Pi) minus the flowing bottom hole pressure 
(Pwf)]. This pressure normalization of production rates would adjust for pressure changes that 
occur during well operation which result in non-characteristic shifts in production rate. Often, 
data on bottom hole flowing pressure is not available to forecasters and conducting this analysis 
on mainly production data presupposes that the noise to signal ratio is minimal and will not 
significantly affect the results. But with very erratic production, as is experienced in very early 
data such as during fracture cleanup, this could be a problem. Sharma and Lee (2016) advised 
that outliers noticed in this plot ought to be taken out during analysis so that a smooth trend is 
visible. The slope of the curve changes from 0.5 to 1 signaling the onset of boundary dominated 
flow and the point where Arps’ models could again be useful in prediction.
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After these diagnostic techniques are applied, it becomes easier to identify what sections of the 
well data to apply specific models for the purposes of predicting production. The accurate 
identification of this point in the data trend is crucial to reducing the error in forecasts. This is 
because assuming that production stays longer in the transient stage leads to overestimation of 
reserves while assuming a faster change to boundary dominated flow (BDF) will lead to a more 
conservative reserve estimate (Harris & Lee, 2014). It often takes analysis of production data in a 
geologic region over a group of wells to determine what time in well life is typical and most 
representative of an area. This exercise is possible only if these wells are producing from similar 
reservoir, were completed in similar fashion and operate in similar way. But this is typically 
more challenging for new tight oil regions from the start of development with few wells and few 
production data points.
Since determining the onset of boundary flow is important for selecting the proper model and 
applying it in a timely fashion, some forecasters have made attempts to translate this time when 
flow regime changes into a decline rate that signals the switch between empirical models. For 
example, Sharma and Lee (2016) prescribed a shift from using Duong’s model or Arps' 
hyperbolic model in the transient flow regime to using the Arps exponential model in the 
boundary flow regime, when production decline rate reaches 5%. Harris and Lee (2014) 
observed that for a small sample of 65 wells selected from Elm Coulee formation in the Williston 
Basin, the decline rate when boundary dominated flow begins could be quite variable. This 
formation was selected for study because its wells are older and provide more production data, 
had better permeability, and more likely to show boundary effects than less permeable rocks. The 
decline rate at the start of BDF showed a right skewed lognormal distribution with an average of 
22% for the wells studied, which decreased to 17% when later term linear flow wells were added 
to the mix (Harris & Lee, 2014). Seidle and Connor (2016) reported a narrower range of 2 to 
12% on this decline rate where a transition is made to BDF. The benefit of using this decline rate 
signal derived from analogues is greater for new fields where there is hardly any data to start 
with (Harris & Lee, 2014). But as more information is gained, these regions will depend less on 
analogues from other regions to a narrower range of values determined in the specific region.
This would be the case of non- U.S. aspiring tight oil plays where historical data will be few and 
where a reliance on U.S. analogue plays may be significant.
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3.3. Tight Oil Forecasting Techniques
The advent of tight oil and gas development has opened yet another chapter in oil and gas well 
forecasting. This is because, unlike classical reservoir engineering forecast methods that rely on 
boundary dominated flow (BDF) conditions for forecasting, tight oil wells typically stay 
transient for a long time. Petroleum engineers often liken the progression of pressure transience 
away from a well and through the rock to the ripples formed by a stone dropped in a pond 
(Khataniar, 2009). In conventional rocks, when a well starts producing, it takes a short time for 
changes in pressure caused by the well to reach the farthest edge of the area from which that well 
will ultimately produce, or its well boundary. Classical decline curve analysis models forecasting 
production in conventional wells use equations that assume boundary-dominated flow 
conditions; this implies that at the least, the first ripple has reached the ‘edge of the pond’ and the 
well is now producing from a constant drainage area. For tight plays, the ripples are slower due 
to extremely tight (low permeability) rocks and typically don’t reach the ‘edge of the pond’ for 
years hence the initial drainage area when the well starts producing continues to increase for 
most of the well’s operating life (Lacayo & Lee, 2014). As a result, different equations and 
models have been developed to handle these conditions. Examples of these models are the (1) 
Logistic Growth Analysis model, (2) Power Law Exponential model, (3) Stretch Exponential 
model, (4) Exponential Truncation of Hyperbolic model, (5) Duong’s rate forecasting model, (6) 
Multiple b-exponent model, and (7) the use of hybrid models (Agboada & Ahmadi 2013; Clark, 
2011; Duong, 2014; Paryani et al., 2016). Some of these perform better at different points in the 
life of the well with significant consequences to the overall forecasted reserves (Agboada & 
Ahmadi 2013; Paryani et al., 2016). The most successful applications of the models have 
acknowledged that, because of the changing characteristics of tight oil wells throughout their 
production lives, rather than the use of a single model, multiple models ought to be applied. The 
two models reviewed show this phenomenon.
3.3.1. Multiple b-exponents and The Use of Hybrid Models
Some forecasters propose the use of multiple b exponents in forecasting referred to as the 
Multiple Transient Hyperbolic Exponent (MTHE) method (Clark, 2011). This method proposes a
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change in Arp’s hyperbolic b-exponents corresponding to observable changes in flow character. 
This method is based on the fact already clarified in one of the key assumptions of the Arps 
decline analysis, which bases decline forecasts on the presumption of a steady b-exponent value. 
Because this value is transient due to changes in well operating conditions that impact well flow, 
the MTHE method changes this exponent to mimic production behavior. Spivey et al. (2001) 
suggested a b-exponent of 2 to mimic linear flow of gas in the fractures at early time. Kupchenko 
et al. (2008) proposed a b value of 0.25 to match boundary dominated flow regime. This 
technique therefore applies a hybrid of Arp’s model exponents in forecasting production for a 
single well.
Multiple b-exponent or hybrid models are mainly empirical and present a simple way to trend 
production over time. Lacayo and Lee (2014) observed that these models improve forecasting by 
reducing the error caused by non-boundary flow conditions experienced in tight wells. By 
adjusting the b-exponent, the MTHE models also improve the handling of the transition between 
linear and boundary dominated phases in the wells’ flow (Lacayo & Lee, 2014). On the other 
hand, Clark (2011) argued that this technique of switching b exponents is discontinuous and still 
presents a non-unique, bias-prone solution as forecasters still need to observe and guess when to 
apply the accurate b-values.
Some forecasters recommend switching between models rather than applying a change in b 
exponents. This technique is referred to as the hybrid model forecasting technique. Harris and 
Lee (2014) showed the impact of switching between Duong’s model and Arp’s hyperbolic and 
exponential models when the decline rate of wells reaches set values. This showed an 
improvement in reserves forecasting in the applications they presented. Yet, even with the 
strength of these empirical models, the level of uncertainty in reserve estimation could vary 
based on how much of historical production is known from the well or region for which the 
forecast is being conducted. And, as is the case with conventional wells, the use of erratic data or 
insufficient data has its risks. Harris and Lee (2014) proposed eliminating the first six months of 
data to improve accuracy of forecasts. They also observed that since rates are higher during early 
times in the life of the well, errors at that period will affect reserve estimates more. As a result, 
rate forecasting techniques that recommend hybrid models or the use of select decline rates when
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BDF regime is reached, will be more erroneous if those changes are made early in the life of the 
well. Harris and Lee (2014) also showed that if BDF starts earlier than it is assumed to start, 
there is a risk of overestimation of reserves by switching late to an Arps BDF model from a 
linear flow model; and if BDF starts later than assumed, there is risk of underestimation. This 
selection of starts of BDF further highlight the openness for bias on the part of a forecaster or 
chance for non-unique solution across different forecasters.
3.3.2. Duong’s Rate Forecasting Model
Duong (2010) proposed a method of production rate forecast and estimated ultimate recovery 
(EUR) forecast for shale formations in which the main contribution to flow is from fractures. 
Although this model was developed using gas wells, it has been put to wide use in oil production 
forecasting (Agboada & Ahmadi, 2013; Duong, 2014; Haris & Lee, 2014; Lacayo & Lee, 2014). 
Duong (2010) observed that shale oil and gas wells show a characteristic straight line with 
negative slope when rates are plotted against time on a log-log scale. This flow regime is 
identified as transient linear flow (slope of 0.5) or bilinear flow (slope of 0.25), and could run for 
different durations, with some wells showing up to five years and other wells staying in this flow 
regime for their entire productive life (Duong, 2010). Duong (2010) reported that this 
phenomenon was observed by several other studies in (1) natural and hydraulic fractures, (2) 
single and multistage fractures, and (3) finite conductivity fractures (pressure drop along the 
length of the fracture), or (4) infinite conductivity fractures (no pressure drop along the length of 
the fracture). He explained that the sustained linear flow is a result of enhanced connected 
permeability caused by the reactivation of faults or fractures in response to pressure changes in 
the rock during production depletion. This could be likened to the movement of crushed ice 
fragments in a bowl as water is drained out from a single spot or sucked out with a straw.
Duong (2010) also plotted the ratio of production rate and cumulative production, q /N p against 
time on a log-log scale to obtain a slope ‘m’ and an intercept ‘a’. A plot of production rate and t 
(a, m) produces a straight line of positive slope, q1 and intercept, q^, production rate at infinite 
time. The production rate at any point in the well’s life is forecasted thus (Duong, 2010):
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q = qi t (a ,m ) + qa) (16)
Where
t  (a, m) = t m ei-m( >
q1 = Flow rate at day 1 
q = Daily production rate 
Np = Cumulative production
q^ = Rate at infinite time (forced to an intercept of 0 reflective of a production rate at infinite 
time of zero according to (Khanal et al. 2015)
Cumulative production from the well is calculated as follows
Np = ^ - t ( a ,m ) t m (17)
And, upon determining an economic limit of production, qec0n, and the time when that rate is 
reached, tecon, the total reserves or estimated ultimate recovery (EUR) is determined as follows 
(Duong, 2011):
EU R=  ^  t(a ,m )  t fcon (18)
While Duong’s model has received wide acceptance in the early life of tight oil development, 
several works have found it too optimistic because it presumes that the well stays in transient 
linear flow for most of its productive life (Lacayo & Lee, 2014). Recent applications in 
forecasting well production show that some wells enter boundary dominated flow late in their 
life leading to faster decline. Lacayo and Lee (2014) argued that Duong’s model is prone to 
overestimating future production (reserves) because it assumes longer transient conditions for the 
well and protracts production over a longer time on a slower decline. For tight oil wells with up 
to two years or more of non-erratic production data, the Duong model is shown to work well 
(Paryani et al., 2016). This is evident in the level of acceptance it has received in academic and
industry circles for wells in transient flow (Sharma & Lee, 2016) including software applications
such as the Drillinginfo Software.
However, for young tight oil plays with very few months of production, the challenge in 
forecasting remains. Harris and Lee (2014) tested the ability of Duong’s model to accurately
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determine reserves using a hindcasting technique on already known data and observed that the 
model overestimated production. They observed that the removal of the first six months of data, 
which is typically more erratic, improved the accuracy of the model. Seidle and O’Connor 
(2016) re-echoed this concern when they realized that using just the first six months of 
production history, gave erroneous predictions whether the Duong model, Stretched Exponential 
Decline Model, or the modified Arps model were used. Others have praised the accuracy of 
Duong’s model especially for transient flow periods, while maintaining that it did not capture 
flow at the boundary dominated flow well (Kanfar & Wattenbarger, 2012).
Following this shortcoming of the model, Duong (2014) updated his model to include a 
transition point from transient flow to boundary dominated flow to rein in high reserve estimates 
observed by previous applications of the model over the entire life of the well. In this update, 
Duong (2014) noted that the influence of nearby fractures places wells in boundary dominated 
flow regimes. He also recommended pressure normalization of rates, where pressure data is 
available. But since most forecasts are conducted with public data which hardly includes 
continuous pressure data from wells, such as well head pressure or flowing bottom hole pressure, 
Duong (2014) made some assumptions around which forecasts could be generated. Different 
from previous attempts by other authors (Kupchenko et al., 2008; Sharma & Lee, 2016) to 
recommend switch points for boundary influenced or boundary dominated regimes based on 
some select decline rate, for example when decline rate reaches 5%, Duong (2014) recommends 
some quasi-analytical formula at deriving the switch point and the decline rate at which the Arps 
exponential (b < 1) model could be applied to arrive at bounded estimates of reserves. Duong 
(2014) thus applies hybrid models in a manner that acknowledges the changing regimes in wells, 
and also reduces the problem of non-unique solutions by analytically selecting the point at which 
the Duong (2010) model runs out of use.
The start of fracture interference in hydraulically fractured wells is determined thus (Duong,
2014):
tsfi = (1.Q2a)1/(m~1) (19)
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Dimensionless start time to fracture interference (tDsfi)  ranges between 0.2 and 0.4 depending 
on whether the well was in constant flow pressure mode or constant rate production mode 
respectively (Duong, 2014). The decline rate at which transition occurs, Dye is determined using 
dimensionless time to the start of fracture interference, tDsfi  and time to the start of fracture 
interference, tSf t, as follows:
Dye = ^  (20)* tsfi
Then the production rate after this transition point is determined using the Arps exponential 
decline formula thus:
, -DVPtq = qSf i e-Uye (21)
For plays in medium development stage, where some historical data is available, this model has 
been shown to predict production reliably (Duong, 2014).
The use of well analogues allows forecasters to anchor modeled production on actual 
observations in the field in question. And more production data from analogue wells and 
formations within a region provides a better understanding and forecasting of the range of 
production that is possible for a new well. Production from analogue wells are used to develop 
type wells for that same region or comparable region in which similar wells are planned. This 
implies that while tight oil forecasting models are useful for new plays within or outside the US, 
analysts of those plays cannot rely completely and verifiably on these models when production is 
still very immature. New tight oil plays may have to rely more on type wells from analogue plays 
within the U.S. or other developed fields, until enough data and understanding is gathered for 
specific wells or regions to conduct more reliable forecasts from local analogues.
The next section reviews U.S. tight oil reserve estimates and tests a technique on arriving at 
regional forecasts based on expected future well counts and the use of type wells alongside 
Duong’s modified rate forecasting model. Reserves are determined based on what volumes
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producing wells and future wells can produce technically and economically. The section further 
shows how Duong’s modified model can be used to develop longer profiles from type wells with 
insufficient data to produce 20-year production life well profiles and a tight oil reserves forecast 
for the continental U.S. (Figure 31).
L o g - lo g  p lo t :  D a i ly  r a t e / C u m u l a t i v e  P r o d u c t io n  ( q / N p )  v e r s u s  
t i m e
U s in g  a  p o w e r  la w  d a t a  f i t :  d e t e r m i n e  i n t e r c e p t  " a "  &  p o w e r
C a r t e s ia n  p lo t :  d a i ly  r a t e  v s  t  ( a ,  m ) .
U s in g  a  l in e a r  d a t a  f i t  t r e n d  l in e :  d e t e r m i n e  s lo p e  ( q 1 )  a n d  
i n t e r c e p t  ( q , J .  q OT f o r c e d  t o  z e r o
A p p ly  e q u a t i o n  1 9  t h r o u g h  2 1  t o  d e r i v e  t h e  t i m e  u n t i l  s t a r t  o f  
f r a c t u r e  i n t e r f e r e n c e ,  t h e  d e c l in e  r a t e  f r o m  t h a t  p o in t  
o n w a r d ,  a n d  t h e  A r p s  f o r m u l a  a s  a p p l i e d  in  D u o n g  ( 2 0 1 4 )  is 
a p p l ie d  f o r  r a t e  f o r e c a s t  o n w a r d  u n t i l  z e r o  o r  e c o n o m ic  l i m i t  
o f  t h e  w e l l .
Figure 31. Step by Step Application of Duong's Modified Rate Forecast Model (Duong, 2014)
3.4. US Tight Oil Production Forecasts by Play
Prior to the oil price meltdown in Q4 of 2014, U.S. tight oil production was projected to grow 
through 2021 after which some decline was expected (EIA, 2013b). This projection seemed quite 
plausible given the annual rate additions and level of investments going on in the different plays. 
The EIA (2013 a) numbered 21 joint ventures between U.S. companies and foreign investors that 
injected over $25 billion into tight oil and gas plays. The EIA currently projects tight oil 
production in the U.S. to exceed 7 million barrels per day in 2040 from 2015 levels slightly 
above 4.5 million bpd (EIA, 2017b). Most of this production is expected to come from a play 
like the Bakken, which spans an area of approximately 37,000 square miles and is thought to 
contain 23 billion barrels of technically recoverable reserves (EIA, 2016g). The difference
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between the EIA’s projection of growth from 2013 through 2021 and the actual tight oil 
production decline experienced in 2015 and 2016 highlight the challenge with regional 
production forecasts.
Forecasting production on a regional scale could seem herculean especially for a price sensitive 
resource such as high cost tight oil. Some attempts have been made in the past in this regard for 
the Eagle Ford (Alotaibi et al., 2015). However, a thorough look at the historical performance of 
different plays could provide some insights and make the forecasting exercise manageable. As a 
result, the estimation of production at the regional level could be simplified in a few steps 
(Modified from Alotaibi et al., 2015):
• Determination of reserves in the play (In new regions, applying analogue recovery factors 
to the assessed volumes of oil in place; to serve as check and potential ceiling on overall 
forecasted production).
• Determination of representative type wells for each major play or sub-play based on a 
baseline technology assumption.
• Determination of number of wells drilled annually within the play based on the 
commercial climate.
3.4.1.1. U.S. Tight Oil Reserves
Total U.S. oil production has increased by over 1 million barrels of oil per day every year since 
2012 mainly due to tight oil development, and tight oil production now contributes almost 50% 
of total U.S. production (EIA, 2017a). Tight oil plays like the Bakken and the Eagle Ford have 
seen average year-on-year increase in oil production from 2010 through 2015 of above 30% and 
100% respectively (EIA, 2017e). This increase in production occurred on the backdrop of high 
oil prices. Of the 9.4 million bpd produced in the US, tight oil production in 2015 reached 4.9 
million barrels per day (EIA, 2017b). Oil production is sustained by oil reserves growth; the 
amount of oil that is available for production.
Oil and gas reserves is defined as:
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...those quantities of oil and gas, which, by analysis of geoscience and engineering data, 
can be estimated with reasonable certainty to be economically producible—from a given 
date forward, from known reservoirs, and under existing economic conditions, operating 
methods, and government regulations—prior to the time at which contracts providing the 
right to operate expire, unless evidence indicates that renewal is reasonably certain, 
regardless of whether deterministic or probabilistic methods are used for the estimation. 
The project to extract the hydrocarbons must have commenced or the operator must be 
reasonably certain that it will commence the project within a reasonable time. (Code of 
Federal Regulations, 2017)
The key elements of this definition, according to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
enforcement, include the existence of technology to produce the resource, commercial and 
contractual conditions to access, produce, and bring the resources to market, and the fact that 
current prices can sustain a profitable venture. In the absence of any of these economic and 
commercial conditions, the resources take on less certain qualifiers such as 'contingent resource' 
(PRMS, 2011). Therefore, the availability of reserves determines the amount of oil that is known 
with high certainty, and this certainty incentivizes the deployment of capital needed to produce 
the volumes within a specific period. From 2011 to 2012, US tight oil reserves grew by 3.7 
billion barrels and by 2014, the U.S. recorded a sixth year of reserves growth, thanks in large 
part to strong tight oil development across the country (EIA, 2014a; EIA, 2015a). According to 
the EIA (2015a) the U.S. added 3.4 billion barrels of oil and condensate reserves from 2013 to 
2014. This reserve addition came on the background of rapid tight oil development activities in 
the nation’s shale and other tight oil plays, and high oil prices within the $100/bbl range.
The major U.S. tight oil basins that have contributed to reserve additions in the last few years 
include the Williston, Western Gulf, Permian, Denver-Julesburg, and Forth Worth Basins. These 
basins contain the major shale oil and other tight oil projects that have increased U.S. oil 
production in the last decade. These formations are the Eagle Ford, Bakken, Bone Springs, 
Wolfcamp, Niobrara, Utica, and Marcellus formations. Projects in these formations are typically 
driven by horizontal wells drilling and costly hydraulic fracture completions. Expensive
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stimulation and well completion techniques are required to unlock the resources in the 
formations but also require high oil prices and are vulnerable to price swings.
According to the EIA (2017f), the U.S. has over 11 billion barrels of recoverable tight oil 
reserves. These are portioned in the main tight oil plays as follows:
Table 3. U.S. Proved Reserves 2013 through 2015 (Million bbl) (EIA, 2014d; EIA, 2017f
2013 2014 2015
Basin Play State(s) Reserves Reserves Reserves
W illis ton Bakken
ND, M T , 
SD
4 ,8 4 4 5 ,9 7 2 5 ,0 3 0
W e s te rn  G ulf Eagle Ford TX 4 ,1 7 7 5 ,1 7 2 4 ,2 9 5
Perm ian
Bone Spring, 
W o lfc am p
N M , TX 335 722 782
D enver-Julesburg N io b ra ra
CO, KS, 
NE, W Y
17 512 4 6 0
A ppalach ian M a rc e llu s * PA, W V 89 232 143
Fort W o rth B arn e tt TX 58 4 7 33
Sub-total 9,520 12,657 10,743
O th e r  tig h t oil 523 7 0 8 8 5 9
U.S. tight oil 10,043 13,365 11,602
New assessments continue to change the figures for technically recoverable resources as well as 
tight oil reserves. Some estimates place reserves for North Dakota at 7.4 Billion barrels, which 
would include the Bakken, Three Forks formation, and other formations within the state (ND 
SWC, 2016). New United States Geological Survey estimates have declared technically 
recoverable resources for the Permian to approximately 20 billion barrels and as technology and 
efficiency drives down development costs or as oil prices rise, estimates for these plays will 
change (EIA, 2017t).
The impact of falling crude oil prices since the Q4 of 2014 has been severe on tight oil 
production and tight oil reserves. This is because with low prices, the economic characteristic of 
the reserves definition becomes a higher hurdle for most tight oil projects to meet. As a result,
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reserves attributed to those high-cost projects are excluded from consideration. Following the fall 
in oil prices in Q4 2014 and consistently low prices through 2016, U.S. tight oil reserves from 
2014 to 2015 changed from 13 billion to 11.6 billion barrels (Table 3). Figure 32 shows an 
annual oil price calculated by averaging the prices on the first day of 12 consecutive months in 
the year. This specific price definition is important because it is the price that is used in 
evaluating reserves in each year in accordance with SEC rules (Code of Federal Regulations, 
2017).
12-MONTH FIRST-DAY-OF-MONTH AVERAGE SPOT PRICE
$ 1 2 0 .0
$ 1 0 0 .0  $ 9 5 .8  $ 9 5 .0  $ 9 7 3  $ 9 4 .6
2 0 0 8  2 0 0 9  2 0 1 0  2 0 1 1  2 0 1 2  2 0 1 3  2 0 1 4  2 0 1 5  2 0 1 6
Figure 32. Crude Oil Spot Prices for Crude Oil Reserve Estimation (EIA, 2017k)
*(2008 and prior had last day o f  the year prices; 2009 onward shows average o f  12 consecutive first day o f  the 
month prices)
3.4.1.2. Determination of Type Wells
A type well is a production profile representative of wells of similar geologic, reservoir, 
mechanical, and operational characteristics drilled within a given play. Due to unique geologic 
characteristics of tight oil plays and sections within plays, and differences in development styles, 
production profiles across oil plays could be different. The underlying assumption is that wells in 
any given play are developed to take advantage of the properties of the rocks, sizes of lease tracts
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and other operator and play parameters. For example, some plays are more pressurized than 
others, some are tight shale without fractures, some are fractured shale and others are hybrid 
shale where shale is associated with non-shale and more permeable rock, such as carbonates, 
making them more suitable for hydraulic fracturing (Jarvie, 2012). Table 4 summarizes the key 
geologic and petrophysical characteristics of four major U.S. tight oil plays.
Table 4. Shale Plays and Basic Characteristics (Jarvie, 2012; EIA/ARI, 2013)
Shale Play Basin Age State Tight
Shale
Fractured
Shale
Hybrid
Shale
Wolfcamp, 
Spraberry, 
Bone Springs, 
Delaware
Permian Permian Texas X
Eagle Ford Austin
Chalk
Trend
Cretaceous Texas X
Bakken Williston Devonian North
Dakota
X X
Niobrara South
Park
(Denver-
Julesburg)
Cretaceous Colorado X X
Type wells are developed by aggregating wells of similar geologic and well-design 
characteristics within a reservoir. Production from these wells are time-shifted to begin on a set 
date, and the data from that date becomes the production rate of the first period (day or month). 
For every period, oil production from all wells are then summed across and divided by the 
number of wells that contributed to the total production (Alotaibi et al., 2015). The production 
profile that results is the type well profile. This type well production profile could then be used to 
represent the potential profile of any future well with similar completion and planning drilled 
within this formation. Others have referred to these type wells as type curves (Alotaibi et al.,
2015), although another usage of the type curve terminology is for production profiles developed 
from solutions to dimensionless flow equations under specified conditions (Petrowiki, 2017). For
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this research, these terms are used interchangeably to mean the production profiles developed 
from aggregating actual profiles from tight oil wells. While this profile is hardly the exact profile 
for any specific well within the play, in a general sense, it provides an industry-accepted 
representation of wells, and is used in analyses that run from play economics, cumulative 
production to entire development plans (Drillinginfo, 2016). Several commercially-available 
software packages are employed to easily develop type curves for different plays. A good 
example of such software, also used in this research, is the Drillinginfo Software.
A review of the type curves across the major U.S. plays using the Drillinginfo software show 
time, location and operator variables that are worthy of note. Firstly, the type curves of key oil 
plays show that generally, oil and gas producers increase well productivity progressively (Figure 
33). The steady increase in well performance shows the impact of learning and technology 
improvement, especially in well completion technology. Secondly, the variability in initial 
production rates across the different plays also shows that the performance of wells is different 
across U.S. plays. Since well performance directly impacts the economics of projects, ownership 
of operations within a high productivity play, for example, has a place in the strategy of 
operators, pertaining to overall company production volumes and economic performance. 
Thirdly, even within the same oil play, operators perform differently (Figure 34). This suggests 
differences in operator tenure and learnings within the play, ownership of premium acreage and 
operational efficiency.
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Figure 33. Type Curves of U.S. Tight Oil Wells across Multiple Operators Showing 
Progressively Increasing Well Productivity (Drillinginfo, 2017)
Average Production within First 90 days 
(Bonespring)
6 0 0  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 0 1 1  2 0 1 2  2 0 1 3  2 0 1 4  2 0 1 5  2 0 1 6
■  Concho ■ Devon M e w b o u rn e
Figure 34. Variability in Operator Performance within the same oil Sub-play (Permian: Bone 
Springs)
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This variation in operator performance, temporal and spatial well productivity show the 
challenges in conducting a blanket forecast at the play level, even in mature tight oil plays. This 
task will be a bigger challenge in a new play without historical data. However, overall, the type 
well for specific plays, while arguably simplistic, carries in it these variations somewhat 
elegantly. Towards the goal of answering questions as to the direction of changes given different 
levels of drilling, this level of detail is considered sufficient for this research.
3.4.1.3. Forecasting Number of Wells within Tight Plays
Given the reigning oil price at any time, records exist of the number of wells that are drilled 
within each of the major tight oil plays. Oil operator activity is seen in the number of wells that 
can be carried by the current oil price environment and outlook, cost of development, cost of 
capital and typical return companies seek.
Data on the number of active rigs in major plays is available through the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration’s Drilling Productivity Reports and oil price records. Within these 
reports are a few highlights worth mentioning: Firstly, individual well productivity within oil 
plays have continued to rise, signaling an increased productivity of wells through better drilling 
and completion techniques. This is also reported by investors in the main plays who have seen an 
increase in wells’ total ultimate recovery from 600 thousands of barrels of oil equivalent 
(MBOE) to 900MBOE over a few years (Purdy et al., 2016). This suggests that in the future it 
could take fewer wells to maintain similar production rates. It follows, therefore, that if those 
wells are drilled at similar or cheaper costs, the breakeven price of wells will continue to 
decrease, at least until premium acreage is exhausted, and fewer rigs may be required for the 
number of better-preforming wells required to keep production levels up. Also, if the economics 
of wells improve as a result of better technology and productivity, rig counts will not drop so 
precipitously even with slight reductions in oil prices.
Although oil price provides a gauge on oil development activity, this is not always a direct 
relationship for several reasons. There are observable lags in this relationship for several reasons
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(Figure 35). For example, oil and gas operators hedge production through contracts on platforms 
provided by financial markets, based on their oil price outlook (Umekwe & Baek, 2017a). 
Hedging at high enough prices over the period covered by contracts allows oil and gas operators 
to continue development operations even during lower spot prices. As a result, the spot price of 
the day may not represent the price that is incentivizing development at the time.
Another factor that could thwart the historical relationship between oil price and drilled wells 
holding steady into the future, is the availability of quality acreage. As operators develop fields, 
quality acreage within the fields diminish, as the ‘low hanging fruit’ is drilled up. This leads to 
less premium acreage being drilled and potentially fewer and probably less productive wells in 
the future even when the same historical oil prices are attained. Conversely, cumulative tight oil 
production from the Permian (including all sub-plays), the Bakken and the Eagle Ford are 2.8 
billion, 2.2 billion and 2.1 billion barrels of oil respectively while the reserve estimates for these 
plays show potentially greater volumes still to be produced (Table 3; EIA, 2017e). Given that 
current and potentially future reserve estimates show more economic resources available for 
production, it is possible to see similar well counts in the future. In addition, it is also possible 
that improvements in technology continue to improve profitability of less premium acreage by 
pushing down development costs. For these reasons, this research assumes that drilling levels 
similar to that observed would hold for a 20-year outlook time, in deriving a high drilling case 
(year 2014) and low drilling case (year 2015) range for U.S. Tight oil production (Table 5).
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Figure 35. Well count and Oil Prices within Tight Oil Plays (EIA, 2016d; EIA, 2016f)
Table 5. Average Monthly Rig Count (proxy for wells drilled) in Major U.S. Tight Oil Plays 
(EIA, 2016d; EIA, 2016f)
0
WTI
average
spot
price
($)
Bakken
Rig
Count
Eagle
Ford
Rig
Count
Haynesville 
Rig Count
Marcellus 
Rig Count
Niobrara 
Rig Count
Permian
Rig
Count
Utica
Rig
Count
2007 72 49 57 182 48 112 246 8
2008 100 73 64 206 50 116 265 6
2009 62 51 41 160 64 52 137 4
2010 79 116 113 224 108 59 242 5
2011 95 175 199 149 131 85 424 8
2012 94 205 264 65 110 81 496 18
2013 98 182 257 45 87 89 464 30
2014 93 183 260 51 84 100 536 40
2015 49 84 127 36 60 51 276 25
2016* 41 30 45 19 28 20 166 12
* Only Jan to Sep of 2016
At oil prices of approximately $100/bbl, as seen in 2008 and 2013, two things are apparent 
(Table 5). For most of the major oil plays, more rigs are used in 2013 than in 2008. This points to 
drilling activity levels responding to the impact of learning, better technology, and lower 
breakeven costs.
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The EIA (2016e) Annual Energy Outlook estimates that oil prices will rise between $48 in 2017 
to approximately $130/bbl in 2040 with or without Clean Power Plan initiatives staying in place 
(Figure 36). Under this price outlook, tight oil production in the seven major tight oil plays was 
forecasted under two scenarios: The as-is scenario (low oil price) assuming prices stay within the 
late 2016 price range of $45-$50/bbl and the EIA reference case scenario (price rebound). Under 
the low oil price scenario, we assume that oil prices stay at $48/bbl and drilling levels stay as 
was the case in 2016. Under the price rebound scenario, oil prices average $93/bbl through 2040 
and we assume that drilling levels stay at 2014 levels for the purpose of forecasting regional 
production rates.
EIA Price Outlook
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Figure 36. EIA Oil Price Outlook (EIA, 2016e)
3.4.1.4. U.S. Tight Oil Production Forecast
A simple step-by-step assessment approach was used to develop a forecast for tight oil 
production in the U.S. (Figure 37).
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D e v e lo p  ty p e  c u rv e s  ( ty p e  w e ll  p ro f ile s )  f r o m  t ig h t  o il p la y s  
(D r il l in g in fo  S o f tw a r e  o r  M a n u a lly )
D e c lin e  c u r r e n t  p r o d u c t io n  f r o m  to d a y 's  p r o d u c t io n  r a te . A p p lie d  
d e c lin e  o f  m a in  c o n tr ib u t in g  p la y  (P e rm ia n )  o n  to t a l  p ro d u c t io n .
A d d  p ro d u c t io n  f r o m  t w o  s c e n a r io s  o f  fo r e c a s te d  w e ll  c o u n t  in all 
p la y s  to  d e c lin in g  c u r r e n t  p r o d u c t io n  p r o f i le  to  p ro d u c e  tw o  
s c e n a r io s  o f  fo r e c a s te d  t ig h t  o il p r o d u c t io n
Figure 37. Simplified Approach for U.S. Tight Oil Production Forecast
Firstly, type curves were developed for each of the major seven U.S. tight plays using the 
Drillinginfo software. In the absence of commercial software, these type curves could be 
developed as was discussed earlier, by pulling together well production data in select plays. To 
ensure some uniformity and longevity of production data, wells from 2012 were used to develop 
seven ‘type well profiles’ for each of the major plays from where tight oil is produced: Bakken, 
Eagle Ford, Permian, Niobrara, Haynesville, Utica, and Marcellus. These wells showed over 60 
months of production from oil targeted drilling in each play. While wells from more recent years 
would provide initial well production rates more reflective of current technology and well 
performance, more importance was placed on generating longer term production data (60 
months) to improve the reliability of focasting models.
Secondly, the 60 months of production data in type wells were forecasted out to develop 
production profiles for a 20 year well productive life using the modified Duong forecast model 
(Figure 38). Unlike the other models that depend on analyst observation of data only, this 
method reduces the subjectivity in selecting the point at which boundary-dominated flow regime 
starts and increases the replicability of results. The production profile from the wells were
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normalized using the total production over a 20-year period so as to show profiles of each 
month’s contribution to total well production (Figure 39). The normalized profiles were 
transferred into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet forecast model. The Drillinginfo Software was 
used to produce a tenth percentile, fiftieth percentile, and ninetieth percentile (P10, P50, P90) 
range of typical estimated ultimate recovery (EUR) for wells in all seven plays (Table 6). The 
Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) statistical distribution was applied to 
generate an expected or mean well EUR. This distribution was selected because it is flexible, is 
applied in conditions where three-point estimates of a variable exist and where the intention of 
the analyst is to place more weight on the central value (P50 EUR) (Palisade, 2017a). The 
production rate for every month in each play is determined by multiplying this expected well 
EUR with the normalized forecasted type well profile for each play.
Example of Duong Modeled 20 year Production Rate
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Figure 38. Twenty-year Forecasted Tight Oil Production
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Figure 39. Normalized Tight Oil Production Profiles
Table 6. Twenty-year Total Well Production Ranges for Select U.S. Tight Oil Plays (Modified 
Drillinginfo, 2017)
Thousand Barrels of Oil P10 P50 P90
Mean 
(P10+4 (P50) +P90)/6
Bakken 3 0 0 2 5 7 2 0 0 2 5 5
Eagle Ford 2 0 0 1 8 0 1 7 0 1 8 2
Haynesville 6 0 5 5 5 0 5 5
Marcellus 4 5 4 0 3 5 4 0
Niobrara 1 5 0 1 3 0 1 1 0 1 3 0
Permian 3 0 0 2 6 0 2 1 0 2 5 8
Utica 3 0 2 9 2 5 2 9
Next, I used historical oil prices and drilling rig count data, proxy for well count data, from the 
EIA Drilling Productivity Reports to extract data on historical drilling levels in 2014 (average oil 
price ~$100/bbl) and 2015 (average oil price $49/bbl) for potential future high and low drilling 
levels respectively (Table 5).
The current tight oil production in the U.S. is at 4.4 million barrels per day with the bulk of that 
production from the Permian play (EIA, 2017e). This production rate was declined through year 
2040, assuming that no additional well was drilled, so as to generate a production background
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upon which to add future scenarios of drilling productivity. The decline profile used the profile 
of a typical Permian well. This is because the Permian formation provides the largest share of 
U.S. tight oil production today and the decline of current tight oil production largely depends on 
the profile of the largest contributing share. In addition, the exercise also shows that a reasonable 
forecast could be conducted by applying standard petroleum engineering principles while using 
easily available non-proprietary data.
By allowing this current level of U.S. Tight oil production to decline at the rate of the Permian 
basin and adding new wells in the pace of high oil price (2014) or lower oil price (2015) levels, 
two production forecast scenarios were determined. The low drilling production profile assumed 
that drilling for the next 20 years is similar to 2015 drilling levels typified by low oil prices 
averaging $48/bbl. The high drilling production profile scenario assumes drilling levels stay at 
the 2014 drilling level. These two scenarios show the impact of prices on levels of production. 
These profiles were compared against the U.S. Energy Information Administration Tight Oil 
Production estimates from their Annual Energy Outlook 2017 Publication (EIA, 2017l; Figure 
41)..
The U.S. EIA Energy Outlook 2017 publication provides a rigorous look at energy projections 
until year 2050, using an integrated model, the National Energy Modeling System, which 
handles the interactions of changes in the economy with energy demand and supply factors (EIA, 
2017l). Oil production projection is a major part of this publication. The projections include 
high, low and reference cases for oil production. The reference case for oil production is simply 
the best guess of experts on potential outcomes, including all foreseeable interactions of oil 
demand and supply drivers. This is the status quo case that applies current regulations with 
sunset and kickoff dates for different aspects of laws as currently known, economic trends from 
expert opinions and other factors that impact the energy sector (EIA, 2017l). The reference case 
for tight oil production, for example, assumes increasing production through 2030 due to trends 
in existing technology that lead to increased well productivity and after some years reduced 
productivity as less productive areas start getting targeted (EIA, 2017l). The production forecast 
developed in this section makes a simplifying assumption to arrive at two scenarios for 
production and an average that compares with the EIA oil production outlook. The fact that these
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compare well with the more rigorous EIA reference case, shows that by applying engineering 
principles, other stakeholders of tight oil production in the U.S. and outside the U.S. can estimate 
future production at a regional scale effectively (Figure 40, Figure 41).
T ig h t  O il  P r o d u c t io n :  H is t o r y  a n d  
D e c l in e
■Low drilling levels (bo p d ) ■ High drilling levels (bo p d )
Figure 40. U.S. Tight Oil Production Forecast Approach
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9US Tight Oil Production Forecast
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Figure 41. U.S. Tight Oil Production Forecast Showing Low Drilling, High Drilling, the EIA 
(2017l) Reference case Profiles
3.4.2. Summary on U.S. Tight Oil Production Forecast
The high drilling and low drilling forecast scenarios discussed above illustrate the impact of high 
oil prices on rig count, drilling and production rates. This illustration suggests that if the 
commercial climate sustains more tight oil production activity and the pace of drilling continues 
to rise in response to high oil prices, there is an even brighter chapter ahead for tight oil 
development within the US. But low oil prices change this story. This is the experience of the oil 
industry since Q42014 when prices dropped by over 40% in 1 month and by mid-2017 still hover 
around the $45 to $55 per barrel range.
In summary, this chapter discussed tight oil resources, the key characteristics of major plays 
within the U.S. that are sustaining tight oil production and the techniques applied by the industry 
in forecasting production. A key application of forecasting techniques is determining reserves at 
well and regional level. A simple workflow for determining regional forecasts has been
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demonstrated. The next section examines how tight oil regions outside the U.S. could apply 
similar techniques to evaluate frontier tight oil plays.
3.5. Tight Oil Development outside the US.
Energy development in the different U.S. shale plays has created millions of dollars of new 
revenue local and state governments leading to thousands of employment opportunities (UT San 
Antonio, 2012). Following this huge success of shale resource development is a natural question 
as to where else in the world such potential might exist.
The previous sections discussed tight oil development success in the U.S. and concluded that 
resource availability, good quality rocks, drilling and completion technology, and a vibrant 
energy investment climate are among the major drivers of tight oil development success. This 
section identifies key qualities of non-U.S. plays that make them suitable for development. The 
focus on non-US plays is on the availability of the resource and existence of viable U.S. 
formation analogues. An underlying assumption in this section is that skills within the petroleum 
industry are highly mobile and global and similar levels of technology can be drawn into tight oil 
plays outside the US. While the business climate that supports cost intensive oil and gas 
development may exist in some non-U.S. climate, the system and laws that enable huge, 
confident capital outlays exist to different degrees. The objective of this section is to show that 
with resource levels comparable to the U.S., and rock quality analogues, it is possible to conduct 
basic economic assessments that incorporate key economic parameters, uses production 
forecasting, development style and capital availability measures reflected in the risk-adjusted 
cost of capital, to develop an economic ranking of projects across non-U.S. plays. A review of 
infrastructural and logistical factors required for tight oil development in non-U.S. locations is 
outside the scope of this section.
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3.6. The EIA/ARI World Shale Gas and Shale Oil Resource 
Assessment Methodology and Summary Findings
In 2013, the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) in partnership with the 
Advanced Resources International (ARI) conducted an assessment on shale plays in 41 countries 
outside the U.S. (EIA/ARI, 2013). They identified 137 shale formations with potential 
technically recoverable oil. They screened non-U.S. shale regions using data from public, private 
and government resources, in light of the advances in shale development in the US. The 
methodology of the EIA study is similar to previous methodologies used in assessing 
conventional resources except for the sparseness in available data, which the study 
acknowledges, given the novelty of shale development in the U.S. and other locations around the 
world (EIA/ARI, 2013). For some plays with planned or ongoing private industry activity where 
geologic data was available, the EIA/ARI (2013) study conducted more specific analyses. In 
assessing less familiar plays, this study relied on better-known U.S. analogues.
The EIA/ARI screening study methodology could be summarized in five steps.
Firstly, they conducted a broad preliminary screening of basins using available information to 
determine basins that could be studied further. Information on the age of the basin, nature of 
source rock, stratigraphy and well logs was used to determine depositional environment, depth, 
structure and thickness of the shale layer, total organic content and thermal maturity.
The second step was to estimate the areal extent of the shale formation by developing regional 
cross sections and an overview of the general basin architecture.
Thirdly, assessments were made of the portions in the basin that were likely to be amenable for 
development. At this level, information on the depositional environment, well logs, depth, 
thickness, and organic content of the shales and other data was applied. For example, the report 
noted that shales deposited in marine environments, are typically less ductile and more easily 
frackable due to lower clay content. It also determined that prospective shale depths ranged from 
approximately 3500-16500ft, recorded total organic carbon levels above 2% by weight and 
mainly containing type I & II carbon (EIA/ARI, 2013).
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The fourth step was a determination of the oil in place estimate. This involved using porosity 
data, depth and thickness data from core and log analysis, and stratigraphic and mineralogical 
studies to estimating organically-rich thickness and fluid saturations. Upon gathering information 
from multiple sources, including U.S. analogue regions, on the prospective area extent (A), 
organically-rich rock thickness (h), porosity (0), water saturation (Sw) and formation volume 
factor (Boi), the EIA/ARI (2013) determined the oil in place (OIP) of a region as follows:
^ r n  7 7 5 8  x  A  x  h  x  0  x  ( 1 -  S w )
UIF =  --------------   (26)
& o i
The calculated oil in place number was adjusted using two risk factors: A play success 
probability factor, which estimates the probability of the play being developed, and a prospective 
area success risk factor, which captures the risks posed by insufficient exploration and 
production data from some segments of the prospective area (EIA/ARI, 2013). These two factors 
reduce the calculated OIP number even further to yield a risked oil in place value. The EIA/ARI 
(2013) study determined composite risk for the 10 largest tight oil play provinces (Table 7).
Finally, a recovery factor was assigned to plays based on the play geology, reservoir complexity, 
potential success in stimulating the shale formation and recovery factors of analogue plays that 
have been developed in the US. Recovery factors (RF%) ranged from 3% to 6% with some 
exceptional cases of 8% and 2% (EIA/ARI, 2013).
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Table 7. Recoverable Tight Oil Estimates in 10 Non- U.S. Shale Nations (EIA/ARI, 2013)
Region Basin Formation
Risked 
Oil In­
Place 
(Billion, 
bbl)
Tech
recoverable 
(Billion, bbl)
Play
Success
Factor
Prospectiv 
e Area 
Success 
Factor
Compos
ite
Success
Factor
Russia Western Siberian Central
Bazhenov Central 965 57.9 100% 45% 45%
West Siberian North Bazhenov North 278 16.7 75% 35% 26%
China
Jianghan Basin Longmaxi 1 0 60% 40% 24%Qixia/Maokou 5 0.2 50% 40% 20%
Greater Subei Mufushan 0 0 40% 30% 12%Wufeng/Gaobiaj ian 5 0.2 40% 30% 12%
U. Permian 1 0.1 40% 30% 12%
Tarim Basin
M-U. Ordovician 31 1.6 50% 50% 25%
Ketuer 129 6.5 50% 50% 25%
Junggar Basin Pingdinquan/Lucaogu 109 5.4 60% 60% 36%Triassic 134 6.7 60% 60% 36%
Songliao Basin Qingshankou 229 11.5 100% 50% 50%
Argentina
Neuquen
Los Molles 61 3.7 100% 50% 50%
Vaca Muerta 270 16.2 100% 60% 60%
San Jorge Basin Pozo D-129 17 0.5 60% 40% 24%
Austral-Magallanes Basin
L. Inoceramus-Magnas 
Verdes
131 6.6 75% 60% 45%
Libya
Ghadames
Tannezuft 104 5.2 100% 50% 50%
Frasnian 26 1.3 100% 50% 50%
Sirte
Sirte/Rachmat 406 16.2 80% 50% 40%
Etel 51 2 80% 50% 40%
Murzuq Tannezuft 27 1.3 100% 50% 50%
Colombia/
Venezuela Maracaibo basin
La Luna/Capacho 297 14.8 70% 50% 35%
Mexico
Burgos Eagle Ford Shale 106 6.3 100% 60% 60%
Tampico Pimienta 138 5.5 70% 50% 35%
Tuxpan
Tamaulipas 13 0.5 70% 50% 35%
Pimienta 12 0.5 70% 50% 35%
Veracruz Maltrata 7 0.3 70% 75% 53%
Pakistan Lower Indus
Sembar 145 5.8 40% 30% 12%
Ranikot 82 3.3 40% 30% 12%
Canada
Alberta Basin Banff/Exshaw 11 0.3 100% 40% 40%
East & West Shale Basin Duvernay 67 4 100% 70% 70%
Deep Basin North Nordegg 20 0.8 100% 50% 50%
NW Alberta Basin Muskwa 42 2.1 100% 50% 50%
Williston Basin Bakken 22 1.6 100% 60% 60%
Indonesia
C. Sumatra Brown Shale 69 2.8 75% 60% 45%
S. Sumatra Talang Akar 136 4.1 50% 35% 18%
Tarakan
Meliat 1 0 40% 50% 20%
Tabul 11 0.3 40% 50% 20%
Kutie Balikpapan 17 0.7 40% 40% 16%
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This research builds on the EIA/ARI (2013) effort and sharpens that comparison using key shale 
play geologic and economic parameters. By isolating the key properties of these plays and 
comparing them to successful developments in the US, a ranking is produced that demonstrates 
the key advantages and challenges in developing the plays. This evaluation intends to show a 
method for analyzing development potential of the plays.
The objective of this section is to compare the economic viability of shale oil production in ten 
other countries outside the US. These countries account for more than 61% of total technically 
recoverable shale oil among the countries studied (EIA/ARI, 2013). For ease of comparison, 
these plays are evaluated under a single oil and gas fiscal system. The use of a single fiscal 
system provides a commerciality assessment baseline and intends to show that major changes 
within tax systems could be one more lever for facilitating the development of these challenged 
resources and altering the commercial attractiveness of the plays. This is more so for countries in 
which other elements of the commercial assessment, such as project discount rates, put them in a 
more challenged spot in attractiveness for global capital.
3.7. Analogue Selection for Non- U.S. Tight Oil Plays from More 
Mature U.S. Tight Oil Plays
The most successful examples of shale resource development are found in the U.S. And few 
plays have been central to the U.S. tight oil boom. In finding play analogues for the non-U.S. 
shale provinces, it was necessary to use a few parameters shared by all shale regions (EIA/ARI, 
2013). These parameters are the total organic carbon (TOC), which refers to the amount of 
organic material present in tight rock, rock thermal maturity index (R%) which measures the 
maturity of hydrocarbons based on the level of the reflectance and the amount of vitrinite they 
contain. The third parameter is the reservoir pressure which determines the productivity of 
formations, making overpressured rocks more prospective for tight oil development. The fourth 
parameter is clay content which, if low, highlights the effectiveness of hydraulic fracturing in a 
given formation (EIA/ARI, 2013). The fifth parameter is the formation depth, which determines 
alongside other factors, the cost of drilling.
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With successful regional deployment of hydraulic fracturing technology, seven plays have been at 
the center of U.S. oil production resurgence: Bakken, Eagle Ford, Permian, Niobrara, Marcellus, 
Utica, and Haynesville (EIA, 2016d). Based on the performance of wells in U.S. plays, the 
EIA/ARI (2013) study and this research draw on U.S. tight oil examples for analogues of non-U.S. 
plays. This section shows a comparison of the geological characteristics of these major U.S. plays 
to the non- U.S. plays (Table 8).
Table 8. Parameters of U.S. tight oil plays
Basin Play
Recovery
Factor%* TOC R%* Depth Clay
Pressure
(psi/ft)*
Williston Bakken 8.4 10 0.8 10,000 low 0.6
Maverick
Eagle
Ford 9 4.24 0.85 6000 low 0.6
Permian Wolfcamp 3.4 9.33 0.92 9300 low 0.6
Denver-
Julesburg Niobrara 4.6 2.69 0.7 ~8000 medium 0.433
EIA/ARI (2013) 
EIA/IHS (2016) 
USGS (2005) 
Pollastro et al. (2012)
3.7.1. Prospectivity Map Technique for Tight Oil Analogue 
Play Selection
The determination of geologic prospectivity of any play is hardly without major uncertainties, 
and the description of shale or other tight oil plays could be a challenge. This is because tight oil 
plays are not composed of a single rock type. Rocks that make up a tight oil play could include 
shale, carbonates, siltstone, or mudstone, making uniform definition or accuracy of predicted 
performance difficult. However, in the literature of shale unconventional development, which 
constitutes a major portion of tight oil development, a few factors could be isolated for 
comparison across tight oil plays (EIA/AIR, 2013). This section discusses a comparison of those 
factors across non-U.S. plays and U.S. plays as a means of identifying play analogues.
In addition to identifying the governing parameters across prospective tight oil plays, it could be 
difficult to compare across plays due to the many factors that should be considered. This section
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presents a simplified method of viewing the several dimensions of characteristics for play-by- 
play comparison through prospectivity description radar/spider plots. These plots were 
developed using indexed versions of quantitative measures of prospectivity. These maps provide 
an easy visual comparison across tight oil plays. Each play was described by the five parameters 
discussed earlier: TOC, pressure, maturity index, clay content, and depth. To ensure that these 
parameters were scaled uniformly across each play, normalized versions of the parameters were 
developed.
In situations where only qualitative measures of a play characteristic were provided by the 
EIA/ARI (2013) research, we derived rankings. For example, descriptions of parameters like 
clay content and reservoir pressure for the non- U.S. plays in the report were provided in 
qualitative terms. Qualitative descriptions of reservoir pressure in the shale plays and numeric 
translations ranged from underpressured (0.3psi/ft), slightly underpressured (0.35psi/ft), normal 
pressure (0.433psi/ft), slightly over-pressured (0.5), to highly over-pressured (0.65psi/ft) 
reservoirs (Table 9). A clay content ranking was also developed using the qualitative descriptions 
of clay content of individual formations (Table 10).
Parameters of each shale play were indexed against the extreme values observed in the EIA/ARI 
(2013) study (Table 11) using a method shown in Table 12. This was to ensure that comparisons 
among individual formations could be made on a uniform basis. Finally, the figures show a 
comparison of the most prospective play within non- U.S. regions against the two most 
comparable analogues among the U.S. key tight oil plays.
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Table 9. Estimation of Reservoir Pressure from Pressure Qualifiers in the EIA/ARI (2013) 
Report.
Description psi/ft Example Formations (EIA/ARI (2013))
U n d e r  p r e s s u r e d 0 .3 C o lo r a d o  G r o u p ,  S o u t h e r n  A l b e r t a ,  C a n a d a
S l i g h t l y  u n d e r p r e s s u r e d 0 . 3 5
E a g le  F o r d ,  S a b in a s  B a s in ,  M e x i c o  ( s l i g h t l y  
u n d e r p r e s s u r e d )
N o r m a l  p r e s s u r e 0 . 4 3 3
S l i g h t l y  o v e r p r e s s u r e d 0 .5 L la n o s  B a s in  i n  C o l o m b i a ;  B a l t i c  B a s in ,  P o la n d
M o d e r a t e l y
o v e r p r e s s u r e d 0 . 5 5
O v e r p r e s s u r e d 0 . 6 L o s  M o l l e s  s h a le ,  A r g e n t i n a
H i g h l y  O v e r p r e s s u r e d 0 . 6 5
E a g le  F o r d ,  B u r g o s  B a s in  M e x i c o ;  L a  L u n a r -  
M i d d l e  M a g d a l e n e  V a l l e y  B a s in
0 . 7
W o l f c a m p  S h a le  i n  P e r m ia n  B a s in  T X ,  C o o p e r  
B a s in  i n  A u s t r a l i a
0 . 7 8 E t r o p o le  S h a le ,  E a s t e r n  E u r o p e
1 K u t e i  B a s in ,  In d o n e s ia
Table 10. Estimate ranking of clay content descriptions
Clay Content Rankin g
L o w 5
L o w - m e d i u m 4
M e d i u m 3
m e d i u m - h i g h 2
H i g h 1
Table 11. Extreme parameters used in normalization of overall shale parameters (EIA/ARI, 
2013)
E x t r e m e
p a r a m e te r s
( P m a x ) E x a m p l e s  ( E I A / A R I ,  2 0 1 3 )
T O C 11 B a k k e n  F o r m a t io n ,  W i l l i s t o n  B a s in ,  C a n a d a
R e s e r v o i r
P r e s s u r e 1 p s i / f t M e l i a t  f o r m a t i o n ,  T a r a k a n  B a s in ,  In d o n e s ia
R % 1 .1 5
L o n g m a x i ,  W u f e n g / G a o b i a j i a n / U p p e r  P e r m ia n  f o r m a t io n s  
i n  C h i n a
C l a y  C o n t e n t 5 L o w  c l a y  c o n t e n t  ( in t r o d u c e d  h e r e  b y  a u th o r )
D e p t h ( f t ) 1 3 , 5 0 0 E t e l  F o r m a t io n ,  S i r t e  B a s in ,  L i b y a
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Table 12. Heuristic for Indexing Parameters (Example shown is for Qingshankou formation, 
Songliao Basin, China)
E x t r e m e
p a r a m e te r s
( P m a x )
Q in g s h a n k o u  
f o r m a t i o n  
p a r a m e te r s  ( P )
F o r m a t i o n
p a r a m e te r s
w i t h o u t
q u a l i f i e r s
I n d e x  =  
( P / P m a x ) * 1 0
T O C 11 4 4 3 . 6
P r e s s u r e
( p s i / f t )
1 m o d e r a t e ly
o v e r p r e s s u r e d 0 . 5 5 5 .5
R % 1 .1 5 0 . 9 0 % 0 . 9 7 . 8
C l a y 5 m e d iu m 3 6 . 0
D e p t h  ( f t ) 1 3 5 0 0 5 5 0 0 5 5 0 0 5 . 9 *
* Depth index scaled differently
The depth parameter was rescaled to ensure that shallower formations ranked higher, thus 
reflecting the advantage of lower cost of development for those formations, all else being equal. 
The depth parameter index was carried out as follows: [(Pmax -  P)/Pmax] * 10. As a result of 
this adjustment, all the parameters were scaled to range from low to high; the higher the values, 
the larger the pentagons in the figure and the more prospective the shale play (Figure 42).
Qingshankou formation, Songliao Basin, China
T O C
1 0 .0
8 .0
P re s s u re
^ ^ — Q in g s h a n k o u  f o r m a t io n ,  
S o n g lia o  B as in , C h in a
C la y  R%
Figure 42. Example of Prospectivity Map (The Qingshankou shale formation in China)
D e p th
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3.8. Major Non-U.S. Tight Oil Plays Presented in the EIA/ARI 
(2013) Report
The EIA/ARI (2013) reported that, of the 137 formations studied in 47 nations, the top nine 
countries are China, Russia, Mexico, Indonesia, Pakistan, Libya, Venezuela/Colombia, 
Argentina, and Canada. We compared the technically recoverable oil in each formation and 
selected plays with the largest volumes for side-by-side comparison. All the geologic 
descriptions and petroleum characteristics of non- U.S. plays presented in this research and used 
in this analysis were derived from the EIA/ARI 2013 report. This section highlights the 
characteristics of the primary shale plays in these countries as presented in the EIA/ARI (2013) 
report (Table 13) and compares them against the closest analogues among U.S. tight oil plays.
Table 13. Key parameters of Non-U.S. shale provinces (EIA/ARI, 2013)
Country Basin Formation
Clay
Content TOC
Maturity
Index Depth RF%
Pressure
(psi/ft)
Russia
Western
Siberian
Central
Bazhenov
Central low 10 0.85 8200 6.0% 0.65
Argentina Neuquen Vaca Muerta
low-
medium 5 0.85 5000 6.0% 0.65
Libya Sirte Sirte/Rachmat medium 2.8 0.85 11,000 4.0% 0.433
Colombia/
Venezuela
Maracaibo
basin
La
Luna/Capacho low 5 0.85 10,000 5.0% 0.433
China Songliao Basin Qingshankou medium 4 0.9 5500 5.0% 0.55
Mexico Burgos
Eagle Ford 
Shale low 5 0.85 3500 5.9% 0.65
Pakistan Lower Indus Sembar low 2 0.85 5000 4.0% 0.433
Indonesia S. Sumatra Talang Akar high 5 0.7 7000 3.0% 0.433
Canada
East Shale 
Basin Duvernay low 3.4 0.9 9000 6.0% 0.65
3.8.1. Russia
According to the EIA/ARI (2013), Russia has the world’s largest technically recoverable shale 
oil resource and the eighth largest shale gas resources. The Bazhenov Central and Bazhenov 
North formations in the West Siberian Central and West Siberian North basins were assessed in
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the EIA/ARI study. The study estimates that these basins contain a total Original Oil in Place 
(OOIP) of 1,243 billion barrels of which six percent, 75 billion barrels are thought to be 
technically recoverable. The Bazhenov central shale in the West Siberian central basin is the 
most prospective play in Russia and contains 78% of the total shale oil and 62% of shale gas 
resource. The prospectivity map of the Bazhenov Central shale in Russia’s West Siberian Central 
basin alongside the closest analogues in the U.S. (Figure 43). The prospectivity map illustrates 
that good TOC values and low rock clay content are the key drivers for productivity in the 
Bazhenov central shale in Russia, and that this tight oil play is most analogous to the Permian 
play within the US.
Bazhenov central shale, West Siberian Central 
Basin, Russia
T O C
B a z h e n o v  c e n tra l s h a le , 
W e s t  S ib e r ia n  C e n tra l B as in , 
R uss ia
B a k k e n
 P e rm ia n
Figure 43. Prospectivity Map for Bazhenov Central Shale, Russia.
3.8.2. China
According to the EIA/ARI (2013), China ranks second in recoverable shale oil volumes and first 
in recoverable shale gas resources among non-U.S. global shale regions. There are 12 basins and 
13 formations covered in the EIA/ARI (2013) study. The study estimates that these basins
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contain a total OOIP of 644 billion barrels of which five percent, 32 billion barrels are thought to 
be technically recoverable. The Jungarr, Sangliao and Tarim basins contain 98% of shale oil in 
place resources and 30% of shale gas in place resources. The Sangliao basin contains 34% of 
shale oil resources and is the most prospective in the country. The Qingshankou formation 
contains the largest resources among formations in the Sangliao basin presented in the EIA/ARI 
(2013) report. The prospectivity map illustrates that shale oil maturity and depth make a case for 
attractiveness of the Qingshankou formation in the Sangliao Basin, and that this tight oil play is 
most analogous to the Eagle Ford play in the U.S. (Figure 44).
Qingshankou formation, Songliao Basin, China
T O C
• Q in g s h a n k o u  f o r m a t io n ,  
S o n g lia o  B as in , C h in a
E a g le  F o rd  
N io b r a ra
Figure 44. Prospectivity Map for the Qingshankou formation, China
3.8.3. Argentina
According to the EIA/ARI (2013) among non-U.S. global shale regions, Argentina ranks third in 
recoverable shale oil volumes and second in recoverable shale gas resources. There are four 
basins and six formations covered in the EIA/ARI (2013) study on shale resources in Argentina. 
These basins are the Neuquen, San Jorge, Austral-Magallanes, and Parana basins. The study 
estimates that these basins contain a total OOIP of 480 billion barrels of which 5.6%, 27 billion 
barrels are thought to be technically recoverable. The Neuquen and Austral-Magallanes basins
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contain 97% of Argentina’s shale oil in place resources and 86% of shale gas in place resources. 
Of these volumes, the Neuquen basin contains 69% of shale oil resources and is the most 
prospective. The main formation in the Neuquen basin is the Vaca Muerta shale formation. The 
prospectivity map for the oil section of the Vaca Muerta shale in Argentina’s Nuequen basin, is 
shown to be most analogous to the Eagle Ford tight oil play (Figure 45).
Vaca Muerta, Nuequen Basin, Argentina
D e p th
T O C
1 0 .0
P re s s u re
V a c a  M u e r t a ,  N u e q u e n  B asin  
—  —  E a g le  F o rd  
 N io b ra ra
Figure 45. Prospectivity Maps for Vaca Muerta Shale, Nuequen Basin, Argentina
3.8.4. Libya
According to the EIA/ARI (2013), Libya has the fourth largest recoverable shale oil resources 
among non-U.S. global shale oil nations. The EIA/ARI (2013) study covered three basins and 
seven formations covered and estimates that these basins contain a total OOIP of 613 billion 
barrels, of which four percent, 26 billion barrels is thought to be technically recoverable. The 
Ghadames and Sirte basins contain 96% of Libya’s shale oil in place resources and 98% of shale 
gas in place resources. Between both basins, the Sirte basin contains 74% of the total shale oil 
resources and is considered more prospective. The Sirte/Rachmat formation within this basin 
contains the largest resource volumes. The prospectivity map illustrates that oil maturity index is 
the key advantage of the Sirte play. The depth of the formation could lead to high drilling and
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well completion costs. The Sirte/Rachmat shale play is noted to be most analogous to the 
Niobrara tight oil play in the US.
Figure 46. Prospectivity Maps for Sirte/Rachmat Shale, Libya
3.8.5. Colombia /Venezuela
According to the EIA/ARI (2013), a basin that is located across the border between Colombia 
and Venezuela has the fifth largest recoverable shale oil resources, among non-U.S. shale 
provinces. This basin alongside one shale formation was covered in the EIA/ARI (2013) study 
on shale resources in Colombia/Venezuela. This basin lies across the Colombia-Venezuela 
border and is called the Maracaibo/Catatumbo basin and contains 269 billion barrels of which 
4.8% or 13 billion barrels is thought to be technically recoverable (EIA/ARI, 2013).
The high cost in Venezuelan heavy oil production places the cost of oil supply in that nation 
closer to par with development in tight oil, making the cost of switching developments quite low 
and presenting some incentive for tight oil development. But the huge reserves of heavy oil and 
already-existing infrastructure in Venezuela may keep that nation busier in its development. This 
is not so much the case for Colombia which is experiencing significant decline in current 
production. This situation presents a stronger incentive for tight oil development through the
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Colombian side of this basin. According to Worldcrunch (2017) Colombia’s reserves have 
dropped to 1.7 billion due to low oil prices and current resource extraction rate and a focus on 
tight oil would allow close to a 300% growth in reserves.
The prospectivity map illustrates that low clay content and oil maturity are the key attractiveness 
of this play while depth of the formation could pose the greatest challenge to development. Due 
to its similarity with the Eagle Ford in low clay content, oil maturity and total organic carbon, the 
U.S. Eagle Ford is selected as its analogue.
3.8.6. Mexico
Mexico has the sixth largest recoverable shale oil volumes and fifth largest recoverable shale gas 
resources, among non-U.S. global shale regions (EIA/ARI, 2013). There are five basins and eight 
formations covered in the EIA/ARI study on shale resources in Mexico. The study estimates that 
these basins contain a total OOIP of 275 billion barrels of which 13 billion, five percent is 
thought to be technically recoverable. Of the Burgos, Tampico, Tuxpan, Sabinas, and Veracruz 
basins reported by the EIA/ARI (2013) study, the Burgos and Tampico basins contain 88% of 
shale oil in place resources and 71% of shale gas in place resources. The Burgos basin contains
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38% of shale oil resources and is most prospective. The prospectivity map illustrates that several 
factors make this play attractive; the low clay content and mature oil resources located at 
shallower depth top the list. A close analogue for this play is the Eagle Ford shale of South Texas 
of the United States.
Eagle Ford, Burgos Basin, Mexico
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Figure 48. Prospectivity Maps for Eagle Ford, Burgos Basin, Mexico
3.8.7. Pakistan
According to the EIA/ARI (2013) among non-U.S. global shale regions, Pakistan ranks seventh 
in recoverable shale oil volumes. There are five basins and six formations covered in the 
EIA/ARI (2013) study on shale resources in Pakistan. The study estimates that these basins 
contain a total OOIP of 227 billion barrels of which 9 billion, four percent is thought to be 
technically recoverable. Of the basins in India and Pakistan discussed in the EIA/ARI (2013) 
study, only the Indus basin of Pakistan was considered mature and with sufficient prospectivity 
for quantitative analysis. The main formation in the lower Indus basin is the Sembar shale which 
contains 68% of the total shale oil resources and over 90% of shale gas resources in Pakistan.
The prospectivity map illustrates that the low clay content and shallow depth of mature oil 
resources in the Sembar play could be its main attractiveness, but the low carbon content of the
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play could be its major disadvantage. The U.S. Eagle Ford tight oil play was considered its 
closest analogue.
3.8.8. Canada
According to the EIA/ARI (2013) among non-U.S. global shale regions, Canada ranks eighth in 
recoverable shale oil volumes. There are 12 basins and 13 formations covered in the EIA/ARI 
(2013) study on shale resources in Canada. The study estimates that these basins contain a total 
OOIP of 162 billion barrels of which 9 billion, four percent is thought to be technically 
recoverable. Of the basins in Canada discussed in the EIA/ARI (2013) study, the leading basins 
are the East and West Shale basin, North West Alberta Basin, and the Williston Basin which 
contain 80% of total shale oil and 27% of total shale gas resources. The East and West Shale 
basin and the Williston Basin, which continues into prolific sections in North Dakota, are the two 
most prospective basins in Canada (EIA/ARI, 2013). The Duvernay shale is the main shale 
formation in the East and West shale basin and contains 41% of the shale oil resources. The 
prospectivity map on the Duvernay shale in Canada’s East and West Shale Basin shows it to be
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analogous to the U.S. Eagle Ford (Figure 50). The prospectivity map also illustrates that the low 
clay content, well pressured and mature shale oil are the main attractiveness of the play.
Duvernay Shale, East & West Shale Basin, 
Canada
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Figure 50. Prospectivity Maps for Duvernay Shale, Canada.
3.8.9. Indonesia
According to the EIA/ARI (2013) among non-U.S. global shale regions, Indonesia ranks ninth in 
recoverable shale oil volumes. There are five basins and six formations covered in the EIA/ARI 
study on shale resources in Indonesia. The study estimates that these basins contain a total OOIP 
of 234 billion barrels of which 8 billion, 3.4 percent is thought to be technically recoverable. Of 
the basins in Indonesia discussed in the EIA/ARI (2013) study, the Central Sumatra was 
considered most prospective. The main formation in the Central Sumatra basin is the Brown 
shale formation which contains 29% of the total shale oil resources and over 14% of shale gas 
resources in Pakistan. The prospectivity map on the Brown shale in Indonesia’s Central Sumatra 
basin shows it to be most analogous to the U.S. Niobrara tight oil play and illustrates that oil 
maturity could be the main attractiveness of this play (Figure 51).
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Figure 51. Prospectivity Maps for Brown Shale, Indonesia
3.9. Economic Evaluation of 640-acre Developments in Non-U.S.
Plays
3.9.1. Recovery per square mile (640-acre)
One of the characteristics of unconventional resources is the close association of the source rocks 
to reservoir rocks (Jarvie, 2012). As a result, in the absence of conventional traps, resource 
location is spread over wider prospective areas, with occasional high permeability zones 
characterized by dense natural fracture networks, often referred to as sweet spots. One of the 
characteristics of the non-U.S. regions studied by the EIA/ARI (2013) is resource concentration 
per square mile (640 acre). The EIA/ARI (2013) noted that this high resource concentration 
refers to more attractive areas for development within the broad prospective area. The more such 
areas exist in a play, the more prospective that play is. In conventional resource developments, 
oil and gas resources accumulate over geologic time into traps, which are typically locations of a 
smaller areal spread, which could be targeted for development. The EIA/ARI (2013) study 
presents the volume of resource per square mile for non-U.S. shale oil plays. In a sense, large
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resource concentration per square mile is a measure of how similar the play is to conventional oil 
play and how easily it lends itself for development with fewer wells. Using the resource 
concentration of the non-U.S. regions and the recovery factors estimated by the EIA/ARI (2013) 
study, I find an analogue type well for each development, the number and cost of wells required 
to produce the estimated volumes and conduct an economic assessment for the venture. The 
recovery estimates or recoverable resource density are determined by applying the recovery 
factors for each formation on the resource concentration (Table 14). Resource concentration 
measure bypasses the actual geologic structural complexity involved in developing the play or 
the infrastructural readiness of the region in which such development occurs, which both lie 
outside the scope of this assessment. But this measure conceptually presents the spread of 
development and drilling intensity that could be required for such development to occur.
Table 14. Resource density for selected formations in non-U.S. shale plays and estimated EUR 
(EIA/ARI, 2013)
Countries
Formation OOIP 
MMSTB/ 
640 acre
Recovery 
Factor %
Recoverable Resource
Concentration
(EUR/640 acre) (MMSTB)
Russia
Bazhenov
Central 18.5 6.0%
1.110
Argentina Vaca Muerta 77.9 6.0% 4.674
Libya Sirte/Rachmat 28.8 4.0% 1.149
Colombia/
Venezuela
La Luna/ 
Capacho 92.3 5.0%
4.599
China Qingshankou 66.4 5.0% 3.334
Mexico
Eagle Ford 
Shale 43.9 5.9%
2.609
Pakistan Sembar 36.6 4.0% 1.464
Indonesia Talang Akar 50.2 3.0% 1.513
Canada Duvernay 7.1 6.0% 0.424
A review of mature plays in the US, such as the Bakken, Eagle Ford and Permian plays show 
that operators have been able to downsize well spacing quite successfully. While there is more 
desire for longer wells, due to the lower recovery factors for tight plays, wells are now spaced as 
closely as 660ft (Continental Resources, Inc., 2013; EOG Resources, 2016). With such spacing 
possible and the ability for operators to stack the wells at some offset from each other (Figure 
52), it is possible to assume a 640-acre development of say 10,000ft by 2,788ft instead of the
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regular 5280ft by 5280ft, which would allow longer wells to achieve the recovery factors of 
middle single digits as shown in Table 7.
1 MILE
(^ )  New Well Existing Well
Figure 52. Cartoon Development Plan Showing Possible Well Placements (Continental 
Resources, Inc., 2014)
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This chapter goes on to show a comparison of a 640-acre tight oil development across these 10 
countries by applying the number of wells (represented by the appropriate type well and per well 
reserve) required to produce the reserve estimated within the EIA/ARI (2013) study (Table 14).
3.9.2. Production Rate Analogues
To evaluate the economics of producing wells in the non-U.S. plays, it is essential that some 
estimate of a production profile is developed. It is also generally understood that tight oil wells 
have a high initial production and fast decline in the early life of production. To adequately 
select analogues for these plays, the geological and petroleum properties of the plays were 
compared against the known properties of major U.S. tight oil plays, and where a suitable 
analogue is determined, the type curve of the U.S. play was considered a suitable proxy for that 
non-U.S. play (Table 15).
Table 15. Non-U.S. Play Formations and U.S. Tight Oil Analogues
Country Formation U.S. Tight Oil Analogue
R ussia B a z h e n o v  C e n t r a l B a k k e n
C h in a J u n g g a r  B a s in , P in g d in q u a n /L u c a o g u E a g le  F o r d
A rg e n t in a N u e q u e n ,  V a c a  M u e r t a E a g le  F o r d
Libya S i r t e ,  R a c h m a t N io b r a r a
C o lo m b ia M a r a c a i b o ,  La L u n a /C a p a c h o E a g le  F o r d
V e n e z u e la M a r a c a i b o ,  La L u n a /C a p a c h o E a g le  F o r d
M e x ic o B u r g o s , E a g le  F o r d E a g le  F o r d
P a k is ta n L o w e r  In d u s ,  S e m b a r E a g le  F o r d
C a n a d a D u v e r n a y  S h a le E a g le  F o r d
In d o n e s ia C  S u m a t r a ,  B r o w n  S h a le N io b r a r a
Using the Drillinginfo commercial software, DI Desktop (Drillinginfo, 2016), we developed type 
curves for the Eagle Ford, Bakken, Niobrara, and Permian (represented by the tight oil 
dominated Wolfcamp formation) formations. Since most tight oil plays have produced for less 
than a 10-year period, to develop a 20-year well profile, these type wells were forecasted out to 
240 months of production by applying the modified Duong model described earlier in this 
research (Figure 53).
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Type Wells For Major Tight Oil Plays Estimated using Modified Duong
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Figure 53. Type Wells for U.S. Tight Oil Plays
3.9.3. Cost of Drilling and Completion
A study by the EIA/IHS (2016) on oil and gas upstream costs shows that a few factors drive 
development costs in tight oil and gas plays. Among the main drivers, well depth, well design, 
and completion design were identified as largest cost components in unconventional wells. 
This section discusses the cost estimates for non-U.S. shale plays based on well length, using 
costs from analogous U.S. plays discussed in the EIA/IHS (2016) study.
Given the advancements in drilling and completion technology in the US, to apply a uniform 
geometry across the non-U.S. plays, it was assumed that wells in these non-U.S. plays will be 
drilled applying similar technological standards as represented by those in the EIA/HIS (2016) 
cost study. This assumption ensures that it is technically feasible to drill the well lengths 
proposed for each development. Given that regions like the Bakken have horizontal lateral 
sections of up to 11,000ft long, and that, barring tract size limitations, operators prefer longer 
laterals, the laterals in each formation were assumed to be at least as long as the depth of the 
formation. This assumption was considered appropriate because, evidence in investor
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presentations showed that operators would prefer longer wells where the mineral rights 
ownership allowed mineral leases to be conveniently sized (EOG Resources, 2016). Hence, for a 
formation that is 7000 ft deep, the horizontal lateral was assumed to be at least 7000ft long, 
resulting in a total well depth of 14000ft. This assumption provides a basis for an objective well 
cost determination using drilling cost per foot analogues.
The EIA/IHS (2016) report on upstream oil and gas development costs provided completed well 
costs for the Bakken, Permian, Eagle Ford from which dollar per foot completed well costs were 
derived (Table 16). Whiting Petroleum company, a major operator in the Niobrara play reported 
total well drilling and completion costs ranging from $4.0 to $4.5 million by the end of 2016 due 
to approximately 50% reduction in drilling time from levels in 2014 (Whiting Petroleum, 2017). 
Drilling costs constitute approximately a third of total well costs (EIA/IHS, 2016). At $4.5 
million for total 2016 well costs, after a 30 to 50% reduction in drilling costs since 2014, 
escalating 2016 costs back to 2014 levels, implied that drilling costs alone for a 15000 foot 
Niobrara well was approximately $2 million. Total completed well cost for a Niobrara well, 
therefore, was estimated at $5 million. Due to higher oil prices in 2014, oil services costs were 
much higher then than in 2015 or 2016 drilling costs (EIA/IHS, 2016). However, in frontier 
regions, the cost of services is expected to start at high levels due to low supplies of drilling and 
well services and costs will be expected to gradually decrease with efficiency improvements and 
learnings. For that reason, higher well costs for 2014 were considered adequate to use in frontier 
play economic assessments conducted here. Using estimates for per foot drilling and completion 
costs, total well costs for the non-U.S. play wells were derived (Table 16 and Table 17)
Table 16. Cost of drilling and completion for select shale plays based on 2014 costs (EIA/IHS, 
2016)
Play Well
Costs
($MM)
Well Total 
depth (ft)
$/ft
Bakken 7.1 20,000 355.00
Permian 7.7 11,750 655.32
Eagle Ford 7.6 12,000 633.33
Niobrara* 5 15,000 333.33
* Niobrara 2014 well cost derived from Whiting Petroleum (2017) cost estimates
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Table 17. Cost Estimates for Wells in Non-U.S. Shale Plays
Province Formation Total Vertical 
Depth (TVD)
(ft)
Total 
Measured 
Depth (ft)
Well Cost 
($ million)
Russia Bazhenov Central 8,200 16,400 5.82
Argentina Neuquen, Vaca 
Muerta
5,000 10,000 6.33
Libya Murzuq, Tannezuft 11,000 22,000 7.33
Colombia Maracaibo, La 
Luna/Capacho
10,000 20,000 12.67
China Songliao Basin, 
Qingshankou
5,500 11,000 6.97
Mexico Burgos, Eagle Ford 3,500 7,000 4.43
Pakistan Lower Indus, Sembar 5,000 10,000 6.33
Indonesia C Sumatra, Brown 
Shale
7,000 14,000 4.67
Canada Williston Bakken 9,000 18,000 11.40
Venezuela Maracaibo, La 
Luna/Capacho
10,000 20,000 12.67
3.9.4. Cash Flow Modeling for Development in Tight Plays
The main elements of the cash flow modeling for evaluating tight oil development in plays 
cannot exist outside a fiscal system of the mineral state. For this assessment, the net present 
value was selected as the economic measure of project viability. To derive the net present value 
of projects calls for the selection of appropriate discount rates for deploying capital in locations 
were the operation occurs and not just were the company is incorporated (Damodaran, 2016a). 
This section discusses the selected fiscal system and the basis for the discount rates used.
3.9.4.1. The Fiscal System
The fiscal system of any region provides the framework within which all investments are 
assessed, and is important to attracting investments to any region. For this reason, mineral states 
adjust the incentive structure of their systems to achieve policy objectives. Countries that intend 
to attract capital to develop challenged resources within their borders realize that they compete 
against other locales with different and often other resources with a lower cost of supply. For this
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reason, the dynamism of rapidly changing global cost structures for bringing resources to market, 
fluctuations in oil prices and the attractiveness of developing certain resources, keep mineral 
states busy figuring out ways to stay competitive, while getting the greatest value for their 
resources for the benefit of their people.
For comparing projects in different tight oil plays against one another, it is necessary that a 
simple fiscal system is selected. Guidance for such a system was sought from successful mineral 
states within the U.S. where shale and other tight oil resource development is prevalent. The tax 
system of a major tight oil producing state in the U.S. was selected. For reasons of its simplicity 
and attractiveness to independent producers, the fiscal system selected for this comparison was 
modeled after the state of North Dakota. Unlike an older oil state like the state of Texas, which 
has a continuum of field types ranging from conventional, quasi-conventional and 
unconventional resources, which could blur the understanding of incentives for development, the 
emergence of North Dakota as a key oil producing state after the year 2000, is primarily due to 
tight oil development, and the favorable tax system that attracted massive investments.
The main elements of this tax system prescribe a gross oil extraction tax of 5% from January of 
2016, a production tax of 5% and a marginal corporate income tax rate of 4.31% for incomes 
above $50,000 (North Dakota Petroleum Council, 2015; NDCC, 2016). The state of North 
Dakota eliminated its oil and gas property tax and replaced it with the gross production tax stated 
above (North Dakota Petroleum Council, 2015). The oil extraction tax increases to 6% when the 
oil price calculated at the well head exceeds $90/bbl for three consecutive months and is waived 
for wells producing at 35 barrels per day, if such wells are producing from the Bakken formation 
or the Three Forks formations (North Dakota Petroleum Council, 2015; North Dakota State 
Government, 2016). Royalty rates in North Dakota run in the 20% range (North Dakota State 
University, n.d) which is comparable with royalties of 20-25% charged by private land owners in 
the Eagle Ford (Dallas Federal Reserve Bank, 2012). These elements of gross production and 
extraction taxes, royalty rates were applied in a Microsoft Excel Cash Flow model used in 
evaluating projects in the different non-U.S. plays.
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3.9.4.2. Discount Rate Estimation for Net Present Value 
Determination
To estimate the cash flow generated from oil production from any given play, the discount rate is 
required to account for the time value of money and the cost of investment capital to the oil and 
gas operator. Since business capital could be generated from debt or equity capital, the discount 
rate was estimated using the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) methodology 
(Damodaran, 2017). This methodology selects discount rates for the cash flow model to reflect 
the weighted cost of equity and debt capital for investments in the nations in which shale 
development projects occur. The decision to invest in any non-U.S. play by an operator, for 
example a U.S. operator, would depend on the rate of return on capital from the non-U.S. project 
when compared against the operators’ other projects. This non-U.S. project would have to be 
analyzed using the appropriate cost of capital reflective of the risk of doing business in the 
location where the operation exists, to ensure a fair comparison across all projects in the 
operator’s portfolio.
Tight oil development in the U.S. was facilitated mostly by small operators and independent 
exploration and production (E&P) companies. These independent companies are typically more 
leveraged and carry over twice as much debt capital on their books than major integrated 
companies (Damodaran, 2017). Damodaran (2017) assessed over 300 U.S. oil and gas non­
integrated companies in January of 2017, and observed that they carry 68% of equity capital and 
32% of debt capital compared to 9% of debt capital carried by integrated companies. In 
determining the appropriate cost of capital, this analysis poses the question: how will a typical 
independent E&P company compare its investment in projects in non-U.S. shale plays in a 
manner that accounts for the market risk that results from the countries in which these plays 
exist? According to Damodaran (2016a), this would include the interest rate an investor would 
require to invest in a company, whether incorporated in the U.S. or not, if it does business in the 
location of this tight oil play.
The reason for assessing this cost of capital using a weighted approach is that different investors 
require different interest rates. The interest rate demanded by investors whom the business is 
contractually obligated to pay a fixed rate (bond-holders) is different and much less than the
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interest rate demanded by investors who buy a piece of the business and are ready to lose if the 
business fails, or profit if the business succeeds (stock holders). From the allocation of the 
business capital that comes from bond-holders and the portion that comes from stock holders, 
one could determine what it costs that business to raise capital.
Damodaran (2016a) identified several factors that determine the market perception and possibly 
the existence of risk to investments in a country. He noted that nations with political systems that 
increased the cost of doing business, such as nations with corrupt systems or weak laws, impose 
new costs and inefficiencies in the conduct of business. He also pointed out that countries with 
single resource economies or a highly lopsided tax revenue base pose significant threats to 
foreign investments because fluctuations in commodity prices, for example, or events that impact 
tourism in a country with only that industry, drags down the entire economy of the country. The 
clearest signal to the market of the struggles of potential investment destination is the ability of a 
country to pay or default on debt, often referred to as the sovereign default risk (Damodaran, 
2016a). This is the risk measured by rating agencies and through other market signals 
(Damodaran, 2016a). Damodaran (2016a) concluded that the interest rate charged on long term 
sovereign debt of a country and the price that market agents charge to ‘insure’ or hedge those 
who buy the debt of a country (Credit Default Swaps), present a real-time tractable instrument to 
measure the level of risk involved with investing in a country. This also provides a guide in 
determining the discount rate appropriate for evaluating cash flows from projects in those 
countries (Damodaran, 2016a).
A direct estimate of the cost of debt and the cost of equity capital applies the interest rate a bond 
holder and a stock holder in the operating company would require to give up other investment 
opportunities to invest in the operator carrying out the project in a non-U.S. tight oil play. 
According to Damodaran (n.d) this investor evaluates the riskiness of his investment against the 
riskiness of a low risk asset in a mature market like the US. This introduces the concept of 
spreads. A large default spread, according to Damodaran (2016a), implies that the risk of default 
of investments within the location of the firm’s operations is much larger than the risk of default 
of investments in a matured financial market, i.e., the U.S. market. The risk-free benchmark
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security instrument often used in this analysis is the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond (Damodaran, 
2016b; Damodaran, n.d).
The estimation of the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) requires information such as the 
fraction of debt and equity capital used in the project, interest on debt capital, and interest on 
equity capital as follows (Damodaran, 1999a):
w a c c = k ‘ fey+ k * fey (27)
Ke = Tb + 0  (MERP + CRP) (28)
Kd = I d ( 1 - 7 0  (29)
Adjusted for the cost of debt for a non-U.S. operated asset (Damodaran, n. d)
Kd = (ld + CRP) * ( 1 - T )  (30)
Where
Ke = cost of equity (E) = Total equity risk premium
Kd = After-tax cost of debt (D) = After-tax total debt risk premium
Id = Interest rate on debt in U.S. (which consists of risk free rate + company default spread)
CRP = Country risk premium or added risk exposure to investing in this country as inferred from 
the risk of its equity market when compared against default risk of a matured market.
MERP = Mature market equity risk premium above the risk-free rate 
T = Company’s U.S. marginal tax rate.
Tb = U.S. 10-year Treasury Bond Rate
P = U.S. Oil and Gas E&P Industry stock relative volatility (levered) (Damodaran, 1999b)
Damodaran (2017) assessed groups of oil and gas exploration companies within U.S. and 
globally to generate general financial statistics useful in this analysis, which include the level of 
debt capital (Table 18). He also assessed a group of countries for the added risk of investments 
within those countries posed by the relative risk of default on their debts as indicated by rating 
agencies like Moody, and from inference from market data on the risk of default assessed by 
companies who insure buyers of U.S. traded foreign bonds (Table 19). Assessments from
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Damodaran (2017) for January 2017 are considered to be representative of conditions of the 
equity and bond markets for the end of year 2016.
Table 18. Financial Statistics of Oil and Gas Companies (Damodaran, 2017)
Oil/Gas (Production and Exploration)
Global US
N u m b e r  o f  f i r m s 1 1 4 0 3 9 2
A f t e r - t a x  R e t u r n  o n  C a p i t a l  In v e s t m e n t 1 1 . 7 2 % 1 1 . 8 4 %
A v e r a g e  e f f e c t i v e  t a x  r a te 3 4 . 9 4 % 4 1 . 4 6 %
U n l e v e r e d  B e t a 1 .1 0 0 .9 1
E q u i t y  ( L e v e r e d )  B e t a 1 .4 8 1 .2 7
C o s t  o f  e q u i t y 1 2 . 8 2 % 9 . 4 5 %
S t a n d a r d  d e v ia t io n  i n  s to c k  p r ic e s 7 3 . 9 4 % 7 1 . 9 3 %
P r e - t a x  c o s t  o f  d e b t 5 . 1 3 % 4 . 1 7 %
M a r k e t  D e b t / C a p i t a l 3 1 . 9 8 % 3 2 . 5 1 %
C o s t  o f  c a p i t a l 9 . 8 7 % 7 . 1 9 %
Table 19. Country Total Equity Risk Premiums (Damodaran, 2017)
C o u n t r y T o t a l  E q u i t y  R i s k  
P r e m iu m s
C r e d i t  D e f a u l t  S p r e a d  
( N e t  o f  U S )
A r g e n t i n a 1 4 . 9 4 % 4 . 7 6 %
C a n a d a 5 . 6 9 % 0 . 0 0 %
C h i n a 6 . 5 5 % 1 . 2 7 %
C o l o m b i a 8 . 4 0 % 2 . 0 4 %
In d o n e s ia 8 . 8 2 % 1 . 8 7 %
M e x i c o 7 . 4 0 % 1 . 8 2 %
P a k is t a n 9 . 2 4 % 2 . 0 8 %
R u s s ia 1 9 . 9 0 % 3 0 . 4 4 %
V e n e z u e l a 1 4 . 9 4 % 3 . 8 0 %
L i b y a * 1 9 . 9 0 % 3 0 . 4 4 %
*Libya CC2 credit rating absent from  Damodaran (2017) assessments was found to be comparable to the 
credit rating fo r  Venezuela (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017)
The cost of equity capital was assessed for operations in the foreign tight oil operations 
(Equation 28). The cost of debt was estimated by adjusting the overall cost of debt used for tight 
oil development operations in a foreign country to the cost of debt for operations within the U.S.
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( E q u a t i o n  3 0 ) .  T h e  a d j u s t m e n t  o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  o n  d e b t  b y  t h e  t a x  r a t e  a l s o  r e f l e c t s  t h e  
b e n e f i c i a l  t a x  t r e a t m e n t  t h a t  t h i s  s o u r c e  o f  c a p i t a l  e n j o y s  w i t h i n  U . S .  t a x  p o l i c y  a s  o p p o s e d  t o  t h e  
c o s t  o f  e q u i t y  c a p i t a l  ( G r a h a m ,  2 0 0 0 ) .  S i n c e  p r o f i t  i n c o m e  g e n e r a t e d  b y  c o r p o r a t i o n s  i s  t a x e d  
w i t h i n  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  a n d  c o r p o r a t i o n ’ s d i v i d e n d s  p a i d  o u t  t o  t h e  i n v e s t o r  i s  a l s o  t a x e d  a s  
p e r s o n a l  i n c o m e ,  G r a h a m  ( 2 0 0 0 )  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  i n v e s t o r  w o u l d  w a n t  a  r e t u r n  h i g h  e n o u g h  t h a t  
c o m p e n s a t e s  f o r  w h a t  h e  l o s e s  t o  t a x e s .  T h i s  l e v e l  o f  r e t u r n  r e q u i r e d  b y  i n v e s t o r s  c o u l d  e r o d e  t h e  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  p r o j e c t s  f o r  o p e r a t o r s .  G r a h a m  ( 2 0 0 0 )  t h e r e f o r e  r e a s o n e d  t h a t  t h e  b e n e f i c i a l  
t r e a t m e n t  o f  d e b t  i n  U . S .  t a x  p o l i c y  i s  s e e n  a s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  i n c e n t i v i z e  c o m p a n i e s  t o  s h o u l d e r  t h e  
r i s k  i n v o l v e d  i n  m a k i n g  i n v e s t m e n t s ,  a w a r e  t h a t  t h e  t a x  s y s t e m  a l l o w s  t h e m  t o  d e d u c t  t h e  i n t e r e s t  
p a i d  f o r  d e b t  g e n e r a t e d .  D u b a y  ( 2 0 1 5 )  a l s o  n o t e s  t h a t  t h i s  t a x  t r e a t m e n t  e l i m i n a t e s  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  
d o u b l e  t a x a t i o n  b y  e n s u r i n g  t h a t  r e t u r n s  f r o m  s a m e  i n v e s t m e n t s  a r e  o n l y  t a x e d  a s  d i v i d e n d s  t o  
i n v e s t o r s .
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  w e i g h t e d  a v e r a g e  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  w a s  d e t e r m i n e d  u s i n g  t h e  c o s t  o f  e q u i t y  a n d  c o s t  o f  
d e b t  a n d  t h e  o v e r a l l  w e i g h t  o f  e a c h  c o m p o n e n t  o f  c a p i t a l  a m o n g  U . S .  c o m p a n i e s  ( E q u a t i o n  2 7 ;  
T a b l e  2 0 ) .
T a b l e  2 0 .  W A C C  ( D i s c o u n t  R a t e s )  f o r  d i s c o u n t e d  c a s h  f l o w  a n a l y s i s  f o r  n o n - U . S .  t i g h t  o i l  a s s e t  
c a s h f l o w s
Country
Total Equity Risk 
Premium for Country 
(EOY2016)
Cost of 
Equity (Oil 
and Gas, 
E&P)
After 
Tax Cost 
of Debt WACC
A r g e n t i n a 1 4 . 9 4 % 1 8 . 2 7 % 5 . 8 0 % 1 4 . 2 1 8 %
C a n a d a 5 . 6 9 % 6 . 5 5 % 2 . 7 1 % 5 . 3 0 4 %
C h i n a 6 . 5 5 % 7 . 6 4 % 3 . 5 4 % 6 . 3 0 8 %
C o l o m b i a 8 . 4 0 % 9 . 9 9 % 4 . 0 4 % 8 . 0 5 2 %
In d o n e s ia 8 . 8 2 % 1 0 . 5 2 % 3 . 9 3 % 8 . 3 7 5 %
M e x i c o 7 . 4 0 % 8 . 7 2 % 3 . 8 9 % 7 . 1 5 1 %
R u s s ia 9 . 2 4 % 1 1 . 0 5 % 4 . 0 6 % 8 . 7 7 9 %
V e n e z u e l a 1 9 . 9 0 % 2 4 . 5 5 % 2 2 . 5 0 % 2 3 . 8 8 5 %
P a k is t a n 1 4 . 9 4 % 1 8 . 2 7 % 5 . 1 8 % 1 4 . 0 1 5 %
L i b y a * 1 9 . 9 0 % 2 4 . 5 5 % 2 2 . 5 0 % 2 3 . 8 8 5 %
*Libya CC2 credit rating absent from  Damodaran (2017) assessments was found to be comparable to the 
credit rating fo r  Venezuela (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017)
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In tight oil development, a single well in a 640-acre spacing unit does not effectively develop the 
acreage (IOGCC, 2015). A review of development practices in most tight oil plays in the U.S. 
show that tighter well spacings are used especially for the development of oil resources from low 
permeability formations in tight oil plays. This analysis starts off with the estimated recovery 
from 640/acre parcels determined by the U.S. EIA/ARI (2013) report. We apply the estimated 
ultimate recovery from U.S. wells analogous to the types of wells that would be drilled in similar 
non-U.S. tight formations, to determine the number of wells a given development would require. 
The number of wells a development plan requires also adds to the cost of that development. As a 
result, for a 640 acre (1 square mile) development that is resource rich and where the rock quality 
makes it analogous to the best tight oil plays in the US, more resource would be produced using 
fewer wells, contributing to the overall profitability of the venture. The discounted cashflow 
analysis resulting from the forecasted production was estimated using the appropriate discount 
rates to determine the net present value of each investment in 10 non-U.S. tight oil plays.
Table 21. Well length, well cost, and well count required to achieve EIA/ARI (2013) recoveries 
in non-U.S. tight oil plays
Province Formation Recoverable/ 
640 acre 
(million 
barrels)
Total Depth 
(feet)
Well Cost ($ 
millions)
Well
Count
Russia Bazhenov Central 1.11 16,400 5.82 4
Argentina Neuquen, Vaca Muerta 4.67 10,000 6.33 9
Libya Murzuq, Tannezuft 1.15 22,000 7.33 11
Colombia Maracaibo, La 
Luna/Capacho
4.60 20,000 12.67 9
China Sangliao Basin, 
Qingshankou
3.33 11,000 6.97 6
Mexico Burgos, Eagle Ford 2.61 7,000 4.43 5
Pakistan Lower Indus, Sembar 1.46 10,000 6.33 3
Indonesia C Sumatra, Brown Shale 1.51 14,000 4.67 15
Canada Williston Bakken 0.42 18,000 11.40 1
Venezuela Maracaibo, La 
Luna/Capacho
4.60 20,000 12.67 9
Other inputs used in the cash flow model to assess the economic viability of cashflows from 
non-U.S. tight oil cash flows under the base fiscal system of North Dakota.
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Table 22. Cash Flow Model Inputs and Elements of an Oil and Gas Tax Regime Designed after 
the North Dakota Oil and Gas Tax System
Model Inputs for an Independent Oil and 
Gas Company Estimates
N e t b a c k  c o s ts $ 3 . 0 0
B a s e  O i l  P r ic e  ( $ / b b l ) 5 5
R o y a l t y  p e r c e n t 2 0 %
O P E X  ( $ / b o e ) $ 1 8
In t a n g ib l e  D e v e l o p m e n t  C A P E X  
( I n d e p e n d e n t  E & P )
F o r  In c o m e  T a x  
p u r p o s e s ,  1 0 0 %
E n d  o f  p r o je c t  l i f e  u n d e p r e c ia t e d  C a p i t a l  
W r i t e - o f f 1 0 0 %
D e p r e c i a t i o n  T a n g i b l e  C A P E X M A C R S  7 - y r
S ta te  S e v e r a n c e  ( E x t r a c t i o n )  T a x  ( % ) 5 %
P r o d u c t io n  T a x  ( % ) 5 %
S ta te  C o r p o r a t e  I n c o m e  T a x  R a t e  ( % ) ~ 5 %
F e d e r a l  C o r p o r a t e  In c o m e  T a x  R a t e  ( % ) 3 5 %
3.9.5. Results and Discussion
The results illustrate the economic viability of tight oil development projects in 10 non-U.S. tight 
oil plays, assessed within a fiscal system modeled after the State of North Dakota with the 
following key elements:
•  R o y a l t y  r a te  o f  2 0 %
•  G r o s s  o i l  p r o d u c t io n  t a x  r a te  o f  5 %
•  G r o s s  o i l  e x t r a c t i o n  t a x  r a te  o f  5 %
•  S ta te  o i l  a n d  g a s  p r o p e r t y  t a x  r a t e  o f  0 %
•  S ta te  C o r p o r a t e  I n c o m e  t a x  o f  5 %
•  U . S .  F e d e r a l  C o r p o r a t e  I n c o m e  t a x  r a te  o f  3 5 %
However, this assessment is not a full cycle economic assessment as it excludes components like 
bonus bid and mineral lease rentals, which occur before the project even commences, or the tax 
treatment of those cost components through cost depletion. Cost depletion allows the operator to 
recover the cost of acquiring the mineral as a deduction from taxable income, so that as the 
mineral is gradually depleted, the operator recovers their full cost (Stermole & Stermole, 2012).
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The cost of acquiring leases is governed by the mineral rights laws of the different localities. For 
simplicity and comparability, this assessment excludes lease acquisition cost and also excludes 
sunk cost elements like facility cost incurred such as pipelines and other well site facilities and 
module costs required. The assumption made here is marginal in that, the operating company 
already has footing within this asset and is assessing investment in that next 640-acre 
development.
Another deduction this assessment excludes is the percentage depletion deduction. This is a 
special tax treatment for most extractive mineral companies which allows them to deduct up to 
100% of taxable income, depending on how that amount compares with a fixed percentage of 
gross revenue net of royalties (Stermole & Stermole, 2012). According to Stermole and Stermole 
(2012), the fixed percentage of gross revenue, net of royalties, allowed for oil and gas operators 
(only independent operators, i.e operators who explore, produce but do not refine into petroleum 
products), is 15%.
The base case of this analysis applied the elements of the cashflow model alongside best 
estimates for costs. We use a base oil price of $55/bbl, recovery factors of each 640-acre parcel 
as stated in the EIA/ARI (2013) report, and royalty rate, tax elements as listed above. To conduct 
the sensitivity analysis, ranges were selected for the parameters to represent the potential for 
higher or lower oil prices, severance tax, recovery factors, well costs, discount rates (Table 23). 
Oil price was varied between $35/bbl to a peak of $100/bbl to cover a good portion of the spread 
in prices between 2007 through 2016. Well cost was assumed to vary to as high as 150% of the 
estimated cost to reflect the high cost of initial developments in frontier plays with fewer rigs and 
drilling services than the US. The recovery factor was varied to be able to achieve the highest 
recovery factor at 10%, to reflect some of the ground-breaking recovery achievements with 
tighter spacings in the Eagle Ford and Permian plays in the US. The extraction tax of 5% of 
gross production is the same as the production tax of 5% in North Dakota and together are 
applied against the gross value of the resource at the wellhead, after royalty is taken out. For our 
sensitivity analysis, the change in extraction tax between 2% and 10%, therefore, serves two 
purposes. Firstly, in North Dakota the extraction tax rate could vary to as low as 2% to 
incentivize production from marginal wells. A sovereign in one of our tight oil locations could
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choose to apply this provision or some variant of this incentive on extraction taxes and our 
sensitivity range attempts to capture that scenario. Secondly, with this same tax rate applied to 
both production and extraction taxes, it is possible for U.S. to see the impact of a decision to 
allow a variable production tax instead.
Table 23. Parameter range evaluated for sensitivity Analysis
Parameter Units Low High
O il  P r ic e ( $ )  v a lu e $ 3 5 $ 1 0 0
W e l l  c o s t △ % - 5 % + 5 0 %
R e c o v e r y  F a c t o r △ % - 1 0 % + 1 0 0 %
R o y a l t y  R a t e V a l u e 1 2 .5 % 3 0 . 0 %
E x t r a c t io n  T a x V a l u e 2 . 0 % 1 0 . 0 %
I n t e r e s t  R a t e △ % - 2 5 . 0 % + 2 5 . 0 %
Most of the assets assessed prove to be uneconomic at the base case. Figure 54 through Figure 73 
show the results of the assessment of 640/acre development assessments within tight oil plays in 
Russia, China, Argentina, Mexico, Canada, Indonesia, Pakistan, Venezuela, Libya, and 
Colombia. The stochastic results (probability density histograms and tornado charts) were 
derived applying ranges on key parameters (Table 23) using the Palisade Inc software, @Risk 
version 7.5 add-on to Microsoft Excel, to generate ranges of NPV from 10,000 iterations across 
the range of variables.
The stochastic results are presented in histogram and tornado chart plots. The height of the 
probability density histograms shows the fraction of results at each output value, relative to the 
total count of results for the entire number of iterations. The tornado charts rank the selected 
input parameters for their impact on net present value (NPV) and the shades in the bars show 
whether high or low input values result in higher or lower NPVs (Palisade, 2017b). Numbers on 
the tornado bars show the mean NPV value generated from the top and bottom percentile values 
of the input being assessed (Palisade, 2017b).
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Results for Tight Oil Development Project on 640/acre in Russia
Net Present Value (NPV) / Expected NPV : Russia
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Mode -$16,685
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Skewness -0.1990
Kurtosis 2.8018
Values 10000
Errors 0
Filtered 0
Left: X -$29.03
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Figure 54. Net Present Value Distribution of Tight Oil Development Project in Russia
Figure 55. Sensitivity of NPV Tight Oil Development in Russia to key Modeling parameters
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Results for Tight Oil Development Project on 640/acre in China
Figure 56. Net Present Value Distribution of Tight Oil Development Project in China
Figure 57. Sensitivity of NPV Tight Oil Development in China to key Modeling parameters
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Results for Tight Oil Development Project on 640/acre in Argentina
Net Present Value (NPV) / Expected NPV : Argentina
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Figure 58. Net Present Value Distribution of Tight Oil Development Project in Argentina
Figure 59. Sensitivity of NPV Tight Oil Development in Argentina to key Modeling parameters
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Results for Tight Oil Development Project on 640/acre in Mexico
Figure 60. Net Present Value Distribution of Tight Oil Development Project in Mexico
Figure 61. Sensitivity of NPV Tight Oil Development in Mexico to key Modeling parameters
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Results for Tight Oil Development Project on 640/acre in Canada
Figure 62. Net Present Value Distribution of Tight Oil Development Project in Canada
Figure 63. Sensitivity of NPV Tight Oil Development in Canada to key Modeling parameters
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Results for Tight Oil Development Project on 640/acre in Indonesia
Figure 64. Net Present Value Distribution of Tight Oil Development Project in Indonesia
Figure 65. Sensitivity of NPV Tight Oil Development in Indonesia to key Modeling parameters
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Results for Tight Oil Development Project on 640/acre in Pakistan
Net Present Value (NPV) / Expected NPV : Pakistan
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Figure 66. Net Present Value Distribution of Tight Oil Development Project in Pakistan
Figure 67. Sensitivity of NPV Tight Oil Development in Pakistan to key Modeling parameters
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Results for Tight Oil Development Project on 640/acre in Venezuela
Figure 68. Net Present Value Distribution of Tight Oil Development Project in Venezuela
Figure 69. Sensitivity of NPV Tight Oil Development in Venezuela to key Modeling parameters
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Results for Tight Oil Development Project on 640/acre in Libya
Figure 70. Net Present Value Distribution of Tight Oil Development Project in Libya
Figure 71. Sensitivity of NPV Tight Oil Development in Libya to key Modeling parameters
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Results for Tight Oil Development Project on 640/acre in Colombia
Figure 72. Net Present Value Distribution of Tight Oil Development Project in Colombia
Figure 73. Sensitivity of NPV Tight Oil Development in Colombia to key Modeling parameters
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Table 24. Non-U.S. Tight Oil Plays Ranked by Economic Viability
R a n k  o f  P a r a m e te r  to  N P V  s e n s it iv ity  
(R a n k  o f  6  b e in g  t h e  m o s t  i n f lu e n t ia l  p a r a m e t e r )
P ro v in c e
M e a n  N P V  
( $ m il l io n s )  
@ o il  p r ic e  o f  
$ 5 5
O il
P r ic e
W e l l
c o s t
R e c o v e ry
F a c to r
R o y a lty
R a te
E x tra c t io n
T a x
In te r e s t
R a te
Mexico 2.13 6 4 5 3 1 2
Argentina -2.8 6 4 5 3 1 2
China -8.7 6 4 5 3 2 1
Russia -12.2 6 5 3 4 2 1
Indonesia -15 6 5 4 3 1 2
Canada -18.2 6 4 5 3 2 1
Pakistan -19.1 6 5 4 3 2 1
Colombia -47.4 6 5 4 3 2 1
Libya -49.3 6 5 4 3 2 1
Venezuela -65 6 5 4 3 1 2
Table 25. NPV Range for Non-U.S. Tight Oil Plays
Tight Oil P05 NPV P50 NPV P95 NPV
Province ($millions) ($millions) ($millions)
R u s s ia - 2 9 . 0 - 1 2 .1 3 .5
C h in a - 4 7 . 6 - 9 . 7 3 4 . 0
A r g e n t in a - 3 6 . 9 - 4 . 0 3 5 . 0
L ib y a - 6 7 . 6 - 4 9 . 5 - 3 0 . 2
C o lo m b ia - 1 0 2 . 5 - 4 8 . 9 1 2 .6
V e n e z u e l a - 1 0 4 . 7 - 6 6 .1 - 2 2 . 8
M e x ic o - 2 4 . 6 1 .0 3 1 .5
P a k is ta n - 3 6 . 4 - 1 8 . 7 - 3 . 6
C a n a d a - 3 0 . 2 - 1 7 . 4 - 8 . 9
In d o n e s ia - 3 6 . 8 - 1 5 . 7 8 .3
This assessment shows that only the tight oil development in Mexico proved to be economic in 
the mean case (Table 24). The tight oil asset development in Mexico has the Eagle Ford as an
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analogue, with a well length of 7000ft which is shorter and cheaper than wells in the other plays. 
Cash flow from investments in Mexico also apply a discount rate of just over 7% which is quite 
comparable to U.S. or Canadian discount rates at say 5% to 6%. Capital acquired at higher 
interest rates would make this development uneconomic. Other geological advantages of this 
development, such as good rock quality, are also highlighted. With a recovery factor of 5.9% 
predicted by the U.S. EIA/ARI (2013) study for a play like this, it takes just five wells to recover 
oil in this one square mile development as opposed to twice the well count in a tight oil play like 
Indonesia. As a result of highly productive U.S. Eagle Ford analogue, competitive capital cost, 
shallower and less expensive wells, this development rises to the top as the most economically 
prospective non-U.S. play.
Other formations that still show negative NPV although ranking high among the plays assessed 
include Argentina, China, and Russia (Table 24). The range of NPV values from all the plays 
assessed show that seven plays show a positive NPV at the 95th percentile (Table 25). This 
suggests that there is a 5% chance that those investments turn a profit under the parameter ranges 
applied.
In addition, the ranking of factors that most affect the economic viability of projects in the 
different plays is a noteworthy finding. Oil price remains the most influential factor for economic 
viability of tight oil plays, followed mostly by well cost (Table 24). This result underscores the 
contribution of oil prices in kick-starting tight oil development in the US. The influence of well 
costs is also remarkable. The possibility of very high cost of drilling in frontier regions and 
regions with fewer rigs or drilling service and the impact of these factors on cost of drilling is 
seen here as quite influential to tight oil asset development economics. The total cost of wells 
also increases as a result of the number of wells required to develop a 640-acre asset, and recover 
the volumes predicted by the EIA/ARI (2013) study. Productive wells, represented by analogue 
type wells from the best U.S. plays, like the Bakken, Eagle Ford or Permian would require fewer 
wells to recover the oil resource identified as recoverable for individual 640-acres in the tight oil 
region. A low quality tight oil formation will require more wells to develop the same resource 
than a better quality tight oil formation, resulting in a less profitable development.
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Across all the tight oil plays assessed, the cost of capital and extraction tax rate show the least 
impact on NPV. While this is the case, it is worth noting that regions with higher cost of capital 
like Venezuela and Libya are shown to rank low among the tight oil plays assessed. This factor 
becomes more significant on the results of assets in Colombia and Venezuela because this 
analysis assessed the same oil play developed on different sides of the Venezuela-Colombia 
border. The difference in the NPV of both results stems only from the cost of capital for both 
nations. While this assessment shows that the mean NPV is negative for both locations, the high 
case result is positive for Colombia, showing a 5% chance of a profitable venture. It is worth 
noting that under the best economic scenario, represented by our P95 case, the cost of capital for 
investments in Venezuela generates over $30 million less net revenue compared to the same 
investment in Colombia. This result highlights the importance of a favorable investment climate 
and its impact on the cost of capital and profitability of tight oil developments.
On the other hand, tight oil plays like the Duvernay shale in Canada, with favorable low cost of 
capital, showed that recovery factor is a bigger driver than oil price for some assets. The result 
for the Duvernay shale in Canada is an unexpected result because the economic prospectivity of 
this is shown as poor, contrary to its positive development factors such as attractive well cost, 
cost of capital and well productivity. Despite the favorable well cost resulting from shallower 
formation and good rock quality analogous to the U.S. Eagle Ford, the lack of resource density 
appears to harm the economic viability of this play. The EIA/ARI (2013) report shows this play 
to have a recoverable resource density of 0.4MM/640-acre which is just approximately 10% of 
the recoverable resource density in the Vaca Muerta shale in Argentina. Because of the small 
volume of resource within the development acreage, this development is not assessed to be able 
to carry the development cost or turn a profit and is uncompetitive within the fiscal system and 
other assumptions of this analysis. A region with low resource density portends that much 
costlier wells or a very widespread development would be required to develop any significant 
resource.
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3.9.6. Conclusion
The economic analysis of non-U.S. tight oil developments considering sub-surface and above 
ground characteristics show that a project’s economic viability depends on a combination of 
factors. While the typical approach of engineering focuses more on aspects of the subsurface and 
productivity of the tight formation, I have examined above-ground characteristics of a play, such 
as cost of capital in assessing the viability of tight oil developments.
The fiscal system under which this assessment was carried out is also critical to the results 
obtained. This simplified version of a fiscal system uses a gross tax and not a net profit tax 
system, like some other states or sovereigns may employ. This gross tax system deducts 
production and severance taxes from the gross revenue of operators at the well head, even before 
the operator recovers their costs incurred in operations and development. On the other hand, the 
net profit tax deducts the same taxes only after the operators’ costs have been taken out. This 
gross tax fiscal system as applied here also excludes other explicit credits and other incentives 
applied by some sovereign states. While this system is simple to administer and understand, 
opponents of the gross tax system contend that it does not do enough to share in the changing 
costs during field development. For a field with low ongoing maintenance costs, already 
developed, where fewer new capital costs are incurred, it may work well, as the operators’ gross 
revenue is not much reduced by major cost items. But this is different for a frontier tight oil field 
trying to attract initial capital investments in its resource. Other sovereigns in non-U.S. tight oil 
plays, still have the option of adjusting their tax systems to tilt the economic assessment results 
shown, to achieve broader national mineral development goals.
This study relied heavily on a 2013 report by the U.S. Energy Information Administration and 
Advanced Resources International that detailed 137 non-U.S. plays. The report was mainly geo- 
technical and did exclude the economic prospectivity of the said plays. This analysis, therefore, 
contributes to the ongoing effort of searching for new frontiers of tight oil development by 
applying a framework that integrates well costs, based on play characteristics, and analogue 
production profiles to areas without tested production and conditions that determine investment 
capital. While the engineering efforts to develop analogue well productivity is not new, or 
geological attempts to use formation properties in doing same exist, an attempt towards a
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comprehensive assessment that merges components of: (1) analogue formation determination 
through scaled indices, (2) well profile determination, (3) well cost determination, and (4) capital 
cost assessment to produce an economic viability assessment for projects is a major contribution 
of this work. As the search for more affordable energy continues, these factors will shape the 
discussion and analysis for the next big non-U.S. unconventional play.
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Chapter 4. CRUDE OIL PRICES AND U.S. TIGHT OIL 
PRODUCTION: ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
4.1. Introduction
The U.S. tight oil revolution provides a framework for understanding the impact of oil prices on 
tight resource development. This framework has been shaped over the last decade beginning with 
a growing interest in tight oil and gas development in the early 2000s, through the economic 
downturn of 2008-2009 and high oil prices in 2011 through the first half of 2014, and the oil 
price crash beginning in the fourth quarter of 2014 through 2016. Because the structural changes 
in tight oil and gas development seem to be more continuous than of discreet clear-cut periods, it 
is always a challenge to gain full insight into the workings of the industry within the framework 
of a slice of time. Yet, the cycle of high points and low points in tight oil and gas development 
experienced thus far provides some framework within which future changes could be 
understood. Also, insights gained from this cycle could serve as a template for new tight oil plays 
within and outside the US.
This chapter investigates the impact of oil price on development activities in four tight oil plays 
within a data analysis and econometric framework. This section of the research tests for the 
relationship between crude oil prices, drilling rig counts, and oil production in the major U.S. 
tight oil plays. Given that these formations are not uniform or in themselves homogenous, the 
research hypothesis put forth here is that those differences in the plays could be more clearly 
traced by their response to swings in key variables that characterize the industry’s 
macroeconomic changes, such as oil price and drilling rig count.
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4.1.1. Candidate Plays for Oil Price Impact Assessment: 
Selection by Drilling Target
According to the EIA (2016d), 92% of all oil and gas production growth in the U.S. between 
2011 and 2014 are traceable to production in seven major U.S. plays. These are the Bakken, 
Eagle Ford, Permian, Niobrara, Haynesville, Marcellus, and Utica plays.
The oil and gas servicing company, Baker Hughes Inc. provides data on rig counts for drilling 
activities within North America and internationally. This data is demarcated based on rigs 
drilling for oil and gas well targets. With this breakdown, it is possible to identify the primary 
resource target in different plays. An assessment of the number of rigs targeting oil and gas 
production drilling in the major plays shows that rigs in the Williston basin plays (Mainly the 
Bakken formation and some Three-forks formation wells), Permian plays, Eagle Ford play and 
Niobrara play typically target oil production (Figure 74; BHI, 2017), while rigs in the Utica, 
Marcellus and the Haynesville plays drill primarily gas targets (Figure 74). This implies that the 
development activities within these three plays typically target the production of dry gas and wet 
gas (gas reservoirs containing oil of high API gravity), or in a few cases, crude oil. Plays whose 
symbols lie above the straight line in Figure 74 are those in which at least two oil wells are 
drilled for each gas well that is drilled. The four tight oil plays Bakken, Permian, Eagle Ford and 
Niobrara become the focus of this analysis on the relationship between oil price, rig count and oil 
production variables.
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Distinguishing Primary Resource Target for U.S. Tight Plays
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Figure 74. Tight Play Type Selection (Haynesville, Marcellus, Utica shown as primarily gas Plays; 
BHI, 2017)
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4.1.2. Econometric Assessment of Oil Price Impact on U.S. 
Tight Oil Development
The level of oil production within a region is a key indicator of the impact of oil industry 
macroeconomics (mainly oil price) on industry activity in that region. Besides oil price, another 
major indicator is the number of drilling rigs operational in oil development regions. The rig 
count is a significant indicator of oil industry activity because it informs oil servicing companies 
of the trend of demand for products used in drilling and completing wells (BHI, 2016a). In 
response to the oil price slump in 2014, global rig count dropped by 20% and U.S. rig count 
dropped more than 50% since May 2015 through most of 2016 due to unfavorable oil prices 
(BHI, 2016b). This slowdown in drilling activities also signaled a withdrawal of several 
companies from development activities, layoff of oil field workers, reduced corporate capital 
budgets and spending cuts, and bankruptcy filings. According to Haynes and Boone LLP (2017)
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over a hundred oil and gas firm bankruptcy filings have occurred since 2015, four months after 
the precipitous fall in oil prices.
The geologic and well cost differences of the Bakken, Niobrara, Permian and Eagle Ford plays 
have been discussed in previous sections. It remains to be seen how each of the plays fared 
throughout the price cycle and whether there are any lessons to be learned This section presents 
an econometric analysis of oil price on tight oil activity and production in the four tight oil plays. 
The goal of this section is to assess whether the uniqueness of different plays translates to 
observable differences in the impact of oil price on rig count and oil production. This will 
improve understanding on how development strategies respond to price fluctuations and 
highlight the impact of the uniqueness of tight oil plays on the survival of companies that 
participate in them. This should provide value to decision makers in the oil industry and other 
stakeholders in the development of tight play resources in the US. The insights gained from U.S. 
plays could have global implications. As stakeholders in non-U.S. plays advance decisions on 
how best to develop their resources, the lessons learned from U.S. plays, during high and low oil 
price cycles, will be valuable to their own frontier plays.
The impact of oil price on oil plays is investigated within an Auto Regressive Distributed Lag 
(ARDL) cointegration framework, using time series data from four tight oil plays in the US: 
Bakken, Eagle Ford, Niobrara, and Permian. The ARDL regression method analyzes variables in 
a multivariate regression equation including lags of the dependent and independent variables. 
This is an appropriate method to analyze the interaction within oil and gas industry because it 
allows the analyst to assess the relationships across variables while considering potential lags in 
such relationships. This is important because there are often technical lags among oil and gas 
industry variables, for example, delays are inevitable between well drilling, when rigs are 
required, and completion of wells, first production and reporting of production data. Also, 
operators’ response to the commercial climate may not be immediate. This makes the ARDL 
approach a fitting one to test for relationships without losing potential lags.
It is also important to understand the character of the variables being used and to ensure that an 
appropriate model is employed for the analysis. To produce valid conclusions, results from most
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regression models rely on the use of stationary variables (Duke University, n.d -a). Stationary 
variables are variables whose means and variances are constant for the entire length of the time 
series data (Duke University, n.d -a). Additionally, stationary time series easily lend themselves to 
forecasting since past behavior is likely to predict future performance and it’s always possible to 
regain the raw data, even if the forecasting process required the historical data to be transformed by 
some mathematical operation (Duke University, n.d -a). Stationary variables could be used with 
ordinary least square methods (Duke University, n.d -a). However, often, it is also challenging to 
determine the character of a data series whether it is stationary or not. And applying ordinary 
least square methods on nonstationary data may lead to the observation of false relationships and 
statistically invalid conclusions (Duke University, n.d -a). This is where the ARDL model comes 
in handy; the ARDL method allows the analyst to test long term cointegration relationships 
among variables whether they are stationary or not (Pesaran & Shin, 1999). The benefit of a 
successful test of cointegration of variables is that it shows that the variables have a stable, long 
term relationship, which is the basis for reliable conclusions.
For this research, the following two broad questions are evaluated across all U.S. plays: what is 
the impact of oil price on tight oil production? And what is the impact of oil price on drilling 
activity in tight oil plays? Answering these questions will yield more insights into the nature of 
U.S. tight oil plays and these insights could be transferred into the development of analogue 
plays in other tight oil regions around the world.
4.1.2.1. Data
To investigate the impact of oil price on tight oil production and rig activity, the following variables 
were selected: (1) oil price, represented by the West Texas Intermediate crude oil price, (2) tight oil 
production in each play, and (3) rig count in each play provided in drilling productivity reports that 
are published by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).
1) Oil Price Data
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The West Texas Intermediate price data was derived from EIA data sources (EIA, 2016f). This 
price benchmark represents crude oil spot prices as traded in Cushing Oklahoma, which is the 
nation’s biggest oil hub for crude oil storage and sales. The natural logarithm of oil price was 
determined and used in the analysis. The logarithm of raw data also has the advantage of making 
exponential trends more linear and “stabilizing the variance” observed in data (Duke University, n.d 
-b). The logarithm smoothening effect is also observed because on a log scale, fewer data points in 
time series data go beyond an order of magnitude in difference from previous data points. The 
natural log transform was also applied to allow for a form of econometric model that answers the 
question on the elasticity of price on production or rig counts (Greene, 2008).
2) Tight Oil Production Data
Tight oil production data was derived from the EIA drilling productivity reports (DPR) (EIA,
2017e). The EIA provides tight oil production data at the regional or geographic level and also at the 
geologic formation level to track changes in subsurface targets drilled by operators over the same 
area (EIA, 2014e). In the event where, for example, two oil plays are stacked one on the other, DPR 
reports for production at the geographic level for a county, for instance, show production data from 
both stacked formations as being from the same play, while geologic production data reports 
differentiate production from separate geologic tight oil formations (EIA, 2014e).
To the extent that operators will produce from all zones intersected by the well, where overall 
recovery and economics support such decision, the regional data aligns with production from all the 
composite formations within an area. On the other hand, when geologic formations cross county 
lines into counties with mainly non-tight oil production, aggregating production data based on 
geographic or county level production will miss that production from the formation that sprawls 
outside the county. While aggregating data based on the geologic formation level will follow the 
formation into whatever county it goes. For this reason, tight oil data aggregated at the geologic 
formation level was preferred for this analysis. This is also seen in a comparison between 
geographic and geologic data sets which show almost identical production profiles except for the 
Permian play which contains a mixture of conventional and unconventional stacked plays (Figure 
75).
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In arranging the data for this analysis, tight oil production was tallied for all the four plays. The 
Permian play, being a composite play, showed oil production data segregated into the 
Bonespring, Spraberry, Delaware, Yeso & Glorieta tight formations from the EIA (EIA, 2017e). 
For the Permian play only, all subplay production data was rolled up to represent the total tight 
oil production in the Permian.
Tight oil geographic versus geologic production
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formations(fm) (EIA, 2017e; EIA, 2017t).
3) Rig Count Data
Rig count data was derived from the EIA drilling productivity reports (DPR). This report tallied rig 
counts based on whether those rigs are located in ‘tight oil development counties’ rather than 
whether they targeted just the tight oil zones in those counties. Because these counties are primarily 
producing tight oil, this rig count data is presented by the EIA as rig count for tight oil regions in the 
US. A natural log transform was applied to rig count data as well to honor the integrity of the model 
functional form meant to answer the question on elasticity of price on production and on rig counts.
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The DPR report also observed that rig count is more closely correlated with production data with 
some lag estimated to run for months (EIA, 2015g).
The count of drilling rigs in a play highlights the pulse of the macroeconomic environment because 
of the ancillary services that relate to rig count. Since drilling always precedes oil production, rig 
count is a leading indicator of oil production and is expected to correlate with oil production with a 
lag. This lag is determined by the time it takes to drill, which depends on the requirements of a play 
and the selected well architecture. It is also influenced by the time it takes to hydraulically fracture 
the well, to put it on production and to report that data to the state agencies, at what time it becomes 
available to the EIA reporting system. Several other industry dynamics affect the relationship and 
lag between rig count and oil production.
Another phenomenon that has grown in significance in the last few years, which affects the 
relationship between rig count and oil production data is that of an artificial economic/strategic 
delay in producing a well due to a delay in hydraulically fracturing the well in times of low oil 
prices. This has led to a backlog of drilled but uncompleted wells in the major oil plays (EIA,
2016l). As a result of this phenomenon, a drilling rig leaves its location several months before 
production associated with that well is recorded. This situation creates a long lag time that could 
mask or even breakdown the relationship between rig count and oil production. For this reason, a 
six-month lag was imposed on all variables to increase the chance of capturing the relationships 
between oil price, production. and drilling.
4.1.2.2. Analysis Questions, Models and Methods
In order to determine the relationship among production, rig count and oil price variables, the 
ARDL model was used. An extra binary variable was applied to capture the atypical price plunge 
which started in the fourth quarter of 2014. An appropriate functional form had to be selected to best 
answer the study question, which is: how does changes in oil price affect oil production in the 
Bakken, Eagle Ford, Permian, and Niobrara plays? Since rig use is associated with oil production, 
rig count was also included as a second independent variable in the regression equation. The second 
question investigated is: what is the impact of oil price on drilling activity? Drilling rig count is used
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as a proxy for drilling activity. Since all the research questions border on the elasticity of these 
variables with respect to one another, the log-log model form of equations was selected (Greene, 
2008). As a result, the natural log of the dependent (explained) and independent (explanatory) 
variables was determined because using this form allows U.S. to understand the elasticity of the 
explained versus the explanatory variables, and to answer the following question: what percentage 
change occurs in the explained variable in the event of one percent change in an explanatory 
variable, controlling for other explanatory variables and other unknown factors (Greene, 2008). 
Below are the equations developed for the questions being investigated.
For the question on the impact of oil price and rig count on tight oil production in each play, the 
following model was postulated:
In p r o  = a + b In Pt + cRCt + dDUM + s t (22)
And for the question on the impact of oil price on rig count in each play, the next model postulated 
is as follows:
RC *  = a + b In OP + cDM  + Ut (23)
whereprot is the tight oil production in a U.S. play; P t  (OPt) is crude oil price using the West Texas 
Intermediate price (WTI) as benchmark price, RC (RC*) represents rig count in a play and G ( U )
is the error term, which represents all other factors affecting tight oil production (Equation 22) and 
rig count (Equation 23) that are not explicitly stated in the equations. DUM (DM) is a binary 
dummy variable that represents the impact of the massive price drop that occurred starting from the 
fourth quarter of year 2014. Months Oct 2014 through Dec 2016 carry a dummy variable of 1 and 
all other months carry a dummy variable of zero. Equation 22 investigates the effect of oil price (P t ) 
and rig count on tight oil production. Equation 23 investigates the impact of oil price (OP t ) on 
drilling activity levels using rig count as proxy. This equation also uses the oil price dummy (DM) 
to capture specific impacts on rig counts due to the oil price plunge that began in the fourth quarter 
o f2014.
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If increasing oil prices lead to increases in oil production in a tight oil play, the oil price coefficient, 
b, in equation 22 will be positive, and if it leads to a drop in production, this coefficient will be 
negative. And if increasing oil prices lead to increase in the rig count in a tight oil play, the oil price 
coefficient, b, in equation 23 will be positive and if it leads to a drop in rig count, this coefficient 
will be negative. The magnitude of coefficient b in every play will provide a comparison for 
responsiveness of different plays to oil price within the study time frame.
Equations 22 and 23 are equations to determine long run responses of oil production to changes in 
the independent variables. In estimating using an Auto-regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) 
approach, it is necessary to include the short-run adjustment process into both equations. This 
approach modifies the equation into an error correction format, which then yields both short run and 
long run effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable (Pesaran et al., 2001). When 
the short run components are added, Equation 22 and 23 now become:
n1 n2 n3
AinPROit = a + I  bk A i n PROit - k + 1 ' Ck AimP^-k + I  dk Ain RCi t-k + eDUMt
k=1 k=0 k=0
+ do \nPROiX- i  + di lnPt- i  + 02 \nRCijt- i  + £
(22*)
n1 n2
A in RC*it = a + I b k Ain RC*Ut-k + I c k Ain OPt-k + dDMt + d0 in RC*Ut-1
k=1 k=0
+ di lnOPt - i + Ut
(23*)
The equations 22* and 23* contain the first-differenced variables (Aln variables) and the short-run 
dynamics are captured by their coefficients bk, ck, and dk. The long run effects are determined by 
the estimates of d0, d1, d2. The price variable in these equations is now represented by the notation 
P, and rig count is represented by RC.
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Unless the model variables are cointegrated, whatever estimated coefficients derived are likely to be 
spurious (Greene, 2008). For this reason, Pesaran et al. (2001) recommended a two-step method in 
ascertaining that these coefficients are reliable. An F-test is used to test the joint significance of the 
lagged variables (t-i) and the test statistic from the F test is compared against two critical values, an 
upper bound and a lower bound value, depending on whether the model variables are stationary 
(I(0)) or nonstationary (I(1)). Since nonstationary variables must test above the upper critical value, 
while stationary variables need to yield an F-statistic above the lower bound, an F-statistic that is 
above the upper bound is a conservative test that ensures that whether the variables are stationary or 
not, the cointegration that is observed is valid (Umekwe & Baek, 2017b). Hence, if the F-statistic is 
greater than the upper critical value, we ascertain that the cointegration equation is valid, whether 
some of the variables are stationary or not.
Additionally, equation 22* (23*) was investigated for symmetric effects of oil price on tight oil 
production (rig count) following techniques established in the literature (Bahmani-Oskooee & 
Bahmani, 2015; Umekwe & Baek, 2017a; Umekwe & Baek, 2017b). Symmetric impact of oil price 
on production suggests that if a rise in price leads to an increase in production, a fall in price should 
lead to a proportionate drop in production. And symmetric impact of oil price on rig count suggests 
that if a rise in oil price increases rig count, a fall in oil price should lead to a symmetric fall in rig 
count. To test for symmetric effects, two more time series variables were created from the WTI oil 
price variable (lnPt and lnOPt ; cumulative sum of negative and positive partial differences forming 
two separate series according to technique used by Shin et al (2014). To generate these series, first, 
we subtract oil price at time t-1 from oil price at time t to generate a series of negative and positive 
first difference values. Next, we sum the positive first differences separately from the negative first 
differences to construct cumulative partial sums of the positive and negative first difference values 
such that for positive series and negative series, lnPn (lnOPn) is largest (i.e the most positive) or 
smallest (i.e the most negative) respectively, as follows:
t t
POSt = ln Pt+ = ln P j = ^  max( A ln P} ,0) (24)
j=1 j=1
169
NEGt = ln Pt = ^ A  ln P: = £  min( A ln Pj ,0) (25)
j=1 j=1
where lnP+t and lnPt are the first differences in oil price while POSt and NEGt (PSt and NGt) are 
the partial sums of positive and negative changes in lnPt (InOPt). With these two variables, Eq. 
(22) then becomes:
ni n2 n3
A ln PROit = a' + ^ ^ b ' k A ln PROit_k + ^  c'k A ln POS t-k + ^  d 'k A ln NEG t-k
k=1 k=0 k=0
n 3
+ ^ e 'k A ln R C iit- k + f 'DUMt + GolnPROit_i + Gi lnPOSt- i
k=0
+ G2 ln NEG t- i  + G3 ln RCi t - i  + P
(22**)
and
n1 n2 n3
AlnRC*it = a' + ^  b 'k AlnRC*i t_k + ^  c'k A ln P S t-k + ^  d 'k A ln N G t-k + e'DMt
k=1 k=0 k=0
+ Go lnRC*i t - i + Gi lnPAf_i + G2 lnAGf_i +
(23**)
The variables POSt (PSt) and NEGt (NGt) introduce nonlinearity into the short-run adjustment 
process making this ARDL model a nonlinear ARDL model (Umekwe & Baek, 2017b). We test 
whether the response of oil production to a rise or fall in oil price is symmetric or not, by comparing 
the coefficients of the variables POSt (PSt) and NEGt (NGt) for each play. If the coefficient of POSt 
(PSt) and NEGt (NGt) are different, we declare asymmetry; if not, we declare symmetry.
The nonlinear ARDL analysis was conducted using the IHS commercial software, Eviews version 
9.0. This software also allows the analyst to conduct econometric analysis on time series data of
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different frequencies using a variety of models which include the Ordinary Least Square (OLS), 
Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA), and Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) 
models among other models.
4.1.2.3. Results
A. Impact of Oil Price on Tight Oil Production
The results show the relationship among oil production, rig count and oil price over the period 
January 2007 through December 2016 using a nonlinear ARDL model. Six lags were imposed on 
the dependent and independent variables and the optimum model was selected using the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). As part of the ARDL method, several equations are formed using 
different combinations of the level and lagged variables, and each of the equations yields an AIC 
value. The most optimal model selected is the model with the smallest AIC value (Eviews, 2016). 
Summary statistics from the tests conducted on this optimum model are presented and discussed in 
this section of the research.
Firstly, the effect of oil prices on U.S. tight oil production is assessed for the four plays: Permian, 
Bakken, Niobrara, and Eagle Ford, in the short run. And the effect of oil price changes on oil 
production is tested to establish if that effect is asymmetric or not. The estimated coefficients 
show that oil prices have significant short run impacts on oil production in all four plays except 
the Eagle Ford (Panel A, Table 26). For example, in the short run, a decrease in oil price leads to 
a significant fall in tight oil production in the Bakken. In addition to short run impacts of price on 
tight oil production, these effects were also tested to see if they hold true in the long run. For the 
long run, we observe that the variables POS and NEG show a significant coefficient for Bakken, 
Eagle Ford, and Permian plays, indicating that rise and fall of oil prices have a significant long 
run effect on tight oil production (Panel B, Table 26). In the Bakken play, for example, a rise 
(fall) in oil price has a positive (positive) effect on tight oil production. By comparing the 
significance and magnitude of the POS and NEG variables, we checked to see if the impact of oil 
price on tight oil production is symmetrical; if a decrease in price leads to a drop in production, 
does a rise in price lead to an equal rise in production? If the coefficients for oil price increases,
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APOS (POS) is equal to the coefficients of oil price decreases, ANEG (NEG), then we declare 
symmetry for the short run (long run) but if not, we declare asymmetry. In the short run, all the 
plays showed asymmetric effects of oil price on oil production. While short term rise in oil price 
showed a significant impact on oil production in just the Permian and Niobrara plays, this impact 
was not proportional when prices dropped, and except for the Bakken, in most cases the impact 
of a fall in prices was not even significant. This result was also similar in the long run; oil price 
impact on tight oil production was not symmetric. Generally, a rise in oil price showed an 
increase in oil production and a fall in oil prices did not show a significant decrease in oil 
production. For example, in the Bakken, a drop in oil prices showed just a slower increase in oil 
production.
Besides the impact of normal oil price fluctuations on oil production, the impact of the sudden 
fall in prices beginning from October 2014 was also investigated. The dummy variable for the oil 
price shock is not statistically significant for most cases in the short and long run, indicating that 
the recent collapse in prices of crude oil had little impact on tight oil production in all the plays, 
in both the short and long run, except for the Permian and the Eagle Ford plays. The price 
collapse shows a positive statistically significant impact on Permian oil production in the short 
run and long run, and a negative long run impact on oil production in the Eagle Ford play. This 
implies that oil production is observed to increase in the Permian play following the plunge in oil 
prices, while the impact of this price plunge was opposite for the Eagle Ford play.
Additionally, the effect of rig count on oil production was also investigated for the Bakken,
Eagle Ford, Permian, and Niobrara tight oil plays. In the short run, rig count, RC is seen to have 
a positive and statistically significant impact in the Niobrara play. This implies that increasing 
rig count in the Niobrara play leads to an increase in oil production in the short run. And in the 
long run, rig count has a statistically significant impact on oil production in the Eagle Ford play. 
The long run coefficient is positive for the Eagle Ford, which implies that an increase in active 
rigs in the Eagle Ford play drives up tight oil production for this play in the long run.
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Table 26. Full Information Estimates of Nonlinear ARDL Model describing the Impact of Oil
Price on Tight Oil Production
i = Permian i = Eagle Ford i = Bakken i = Niobrara
Panel A: Short-Run Estimates
A ln P R O i , t
A ln P R O i , t -1 - 0 . 3 4  ( 3 . 5 ) * * 0 . 0 0  ( 0 . 0 5 ) - 0 . 3 8  ( 4 . 1 1 ) * *
A ln P R O i , t -2 - 0 . 3 0  ( 3 . 0 6 ) * * 0 . 2 5  ( 2 . 9 7 ) * * - 0 . 3 1  ( 3 . 2 4 ) *
A ln P R O i, t - 3 - 0 . 2 4  ( 2 . 5 4 ) * * - 0 . 1 9  ( 2 . 0 2 )
A P O S t 0 . 0 0  ( 0 . 0 7 ) - 0 . 4 0  ( 0 . 6 4 ) 0 . 0 4  ( 0 . 7 1 ) 0 . 0 5  ( 0 . 5 6 )
A P O S t-1 - 0 . 1 1  ( 2 . 2 0 ) * * - 0 . 1 2  ( 1 . 4 2 )
A P O S t-2 - 0 . 1 5  ( 2 . 8 7 ) * * - 0 . 2 0  ( 2 . 2 6 ) * *
A P O S t-3 - 0 . 1 2  ( 2 . 0 9 ) * *
A N E G  t 0 . 0 4  ( 1 . 2 ) - 0 . 0 3  ( 0 . 0 7 ) - 0 . 0 7  ( 1 . 8 0 ) * 0 . 0 2  ( 0 . 3 3 )
A N E G t -1 0 . 0 5  ( 0 . 7 3 )
A N E G t - 2 0 . 1 4  ( 1 . 7 6 ) *
A N E G  t-3 - 0 . 1 6  ( 2 . 3 9 ) * *
A l n R C i ,  t 0 . 0 1  ( 0 . 1 8 ) - 0 . 5 1  ( 1 . 3 5 ) 0 . 0 6  ( 1 . 3 0 ) 0 . 0 9  ( 1 . 7 5 ) *
A l n R C i ,  t-1 0 . 8 7  ( 2 . 2 9 ) * * - 0 . 1 1  ( 2 . 5 8 ) * *
D U M t 0 . 0 5  ( 2 . 0 0 ) * * - 0 . 1 5  ( 0 . 4 6 ) - 0 . 0 1  ( 0 . 3 3 ) 0 . 0 2  ( 0 . 4 8 )
Panel B: Long-Run Estimates
P O S t 1 .0 9  ( 2 . 0 2 ) * * 2 . 9 0  ( 3 . 2 3 ) * * 1 .6 1  ( 3 . 9 1 ) * * 3 . 6 3  ( 0 . 7 1 )
N E G t , 0 . 5 4  ( 1 . 0 7 ) - 0 . 4 5  ( 0 . 5 8 ) 0 . 7 5  ( 1 . 9 8 ) * 1 .8 1  ( 0 . 4 8 )
l n R C i 0 . 3 3  ( 1 . 1 9 ) 0 . 7 8  ( 2 . 0 4 ) * * 0 . 0 0  ( 0 . 0 3 ) 4 . 1 3  ( 0 . 8 4 )
D U M t 0 . 5 8  ( 2 . 2 9 ) * * - 1 . 0 6  ( 1 . 8 9 ) * - 0 . 0 5  ( 0 . 2 2 ) 0 . 8 0  ( 0 . 7 )
C o n s t a n t - 2 . 8 7  ( 1 . 9 2 ) * * - 1 3 . 4 1  ( 9 . 5 9 ) * * - 2 . 7 5  ( 4 . 4 3  ) * * - 2 1 . 1 5  ( 1 . 0 2 )
Panel C: Diagnostic Statistics
F 1 0 .2 7 5 . 0 5 1 9 .9 5 1 1 .0 8
E C M t - 1 - 0 . 0 4  ( 7 . 0 5 ) * * - 0 . 2 7  ( 5 . 0 6 ) * * - 0 . 0 7  ( 8 . 4 1 ) * * - 0 . 0 1  ( 6 . 8 9 ) * *
L M 0 . 0 5  [ 0 . 8 2 ] 0 . 0 3  [ 0 . 8 5 ] 0 . 1 0  [ 0 . 7 5 ] 0 . 1 0  [ 0 . 7 5 ]
A d j u s t e d R 2 0 . 1 9 0 . 2 0 0 . 3 4 0 . 2 8
C S  ( C S 2) S ( S ) S ( S ) S ( U S ) S ( S )
N o t e s :  N u m b e r s  i n  t h e  p a r e n t h e s e s  a r e  a b s o l u t e  v a l u e s  o f  ^ - s t a t i s t ic s .  * *  a n d  *  i n d i c a t e  s t a t i s t i c a l  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  a t  t h e  5 %  a n d  1 0 %  l e v e l s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ;  T h e  u p p e r  b o u n d  c r i t i c a l  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  F - t e s t  
f o r  c o i n t e g r a t i o n  a t  t h e  1 0 %  a n d  5 %  l e v e l s  a r e  3 . 2 0  a n d  3 . 6 7 ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ;  L M  is  t h e  B r e u s c h -  
G o d f r e y  s e r i a l  c o r r e l a t i o n  t e s t  a n d  i s  d i s t r i b u t e d  a s  x 2 w i t h  o n e  d e g r e e  o f  f r e e d o m .  T h e  c r i t i c a l  
v a l u e  f o r  t h e  c h i - s q u a r e d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  3 . 8 4  a t  t h e  5 %  l e v e l  a n d  2 . 7 0  a t  t h e  1 0 %  l e v e l .  N u m b e r s  
i n  t h e  b r a c k e t s  a r e  p - v a l u e s .
T h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  a b o v e  r e s u l t s  r e s t s  o n  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  o u r  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  c o i n t e g r a t e d ,  t h a t  
i s ,  t h e r e  is  a c t u a l l y  a  l o n g - t e r m  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e  v a r i a b l e s .  I n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  s u c h  
c o i n t e g r a t i o n  o u r  r e s u l t s  a r e  l i k e l y  s p u r i o u s  a n d  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  f l a w e d .  T o  t e s t  f o r  t h i s ,  t h e  F -  
t e s t  o r  B o u n d s  T e s t  w a s  c o n d u c t e d  a n d  t h e  F - s t a t i s t i c  c o m p a r e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  u p p e r  b o u n d  l i m i t  f o r  
a  1 0 %  c r i t i c a l  v a l u e  ( U m e k w e  &  B a e k ,  2 0 1 7 b ) .  A t  t h e  1 0 %  c r i t i c a l  l e v e l ,  t h e  l o w e r  b o u n d  
c r i t i c a l  l e v e l  i s  2 . 3 7  a n d  t h e  u p p e r  b o u n d  c r i t i c a l  l e v e l  i s  3 . 2 .  P e s a r a n  e t  a l .  ( 2 0 0 1 )  s h o w e d  t h a t  t o
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be safely above the higher bound proves cointegration whether or not some variables are I (1) or 
I (0). The F test statistics in Panel C (Table 26) provide evidence to show that these results are 
valid. The 10% critical value is 3.2 and for all the plays studied, we exceed this value (5.05 - 
19.95). This shows that our variables are cointegrated, i.e. there is a long-term relationship 
between these variables.
The error correction term (ECt-1) is part of ARDL models that are classified as Error Correction 
Models (ECM), and this term indicates how fast our variables adjust towards a long run 
equilibrium (Greene, 2008; Umekwe & Baek, 2017b). This error correction term, to be effective 
at allowing our model variables to converge towards an equilibrium, needs to be negative and 
statistically significant (Greene, 2008). A positive term indicates that perturbations to this system 
lead these variables to diverge without returning to an equilibrium. The value of the coefficient 
measures the speed with which the model adjusts to equilibrium after any disturbance (Baek,
2015). For example, the ECt-1 coefficient for the Eagle Ford (Bakken), -0.27 (-0.07) indicates 
that adjustment toward long run equilibrium occurs at a speed of ~30% (7%) per month. This 
means, it takes approximately 3 (14) months (that is, 1/0.3 = ~3 months; 1/0.07= ~14 months) in 
order to erase the impact of any shocks in the Eagle Ford (Bakken) play.
Other statistics of note are derived from tests conducted to establish the absence of serial 
correlation, stability of the model and to judge goodness of fit (Umekwe & Baek, 2017b). The 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test tests for serial correlation or the validity of the standard error 
calculated, and by extension allows U.S. to validate the significance of the coefficients we have 
determined (IHCs Inc., 2015a). In performing this test, the null hypothesis is that the residuals in 
our model are not serially correlated. If the residuals are serially correlated, then the significance 
test of our coefficients is suspect and unreliable. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) is shown to be 
distributed as x2 (chi-squared) with 1 degree of freedom. At 1 degree of freedom on the chi- 
squared distribution table, the 5% critical value is 3.84 and our LM statistics are statistically 
insignificant for all the plays. Since the LM statistics are not statistically significant, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis, and our model is confirmed not to be serially correlated. Our estimated 
coefficients are also shown to be stable through the cumulative sum (CUSUM), and cumulative 
sum of squares (CUSUMSQ) tests (Table 26).
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B. Impact of Oil Price on Rig Count
Next, we consider the effect of oil prices on drilling activities in the different plays. For the short 
run, the estimated coefficients show that a rise in oil prices, represented by APS, and fall in 
prices, ANG impact rig counts in all the plays (Panel A: Table 27). And the differences between 
the coefficients of APS and ANG show that there is short term asymmetry; rig counts do not rise 
in response to oil price increase and fall proportionately in response to falling oil price. In several 
plays, there is no significant response due to rise or fall in prices.
For the long run, we observe that oil price impacts all tight oil plays significantly except for the 
Niobrara, where that impact is not statistically significant (Panel B: Table 27). For example, in 
the Bakken play, controlling for other factors, a rise in oil prices leads to an increase in rig count 
and a fall in oil prices still leads to a rise in rig counts, albeit a smaller increase. This also 
answers the question on long run symmetry; the response of rig count to oil price is asymmetric 
because rig count does not decrease in response to a drop in oil prices. However, the impact of 
the drastic fall in oil prices, represented by the dummy variable, shows that although slight 
decreases in price had still kept rig counts rising in the Bakken, the price crash of Q4 in 2014, 
DMt had a significant negative impact on rig count.
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T a b l e  2 7 .  F u l l  I n f o r m a t i o n  E s t i m a t e s  o f  N o n l i n e a r  A R D L  M o d e l  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  O i l  
P r i c e  o n  R i g  C o u n t
i = Permian i = Eagle Ford i = Bakken i = Niobrara
Panel A: Short-Run Estimates
A l n R C i ,  t
A l n R C i ,  t-1 0 . 4 0  ( 5 . 4 ) * * 0 . 2 5  ( 2 . 8 5 ) * * 0 . 4 0  ( 4 . 2 6 ) * * 0 . 2 0  ( 2 . 1 8 ) * *
A l n R C i ,  t-2 - 0 . 0 4  ( 0 . 3 8 ) - 0 . 1 3  ( 1 . 3 0 ) 0 . 0 9  ( 0 . 9 7 )
A l n R C i ,  t-3 0 . 0 0  ( 0 . 0 2 ) 0 . 2 0  ( 2 . 0 2 ) * * 0 . 1 3  ( 1 . 4 2 )
A P O S t 0 . 0 5  ( 0 . 5 4 ) 0 . 1 1  ( 0 . 7 2 ) - 0 . 0 6  ( 0 . 4 4 )
A P O S t-1 0 . 2 4  ( 1 . 8 7 ) * 0 . 1 2  ( 0 . 8 8 )
A P O S t-2 - 0 . 1 9  ( 1 . 4 9 ) 0 . 0 0  ( 0 . 0 2 )
A P O S t-3 - 0 . 4 7  ( 3 . 3 9 ) * *
A N E G  t - 0 . 1 2  ( 2 . 0 1 ) * * - 0 . 2 4  ( 2 . 0 2 ) * * - 0 . 1 1  ( 1 . 2 9 ) - 0 . 1 1  ( 1 . 0 7 )
A N E G t -1 0 . 2 0  ( 2 . 8 1 ) * * 0 . 2 3  ( 1 . 7 0 ) * 0 . 0 3  ( 0 . 3 3 ) 0 . 0 4  ( 0 . 3 8 )
A N E G t - 2 0 . 2 1  ( 2 . 9 5 ) * * 0 . 1 9  ( 1 . 3 8 ) 0 . 2 0  ( 1 . 9 3 ) * 0 . 5 5  ( 4 . 7 5 ) * *
A N E G  t-3 0 . 0 6  ( 0 . 8 5 ) 0 . 2 1  ( 1 . 5 4 ) 0 . 0 4  ( 0 . 4 2 ) 0 . 0 8  ( 0 . 6 9 )
D U M t - 0 . 0 1  ( 0 . 2 1 ) 0 . 0 2  ( 0 . 3 1 ) - 0 . 0 4  ( 0 . 8 2 ) 0 . 0 5  ( 0 . 9 4 )
Panel B: Long-Run Estimates
P O S t 0 . 6 6  ( 1 . 8 6 ) * 1 .6 9  ( 3 . 6 2 ) * * 1 .1 8  ( 1 . 9 2 ) * - 0 . 0 9  ( 0 . 0 8 )
N E G t , 0 . 3 1  ( 0 . 8 6 ) 1 .0 8  ( 2 . 3 0 ) * * 0 . 8 5  ( 1 . 4 5 ) 0 . 0 9  ( 0 . 0 9 )
D U M t - 0 . 4 7  ( 1 . 5 0 ) - 0 . 7 5  ( 1 . 5 5 ) - 1 . 3 0  ( 1 . 9 3 ) * - 0 . 4 0  ( 0 . 5 2 )
C o n s t a n t 5 . 3 5  ( 1 6 . 1 3 ) * * 3 . 3 3  ( 8 . 1 1 ) * * 4 . 1 8  ( 5 . 1 6 ) * * 5 . 5 1  ( 4 . 3 5 ) * *
Panel C: Diagnostic Statistics
F 1 1 .3 9 5 . 0 2 3 . 5 2 5 . 2 0
E C M t - 1 - 0 . 0 6  ( 6 . 4 2 ) * * - 0 . 0 7  ( 4 . 3 1 ) * * - 0 . 0 5  ( 4 . 1 1 ) * * - 0 . 0 5  ( 5 . 0 0 ) * *
L M 0 . 0 3  [ 0 . 8 6 ] 2 . 5 3  [ 0 . 1 1 ] 0 . 1 0  [ 0 . 7 6 ] 0 . 4 5  [ 0 . 5 0 ]
A d j u s t e d R 2 0 . 7 7 0 . 4 6 0 . 6 5 0 . 5 5
C S  ( C S 2) S ( S ) S ( U S ) S ( S ) S ( S )
N u m b e r s  i n  t h e  p a r e n t h e s e s  a r e a b s o l u t e  v a l u e  o f  t - s t a t i s t i c s .  * *  a n c *  i n d i c a t e  s t a t i s t i
s i g n i f i c a n c e  a t  t h e  5 %  a n d  1 0 %  l e v e l s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ;  T h e  u p p e r  b o u n d  c r i t i c a l  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  F - t e s t  
f o r  c o i n t e g r a t i o n  a t  t h e  1 0 %  a n d  5 %  l e v e l s  a r e  3 . 2 0  a n d  3 . 6 7 ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ;  L M  is  t h e  B r e u s c h -  
G o d f r e y  s e r i a l  c o r r e l a t i o n  t e s t  a n d  i s  d i s t r i b u t e d  a s  x 2 w i t h  o n e  d e g r e e  o f  f r e e d o m .  T h e  c r i t i c a l  
v a l u e  i n  t h e  c h i - s q u a r e d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  3 . 8 4  a t  t h e  5 %  l e v e l  a n d  2 . 7 0  a t  t h e  1 0 %  l e v e l .  N u m b e r s  i n  
t h e  b r a c k e t s  a r e  p - v a l u e s .
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4.1.2.4. Discussions
Permian
The Permian play, with conventional and tight oil targets, is among the most prolific oil plays in 
the United States, and this play has a unique character in its response to oil price fluctuations.
The impact of oil price change on this play is observed in the short run and long run. Results 
from our econometric analysis show that in the short run, controlling for other factors, a rise in 
oil prices has a negative impact on oil production. And in line with other tight oil plays, in the 
long run, a rise in oil price has a positive impact on Permian tight oil production. And a fall in oil 
prices shows an insignificant impact on tight oil production in this play. However, the oil price 
crash in Q4 2014 has a positive impact on oil production in the Permian play both in the short 
run and long run. Also, a rise in oil price is seen to have a positive effect on rig count in the long 
run.
These results point to one fundamental trait of the Permian play: its character as a ‘backbone 
play’ or fallback play for many operators. In the short run, our results suggest that in response to 
higher prices, operators move out of this play in preference for more profitable tight oil plays 
elsewhere, such as the Eagle Ford or the Bakken. This is also evidenced by the higher response 
(coefficients) in oil production for the Eagle Ford (2.90) and Bakken (1.61) plays to increasing 
oil prices compared to the Permian play (1.09). However, when oil prices crashed since the 
fourth quarter of 2014, as represented by the dummy variable, tight oil production in the Permian 
play increased. This could be for several reasons. The stacked plays of the Permian provide a 
mix of conventional and unconventional targets that attract investments from other plays to this 
play, and allows for well completion designs to target multiple zones. The increased focus on the 
conventional targets in this play, which require lower cost well stimulation operations, provide 
operators the opportunity to generate better returns while improving their understanding of the 
geology of the play, setting themselves up for even much better margins as prices rebound. 
Evidence to the pursuit of slightly more conventional formations within the Permian stacked 
formations is seen in the fact that, at the heart of the low oil price periods, the Permian play had 
most of the vertical wells operational within the US. Vertical well types are typically still found
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profitable in conventional rock types while prohibitively marginal or uneconomic for 
unconventional tight oil development.
Another less obvious reason for this character of anchoring development and production on this 
play is the impact of leasing commercial arrangements and the impact of wells drilled in the 
Permian on proved and contingent reserves of operators. According to Toon (2016) leasing 
contracts in the Permian insist on operators actually producing from the acreages they wish to 
maintain ownership in, rather than just drilling wells. And tight oil production consumes 
disproportionately more capital in stimulating the wells prior to production than actually drilling. 
For this reason, depending on whether an operator is a new entrant in the basin or not, they had 
to prioritize capital spending into fulfilling the leasing contracts and bringing their acreages to 
production. And since the unconventional development in the Permian is more recent than other 
plays, e.g. the Bakken and the Eagle Ford, most operators who had assets in this play had to shift 
capital into investments here (Toon, 2016). Secondly, the presence of several rock formations 
that could be targeted is a major attraction for development and company potential future drilling 
activity. Unlike the Bakken and Eagle Ford that are less than 300ft thick each, the Permian 
formation gross thickness exceeds 3000ft. As a result, even when the cost of drilling a well in the 
Permian equals the same development in the Eagle Ford, the ability to book the petroleum 
reserves in adjacent horizons in this stacked play as potential future targets improves the 
valuation of operating companies (Toon, 2016). For this reason, operators would want to develop 
assets in the Permian play. While existing literature allude to this character of the Permian 
through observation of industry activity, this research presents evidence within a theoretically- 
sound framework of the character of this play and the behavior of operators in response to the 
geology of the play.
Eagle Ford
The Eagle Ford play is another major play in the state of Texas that has seen rising production 
through the last decade. The impact of oil price change on this play is observed in the short run 
and long run. Results from our estimated models show that in the short run and long run, oil 
prices have a significant impact on production in this play. The impact of oil price in the long run
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in the Eagle Ford is not symmetric; while a rise in prices shows a strong positive response in 
production, a fall in prices shows a weaker negative response in oil production and this response 
is not statistically significant when we control for other factors. Controlling for the oil price crash 
and general trending in this play, the Eagle Ford play showed the strongest positive response of 
tight oil production to oil price, among all the plays studied (Panel B, Table 26). One percent 
increase in oil prices corresponds to almost three percent increase in production in this play. This 
result suggests that operator strategy in this play is nimble as producers seem to react to changes 
in the market environment more closely; oil production rises sharply with oil price increase and 
as oil prices plunge, rig addition slows down and oil production reduces.
Additionally, the Eagle Ford play also shows the biggest response in rig count due to increase in 
crude oil prices. Comparing the production and rig count response of this play to oil price 
increase against the same response in other plays studied, offers some insights into well 
productivity as well, and potentially on profitability. The Eagle Ford shows the biggest 
productivity gain per rig added. The geology of this play potentially offers further understanding 
into the behavior of operators here. Eagle Ford rocks are carbonate-rich and respond well to 
hydraulic fracturing leading to sharply rising production in response to new wells that are drilled 
and completed during high oil prices. In the absence of high prices to sustain the cost of 
expensive hydraulic fracturing of the wells, it is plausible that operators will back off expensive 
wells leading to a drop in production. Our results also show that the drastic fall in prices lead to a 
fall in production in the Eagle Ford (Table 26). Even when the drop in prices just reduces the 
number of rigs added in this play, the fall in production that results, suggests that low oil prices 
reduced the number of wells completed in this play significantly, thus impacting oil production. 
This implies that total cost of wells in this play is still high especially due to the cost incurred in 
well completions (stimulation through hydraulic fracturing).
The presence of a busy corridor of pipelines, pipeline infrastructure, and oil and gas expertise 
and servicing industry in the Texas area also has an impact on production levels in this play.
With several producers, pipelines and refineries, Texas is the closest picture of a perfect market 
for oil and gas activities. It follows therefore that the reaction time for players in this part of the
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world is quick enough to cash in on opportunities and withdraw from negative market signals 
ever more flexibly.
Bakken
The Bakken play is an example of a U.S. play born primarily from tight oil, horizontal wells, and 
hydraulic fracturing. The impact of increase and decrease in oil prices over the 2007 through 
2016 timeframe on oil production was mild for this play. Our results show that oil production 
increased much slowly in response to a drop in oil prices in the long run (Panel B, Table 26). 
Since a rise in oil prices led to a rise in oil production and a fall in oil prices did not show a 
proportionate decrease in production, we conclude that the impact of oil price on oil production 
in the Bakken is asymmetric.
Unlike tight oil plays in Texas, the Bakken has more shale rocks with poorer quality than the 
thick Permian rocks with conventional pockets, and is more remote than the well-connected 
plays such as the Eagle Ford of Texas. Wells in this play require hydraulic fracturing and are 
drilled deeper and longer than most other tight oil wells, resulting in higher overall costs. This 
makes a stronger case for operators to react to negative market signals and decrease drilling 
activities as prices drop, leading to reduced production. But this was not observed in our 
analysis. Our results do not show a reduction in production in response to fall in oil prices but 
instead a reduction in oil production growth. Also, we observe a statistically significant reduction 
in well count in response to the oil price crash since Q4 of 2014 (Panel B, Table 26; Panel B, 
Table 27). Another characteristic that keeps this play productive is the high pressure observed at 
geologically deeper rocks as is observed in the Bakken. This over-pressure leads to higher oil 
production in Bakken wells for a longer period before gas production impedes further oil 
productivity.
Purdy et al. (2016) report that most operators in the Bakken held non-producing acreage at the 
time oil prices plunged in 2014 and were bound by lease terms to bring those leases to 
production. For the many producers who had hedged production at this time with oil prices over 
$90/bbl, such as Continental Resources, Inc. with vast acreage holdings in the Bakken, it was 
possible to continue drilling at contractually held oil prices (Continental Resources, Inc., 2014).
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For example, Continental Resources, Inc. used fixed swap prices to ensure it received oil prices 
as high as it had hedged, paying out the swap seller if prices went higher, and used collar 
contracts to ensure prices didn’t go lower than a floor price, its breakeven price for some projects 
(Continental Resources, Inc., 2014; EOG Resources, 2017a). In that way, it would receive make­
up funds for oil prices that went below its projected price or make payments if prices were better 
than it had locked in. For operators who applied this strategy for reducing exposure to oil price 
fluctuations, it would be economical to spend in stimulating wells that were already drilled prior 
to the price plunge and bringing them to production, and drill wells in undrilled acreage to 
maintain ownership of those resources. But for other producers who had started developing in 
this play earlier and already had production in their acreages, they could deploy drilling capital in 
other plays they had to keep, such as the newer tight oil plays like the Permian (Toon, 2016).
This is shown in the fact that rig count in the Bakken dropped significantly in response to the oil 
price plunge, while oil production loss was not significant. Since this play is among the most 
mature of U.S. tight oil plays, with less running room, drilling activities were more focused on 
other upcoming plays.
On the other hand, the statistically significant drop in rig count and the absence of a statistically 
significant reduction in oil production still points to potential mechanistic reasons tied to the 
longevity of this play as a tight oil producer. The Bakken play is a mature play and has 
undergone more cycles of oil price fluctuations than most other tight oil plays. A plausible 
reason contributing to the absence of a significant reduction in oil production in response to the 
price plunge is that, while similar oil price levels were experienced in the wake of the 2009 
economic recession, that period was not a focus of the investigation of the impact of the oil price 
plunge. This is because the change in oil prices was in the context of a general recession in the 
U.S. and the global economy. The focus on the more recent price plunge (assignment of dummy 
variable of 1 to only that period) and neglect of a period with similar, albeit less drastic price 
plunge (2009 period maintaining the dummy variable of 0), in an oil play that experienced both 
periods more fully, could lead to the observed results. This research focused more on the recent 
price plunge and not the others because of the structural differences in the economy across both 
periods.
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Niobrara
The Niobrara play, located in the DJ Basin in Colorado and Wyoming, contributes the least 
production among the four plays studied. Analysis of this play produced mixed results that, in 
most cases, were not found to be statistically significant. While there is a visible change in oil 
production in this play, this change was not found to be statistically significant in the long or 
short run periods. A plausible reason for this result is the mixed strategy of operators; oil and 
also significant gas targets are pursued for development in this play. This implies that oil price 
alone may not significantly explain development or behavior of operators in this play, in terms of 
how rigs are deployed or productivity of the play in general. Mixed development well results, 
lack of sufficient oil transportation infrastructure to improve the economics of development, and 
a comparatively high first year decline rate for Niobrara play wells may also be reflected in the 
undefined response of operator activity within this play (Crowe, 2013).
4.1.3. Summary: Oil Price and Tight Oil Development
This section has discussed the tight oil revolution in the U.S. with a focus on the impact of oil 
price on operator activity and tight oil production. By discussing development trends in key U.S. 
plays, as seen through the oil industry data, this work points to the potential impact of oil price 
on other non-US plays that are studied further in this research. Through a detailed look at the 
production, price, and rig count data, which are easily obtainable from public sources, this 
research has produced a framework for assessing other plays, using methods that are broader 
than those techniques available to the geoscientist, petroleum engineer or other subsurface 
scientists.
Building on the last chapter this section has also shown that interrelated segments of the crude oil 
system in the U.S. are important in understanding the impact of new technology or major shifts 
in the oil industry. Understanding, for example the link between the oil industry and financial 
system could enable the analyst see the impact of oil price hedges, the availability of midstream 
infrastructure on the presence or absence of observable production response to price swings.
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This analysis has also shown that oil price affects oil production. And that impact of price on 
production is not always symmetric across or even within plays; some plays are more susceptible 
to price movements and shocks than others. Oftentimes, a rise in oil prices could lead to 
production responses that are not eroded even when prices fall. This is especially possible due to 
efficiencies that some plays develop which enables them to weather minor price shocks. Another 
reason is that, besides typically drilling a new well, there are several components of oil 
production sustenance or enhancement that could be justified at different price points, such as 
different scales of refracturing operations, partial recompletions or artificial lift projects which 
are outside the scope of this research. And where possible, those are the first steps taken to 
maintain productivity during low price environments before the move to drill new wells.
Drilling rig count constitutes an important metric in understanding price impact on production. 
This is shown in the pace at which rigs are added or taken out of plays in response to price 
movements. This relationship between rig count and price is also made more complex due to lags 
in production and production reporting. Also, the practice of delayed completion of wells dims 
the correlations between rig count and production. The reaction time of operators in different 
plays is reflective of the geology and productivity of the plays, and the impact of these properties 
on the breakeven prices of plays.
Key findings of this section are as follows:
• Oil and gas activity provides a trail of data that can yield insights into operator behavior 
and the valuation of assets in different plays, which is best appreciated within an 
interdisciplinary framework.
• Oil price is important to operator decisions and tight oil development activity levels 
within the US, and this holds true for upcoming tight oil plays in other places.
• Oil price impacts oil production in a different way for every play based on geological and 
above-ground (facilities infrastructure) dynamics.
• Commercial terms governing mineral leases and how they are developed are important in 
oil and gas development decisions.
• Even the same operators who own assets in different plays will react differently based on 
the unique characteristics of the plays in which they operate.
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While this section has discussed the impact of oil prices, regulations set the rules and guidelines 
around which oil and gas operators operate. The next section will discuss the next two questions 
of this research. Firstly, what are some environmental legislations involved in oil and gas 
development in the U.S. and what are the environmental policy implications of tight oil 
development? After a review of the environmental implications surrounding tight oil 
development, the groundwork will be laid for delving into the next question: where else around 
the world could tight oil development lessons be applied? And what is the economic viability of 
developing similar resources in those other global locations?
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Chapter 5. GOVERNMENT ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 
AND U.S. TIGHT OIL PRODUCTION: ENVIRONMENTAL 
PERSPECTIVE
5.1. Introduction
Tight oil development in the U.S. has contributed significant benefits to local and state 
economies through employment, taxes, renewed manufacturing and service industries across the 
country. Of 15 active tight oil plays across the nation tracked by the EIA, the Eagle Ford and 
Bakken have contributed approximately 35% of total tight oil production from 2000 through 
2016 (EIA, 2017e). In 2013, the oil and gas production from mainly the Williston basin was 
estimated to contribute $43 billion to the North Dakotan economy (North Dakota State 
University, 2014) and the impact of the Texas Eagle Ford shale to the economy of 20 counties 
was estimated at over $25 billion (UT San Antonio, 2012). The positive impact of the U.S. tight 
oil boom could also be seen in increased national oil production and decreasing reliance on oil 
imports. Despite these benefits, many have called to question the impact that tight resource 
development has on the environment because of the significant environmental footprint of 
hydraulic fracturing.
Pearce and Turner (1990) summarize these negative impacts of economic activity as external 
cost or negative externality, resulting in a loss of welfare to those who suffer from it, such as 
those who are impacted by the noise, dust or air pollution, or higher housing costs due to tight oil 
development. If external costs are valued and compensation granted for the harm suffered by 
society, they become internalized in the business and the economic benefits of projects become 
appropriately adjusted. To the extent that social costs are not included in the overall economics 
of a project, the net present value derived from the assessment of project profitability does not 
reflect the true net benefit of the activity. The social costs associated with a development also 
depend on the environmental policy in play and how much right to pollute it accords the polluter 
or those external to the market who suffer from pollution (Pearce & Turner, 1990). The pareto 
optimal production level is that level of production which yields the level of revenue sufficient to
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attract investment in a venture, and appropriately compensate those who suffer from loss of 
welfare because of the same activity (Pearce & Turner, 1990).
Pareto optimal tight oil production levels could be achieved by elevated activity and oil 
production that will produce huge benefits that cover all costs related to the activity levels, or 
limited activity levels that will reduce the footprint of tight oil production while producing 
sufficient revenue to make the venture profitable. For example, this reduced level of production 
in tight oil development translates to less truck traffic, less water demands for fewer tight oil 
wells. A restriction of number of wells drilled or completed under the direction of such policy 
could mean reduced profitability for an asset and in some cases totally eradicate activity. For 
example, if the economies of scale benefits enjoyed by a seven well pad is reduced by a policy 
that leads to three wells drilled in that pad, the cost per well is increased, eroding profitability of 
the overall asset. For a small independent oil and gas firm, this loss in profitability could be the 
difference between sourcing high-interest capital to complete a project or missing out on options 
for financing the development of an asset.
Issues raised with respect to tight oil development include the following: (1) produced water 
management, (2) freshwater depletion, (3) fresh surface and underground water pollution, (4) 
methane gas pollution, and (5) traffic and noise pollution. This chapter is divided into four parts. 
The first part discusses the environmental issues involved in tight oil and gas development. The 
second part reviews a few U.S. environmental laws. The next part presents case studies on two 
tight oil development regions and local initiatives in place to address these environmental 
concerns with tight oil development. The fourth part is a cost assessment for different tight oil 
wastewater management options.
5.2. Environmental Externalities from U.S. Tight Oil 
Development
The United States experienced its largest oil production growth in a century in 2014 due, in large 
part, to a tight oil development boom across the country (EIA, 2015g). Tight oil production has 
shaped conversations around U.S. resource development and energy policy, oil industry job
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creation and oil and gas outlook beyond the next decade. This new chapter of oil development is 
different from any other previous oil development cycle in that the resource being developed is 
mainly unconventional, which requires significant investment and environmental disturbance. 
This level of environmental disturbance is driven by the need for hydraulic fracturing.
This section discusses some of the environmental issues experienced due to U.S. tight oil 
development.
5.2.1. Freshwater Depletion
Water use in hydraulic fracturing is among the central environmental issues regarding tight 
resource and shale development operations. Tight oil wells in the Eagle Ford and Bakken shale 
plays use approximately 4 to 5 million gallons of water for hydraulic fracturing (Allen, 2013; 
Schmidt et al., 2015). The average shale gas well uses more water, estimated at 5 million gallons, 
for drilling and completion (Energy4me.org, n.d). Prior to the record years of shale oil drilling in 
2013 and 2014, estimates of water used in hydraulic fracturing for 2012 ranged from 52 to 80 
billion gallons of water, which constituted less than 1% of total water use in the U.S. (EPA, 
2016a). Mostly freshwater is used for hydraulic fracturing due to the high cost of treating 
produced water of different chemistries, the negative impact of fine suspensions and the risk of 
spilling large volumes of stored produced water on site (Schmidt et al., 2015). As a result, just 
5% of fracking water is reused, with some variation across oil plays, and far less water reuse 
noted in the Permian and Eagle Ford and other areas with many disposal wells (EPA, 2016c).
While stakeholders who are interested in water conservation do question this massive water use, 
others see tight oil and gas water consumption as quite small when compared to other uses, or 
when compared to the benefits resulting from oil and gas production. According to 
Energy4me.org (n.d), an educational initiative program by the society of petroleum engineers, 
this water use accounts for less than 1% of water demand in most shale regions and 5 million 
gallons of water used by a shale gas well constitutes water use within a 12-hour period in a 
typical coal-fired power plant. And compared to energy produced by other operations, shale gas 
produces 1 million BTU of energy for every 3 gallons of water use, compared to 11 gallons for 
nuclear power and 23 gallons for coal-fired power plants (Energy4me.org, n.d).
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5.2.2. Produced Water Handling
Produced water constitutes approximately 99% of oil and gas industry wastes (American 
Petroleum Institute, 1997). With an increase in hydraulic fracturing since the 2000s, flowback 
water after each hydraulic fracturing operation could constitute a significant portion of produced 
water, especially in the first days of production. The Permian basin produced over 330 million 
barrels of water every month for the first half of 2016 (Jacobs, 2016). According to Slutz et al. 
(2012), approximately 10-40% of hydraulic fracturing water is produced as flowback water. And 
as a result of this massive volume of water following hydraulic fracturing, approximately 30­
40% of water production over the ten-year life of a well is produced in its first year (Jacobs,
2016). After the surge of water produced in the well’s early life, the rest is produced later 
alongside oil and naturally existing compounds throughout the life of the well.
Over the low oil price period of 2014 through 2017, oil operators have accumulated thousands of 
drilled but uncompleted wells which, if brought to production quickly following a recovery in oil 
prices, would bring with it significant water management challenges (Jacobs, 2016). Jacobs 
(2016) added that the wider problem is already evident in maturing plays like the Permian play, 
where oil makes up just a sixth of all liquid production.
Besides the problem of reduced revenue due to the production of water instead of oil, which is 
more valuable, water handling after production is a major problem not experienced in the days of 
conventional oil production. Unlike developments in conventional plays, where produced water 
could be quickly reinjected for secondary recovery purposes, the low permeability in tight oil 
plays takes away this option for water handling, leaving operators with the costly option of 
trucking water to farther disposal wells or for treatment. According to Jacobs (2016), because of 
insufficient understanding of these new tight oil plays and a hasty chase for geologic sweet spots, 
tight oil development was not strategic in most fields and failed to properly consider water 
management challenges, as is done in conventional oil development programs. As a result, even 
in low oil price periods, with all the challenges in raising capital, operators are turning to options 
like water-reuse and water trucking for disposal at costs of $100 per truckload per hour, while
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advancing more sustainable solutions through small-scale treatment, pipeline constructions 
(Jacobs, 2016).
Besides the cost and logistical inconvenience of produced water handling, the risk in massive 
produced water handling involves the potential for spills. The surge of water handled over a short 
period brings with it the risk of errors especially for new developers within an oil and gas play.
5.2.3. Process Safety and Ground Water Contamination
Some aspects of shale development have been a cause for concern from members of the public. 
Among these concerns are issues on health effects due to unconventional resource production 
operations such as the composition of hydraulic fracture and flow back fluid, the safety of 
underground freshwater sources, air pollution from volatile organic emissions and issues like the 
noise from drilling operations (Shonkoff et al., 2014). There is also the concern of potential 
health impacts of exposure to silica from huge sand quantities used during fracturing and the 
possible elevated levels of naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) from post-fracturing 
flow back fluids (Finkel & Hays, 2015). In addition, a review of contents of hydraulic fracturing 
fluid shows that some compounds in fracturing fluids are hazardous.
The drilling and completion process uses several barriers to ensure that oil and gas is contained 
within the hydrocarbon-bearing zone typically located thousands of feet below groundwater 
zones. The oil well is drilled past these shallow water zones and the use of steel casings 
cemented in place keeps the produced petroleum within the casing until it is produced.
The EPA (2015a) estimates that 20,000-30,000 wells hydraulically fractured annually from 
2011-2014 were mostly fractured less than a mile from 6,800 water sources which provided 
water to 8.6 million people. While the potential for contamination was high, the EPA found very 
few instances where contamination occurred, thanks to a combination of factors that ranged from 
well casing and cementing best practices to insufficient water baseline data collection (EPA, 
2015a). Finkel & Hays (2015) also echoed the EPA’s conclusion that the insufficiency of 
reputable published work that employed acceptable epidemiological study designs including 
baseline disease prevalence, exposed and control groups, clinical documentation of health
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o u t c o m e s  a n d  e x p o s u r e  p a t h w a y ,  m a d e  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e s t a b l i s h  d e f i n i t i v e l y  t h e  o c c u r r e n c e  o f  
h e a l t h  p r o b l e m s  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  a c t i v i t i e s .
5.2.4. Water and Mineral Rights Disputes in Tight Oil 
Development
L a n d  a n d  w a t e r  r i g h t s  i s s u e s  a l s o  b e d e v i l  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  t h e  U S .  E x a m p l e s  o f  m i n e r a l  
r i g h t  d o c t r i n e s  t h a t  g u i d e  c o m m o n  l a w  is s u e s  s u r r o u n d i n g  m i n e r a l  a n d  s u r f a c e  e s t a t e s  i n c l u d e  t h e  
i m p l i e d  e a s e m e n t  o f  r e a s o n a b l e  u s e ,  a c c o m m o d a t i o n  d o c t r i n e ,  a n d  r u l e  o f  c a p t u r e  ( A l l e n ,  2 0 1 3 ) .  
T h e s e  d o c t r i n e s  a r e  i n v o k e d  i n  d i s p u t e s  i n v o l v i n g  o i l  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  a n d  t h e  o w n e r s h i p  o f  w a t e r  
r i g h t s  ( s u r f a c e  o r  u n d e r g r o u n d )  f o r  u s e  i n  t i g h t  o i l  a c t i v i t i e s .  O f t e n ,  o w n e r s h i p  o f  s u r f a c e  r i g h t s  is  
d i s s o c i a t e d  f r o m  o w n e r s h i p  o f  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s .  T h e  i d e a  o f  i m p l i e d  e a s e m e n t  o f  r e a s o n a b l e  u s e  
a f f o r d s  t h e  o w n e r  o f  a  m i n e r a l  r i g h t  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  s u r f a c e  r i g h t  ( i n c l u d i n g  g r o u n d w a t e r )  e x c e p t  
w h e r e  s t a t e d  e x p l i c i t l y  i n  t h e  o i l  a n d  g a s  l e a s e  o r  m i n e r a l  d e e d  ( A l l e n ,  2 0 1 3 ) .  U n d e r  t h i s  
d o c t r i n e ,  t h e  o w n e r  o f  s u r f a c e  r i g h t s  c o u l d  s t i l l  s u e  f o r  d a m a g e s  i f  s u r f a c e  u s e  is  e x c e s s i v e  o r  
w a n t o n .
T h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  a c c o m m o d a t i o n ,  s i m p l y  p u t ,  e n s u r e s  t h a t  b o t h  t h e  s u r f a c e  r i g h t s  a n d  m i n e r a l  
r i g h t s  o w n e r s  a c c o m m o d a t e  e a c h  o t h e r  a n d  t o l e r a t e  m i n o r  i n c o n v e n i e n c e s  t h a t  c o m e  w i t h  s h a r e d  
o w n e r s h i p  ( A l l e n ,  2 0 1 3 ) .  A l l e n  ( 2 0 1 3 )  a r g u e d  t h a t ,  w h i l e  t h e  m i n e r a l  r i g h t  o w n e r  h a s  a  r i g h t  t o  
t h e  s u r f a c e  e s t a t e  t o  d e v e l o p  h i s  r e s o u r c e ,  t h i s  d o c t r i n e  e n s u r e s  t h a t  h e  a c k n o w l e d g e s  a n d  
a c c o m m o d a t e s  t h e  s u r f a c e  r i g h t  o w n e r ’ s p r e - e x i s t i n g  u s e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  w h e n  le s s  i n t r u s i v e  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  e x i s t  t o  t h e  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  o w n e r .  T h e  a c c o m m o d a t i o n  d o c t r i n e  a l s o  p r o t e c t s  t h e  
m i n e r a l  r i g h t  o w n e r  f r o m  u n n e c e s s a r y  l i a b i l i t y  c h a r g e s  b y  t h e  s u r f a c e  r i g h t  o w n e r ,  f o r  m i n o r  
i n c o n v e n i e n c e s  t h a t  m i n e r a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  m i g h t  c a u s e  ( A l l e n ,  2 0 1 3 ) .  W h i l e  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  t h e s e  
d o c t r i n e s  m a y  b e  s i m p l e  t o  u n d e r s t a n d ,  p r o v i n g  l e v e l s  o f  i n c o n v e n i e n c e ,  t h e  e a s e  o f  p u r s u i n g  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  m a k e  t h e  d o c t r i n e  a p p l i c a b l e  m a y  b e  c h a l l e n g i n g  a n d  r e s u l t  i n  c o n t r o v e r s i e s  i n  
t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  t h e  U S .
A n o t h e r  c o n c e p t  o f t e n  d is c u s s e d  is  t h e  r u l e  o f  c a p t u r e .  T h e  r u l e  o f  c a p t u r e  a l l o w s  t h e  o w n e r  o f  a  
g r o u n d w a t e r  w e l l  t h e  r i g h t  t o  u s e  t h i s  r e s o u r c e  a s  h e  s e e s  f i t  w i t h o u t  r e c o u r s e  t o  i t s  i m p a c t  o n  t h e
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g r o u n d w a t e r  a v a i l a b l e  t o  h i s  n e i g h b o r ,  w h o s e  w e l l  p r o b a b l y  f l o w s  f r o m  t h e  s a m e  r e s o u r c e  
( A l l e n ,  2 0 1 3 ) .  K e y  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  r u l e  e x i s t  w h e n  u s e  i s  w a s t e f u l ,  n e g l i g e n t  o r  m a l i c i o u s  a n d  
u n d e r  t h e  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s .
O t h e r  m i n e r a l  r i g h t s  d i s p u t e s  i n  o i l  a n d  g a s  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n c l u d e  s p a c i n g  o f  w e l l s  w i t h i n  le a s e s  
a n d  a c r o s s  s e g m e n t s  o f  l e a s e s  h e l d  b y  d i f f e r e n t  o w n e r s .  S o m e  s t a t e s  m a n d a t e  s p a c i n g  a n d  
u n i t i z a t i o n  r u l e s  f o r  o i l  a n d  g a s  d e v e l o p m e n t .  T h e s e  r u l e s  h e l p  t o  m i n i m i z e  p o t e n t i a l  i s s u e s  t h a t  
m a y  a r i s e  i n  r e s o u r c e  d e v e l o p m e n t .  T h e  p r i v a t e  l a n d  r o y a l t y  o w n e r  h a s  t h e  i n c e n t i v e  o f  d e s i r i n g  
m a x i m u m  d e v e l o p m e n t  w i t h i n  t h e i r  a c r e a g e  w h i l e  f o r  a  s t a t e  p l a y e r ,  t h e r e  i s  t h e  i n c e n t i v e  t o  
d i s c o u r a g e  w a r e h o u s i n g  o f  a c r e a g e  o r  t h e  h o l d i n g  o f  u n d r i l l e d  o r  u n d e v e l o p e d  p o r t i o n s  o f  t h e  
l e a s e .  W h e r e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  d r i l l - t o - k e e p  o r  p r o d u c e - t o - k e e p  e x i s t  i n  l e a s e  c l a u s e s ,  t h e r e  i s  a  
m o t i v a t i o n  f o r  t h e  o p e r a t o r  t o  q u i c k l y  d e v e l o p  t h e  a c r e a g e .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  S t a t e  o f  N o r t h  
D a k o t a  r e q u i r e s  h o r i z o n t a l  w e l l s  s h a l l o w e r  t h a n  t h e  M i s s i o n  C a n y o n  f o r m a t i o n  t o  b e  a t  m o s t  3 2 0  
o r  6 4 0  a c r e s  a p a r t  a n d  n o t  m o r e ,  b u t  w e l l s  d e e p e r  t h a n  t h e  M i s s i o n  C a n y o n  f o r m a t i o n  t o  b e  6 4 0 -  
a c r e  o r  m o r e  ( I O G C C ,  2 0 1 5 ) .  S t a t e s  l i k e  C o l o r a d o  d o  n o t  p r e s c r i b e  a  s p e c i f i c  s i z e  b u t  a l l o w  t h e  
q u a r t e r  o f  a  l e a s e  t h a t  i s  a c c e s s e d  b y  t h e  w e l l  t o  b e  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  d e v e l o p e d  a c r e a g e  ( I O G C C ,
2 0 1 5 ) .  T h i s  i s  t h e  s a m e  f o r  t h e  s t a t e  o f  A l a s k a  ( A A C ,  2 0 1 7 ) .
J a c o b s  ( 2 0 1 7 )  r e p o r t s  o f  i n t e r w e l l  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  d u e  t o  i n f i l l  w e l l s  a n d  w e l l s  d r i l l e d  t o o  c l o s e  
t o  o l d e r  w e l l s ,  t h e r e b y  r e d u c i n g  t h e  u l t i m a t e  r e c o v e r y  o f  o l d e r  w e l l s .  S i n c e  t i g h t  r o c k s  o f t e n  n e e d  
w e l l s  d r i l l e d  m u c h  c l o s e r  t o  e n s u r e  t h e  a c r e a g e  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  d r a i n e d ,  s o m e  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  c o u l d  
a l l o w  f o r  c l o s e r  w e l l  s p a c i n g s  s i n c e  t h e  r i s k  o f  d r a i n i n g  r e s o u r c e s  f r o m  a d j a c e n t  w e l l s  a t  f a r t h e r  
d i s t a n c e s  is  le s s  w i t h  t i g h t  o i l  w e l l s .  T h e  o i l  a n d  g a s  o p e r a t o r ,  E O G  r e p o r t s  o f  w e l l  s p a c i n g s  a s  
l o w  a s  6 5 0 f t  i n  i t s  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  t h e  B a k k e n ,  6 6 0  i n  i t s  P e r m i a n  o p e r a t i o n s  w i t h  p l a n s  o f  g o i n g  
d o w n  t o  5 0 0 f t  ( E O G  R e s o u r c e s ,  2 0 1 7 b ) .  A n d  w e l l  s p a c i n g s  i n  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  h a v e  
r e d u c e d  f r o m  1 0 0 0 f t  i n  2 0 1 0  t o  2 5 0 f t  i n  s o m e  e x t r e m e  c a s e s  ( J a c o b s ,  2 0 1 7 ) .  S o m e  s t a t e s  
m a i n t a i n  s e t  b a c k  r u l e s  t o  e n s u r e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  o n e  l e a s e  o w n e r  a r e  n o t  d r a i n e d  f r o m  a  
n e i g h b o r i n g  l e a s e .  T h e  s t a t e  o f  U t a h  m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  w e l l s  s t a y  6 6 0  f e e t  f r o m  u n i t  b o u n d a r i e s ,  t h e  
s t a t e  o f  I n d i a n a  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  w e l l s  s t a y  3 3 0  f e e t  f r o m  u n i t  b o u n d a r i e s  w h i l e  i n  o t h e r  s t a t e s  
s i m i l a r  r u l e s  a r e  s e t  b a s e d  o n  t h e  d e p t h  o f  w e l l s  ( I O G C C ,  2 0 1 5 ) .  O v e r a l l ,  t h e s e  r u l e s  a r e  m e a n t  t o  
r e d u c e  t h e  i n c i d e n c e  o f  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  m i n e r a l  i n t e r e s t s .
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5.2.5. Hydraulic Fracturing and Seismicity
T h e r e  h a v e  b e e n  r e p o r t s  o f  i n c r e a s e d  s e i s m i c  a c t i v i t y  i n  s o m e  a r e a s  i n  t h e  U . S .  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t i g h t  
o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  o p e r a t i o n s .  S o v a c o o l  ( 2 0 1 4 )  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  s o m e  r e g i o n s  h a v e  e x p e r i e n c e d  a  
s e v e n f o l d  i n c r e a s e  i n  s e i s m i c  a c t i v i t y  p a r t i a l l y  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  o n s e t  o f  s h a l e  d e v e l o p m e n t  
a c t i v i t i e s .  B o a k  ( 2 0 1 7 )  s h o w e d  s t r i k i n g  c o r r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  e a r t h q u a k e s  i n  
O k l a h o m a  a n d  u n d e r g r o u n d  w a t e r  i n j e c t i o n  i n  t h e  A u b u c k l e  f o r m a t i o n  ( F i g u r e  7 6 ) .
2009  2010  2011 2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018
F i g u r e  7 6 .  S e i s m i c i t y  a n d  U n d e r g r o u n d  I n j e c t i o n  i n  O k l a h o m a  ( B o a k ,  2 0 1 7 )
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  d i v e r s e  e f f o r t s  h a v e  b e e n  m a d e  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  w a t e r  
i n j e c t i o n  a n d  s e i s m i c i t y  a n d  t o  c o o r d i n a t e  m o n i t o r i n g  e f f o r t s .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  R a o  ( 2 0 1 4 ) ,  f o r  
h u m a n  a c t i v i t y  t o  c a u s e  e a r t h  m o v e m e n t s ,  u n d e r g r o u n d  i n j e c t i o n  o f  w a s t e  o r  p r o d u c e d  w a t e r  
m u s t  i n t r o d u c e  e n e r g y  i n t o  a n  a c t i v e  f a u l t ,  a n d  t h e  i n t e n s i t y  o f  t h e  m o v e m e n t  d e p e n d s  o n  t h e  
l e n g t h  o f  s u c h  f a u l t .  H e  a d d e d  t h a t ,  e x c e p t  f o r  v e r y  s m a l l  f a u l t s ,  3 D  s e i s m i c  s u r v e y s  c o n d u c t e d  
b y  o i l  e x p l o r a t i o n  a n d  p r o d u c t i o n  c o m p a n i e s  b e f o r e  d r i l l i n g  h a s  h e l p e d  o i l  o p e r a t o r s  i d e n t i f y  a n d  
s t a y  a w a y  f r o m  a c t i v e  f a u l t s .
T w o  t y p e s  o f  i n d u s t r y  d e v e l o p m e n t  a c t i v i t y  t h a t  o f t e n  r e s u l t  i n  s e i s m i c i t y  a r e  d u r i n g  h y d r a u l i c  
f r a c t u r i n g  a n d  d u r i n g  w a t e r  d i s p o s a l .  R a o  ( 2 0 1 4 )  n o t e d  t h a t  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m ,  
m i c r o s e i s m i c  s u r v e y s  c o n d u c t e d  t o  m o n i t o r  s e i s m i c i t y  d u r i n g  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n s
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h a v e  s h o w n  m o s t l y  m i n o r  s e i s m i c  e v e n t s ,  w i t h  a  f e w  i s o l a t e d  e v e n t s  t h a t  r e c o r d e d  2 . 5  o n  t h e  
R i c h t e r  s c a le .  C o n v e r s e l y ,  R a o  ( 2 0 1 4 )  n o t e d  t h a t  w a t e r  d i s p o s a l  p o s e s  a  g r e a t e r  c o n c e r n  o n  
s e i s m i c i t y  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  m o r e  c o n t i n u o u s .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  u n d e r g r o u n d  w a t e r  d i s p o s a l  b y  o p e r a t o r s  
w h o  p r o d u c e  o i l ,  s o m e  c o m p a n i e s  p r o v i d e  w a t e r  d i s p o s a l  s e r v i c e  o n l y  a n d  c o l l e c t  w a t e r  t h a t  is  
p r o d u c e d  c o n t i n u o u s l y  f r o m  o i l  a n d  g a s  w e l l s  f r o m  m u l t i p l e  o p e r a t o r s .  S e v e r a l  c a s e s  o f  i n c r e a s e d  
s e i s m i c i t y  i n  w a t e r  d i s p o s a l  a r e a s  h a v e  b e e n  r e p o r t e d  i n  t h e  O k l a h o m a  M i s s i s s i p p i  L i m e  p l a y  
( J a c o b s ,  2 0 1 6 ) .
T h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  m i c r o s e i s m i c  m o n i t o r i n g  t e c h n o l o g y  h a s  e n a b l e d  o p e r a t o r s  t o  d e t e r m i n e  a n d  
s t a y  b e l o w  t h r e s h o l d  i n j e c t i o n  r a t e s  t o  p r e v e n t  s e i s m i c i t y  ( R a o ,  2 0 1 4 ) .  A n d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  R a o  
( 2 0 1 4 ) ,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  f e w  o f  t h e  1 5 0 , 0 0 0  d i s p o s a l  w e l l s  a r e  r e l a t e d  t o  s e i s m i c  e v e n t s  s h o w s  t h a t  
n o t  a l l  w e l l s  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  s e i s m i c i t y  a n d  t h a t  t h e  d a n g e r s  o f  s e i s m i c  a c t i v i t i e s  c o u l d  b e  f u r t h e r  
r e d u c e d .  J a c o b s  ( 2 0 1 6 )  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  i t  c o u l d  t a k e  o v e r  a  y e a r  o f  r e d u c e d  i n j e c t i o n  a c t i v i t y  t o  s e e  
a  n o t i c e a b l e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  s e i s m i c i t y ,  a n d  a d v i s e d  t h a t  w i d e r  d i s p o s a l  n e t w o r k s  t h r o u g h  p i p e l i n e s  
o r  t r u c k i n g  w a t e r  t o  l o c a t i o n s  o u t s i d e  t h e  1 0 , 0 0 0  s q  m i l e  A r e a  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  w h e r e  s e v e r a l  s e i s m i c  
e v e n t s  h a v e  b e e n  r e c o r d e d ,  w o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d .
B o a k  ( 2 0 1 7 )  o b s e r v e d  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  s o m e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  s e i s m i c i t y  a l r e a d y  d u e  t o  i n t e r v e n t i o n s  
t h r o u g h  s t a t e  r e g u l a t i o n s  s u c h  a s  i n j e c t i o n  r a t e  c a p s ,  c u t  b a c k  o n  i n j e c t i o n ,  p l u g - i n  o f  w e l l s  
l o c a t e d  i n  m o r e  p r o b l e m a t i c  l o c a t i o n s  f o l l o w e d  b y  e n f o r c e m e n t  a c t i o n s  s u c h  a s  s t a n d i n g  r e q u e s t s  
f o r  d a i l y  i n j e c t i o n  r e p o r t s .  B o a k  ( 2 0 1 7 )  a l s o  a t t r i b u t e s  s o m e  o f  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  s e i s m i c i t y  t o  
r e d u c e d  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  a c t i v i t i e s  a n d  f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  d u e  t o  l o w e r  o i l  p r i c e s .  O t h e r  
a c t i o n s  b y  l e a d e r s  i n  t h e  s t a t e  o f  O k l a h o m a  b e s i d e s  r e d u c e d  i n j e c t i o n  d i r e c t i v e s  i n c l u d e  f u n d i n g  
f o r  s e i s m i c i t y  r e s e a r c h  p r o j e c t s ,  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  f u n d s  f o r  r e s p o n s e  u p o n  s e i s m i c  e v e n t s ,  a n d  t h e  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  t r a c k i n g  s y s t e m s  f o r  e a r t h q u a k e s  ( B o a k ,  2 0 1 7 ) .  W h i l e  a c k n o w l e d g i n g  t h a t  
m e a s u r e s  t a k e n  b y  e x e c u t i v e  a n d  p o l i c y m a k e r s  i n  t h e  s t a t e  h a v e  r e d u c e d  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  
e a r t h q u a k e s  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  u n d e r g r o u n d  w a t e r  i n j e c t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s ,  B o a k  ( 2 0 1 7 )  f u r t h e r  
r e c o m m e n d e d  a c t i o n s  t o  i m p r o v e  r e c y c l e  o r  r e - u s e  o f  f r a c k w a t e r ,  p i p e l i n e  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  t o  
e n a b l e  e a s y  t r a n s f e r  a c r o s s  l o c a t i o n s  a n d  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  o t h e r  d i s p o s a l  m e c h a n i s m s  s u c h  a s  
e v a p o r a t i o n .
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5.2.6. Hazardous Waste from Tight Oil Development Activity
W a s t e  f r o m  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  i s  m a i n l y  f r o m  p r o d u c e d  w a t e r  a n d  d r i l l i n g  w a s t e .  S i n c e  p r o d u c e d  
w a t e r  m a k e s  u p  o v e r  9 0 %  o f  t h i s  w a s t e  ( E P A ,  2 0 0 0 ) ,  i t  i s  t h e  f o c u s  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n .  W i t h  t h e  
o n s e t  o f  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  p r o d u c e d  w a t e r  c o u l d  b e  c l a s s i f i e d  i n t o  t w o  s e g m e n t s :  t h e  p o r t i o n  
o f  w a t e r  p r o d u c e d  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  ( i . e .  f l o w b a c k  w a t e r )  a n d  g e n e r a l l y  
p r o d u c e d  w a t e r ,  w h i c h  i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  l i f e  o f  e v e r y  w e l l ,  e v e n  i f  n o t  s t i m u l a t e d  b y  h y d r a u l i c  
f r a c t u r i n g .
a )  P r o d u c e d  W a t e r  W a s t e s  f r o m  u n s t i m u l a t e d  O i l  a n d  G a s  W e l l s
N o t  e v e r y  w a s t e  f r o m  o i l  a n d  g a s  p r o d u c t i o n  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  w e l l  s t i m u l a t i o n .  
S o m e  c o n t e n t s  f r o m  w a t e r  p r o d u c e d  f r o m  u n s t i m u l a t e d  w e l l s  c o n s t i t u t e  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e .  
C o m p o u n d s  l i k e  b e n z e n e  a n d  t o l u e n e  a r e  p r e s e n t  i n  o i l  a n d  g a s  p r o d u c e d  w a t e r  f r o m  w e l l s  u n d e r  
p r i m a r y  r e c o v e r y ,  t h a t  is ,  w e l l s  p r o d u c i n g  w i t h o u t  t h e  a i d  o f  n e a r b y  w e l l s  t h a t  i n j e c t  a n y  
s u b s t a n c e  t o  p r o v i d e  p r e s s u r e  s u p p o r t ,  w h i c h  c o u l d  l e a d  t o  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  c o n t e n t  o f  t h e  
a s s o c i a t e d  p r o d u c e d  w a t e r  ( E P A ,  2 0 0 0 ) .  C o m p o u n d s  f r o m  p r o d u c e d  w a t e r  l i k e  b e n z e n e  a n d  
t o l u e n e  a r e  k n o w n  t o  p o s s e s s  c a r c i n o g e n i c  p r o p e r t i e s ,  w h i c h  i n c r e a s e s  p u b l i c  a l a r m  a s  t o  t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  f o r  h a r m  f r o m  e f f l u e n t s  o f  t h e  o i l  a n d  g a s  p r o d u c t i o n  p r o c e s s .  I n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e s e  
c o m p o u n d s  h a s  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  p u s h  b y  e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s  t o  s e e  t h e  i n d u s t r y  c o n t i n u e  t o  s e e k  
b e t t e r  w a y s  t o  h a n d l e  p r o d u c e d  w a t e r  b e f o r e  d i s p o s a l  ( F r a c k f r e e C o l o r a d o ,  2 0 1 6 ) .
b )  P r o d u c e d  W a t e r  W a s t e s  f r o m  W e l l s  d u e  t o  H y d r a u l i c  F r a c t u r i n g
S o m e  c o m p o n e n t s  o f  w a s t e w a t e r  r e s u l t  d i r e c t l y  f r o m  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n s .  T h e s e  
h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  w a s t e  c o m p o n e n t s  a r e  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  w a s t e  d u e  t o  n a t u r a l  o i l  a n d  g a s  
p r o d u c e d  w a t e r .  S u c h  w a s t e  c o m p o n e n t s  c o u l d  b e  e x p e c t e d  i n  s i g n i f i c a n t  q u a n t i t i e s  a t  t h e  s u r f a c e  
o n l y  d u r i n g  t h e  f l o w b a c k  s t a g e  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  s t i m u l a t e d  w e l l s .  T h e  f l u i d  t y p e  a n d  c h e m i c a l  
w a s t e  f r o m  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  v a r y  w i d e l y  a c r o s s  s h a l e  p l a y s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h e  
h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n  a n d  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  s p e c i f i c  o p e r a t i o n  ( S l u t z  e t  a l . ,  2 0 1 2 ;  
T a b l e  2 8 ) . T h e  v o l u m e  o f  c r o s s - l i n k e r s ,  c o r r o s i o n  i n h i b i t o r s  a n d  s u r f a c t a n t s  u s e d  m a y  d e p e n d  o n
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t h e  s i z e  o f  f r a c t u r e s  i n t e n d e d ,  t h e  c o r r o s i o n  r i s k s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a n  o p e r a t i o n ,  a n d  p r e s s u r e  
r e q u i r e d  t o  p u m p  t h e  f l u i d s  i n t o  t h e  w e l l b o r e .  W a t e r  i s  o f t e n  u s e d  a s  t h e  b a s e  f l u i d .  S a n d  o r  
c e r a m i c  p r o p p a n t s  a r e  u s e d  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  g e l l i n g  a g e n t s ,  c r o s s - l i n k e r s ,  s c a l e  i n h i b i t o r s ,  
s u r f a c t a n t s ,  p H  c o n t r o l  c o m p o n e n t s ,  a n d  s t a b i l i z e r s .  E x a m p l e s  o f  t h e s e  c h e m i c a l s  a r e  m e t h a n o l ,  
a l d e h y d e ,  i s o p r o p a n o l ,  p o t a s s i u m  m e t a b o r a t e ,  p o t a s s i u m  h y d r o x i d e ,  e t h a n o l ,  n a p h t h a l e n e ,  a n d  1 ,  
2 ,  4  T r i m e t h y l b e n z e n e  ( F r a c f o c u s ,  2 0 1 6 ) .  T a b l e  2 9  s h o w s  c h e m i c a l  a d d i t i v e s  a n d  t h e i r  p u r p o s e s  
i n  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r e  f l u i d  a n d  t h e  w e b s i t e  w w w . f r a c f o c u s . o r g , m a n a g e d  b y  t h e  G r o u n d  W a t e r  
P r o t e c t i o n  C o u n c i l  a n d  t h e  I n t e r s t a t e  O i l  a n d  G a s  C o m p a c t  C o m m i s s i o n ,  is  a  f o r u m  b y  w h i c h  o i l  
a n d  g a s  o p e r a t o r s  r e p o r t  t h e  c o n t e n t s  o f  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  f l u i d  u s e d  i n  t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n s .
T a b l e  2 8 .  F l o w b a c k  B r i n e  A n a l y s i s  f r o m  S h a l e  P l a y s  a c r o s s  t h e  U . S .  ( S l u t z  e t  a l . ,  2 0 1 2 )
Barnett Eagle Ford Fayetteville Haynesville Marcellus Bakken
Sodium (mg/L) 10,741 10,900 13,804 34,879 24,445 45,100
Potassium (mg/L) 484 192 256 735 190 3,550
Magnesium (mg/L) 316 111 293 828 263 720
Calcium (mg/L) 2,916 1,270 1,046 7,052 2921 9020
Strontium (mg/L) 505 203 267 1,354 347
Barium (mg/L) 15 10 18 1,121 679 13
Iron (mg/L) 28 112 0 147 26 77
Chloride (mg/L) 23,797 19,318 23,856 71,143 43,578 91,300
Sulphate (mg/L) 309 163 13 0 4 440
Bicarbonate (mg/L) 405 736 6161 382 261 126
Total
Dissolved
Solids (mg/L) 39,516 33,015 45,715 11,7641 72,714 15,0346
Total
Suspended
Solids (mg/L) 1,272 840 700 868 0 0
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T a b l e  2 9 .  E x a m p l e s  o f  c h e m i c a l s  u s e d  i n  d e s i g n i n g  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  f l u i d  *  ( F r a c f o c u s ,  
2 0 1 6 )
Purpose of Additive Ingredients of fracking fluids
Base Fluid (carrying medium for proppants) Fresh, recycled or produced water
Proppant (to prevent fractures shutting in) Silica or ceramic
Gelling agent (to keep proppants in suspension) Guar Gum
PH Control (to provide conducive medium for other 
additives)
Sodium Hydroxide
Water Treatment Anti-bacterial Glutaraldehyde, methanol
Corrosion Inhibitor Aldehyde, Isopropanol, methanol
Cross-Linker (to improve density of carrying fluid) Potassium Metaborate, Potassium Hydroxide
Non-Ionic Surfactant (to reduce system friction) Ethanol, Naphthalene, 1,2,4 
T rimethylbenzene
Solvent Hydrochloric Acid
Similar functions as above Proprietary additives by operators or service 
providers
* N a p h t h a l e n e ,  m e t h a n o l  l i s t e d  i n  2 0 1 5  T o x i c  R e l e a s e  I n v e n t o r y  c h e m i c a l  l i s t  ( E P A ,  2 0 1 6 d )
T h r o u g h  t h e  F r a c f o c u s  w e b s i t e ,  t h e  E P A  ( 2 0 1 6 b )  i d e n t i f i e d  1 , 6 0 6  c h e m i c a l s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  
h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  p r o c e s s ,  1 1 %  o f  w h i c h  p o s e d  a  r i s k  o f  c a r d i o -  a n d  n e u r o - t o x i c i t y ,  c h a n g e  i n  
b l o o d  c h e m i s t r y ,  b o d y  w e i g h t ,  a n d  i m m u n e  s y s t e m ,  l i v e r  a n d  k i d n e y  t o x i c i t y  i f  c o n s u m e d  i n  
c o n t a m i n a t e d  w a t e r .  T h e  E P A  ( 2 0 1 5 a )  a l s o  n o t e d  t h a t  2 0  o f  t h e  m o s t  s o l u b l e  a n d  m o b i l e  
c h e m i c a l s  s u c h  a s  c h o l i n e  c h l o r i d e  a n d  h y d r o x y m e t h y l  p h o s p h o n i u m  w e r e  u s e d  i n  a b o u t  1 4 %  o f  
t h e  h y d r a u l i c a l l y  f r a c t u r e d  w e l l s .  W h i l e  n o n e  o f  t h e  a b o v e - l i s t e d  c h e m i c a l s  w e r e  f o u n d  i n  t h e  
2 0 1 5  T o x i c  R e l e a s e  I n v e n t o r y  ( T R I )  c h e m i c a l s  l i s t ,  o v e r  7 0 %  o f  c h e m i c a l  c o m p o n e n t s  o f  
p r o d u c e d  w a t e r  f r o m  u n s t i m u l a t e d  w e l l s  a r e  l i s t e d  i n  t h e  2 0 1 5  T R I  c h e m i c a l  l i s t  ( E P A ,  2 0 1 6 c ) .  
W i t h o u t  p u b l i s h i n g  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  c h e m i c a l s  i n  t h e  T R I ,  t h e  p u b l i c  i s  n o t  m a d e  a w a r e  o f  
t h e  r i s k  p o s e d  b y  p o t e n t i a l  r e l e a s e  t h r o u g h  p r o t o c o l s  e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  t h e  E P A .  C o n c e r n e d  
m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  h a v e  c o n t i n u e d  t o  p u s h  f o r  f u l l e r  d i s c l o s u r e  o f  c h e m i c a l s ,  w i t h o u t  a n y  
e x c e p t i o n s ,  a n d  a l s o  f o r  t h e  i n d u s t r y  t o  f u r t h e r  i t s  r e s e a r c h  i n t o  m o r e  b e n i g n  c h e m i c a l  o p t i o n s  t o  
r e p l a c e  c u r r e n t  a d d i t i v e s  t o  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r e  f l u i d s .
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S o m e  o f  t h e  i s s u e s  i n  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  a r e  n o t  u b i q u i t o u s  b u t  s p e c i f i c  t o  a  f e w  t i g h t  o i l  
p l a y s .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  t h e s e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i s s u e s  c o u l d  b e  u n d e r s t o o d  b e s t  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  
o i l  p l a y s  w h e r e  t h e y  a r e  a r g u e d .  S t a t e s  l i k e  N e w  Y o r k ,  N e w  J e r s e y ,  P e n n s y l v a n i a ,  T e x a s ,  a n d  
N o r t h  D a k o t a  h a v e  f a c e d  d i f f e r e n t  is s u e s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  w i t h i n  t h e s e  a r e a s  o n  b o t h  s id e s  
o f  t h e  t i g h t  r e s o u r c e  d e v e l o p m e n t  d e b a t e .  T h e  N e w  J e r s e y  l e g i s l a t u r e  b a n n e d  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  
h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  i n  2 0 1 1 ,  w h i l e  N e w  Y o r k  f i r s t  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  s t r i n g e n c y  o f  i t s  p e r m i t t i n g  
p r o c e s s ,  p u s h i n g  f o r  f u r t h e r  s t u d y  o f  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  t e c h n o l o g y  ( P a r l o w ,  2 0 1 1 ) ,  f i n a l l y  
i n s t i t u t i n g  a  b a n  o n  f r a c k i n g  i n  2 0 1 5  ( N Y  S t a t e ,  2 0 1 5 ) .  S u p p o r t e r s  o f  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  v i e w  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  t o  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  a s  a  lo s s  t o  t h e  r e g i o n s  t h a t  o p p o s e  t h e  p r a c t i c e .  C o n s i d i n e  e t  
a l .  ( 2 0 1 1 )  s t u d i e d  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i m p a c t s  o f  s h a l e  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  P e n n s y l v a n i a  b e t w e e n  
2 0 0 8  a n d  2 0 1 0  a n d  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  a  q u a n t i f i a b l e  lo s s  i n  e c o n o m i c  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  i n  
N e w  Y o r k  c a u s e d  b y  t h e  s t a t e ’ s m o r a t o r i u m  o n  s h a l e  e n e r g y  d e v e l o p m e n t .  T h e y  f o u n d  t h a t  t h e  
m o r a t o r i u m  h e l d  b a c k  $ 1 1 . 4  b i l l i o n  i n  e c o n o m i c  o u t p u t ,  1 5 0 0 0  t o  1 8 0 0 0  j o b s  i n  t h e  S o u t h e r n  
T i e r  a n d  W e s t e r n  N e w  Y o r k  a n d  $ 1 . 4  b i l l i o n  i n  l o s t  t a x  r e v e n u e .  T h e y  c o m p a r e d  t h e  e c o n o m i c  
b e n e f i t  o f  a  t y p i c a l  s h a l e  w e l l  a g a i n s t  i t s  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i m p a c t  a n d  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  t h e  e c o n o m i c  
b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  w e l l s  c o u l d  v e r y  w e l l  c o m p e n s a t e  f o r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i m p a c t s  o f  s h a le  d e v e l o p m e n t .
T h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i s s u e s  r a i s e d  w i t h  r e g a r d s  t o  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  c o u l d  b e  s e v e r a l  a n d  
i n t r a c t a b l e  g i v e n  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  i n t e r e s t  o n  t h e  i s s u e  a c r o s s  t h e  U S .  W h i l e  t r a d i t i o n a l  o i l  
a n d  g a s  s t a t e s  m a y  b e  m o r e  s y m p a t h e t i c  t o  t h e  p r a c t i c e ,  o t h e r  s t a t e s  w i t h  s i g n i f i c a n t  n o n - o i l  
e c o n o m i e s  m a y  a p p r o a c h  t h e  i s s u e  d i f f e r e n t l y .  T h i s  c h a p t e r  l a t e r  c r y s t a l l i z e s  t h e  i s s u e s  b y  
p r e s e n t i n g  t w o  c a s e  s t u d i e s  o n  t w o  s t a t e s  t h a t  h a v e  c h a m p i o n e d  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t .  O n e  o f  
t h e s e  s t a t e s ,  T e x a s ,  is  a  m o r e  t r a d i t i o n a l  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  s t a t e  i n  t h e  U . S .  a n d  t h e  o t h e r ,  N o r t h  
D a k o t a ,  h a s  b e e n  t r a n s f o r m e d  i n  t h e  l a s t  d e c a d e  f r o m  a  m o s t l y  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s t a t e  t o  o n e  t h a t  n o w  
r a n k s  s e c o n d  i n  o i l  a n d  g a s  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  U S .  T h e  t w o  c a s e  s t u d ie s  d is c u s s  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t  
o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a s p e c t s  o f  t i g h t  o i l  a n d  g a s  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  t h e  B a k k e n  P l a y  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a  
a n d  t h e  E a g l e  F o r d  P l a y  o f  S o u t h  T e x a s .  P r i o r  t o  t h e  c a s e  s t u d ie s ,  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n  d is c u s s e s  U . S .  
f e d e r a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u l a t i o n s  o n  w a s t e  m a n a g e m e n t  w i t h i n  w h i c h  o i l  a n d  g a s  d e v e l o p m e n t  
h a s  o c c u r r e d  i n  s t a t e s  d is c u s s e d  i n  b o t h  c a s e  s t u d ie s .
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5.3. U.S. Federal Laws Impacting Oil and Gas Industry Waste 
Management
O v e r  t h e  l a s t  c e n t u r y ,  l a w s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s  h a v e  b e e n  p r o m u l g a t e d  a t  t h e  f e d e r a l  a n d  s t a t e  l e v e l s  
t o  h a n d l e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i s s u e s  r e l a t e d  t o  o i l  a n d  g a s  d e v e l o p m e n t .  T h i s  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  r e s e a r c h  
d is c u s s e s  t h e  f e d e r a l  l a w s  i n v o l v e d  i n  o i l  a n d  g a s  w a s t e  m a n a g e m e n t .  T h e  k e y  is s u e s  f a c e d  b y  
t h e  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n d u s t r y  a r e  a s s e s s e d  a n d  t h e  c u r r e n t  s t a t e  o f  s o l u t i o n s  i s  a l s o  
d is c u s s e d .  T h r o u g h  t h e  l e s s o n s  d e r i v e d  f r o m  t h e  U . S .  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  o t h e r  t i g h t  o i l  p r o v i n c e s  
a r o u n d  t h e  w o r l d  c o u l d  f i n d  t e m p l a t e s  a r o u n d  w h i c h  i n d i v i d u a l  s o l u t i o n s  t o  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
i m p a c t s  o f  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  c o u l d  b e  d e r i v e d .
R e g u l a t i o n s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  a r e  c o d i f i e d  u n d e r  
T i t l e  4 0  o f  t h e  C o d e  o f  F e d e r a l  R e g u l a t i o n s  ( C F R )  w h i c h  c o n t a i n s  f e d e r a l  r e g u l a t i o n s  g o v e r n i n g  
a l l  f e d e r a l  a g e n c i e s .  H a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  r e g u l a t i o n  a t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t h e  s t a t e s  i s  m a i n l y  e n f o r c e d  b y  
s t a t e  a u t h o r i t i e s  w i t h i n  t h e  f r a m e w o r k  o f  r e g u l a t i o n s  a n d  g u i d e l i n e s  b y  t h e  f e d e r a l  a g e n c y  c a l l e d  
t h e  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  P r o t e c t i o n  A g e n c y  ( E P A ) .  P a r t s  o f  t h e  C F R  r e g u l a t i o n s  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  
h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  m a n a g e m e n t  a r e  p a r t s  2 6 0  t o  2 7 3  o f  T i t l e  4 0 .
T h e r e  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  U . S .  f e d e r a l  r e g u l a t i o n s  g o v e r n i n g  o n s h o r e  a n d  o f f s h o r e  s e g m e n t s  o f  t h e  o i l  
a n d  g a s  i n d u s t r y ,  a n d  t h e  w a s t e s  g e n e r a t e d  f r o m  b o t h  s e g m e n t s  a r e  m a n a g e d  d i f f e r e n t l y  
d e p e n d i n g  o n  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t r e a t m e n t  a n d  t h e  i n t e n d e d  u s e  ( E P A ,  2 0 0 0 ) .  E x a m p l e s  o f  r e g u l a t i o n s  
g o v e r n i n g  o f f s h o r e  o p e r a t i o n s  i n c l u d e  t h e  O u t e r  C o n t i n e n t a l  S h e l f  L a n d s  A c t  ( O C S L A ) ,  C l e a n  
A i r  A c t ,  C l e a n  W a t e r  A c t ,  S p i l l  P r e v e n t i o n  C o n t r o l  a n d  C o u n t e r m e a s u r e  P l a n s ,  a n d  O i l  S p i l l  
C o n t i n g e n c y  P l a n s .  T h e  o n s h o r e  r e g u l a t i o n s  a r e  m o r e  p e r t i n e n t  t o  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  b e c a u s e  
s o  f a r  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  o c c u r s  m a i n l y  o n s h o r e .  S o m e  o f  t h e  l a w s  r e g u l a t i n g  o n s h o r e  o i l  a n d  
g a s  e x p l o r a t i o n  a n d  p r o d u c t i o n  a r e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  ( E P A ,  2 0 0 0 ) :
•  S a f e  D r i n k i n g  W a t e r  A c t  ( S D W A )
•  C o m p r e h e n s i v e  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  R e s p o n s e ,  C o m p e n s a t i o n ,  a n d  L i a b i l i t y  A c t  ( C E R C L A )
•  R e s o u r c e  C o n s e r v a t i o n  a n d  R e c o v e r y  A c t  ( R C R A )
•  E m e r g e n c y  P l a n n i n g  a n d  C o m m u n i t y  R i g h t  t o  K n o w  A c t  ( E P C R A )
•  C l e a n  W a t e r  A c t  ( C W A )
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5.3.1. Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)
T h i s  l a w  w a s  p a s s e d  i n  1 9 7 4  w i t h  t h e  m a i n  g o a l  o f  s e c u r i n g  p u b l i c  s u r f a c e  a n d  u n d e r g r o u n d  
p o r t a b l e  w a t e r  s a f e t y  a c r o s s  t h e  U . S .  T h r o u g h  a m e n d m e n t s  i n  1 9 8 6  a n d  1 9 9 6  t h e  l a w  h a s  
i n c l u d e d  m o r e  p u b l i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  t r a i n i n g ,  u p g r a d i n g  w a t e r  s y s t e m s  a n d  s e c u r i n g  w a t e r  f r o m  
s o u r c e  p o i n t s  t o  c o n s u m p t i o n  p o i n t s ,  a n d  b y  2 0 0 4 ,  w a s  e x p a n d e d  t o  i n c l u d e  t h e  s e c u r i t y  o f  
1 7 0 , 0 0 0  w a t e r  s o u r c e s  w i t h i n  t h e  U . S .  ( E P A ,  2 0 0 4 ) .  T h r o u g h  a  l e g a l  f r a m e w o r k  t h a t  a l l o w e d  f o r  
s t a t e s  t o  a p p l y  f o r  p r i m a c y  a n d  t a k e  c h a r g e  o f  i m p l e m e n t i n g  a n d  e n f o r c i n g  S D W A  p r o v i s i o n s ,  
a l m o s t  a l l  U . S .  s t a t e s  c u r r e n t l y  e n f o r c e  s t a n d a r d s  o n  p a r  o r  s t r i c t e r  t h a n  E P A ’ s r e g u l a t i o n s  o n  
d r i n k i n g  w a t e r  ( E P A ,  2 0 0 4 ) .
T h e  S D W A  a l s o  o v e r s e e s  t h e  u n d e r g r o u n d  i n j e c t i o n  c o n t r o l  p r o g r a m s  o n g o i n g  i n  s e v e r a l  s t a t e s  
t h r o u g h  c l a s s  I  t o  c la s s  V I  w e l l s .  O f  t h e s e  w e l l s ,  o v e r  1 8 4 , 0 0 0  c l a s s  I I  w e l l s  a r e  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  
o i l  a n d  g a s  r e l a t e d  i n j e c t i o n ,  2 0 %  o f  w h i c h  a r e  f o r  d i s p o s a l  p u r p o s e s  ( E P A ,  2 0 1 6 c ) .  T h e  E n e r g y  
P o l i c y  A c t  o f  2 0 0 5  m a d e  a m e n d m e n t s  t o  t h e  S D W A .  C r i t i c s  o f  t h e s e  a m e n d m e n t s  s a y  i t  
a c h i e v e d  t w o  k e y  d e s i r e s  o f  t h e  o i l  a n d  g a s  i n d u s t r y ;  f i r s t l y ,  t h a t  t h e y  e x e m p t e d  h y d r a u l i c  
f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  f r o m  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  E P A  a n d  s e c o n d l y ,  t h a t  t h e y  f a i l e d  t o  b a n  t h e  u s e  o f  
d i e s e l  a s  f r a c t u r i n g  f l u i d s  e v e n  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  u n d e r g r o u n d  c o n t a m i n a t i o n s  ( E a r t h w o r k s ,  2 0 0 7 ) .  
T h i s  i s  b e c a u s e  d i e s e l  f u e l s  t y p i c a l l y  c o n t a i n  B e n z e n e ,  T o l u e n e ,  E t h y l b e n z e n e ,  a n d  X y l e n e  
w h i c h  a r e  w a t e r - s o l u b l e  a n d  c a n  e a s i l y  c o n t a m i n a t e  a n d  s p r e a d  t h r o u g h  w a t e r .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  
E P A  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  f r a c k i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  t h a t  u s e  d i e s e l  o b t a i n  a n  u n d e r g r o u n d  i n j e c t i o n  c o n t r o l  
( U I C )  p e r m i t  b e f o r e  c o m m e n c i n g  i n j e c t i o n  ( E P A ,  2 0 1 4 b ) .
S i n c e  m o r e  t h a n  9 0 %  o f  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  a r e  d o n e  w i t h  w a t e r  b a s e  f r a c t u r i n g  
f l u i d s ,  t h e  E P A  is  l a r g e l y  u n a b l e  t o  r e g u l a t e  t h e  b u l k  o f  t h e  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  a n d  t i g h t  o i l  
d e v e l o p m e n t  i n d u s t r y .  T h e s e  o p e r a t i o n s  a r e  r e g u l a t e d  a t  t h e  s t a t e  l e v e l  a n d  s i n c e  s t a t e  
e n f o r c e m e n t  i s  e m p o w e r e d  b y  t h e  E P A ,  t h e n  i t  i s  e x p e c t e d  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e ’ s e n f o r c e m e n t  o f  
g r o u n d w a t e r  p r o t e c t i o n  l a w s  e x c e e d  o r  a r e  o n  p a r  w i t h  E P A  s t r i c t n e s s  s t a n d a r d s  a n d  t h e  s t a t e s  
c a n  r e i n  i n  p o t e n t i a l  e x c e s s e s  o f  t h e  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n d u s t r y .  A  f u l l  s t a t e  e n f o r c e m e n t  o f  f e d e r a l  
r e g u l a t i o n s  w o u l d  a l s o  b e  i n  l i n e  w i t h  f i n d i n g s  b y  t h e  E P A  o n  d r i n k i n g  w a t e r  p r o t e c t i o n  
p u b l i s h e d  i n  2 0 1 6  w h i c h  r e c o m m e n d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  ( E P A ,  2 0 1 6 a ) :
199
•  T h a t  s t a t e s  e n s u r e  t h a t  w a t e r  w i t h d r a w a l s  f o r  f r a c k i n g  i s  c o n s i d e r a t e  o f  l o w  w a t e r  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  s e a s o n s  a n d  g e n e r a l  a b u n d a n c e  o f  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e  i n  t h e  a r e a .
•  T h a t  s t a t e s  e n s u r e  t h a t  o p e r a t o r s  a r e  m i n d f u l  o f  i m p a c t  o n  s u r r o u n d i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t  
d u r i n g  c h e m i c a l  m i x i n g  i n  p r e p a r a t i o n  f o r  a n d  d u r i n g  f r a c k i n g  o p e r a t i o n s .
•  T h a t  h i g h  w e l l  i n t e g r i t y  s t a n d a r d s  a r e  i n  p l a c e  t o  e n s u r e  g r o u n d  w a t e r  f o r m a t i o n s  a r e  
p r o t e c t e d .
•  T h a t  s t a t e s  w o u l d  p r o h i b i t  t h e  u s e  o f  u n l i n e d  p i t s  a n d  o t h e r  u n s a f e  f l o w b a c k  w a t e r  s t o r a g e  
a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  p r a c t i c e s .
•  T h a t  i n  s t a t e s  o r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  w h e n  s u r f a c e  d i s c h a r g e  o f  w a t e r  i s  p a r t  o f  w a t e r  
m a n a g e m e n t  s t r a t e g y ,  s t a t e s  e n s u r e  t h a t  f l o w b a c k  w a t e r  i s  p r o p e r l y  t r e a t e d .
•  T h a t  s t a t e s  e n c o u r a g e  r e c y c l i n g  a n d  r e u s e  o f  f r a c k  f l o w b a c k  w a t e r  s o  a s  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  
d r a w  o n  p o r t a b l e  w a t e r  s o u r c e s .
5.3.1.1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act
T h e  C o m p r e h e n s i v e  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  R e s p o n s e ,  C o m p e n s a t i o n  a n d  L i a b i l i t y  A c t  ( C E R C L A )  w a s  
p a s s e d  i n  1 9 8 0  t o  o v e r s e e  t h e  c l e a n u p  o f  h a z a r d o u s  s i t e s  t h a t  h a d  b e e n  a b a n d o n e d ,  i n t e r v e n e  i n  
h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  p o l l u t i o n  b y  i n d u s t r y  t o  f i n d  a n d  h o l d  p o l l u t i n g  p a r t i e s  l i a b l e ,  a n d  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  
f u n d  t o  a d d r e s s  t h e s e  is s u e s  t h r o u g h  t a x  o n  p e t r o l e u m  a n d  c h e m i c a l  i n d u s t r i e s  ( E P A ,  n . d  - a ) .  I t  
e s t a b l i s h e d  a  f r a m e w o r k  f o r  b o t h  q u i c k  r e s p o n s e s  t o  h a r m f u l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e l e a s e s  a n d  l o n g e r -  
t e r m  s u s t a i n a b l e  c l e a n u p  e f f o r t s .  I t  a l s o  e s t a b l i s h e d  a  t r u s t  f u n d  m e a n t  t o  f i n a n c e  p r o j e c t s  
p u r p o s e d  o n  c l e a n i n g  u p  o r p h a n e d  s p i l l  l o c a t i o n s  a n d  o t h e r  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  w h i l e  c r e a t i n g  
p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  g e t t i n g  p a y m e n t s  f r o m  l i a b l e  p a r t i e s .  T h e  t r u s t  f u n d  w a s  f u n d e d  t h r o u g h  t a x e s ,  
f i n e s  a n d  p e n a l t i e s  f o r  v i o l a t i o n s  f r o m  t h e  o i l  a n d  c h e m i c a l s  c o m p a n i e s ,  c o l l e c t e d  o v e r  $ 1 . 5  
b i l l i o n  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  5  y e a r s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e s e  t a x e s  h a v e  b e e n  d i s c o n t i n u e d  f o r  t h e  l a s t  d e c a d e  
( E a r t h w o r k s ,  2 0 0 7 ) .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  E a r t h w o r k s  ( 2 0 0 7 )  t h i s  l a w  a l l o w e d  t h e  f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  t o  
h o l d  l i a b l e  p a r t i e s  i n d i v i d u a l l y  a n d  c o l l e c t i v e l y ,  i n c l u d i n g  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  g e n e r a t o r s ,  p l a n t  
o p e r a t o r s ,  p a s t  o p e r a t o r s ,  a n d  h a z a r d o u s  m a t e r i a l  t r a n s p o r t e r s .  I t  a l s o  e n a b l e d  p a r t i e s  t o  s u e
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p a r t n e r  f i r m s  a n d  g e t  c o m p e n s a t e d  i f ,  t h r o u g h  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  a n d  c o l l e c t i v e l y  l i a b l e  p h i l o s o p h y  o f  
t h e  l a w ,  a  s i n g l e  l i a b l e  p a r t y  i s  m a d e  t o  p a y  f o r  t h e  e n t i r e  c o s t  o f  c l e a n i n g .
I n  1 9 8 6 ,  t h e  E P A ’ s p o w e r s  t o  e n f o r c e  t h i s  p r o g r a m  w a s  e x p a n d e d  t h r o u g h  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  
S u p e r f u n d  A m e n d m e n t  a n d  R e - a u t h o r i z a t i o n  A c t  ( S A R A ) .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  E P A  ( n . d .  - b )  
t h r o u g h  t h e  S A R A ,  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  i n c r e a s e d  i t s  a b i l i t y  a n d  o p t i o n s  f o r  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  l i a b i l i t i e s ,  i n c r e a s e d  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  p r o g r a m ,  c r e a t e d  a  p r i o r i t i z a t i o n  
s c h e m e  f o r  h a z a r d o u s  s i t e s  a c r o s s  t h e  c o u n t r y  a n d  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  t r u s t  f u n d  t o  $ 8 . 5  
b i l l i o n .
A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  E P A  ( n . d .  - a ) ,  t h e  C E R C L A  h a s  r e s p o n d e d ,  c o n t a i n e d ,  a n d  c o n t r o l l e d  h a r m f u l  
r e l e a s e s  i n t o  o v e r  2 , 5 0 0  s u r f a c e  a n d  u n d e r g r o u n d  l o c a t i o n s  a n d  b y  2 0 1 5 ,  t h e  E P A  h a d  a s s e s s e d  
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  s i t e s  f o r  r e m e d i a t i o n ,  c o m p l e t e d  s h o r t  a n d  l o n g - t e r m  c l e a n u p  o f  o v e r  
1 7 0 0  s i t e s ,  a n d  m a d e  o v e r  7 0 0  s i t e s  r e a d y  f o r  r e u s e .  A n d  s i n c e  2 0 1 5 ,  e f f o r t s  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  p a r t i e s  
l i a b l e  f o r  p o l l u t i o n  p a y  h a v e  a l s o  b e e n  o n g o i n g .  I n  2 0 1 5 ,  t h e  E P A  s e c u r e d  a  $ 2  b i l l i o n  
c o m m i t m e n t  f o r  c l e a n i n g  l i a b i l i t i e s ,  o v e r  h a l f  a  b i l l i o n  i n  r e i m b u r s e m e n t  f o r  p a s t  E P A  e x p e n s e s  
i n  c l e a n  u p  a n d  o v e r s i g h t ,  a n d  i n  s a m e  y e a r  a l l o c a t e d  c l o s e  t o  h a l f  a  b i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  i n  f u n d i n g  f o r  
n e w  p r o j e c t s  ( E P A ,  n . d .  - a ) .
5.3.1.2. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
T h e  R e s o u r c e  C o n s e r v a t i o n  a n d  R e c o v e r y  A c t  ( R C R A ) ,  p a s s e d  i n  1 9 7 6 ,  r e g u l a t e s  t h e  l i f e  o f  
h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  f r o m  g e n e r a t i o n  t h r o u g h  t r a n s p o r t ,  t r e a t m e n t ,  a l l  l e v e l s  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  u n t i l  
f i n a l  d i s p o s a l  a s  w e l l  a s  o t h e r  n o n - h a z a r d o u s  s o l i d  w a s t e  ( E P A ,  n . d .  - c ) .  R C R A  r e g u l a t i o n s  a r e  
f o u n d  i n  p a r t s  2 3 9  t h r o u g h  2 8 2  o f  T i t l e  4 0  o f  t h e  C o d e  o f  F e d e r a l  R e g u l a t i o n s .  T h e  R C R A  is  
d i v i d e d  i n t o  1 0  s u b c h a p t e r s  o f  w h i c h  t h e  t h i r d  ( a k a  s u b t i t l e  C )  i s  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  
h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  f r o m  g e n e r a t i o n  t h r o u g h  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  t o  d i s p o s a l .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  E a r t h w o r k s  
( 2 0 0 7 ) ,  f o u r  y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  p a s s i n g  o f  t h e  R C R A ,  t h e  U . S .  c o n g r e s s  b l o c k e d  t h e  E P A ’ s a b i l i t y  t o  
e n l i s t  o i l  a n d  g a s  w a s t e s  u n d e r  S u b t i t l e  C  b y  p a s s i n g  t h e  S o l i d s  W a s t e  D i s p o s a l  A c t  ( S W D A )  
w h i c h  e f f e c t i v e l y  d e f i n e d  o i l  i n d u s t r y  w a s t e  a w a y  f r o m  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  E P A .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,
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e f f e c t i v e l y ,  t h e  o i l  a n d  g a s  e x t r a c t i o n  i n d u s t r y  i s  e x e m p t e d  f r o m  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  R C R A  S u b t i t l e  
C  o n  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e s  ( E P A ,  2 0 0 0 ) .
W i t h  a  f e w  e x e m p t i o n s ,  t h i s  A c t  g e n e r a l l y  r e q u i r e s  f a c i l i t i e s  t h a t  d e a l  w i t h  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  t o  
o b t a i n  R C R A  p e r m i t s .  T h e  E P A  h a s  a u t h o r i z e d  a n d  m a i n t a i n s  o v e r s i g h t  o n  4 7  s t a t e  p r o g r a m s  
i n c l u d i n g  T e x a s  a n d  N o r t h  D a k o t a  t h a t  i m p l e m e n t  R C R A  p r o g r a m s  ( E P A ,  2 0 0 0 ) .  A m o n g  o t h e r  
m e t h o d s  o f  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  t r e a t m e n t  a n d  d i s p o s a l ,  t h e  R C R A  p e r m i t s  t h e  d i s p o s a l  o f  h a z a r d o u s  
w a s t e  i n  1 7 %  o f  c la s s 1  d i s p o s a l  w e l l s  l o c a t e d  i n  1 0  s t a t e s  i n  t h e  n a t i o n  ( E P A ,  n . d .  - d ) .
H o w e v e r ,  i f  t h e  o i l  a n d  g a s  e x t r a c t i o n  i n d u s t r y  i s  i n c l u d e d  u n d e r  t h e  R e s o u r c e  C o n s e r v a t i o n  a n d  
R e c o v e r y  A c t  ( R C R A )  a n d  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  i s  r e p o r t e d  a n d  l i s t e d  u n d e r  t h e  T o x i c  R e l e a s e  
I n v e n t o r y  u n d e r  t h e  E m e r g e n c y  P l a n n i n g  a n d  C o m m u n i t y  R i g h t - t o - k n o w  A c t ,  ( E P C R A )  t h e r e  
a r e  a  f e w  p o t e n t i a l  o u t c o m e s .
F i r s t l y ,  t h e r e  i s  t h e  b u s i n e s s  a s  u s u a l  s c e n a r i o .  I f  t h e  s t a t e - r u n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  p r o g r a m s  
a r e  E P A - a u t h o r i z e d ,  ‘ a c c r e d i t e d ’ , a n d  e n f o r c i n g  l a w s  t h a t  a r e  a t  l e a s t  a s  s t r i n g e n t  a s  E P A  l a w s ,  
t h e  m a n n e r  i n  w h i c h  t h e s e  w a s t e s  a r e  h a n d l e d  w i l l  n o t  c h a n g e .  W h a t  c o u l d  c h a n g e  i s  t h e  p u b l i c  
a w a r e n e s s  a n d  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  t h a t  r e s u l t s  f r o m  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  m o r e  f a c i l i t i e s  w o u l d  r e p o r t  t o x i c  
r e l e a s e s  u n d e r  t h e  E P C R A .  H o w e v e r ,  a  r e v i e w  o f  t h e  s t i p u l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  T e x a s  a n d  N o r t h  D a k o t a  
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o d e s  s h o w s  t h a t  t h e s e  s t a t e s  p r e s c r i b e  E P A  g u i d e l i n e s  o n  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  
m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  l a r g e l y  d r a w  d e f i n i t i o n s  a n d  g u i d e l i n e s  f r o m  t h e  C o d e  o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  R e p u b l i c  
w h i c h  e m p o w e r s  t h e  E P A .  A n o t h e r  r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  b u s i n e s s  a s  u s u a l  s c e n a r i o  i s  t h a t  t h e  
c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  s o m e  r e p o r t a b l e  c h e m i c a l s  i n  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  w a t e r  m a y  k e e p  t h e m  b e l o w  
r e p o r t a b l e  t h r e s h o l d s .
O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  o i l  a n d  g a s  e x t r a c t i o n  i n d u s t r y  u n d e r  t h e  R C R A  c o u l d  i n c r e a s e  
w a s t e w a t e r  m a n a g e m e n t  b u r d e n  f r o m  f r a c k e d  w e l l s ,  i f  f l o w b a c k  w a t e r  e x h i b i t s  h a z a r d o u s  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  i n  t h e  E a g l e  F o r d ,  T e x a s  a n d  o t h e r  a r e a s  w i t h  s e v e r a l  d is p o s a l  
w e l l s ,  t h e r e  c o u l d  b e  i n c r e a s e d  c o s t  i n  c o m m e r c i a l  i n j e c t i o n  i n  c l a s s  1 h a z a r d o u s  d i s p o s a l  w e l l s .  
T h i s  b u r d e n  w i l l  b e  g r e a t e r  i n  s t a t e s  w i t h  e v e n  f e w e r  o r  n o  h a z a r d o u s  d i s p o s a l  w e l l s  s u c h  a s
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N o r t h  D a k o t a .  T h i s  m a y  a l s o  g e n e r a t e  i n t e r e s t  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  w a t e r  r e c y c l e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  t h a t  w i l l  
r e d u c e  t h e  o v e r a l l  f o o t p r i n t  o f  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  a n d  t h e  o i l  a n d  g a s  i n d u s t r y .
5.3.1.3. Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know 
Act (EPCRA)
T h e  E m e r g e n c y  P l a n n i n g  a n d  C o m m u n i t y  R i g h t - t o - k n o w  A c t  ( E P C R A )  s e c t i o n  3 1 3  r e q u i r e s  
g e n e r a t o r s ,  t r a n s p o r t e r s  a n d  u s e r s  o f  h a z a r d o u s  c h e m i c a l s  a b o v e  s t i p u l a t e d  t h r e s h o l d s  t o  s u b m i t  
a n n u a l  t o x i c  r e le a s e  r e p o r t s  t o  t h e  T o x i c  R e l e a s e  I n v e n t o r y  ( T R I )  ( E P A ,  2 0 0 0 ) .  T h e s e  f a c i l i t i e s  
m u s t  h a v e  1 0  o r  m o r e  e m p l o y e e s  t o  f a l l  u n d e r  t h i s  r e g u l a t i o n ,  b e  i n v o l v e d  i n  s p e c i f i c  i n d u s t r y  
s e c t o r s  l i s t e d  u n d e r  t h i s  A c t  a n d  u s e  c h e m i c a l s  l i s t e d  u n d e r  a  l i s t  d e v e l o p e d  b y  t h e  E P A ,  a b o v e  
t h r e s h o l d  l i m i t s  ( E P A ,  n . d .  - e ) .  T h e  E P C R A  s e c t i o n  3 1 3  e x e m p t s  t h e  o i l  a n d  g a s  e x t r a c t i o n  
i n d u s t r y  f r o m  r e p o r t i n g  i t s  w a s t e  u n d e r  t h e  T o x i c  R e l e a s e  I n v e n t o r y  ( E P A ,  2 0 0 0 ) .  T h i s  
e x e m p t i o n  i m p l i e s  t h e  i n d u s t r y ’ s f a c i l i t i e s  d o  n o t  n e e d  t o  k e e p  r e c o r d s  o f  o r  r e p o r t  t h e  c h e m i c a l s  
a n d  h a z a r d o u s  m a t e r i a l s  t h e y  m a n a g e ,  o r  c o o r d i n a t e  w i t h  s t a t e  a n d  l o c a l  e m e r g e n c y  r e s p o n s e  a n d  
p l a n n i n g  c o m m i t t e e s .  A n  E P A  r e s p o n s e  t o  a  2 0 1 2  p e t i t i o n  f i l e d  t o  i n c l u d e  t h e  o i l  a n d  g a s  
e x t r a c t i o n  i n d u s t r y  u n d e r  t h e  T R I  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  E P C R A  w a s  p a r t l y  r e j e c t e d  ( E P A ,  2 0 1 5 b ) .  
T h e  g a s  s e c t o r  w a s  a c c e p t e d  f o r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  b u t  t h e  o i l  s e c t o r  w a s  r e j e c t e d  s t a t i n g ,  a m o n g  o t h e r  
r e a s o n s ,  t h a t  t h e  c h e m i c a l  r e l e a s e  a t  t h e  w e l l  l e v e l  d i d  n o t  m e e t  r e p o r t i n g  t h r e s h o l d s  a n d  a t  t h e  
s m a l l e s t  u n i t s  o f  m e a s u r e m e n t ,  w e l l  s i t e s ,  h a r d l y  a n y  f a c i l i t i e s  h a d  1 0  o r  m o r e  e m p l o y e e s  ( E P A ,  
2 0 1 5 b ) .
5.3.1.4. Clean Water Act (CWA)
T h e  C l e a n  W a t e r  A c t  ( C W A )  p a s s e d  i n  1 9 7 2 ,  e m p o w e r e d  t h e  E P A  t o  r e g u l a t e  t h e  d i s c h a r g e  o f  
w a s t e  i n t o  U . S .  w a t e r w a y s  ( E P A ,  n . d .  - f ) .  I t  a l s o  a l l o w e d  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a  p e r m i t t i n g  s y s t e m  b y  
w h i c h  d i s c h a r g e s  i n t o  s u r f a c e  w a t e r s  w e r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  m e e t  s e t  c o n t a m i n a n t  l e v e l s .  W a s t e w a t e r  
r u n o f f s  f r o m  o i l  a n d  g a s  a c t i v i t y  s i t e s  w e r e  e x e m p t e d  f r o m  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  C W A  ( E P A ,  n . d  
- g )  b u t  t h r o u g h  a  s e r ie s  o f  a m e n d m e n t s ,  t h e  E P A  w a s  e m p o w e r e d  t o  r e g u l a t e  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  s i t e s  
l a r g e r  t h a n  5  a c r e s  ( E a r t h w o r k s ,  2 0 0 7 ) .
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T h e  U . S .  f e d e r a l  r e g u l a t i o n s  d is c u s s e d  a b o v e  d o  n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  a n  e x h a u s t i v e  r e v i e w  o f  a l l  l a w s  
t h a t  a f f e c t  o i l  a n d  g a s  o p e r a t i o n s .  R a t h e r ,  t h e y  s h o w  t h a t  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  t h e  
p e t r o l e u m  i n d u s t r y  a n d  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  e n t i r e l y  u n c h e c k e d .  F o r  
t h e s e  a c t i v i t i e s  t o  h a v e  b e e n  s u s t a i n e d  t h r o u g h  s e v e r a l  d e c a d e s  w i t h  t h e  s o c i a l  l i c e n s e  t o  o p e r a t e  
w i t h i n  t h e  c o m m u n i t i e s  i n  w h i c h  t h e y  e x i s t ,  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u l a t i o n s  p l a y e d  a  m a j o r  r o l e .  T h e  
r e v i e w  o f  t h e  l a w s  a l s o  s h o w  t h a t  i n  s o m e  c a s e s  t h e  o i l  a n d  g a s  i n d u s t r y  w a s  t r e a t e d  d i f f e r e n t l y .
A  m a j o r  e x a m p l e  o f  t h e  u n i q u e  t r e a t m e n t  o f  t h e  o i l  a n d  g a s  i n d u s t r y  s t e m s  f r o m  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  
a n d  t a x  b o o s t  p r o v i d e d  t o  s p e c i f i c  o p e r a t i n g  w e l l  c a t e g o r i e s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  s t r i p p e r  w e l l s .  S t r i p p e r  
w e l l s  ( w e l l s  p r o d u c i n g  l e s s  t h a n  1 0 b b l s  o f  o i l  p e r  d a y )  a r e  l a r g e l y  e x e m p t e d  f r o m  m o s t  f e d e r a l  
a n d  s t a t e  r e g u l a t i o n s  d u e  t o  p o t e n t i a l l y  l o w  e m i s s i o n s  f r o m  t h e m  a n d  t h e  d r i v e  t o  i n c e n t i v i z e  
t h e i r  o w n e r s  t o  k e e p  t h e m  o p e r a t i o n a l  ( E P A ,  2 0 0 0 ) .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e s e  w e l l s  c o n s t i t u t e  a  h u g e  
s e g m e n t  o f  o p e r a t i n g  o i l  w e l l s  i n  t h e  U S .  F r o m  1 9 7 6  t o  2 0 0 7  s t r i p p e r  w e l l s  h a v e  c o n s t i t u t e d  7 1  
t o  8 5  %  o f  a l l  o i l  w e l l s  i n  t h e  U . S .  ( I n d e p e n d e n t  P e t r o l e u m  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  A m e r i c a ,  2 0 1 6 ) .  
E n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t  g r o u p s  h a v e  a r g u e d  t h a t  c u r r e n t  l a w s  h a v e  n o t  g o n e  f a r  e n o u g h  i n  r e s t r i c t i n g  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  v i o l a t i o n s  p e r p e t r a t e d  b y  t h e  o i l  a n d  g a s  a c t i v i t i e s  ( F r a c k f r e e C o l o r a d o ,  n . d . ) .  T h e  
C o l o r a d o - b a s e d  g r o u p ,  F r a c k f r e e C o l o r a d o  ( n .  d . )  a r g u e d  t h a t  b y  d e s i g n  o r  i n a d v e r t e n t l y ,  t h e  o i l  
a n d  g a s  i n d u s t r y  w a s  l a r g e l y  e x e m p t  f r o m  t h e  s t r o n g e s t  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  l a w s .  A  
m a j o r  e x a m p l e ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h i s  g r o u p  is  t h e  e x e m p t i o n  o f  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  f r o m  t h e  
r e g u l a t i o n  o f  o t h e r  f o r m s  o f  u n d e r g r o u n d  i n j e c t i o n  u n d e r  t h e  S a f e  D r i n k i n g  W a t e r  A c t .
G i v e n  t h e i r  i m p a c t  o n  h a z a r d o u s  c o n t a m i n a n t s  c o n t r o l  a n d  p u b l i c  i n v o l v e m e n t  a n d  t r a n s p a r e n c y  
o f  w a s t e  r e c o r d s ,  t w o  l a w s  m o s t  c r i t i c a l  t o  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  o i l  a n d  g a s  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  a r e  t h e  
R C R A  a n d  E P C R A .  T h e  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  P r o t e c t i o n  A g e n c y  r e g u l a t e s  w a s t e  h a n d l i n g  i n  m a n y  
i n d u s t r y  s e c t o r s  a n d  r e p o r t s  w a s t e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  R C R A .  T h e  o i l  a n d  g a s  
e x t r a c t i o n  i n d u s t r y  i s  e x e m p t e d  f r o m  t h e  R C R A  a n d  f r o m  r e p o r t i n g  i t s  w a s t e  i n  T o x i c  R e l e a s e  
I n v e n t o r i e s  ( T R I )  u n d e r  t h e  E m e r g e n c y  P l a n n i n g  a n d  C o m m u n i t y  R i g h t  t o  k n o w  A c t  ( E P C R A )  
( E P A ,  n . d .  - h ) .  T h i s  h a s  l e d  t o  d i s c o n t e n t  a m o n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a c t i v i s t s  a n d  s k e p t i c s  o f  t h e  o i l  
a n d  g a s  i n d u s t r y .
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W h i l e  a  b r o a d  r e v i e w  o f  f e d e r a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  r e g u l a t i o n s  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  c o v e r a g e  o f  e x i s t i n g  
l a w s  a n d  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  o f  t h e  o i l  a n d  g a s  i n d u s t r y ,  a  n a r r o w e r  r e v i e w  o f  t h e  i n t e r p l a y  b e t w e e n  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  l a w s  a n d  t h e  t i g h t  o i l  i n d u s t r y  c o u l d  b e  b e t t e r  u n d e r s t o o d  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  
s p e c i f i c  o i l  p r o v i n c e s  a n d  o i l  p l a y s .  T h i s  r e v i e w  is  p r o v i d e d  n e x t ,  w i t h  a  f o c u s  o n  c a s e  s t u d ie s  i n  
t h e  B a k k e n  p l a y  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a  a n d  t h e  E a g l e  F o r d  p l a y  o f  S o u t h  T e x a s .
5.4. Case Studies for Tight Oil Development and Environmental
Issues
5.4.1. The State of North Dakota: The Environment and Tight
Oil Development
T h e  s t a t e  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a  h a s  b e c o m e  t h e  c a p i t a l  o f  t h e  U . S .  o i l  p r o d u c t i o n  c o m e b a c k  o f  t h e  l a s t  
d e c a d e ,  a n d  r a n k s  s e c o n d  a m o n g  o i l  p r o d u c i n g  s t a t e s  n e x t  t o  t h e  m o r e  t r a d i t i o n a l  t o p  o i l  
p r o d u c i n g  s t a t e  o f  T e x a s .  O i l  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  N o r t h  D a k o t a  h a s  r i s e n  f r o m  u n d e r  1 0 0  t h o u s a n d  
b a r r e l s  p e r  d a y  i n  2 0 0 5  t o  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  1 . 2  m i l l i o n  b a r r e l s  p e r  d a y  i n  2 0 1 5  ( E I A ,  2 0 1 7 c ) .  
S o u r c e s  o f  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  w a t e r  i n  N o r t h  D a k o t a  a r e  b o t h  s u r f a c e  a n d  u n d e r g r o u n d .  T h e  
m a i n  w a t e r  s o u r c e  is  t h e  M i s s o u r i  w a t e r  s y s t e m  a n d  u n d e r g r o u n d  w a t e r  s o u r c e s  i n c l u d e  p o t a b l e  
w a t e r  f o r m a t i o n s  l o c a t e d  a t  d e p t h s  o f  2 0 0 0  f t ,  a l o n g s i d e  l e s s  p o t a b l e  w a t e r  s u p p l i e s  l o c a t e d  a t  
d e p t h s  o f  5 0 0 0 - 6 0 0 0  f t  ( N D  S t a t e  W a t e r  C o m m i s s i o n ,  2 0 1 6 ) .
T h e  i m p a c t  o f  o i l  p r o d u c t i o n  g r o w t h  h a s  b e e n  h u g e  f o r  t h e  s t a t e  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a  ( N D ) .  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  P a r l o w  ( 2 0 1 1 ) ,  o i l  p r o d u c t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s  y i e l d e d  t h e  s t a t e  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a  
a p p r o x i m a t e l y  $ 7 0 0  m i l l i o n  i n  t a x  r e v e n u e s  i n  2 0 1 1 ,  i n c r e a s i n g  s t a t e  f u n d s  f o r  r o a d  r e p a i r s  a n d  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  l o w  c o s t  h o u s i n g ,  r a i s e d  s a l a r i e s  w i t h i n  t h e  s t a t e  a n d  p u s h e d  d o w n  
u n e m p l o y m e n t  r a t e s  t o  a s  l o w  a s  2 . 5 % .  T h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  t h i s  d e v e l o p m e n t  a r e  a l s o  s h a r e d  a m o n g  
t h e  S t a t e ’ s n a t i v e  p o p u l a t i o n s .  T h r o u g h  s t a t e - t r i b a l  c o l l a b o r a t i o n s ,  t h e  s t a t e  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a  h a s  
s e c u r e d  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  o n  r e s e r v a t i o n  l a n d ,  l e a d i n g  t o  t h e  a c c r u a l  o f  m i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s  i n  s t a t e  
t a x e s ,  a b o u t  a  t h i r d  o f  w h i c h  is  s h a r e d  w i t h  t h e  t r i b e s  ( P a r l o w ,  2 0 1 1 ) .  H o w e v e r ,  a l o n g s i d e  a l l  t h e  
b e n e f i t s  o f  i n t e n s e  o i l  a n d  g a s  d e v e l o p m e n t  a c t i v i t i e s ,  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o s t s  h a v e  b e e n  i n c u r r e d .
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Challenges in Tight Oil Resource Development
T h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n  d is c u s s e s  s o m e  is s u e s  t h a t  t h e  S t a t e  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a  g r a p p l e s  w i t h  i n  i t s  
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t i g h t  o i l  r e s o u r c e s .
Natural Gas Flaring Concerns
T h e  r a p i d  p r o d u c t i o n  i n c r e a s e  o b s e r v e d  i n  t h e  s t a t e  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a  b r o u g h t  a l o n g  g a s  h a n d l i n g  
i s s u e s  w h i c h  h a v e  l e d  t o  t h e  d i s p o s a l  o f  n a t u r a l  g a s  b y  b u r n i n g  ( g a s  f l a r i n g ) .  O i l  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  
N o r t h  D a k o t a  g r e w  b y  a l m o s t  4 0 0 %  f r o m  J a n u a r y  2 0 1 0  t h r o u g h  2 0 1 4 ,  a l m o s t  d o u b l i n g  g a s  
p r o d u c t i o n  a l o n g s i d e ,  a n d  g a s  g a t h e r i n g  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  h a s  l a g g e d  t h i s  p a c e  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t  ( E I A ,  
2 0 1 4 e ;  E I A ,  2 0 1 7 d ) .  T h i s  l a g  i n  t h e  p a c e  o f  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  g r o w t h  s t e m s  f r o m  t h e  l o w  e c o n o m i c  
a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  o f  i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  c o n s t r u c t i n g  g a s  g a t h e r i n g  l i n e s  t o  a d d r e s s  t h i s  is s u e ,  g i v e n  t h e  
s m a l l  v o l u m e  o f  g a s  a n d  t h e  s p r e a d  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t .  O t h e r  is s u e s  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  f l a r i n g  i n c l u d e  
( 1 )  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w i t h  a l i g n i n g  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  s u r f a c e  l a n d  o w n e r s  f o r  p i p e l i n e  r o u t i n g  a n d  f a c i l i t y  
c o n s t r u c t i o n s ,  ( 2 )  p e r m i t t i n g  d e l a y s ,  ( 3 )  c o u n t y  z o n i n g  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  ( 4 )  h a r s h  w e a t h e r  c o n d i t i o n s ,  
( 5 )  t h e  r i g h t  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  t o  h a n d l e  t h e  p r e s s u r e  o f  n e w  w e l l s ,  ( 6 )  t h e  r e p u r p o s i n g  o f  l i q u i d  
p i p e l i n e s  f o r  g a s  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  a n d  ( 7 )  t h e  h i g h  c o s t  o f  g e t t i n g  t h e  g a s  t o  p i p e l i n e  q u a l i t y  ( E I A ,  
2 0 1 4 f ;  L e e ,  2 0 1 7 ) .  N o r t h  D a k o t a  r e g u l a t i o n s  a l s o  a l l o w e d  n e w  w e l l s  t o  f l a r e  t h e  g a s  p r o d u c e d  
a l o n g s i d e  o i l  e a r l y  i n  t h e  l i f e  o f  w e l l s  a l o n g s i d e  o t h e r  e x e m p t i o n s  m e a n t  t o  a c c o m m o d a t e  g a s  
h a n d l i n g  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  s o  a s  n o t  t o  s t i f l e  o i l  p r o d u c t i o n  ( N D A C ,  2 0 1 4 ) .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  t h e  s h a r e  o f  
n a t u r a l  g a s  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  s t a t e  t h a t  w a s  f l a r e d  e x c e e d e d  3 5 %  i n  t h e  f i r s t  q u a r t e r  o f  2 0 1 4  ( E I A ,  
2 0 1 4 f ) .  A c c i d e n t a l  r e l e a s e  o f  n a t u r a l  g a s  d u r i n g  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  a c t i v i t i e s  i n t r o d u c e  
h a z a r d o u s  a i r  p o l l u t a n t s  i n t o  t h e  a t m o s p h e r e  a n d  v i o l a t e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  C l e a n  A i r  A c t  ( E P A ,  
n . d  - i )
Increased Traffic and Environmental Nuisance
D r i l l i n g  a n d  c o m p l e t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e  W i l l i s t o n  a r e a  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a  h a v e  i n c r e a s e d  t r u c k  
t r a f f i c  d u e  t o  t h e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  o f  d r i l l i n g  a n d  w e l l  c o m p l e t i o n  e q u i p m e n t .  T h i s  t r a f f i c  t y p i c a l l y  
l e a d s  t o  m o r e  r o a d  a c c i d e n t s ,  n o i s e ,  d u s t ,  o v e r a l l  p o o r  a i r  q u a l i t y ,  a n d  s t r a i n  o n  p u b l i c  u t i l i t i e s .  A  
g o o d  e x a m p l e  o f  t r u c k  t r a f f i c  is s u e s  i s  s e e n  d u r i n g  w e l l  c o m p l e t i o n s .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  J a c o b s  ( 2 0 1 6 )
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a  w a t e r  t r u c k  h a u l s  le s s  t h a n  1 5 0  b a r r e l s  o f  w a t e r ,  a n d  g i v e n  t h a t  i t  c o u l d  t a k e  o v e r  9 5 , 0 0 0  b a r r e l s  
( 4  m i l l i o n  g a l l o n s )  t o  f r a c k  a  w e l l ,  m o r e  t h a n  6 0 0  t r u c k l o a d s  o f  w a t e r  w o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  f o r  a  
h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  s e v e r e  t r a f f i c  a n d  r o a d  u s e  i n  c o u n t i e s  l i k e  t h e  
M c K e n z i e  i n  N o r t h  D a k o t a  w h i c h  e x p e r i e n c e  s i g n i f i c a n t  l e v e l s  o f  d r i l l i n g  o p e r a t i o n s .
Housing Shortages and Social Stresses Due to a Transient Workforce
T i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  N o r t h  D a k o t a  i s  s u p p o r t e d  b y  a  b o t h  l o c a l  a n d  n o n - l o c a l  w o r k  f o r c e .  
T h e  m o v e m e n t  o f  a  n e w  a n d  t e m p o r a r y  l a b o r  f o r c e  t h r o u g h  s m a l l  c o m m u n i t i e s  a m o u n t s  t o  s o m e  
s o c i a l  s t r e s s  o n  t h e  l o c a l  p o p u l a t i o n .  W h i l e  i n f l u x  o f  p e o p l e  c o u l d  b o o s t  l o c a l  b u s in e s s e s  t h a t  
c a t e r  t o  t h e  n e e d s  o f  o i l  f i e l d  w o r k e r s ,  t h e  f a s t  m o v e m e n t  o f  a  p o p u l a t i o n  t y p i c a l l y  l e a d s  t o  a  lo s s  
o f  c u l t u r e  a n d  s o c i a l  s t r a in s  o n  t h e  r e s i d e n t  p o p u l a t i o n .  T h e  i n f l u x  o f  o i l  a n d  g a s  d e v e l o p m e n t  
w o r k e r s  h a s  a l s o  l e d  t o  h i g h e r  r e n t a l  p r i c e s ,  t y p i c a l l y  t o o  e x p e n s i v e  f o r  l o c a l  p o p u l a t i o n s .  T h e  
U . S .  H o u s i n g  a n d  U r b a n  D e v e l o p m e n t  ( 2 0 1 4 )  n o t e d  t r e n d s  p o i n t i n g  t o  h o u s i n g  s h o r t a g e s  i n  
N o r t h  D a k o t a  w h e n  d a t a  o n  f a l l i n g  r e n t a l  v a c a n c i e s ,  o v e r  2 0 0 %  r is e  i n  r e n t a l  p r i c e s  i n  s o m e  
c o u n t i e s  a n d  f a l l i n g  u t i l i z a t i o n  r a t e  o f  h o u s i n g  c h o i c e  v o u c h e r s .  B e s i d e s  t h e  i s s u e  o f  h i g h e r  
a c c o m m o d a t i o n  c o s t s ,  h i g h e r  p a y i n g  o i l  a n d  g a s  j o b s  a l s o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  i n f l a t i o n a r y  p r e s s u r e  o n  
p r i c e s  o f  g o o d s  s o ld .  H i g h e r  p r i c e s  i n c r e a s e  t h e  c o s t  o f  l i v i n g  t o  t h e  c i t i z e n s  o f  t h e  s t a t e ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  t h o s e  e m p l o y e d  i n  l o w e r  p a y i n g  j o b s  o u t s i d e  t h e  o i l  a n d  g a s  i n d u s t r y .
Pollution Concerns
T h e  p a c e  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  w a t e r  p o l l u t i o n  i s  a n  a s p e c t  o f  c o n c e r n  t o  s o m e  
i n t e r e s t  g r o u p s  w i t h i n  t h e  S t a t e  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a .  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  g r o u p s  h a v e  r a i s e d  c o n c e r n s  
w i t h  is s u e s  l i k e  t h e  s p e e d  o f  t h e  d r i l l i n g  p e r m i t t i n g  p r o c e s s  w i t h i n  t h e  s t a t e  a n d  p u s h e d  f o r  m o r e  
s c r u t i n y  f o r  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  p r o j e c t s  ( P a r l o w ,  2 0 1 1 ) .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  i f  w e l l s  a r e  p e r m i t t e d  
t o o  q u i c k l y ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  s o m e  s t e p s  c o u l d  b e  m i s s e d  i n  t h e  d u e  d i l i g e n c e  r e q u i r e d  t o  s a f e l y  
e x e c u t e  n e w  w e l l s  i n  h i g h  r i s k  a r e a s ,  s u c h  a s  i n  a r e a s  a d j a c e n t  t o  o l d e r  w e l l s .  H a s t y  p e r m i t t i n g  
c o u l d  a l s o  r e s u l t  i n  s u r f a c e  r e c e p t a c l e s  n o t  b u i l t  t o  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  s o  a s  t o  p r e v e n t  p o l l u t i o n  o f  
s u r f a c e  w a t e r  b o d i e s .  M i l l i o n s  o f  g a l l o n s  o f  w a t e r  a r e  h a n d l e d  p r i o r  t o  a n d  j u s t  a f t e r  h y d r a u l i c  
f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  d r i l l e d  w e l l s .  D u r i n g  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  m i x i n g  w a t e r  w i t h  c h e m i c a l s  p r i o r  t o
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f r a c t u r i n g  o r  h a n d l i n g  w a t e r  t h a t  f l o w s  b a c k  f r o m  t h e  w e l l  a f t e r  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n s ,  
i t  is  p o s s i b l e  s o m e  o f  t h i s  w a t e r  c o u l d  c o m e  i n  c o n t a c t  w i t h  s u r f a c e  f r e s h w a t e r  b o d i e s  a n d  s o  
c o n t a m i n a t e  w a t e r  s o u r c e s  u s e d  b y  n e a r b y  r e s i d e n t s .  P a r l o w  ( 2 0 1 1 )  a d v i s e d  o n  t h e  n e e d  f o r  
b a s e l i n e  s t u d ie s  o n  w a t e r  c o m p o s i t i o n  p r i o r  t o  f r a c k i n g  o p e r a t i o n s ,  m o r e  c o n t r o l  o n  w a s t e w a t e r  
d i s p o s a l ,  a n d  f o r  m o r e  r i g h t s  f o r  c i t i z e n s  t o  f i l e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o m p l a i n t s .
Freshwater Access Concerns
W a t e r  is  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  o i l  a n d  g a s  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  s e v e r a l  w a y s  r a n g i n g  f r o m  t h e  m a k i n g  o f  
d r i l l i n g  m u d ,  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g ,  p r o d u c e d  s a l t w a t e r  h a n d l i n g ,  a n d  w a t e r f l o o d i n g  ( B e c k ,  2 0 1 1 ) .  
I n  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  i s  t h e  m o s t  s i g n i f i c a n t  u s e  o f  w a t e r  g i v e n  t h e  
v o l u m e  o f  w a t e r  a n d  l o g i s t i c s  i n v o l v e d .  O v e r  2 5 0  m i l l i o n  b a r r e l s  o f  w a t e r  w a s  u s e d  i n  N o r t h  
D a k o t a  i n  2 0 1 4  f o r  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  ( N D  S t a t e  W a t e r  C o m m i s s i o n  [ N D  S W C ] ,
2 0 1 6 ) .  S o u r c e s  o f  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  w a t e r  i n  N o r t h  D a k o t a  a r e  b o t h  s u r f a c e  a n d  u n d e r g r o u n d .  
T h e  M i s s o u r i  w a t e r  s y s t e m  is  t h e  m a i n  s o u r c e  o f  s u r f a c e  w a t e r  t o  t h e  s t a t e  w h i l e  u n d e r g r o u n d  
w a t e r  s o u r c e s  a r e  t y p i c a l l y  f r e s h w a t e r  a q u i f e r s  w h i c h  l i e  2 0 0 0 f t  b e l o w  t h e  s u r f a c e ,  a n d  s a l i n e  
w a t e r  s o u r c e s  w h i c h  l i e  5 0 0 0 - 6 0 0 0 f t  b e l o w  t h e  s u r f a c e  ( N D  S W C ,  2 0 1 6 ) .  O t h e r  s u r f a c e  w a t e r  
s u p p l i e s  i n  t h e  s t a t e  a r e  n o t  d e p e n d a b l e  a s  w a t e r  v o l u m e s  a r e  s e a s o n a l  a n d  q u i t e  v a r i a b l e  
( U n i v e r s i t y  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a ,  2 0 1 3 ) .
T h e  N o r t h  D a k o t a  s t a t e  w a t e r  c o m m i s s i o n  e s t i m a t e s  t h a t ,  w i t h  t h e  p r o j e c t e d  p a c e  o f  o i l  a n d  g a s  
d e v e l o p m e n t ,  d e m a n d  f o r  w a t e r  i s  e x p e c t e d  t o  g r o w  t o  o v e r  1 6  b i l l i o n  g a l l o n s  p e r  y e a r  b y  2 0 1 9  
( B e c k ,  2 0 1 1 ) .  T h r o u g h  2 0 2 0  t h e  N o r t h  D a k o t a  s t a t e  w a t e r  c o m m i s s i o n  p r o j e c t s  a  g r o w t h  o f  w a t e r  
r e q u i r e d  f o r  o t h e r  u s e s  s u c h  a s  d o m e s t i c ,  r u r a l  a n d  m u n i c i p a l ,  l i v e s t o c k ,  i r r i g a t i o n a l ,  a n d  
i n d u s t r i a l  u s e  ( B e c k ,  2 0 1 1 ) .  A n d  t h e  p r o j e c t e d  r i s e  o f  s o m e  s e c t o r s  d u e  t o  p o p u l a t i o n  in c r e a s e s  
r a is e s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  s e v e r i t y  o f  w a t e r - s t r e s s  w i t h i n  t h e  s t a t e  a n d  p r o b a b l y  f u r t h e r s  t h e  c o m p e t i t i o n  
f o r  t h e  r e s o u r c e  b y  t h e  s e c t o r s .  B e s i d e s  t h e  u s e s  o f  w a t e r  u s e  a n d  a c c e s s ,  s o m e  y e a r s  h a v e  s e e n  
s i g n i f i c a n t  w a t e r  s t r e s s  w i t h i n  t h i s  s t a t e  ( F i g u r e  7 7 ) .
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F i g u r e  7 7 .  H i s t o r i c  D r o u g h t  l e v e l s  i n  t h e  s t a t e  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a  ( U . S .  D r o u g h t  M o n i t o r ,  2 0 1 5 )
S o m e  p o p u l a r  r e s o u r c e  a c c e s s  d i s p u t e s  h i g h l i g h t  e x i s t i n g  c h a l l e n g e s  i n  w a t e r  r i g h t s  t o  c u r r e n t  
w a t e r  s o u r c e s  t h a t  t h r e a t e n  t h e  f u t u r e  s u p p l y  o f  w a t e r  f o r  t h e  m a n y  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r s  i n  N D .  O v e r  
9 5 %  o f  N D ’ s s u r f a c e  w a t e r  i s  i n  t h e  M i s s o u r i  R i v e r  m o s t l y  s t o r e d  i n  l a k e s  S a k a k a w e a  a n d  O a h e  
w h i c h  a r e  b o t h  u n d e r  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  U . S .  A r m y  C o r p s  o f  E n g i n e e r s  ( B e c k ,  2 0 1 1 ) .  T h e  A r m y  
C o r p s  o f  E n g i n e e r s  p l a c e d  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o n  w i t h d r a w a l s  f r o m  t h e  M i s s o u r i  R i v e r  s y s t e m  w i t h i n  t h e  
b o u n d a r i e s  o f  L a k e  S a k a k a w e a  a n d  O a h e  l e a d i n g  t o  c h a l l e n g e s  b y  t h e  s t a t e  ( N D  S W C ,  2 0 1 6 ) .  
T h e  A r m y  C o r p s  o f  E n g i n e e r s  ( 2 0 1 3 )  a f f i r m e d  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  t h e  1 9 5 4  G a r r i s o n  D a m  p r o j e c t  
s t r e t c h e s  o v e r  a l m o s t  0 . 5  m i l l i o n  a c r e s  o v e r  6  c o u n t i e s  w h i c h  i n c l u d e  4 5  o f  t h e  5 7 6  o i l  f i e l d s  
w i t h i n  t h e  s t a t e ,  m a j o r  w a t e r  u s e  f o r  o i l  a n d  g a s  d e v e l o p m e n t  a l o n e  t h r e a t e n s  o t h e r  f u t u r e  u s e s .  
T h i s  h a s  l e d  t o  s h a r p  c h a l l e n g e s  f r o m  t h e  S t a t e  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a ,  w h i c h  s e e s  i t s  a c c e s s  t o  w a t e r s  
w i t h i n  i t s  b o r d e r s  a s  t h r e a t e n e d  a n d  i n  e x t e n s i o n  t h e  v i t a l  r e v e n u e - g e n e r a t i n g  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  o i l  
a n d  g a s  r e s o u r c e s .  B e c k  ( 2 0 1 1 )  s u m m a r i z e d  w a t e r  a c c e s s  i s s u e s  t h a t  t h r e a t e n  s t a b l e  s u p p l y  o f  
w a t e r  f o r  t h e  s t a t e ’ s i n d u s t r i a l  u s e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  s t a t e  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a  a n d  t h e  s t a t e s  o f  W y o m i n g  
a n d  M o n t a n a  o v e r  w a t e r  w i t h d r a w a l s  f r o m  t h e  Y e l l o w s t o n e  R i v e r  w a t e r ,  o t h e r  w a t e r  r i g h t  
d i s p u t e s  w i t h  t h e  n a t i o n  o f  C a n a d a  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  D e v i l s  L a k e  p r o j e c t s ,  a n d  is s u e s  o f  w a t e r  r i g h t s  
w i t h  t h e  N a t i v e  t r i b e s .  A  f u l l  o r  p a r t i a l  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e s e  is s u e s  t h a t  a c c o m m o d a t e s  o i l  a n d  g a s
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w a t e r  d e m a n d s  w i l l  b e  c e n t r a l  t o  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  f l o u r i s h i n g  o f  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n d u s t r y  i n  
t h e  s t a t e  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a .
D u e  t o  p o t e n t i a l  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a d v a n c e s  i n  r e c y c l a b i l i t y  o f  f r a c t u r e  w a t e r  a n d  a d v a n c e s  i n  n o n ­
w a t e r  f r a c t u r i n g ,  i t  is  h a r d  t o  s a y  w h a t  w i l l  b e  t h e  f u t u r e  o f  w a t e r  d e m a n d  f o r  N D  s h a le  
d e v e l o p m e n t .  B u t  t h e r e  i s  g e n e r a l  a g r e e m e n t  o n  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  t h e r e  o u g h t  t o  b e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  
k n o w n  s u p p l i e s  ( B e c k ,  2 0 1 1 ) .
North Dakota State Level Solutions to Oil and Gas Development Issues
T h e  p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n  h i g h l i g h t e d  t h e  k e y  is s u e s  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  N o r t h  
D a k o t a  r a n g i n g  f r o m  s o c i a l ,  t o  p o l i t i c a l ,  t o  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e  is s u e s .  T h e s e  i m p a c t s  o n  h o u s i n g  
a f f o r d a b i l i t y ,  t r a f f i c ,  a n d  w a t e r  a c c e s s  a n d  w a s t e  m a n a g e m e n t  a r e  h a n d l e d  t h r o u g h  f r e e  m a r k e t  
s o l u t i o n s  a n d  b y  r e g u l a t i o n s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s  w i t h i n  t h i s  s t a t e  
b e g i n s  w i t h  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a t e  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a  w h i c h  a s s i g n e d  s t r e a m s  a n d  n a t u r a l  
w a t e r  c o u r s e s  a s  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  s t a t e  f o r  m i n i n g ,  i r r i g a t i o n ,  a n d  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  ( B e c k ,  2 0 1 1 ) .  
N o r t h  D a k o t a ’ s c o n s t i t u t i o n  a l s o  a s s ig n s  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  n o n - d o m e s t i c  u s e s  o f  w a t e r  t o  t h e  
N o r t h  D a k o t a  S t a t e  W a t e r  C o m m i s s i o n  ( B e c k ,  2 0 1 1 ) .  T h e  N o r t h  D a k o t a  C e n t u r y  C o d e  ( 2 0 1 7 )  
c l a r i f i e s  t h a t  w a t e r  u s e  m u s t  b e  “ c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  b e s t  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  p e o p l e  o f  t h e  s t a t e ”  a n d  
s u c h  b e n e f i c i a l  u s e  a s  “ t h e  b a s is ,  t h e  m e a s u r e  a n d  t h e  l i m i t  o f  t h e  r i g h t  t o  t h e  u s e  o f  w a t e r ”  ( 6 1 ­
0 4 - 0 1 . 1  ( 2 ) ) .  S o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e  s t a t e ’ s t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  is s u e s  a r e  f u r t h e r  d is c u s s e d  w i t h i n  t h i s  
s e c t i o n .
North Dakota Gas Flaring Solutions
T h e  p r o b l e m  o f  g a s  f l a r i n g  i n  N o r t h  D a k o t a  is  t a c k l e d  i n  m a n y  f r o n t s  r a n g i n g  f r o m  w e l l  
p e r m i t t i n g ,  g a s  g a t h e r i n g  f a c i l i t y  i n v e s t m e n t s ,  a n d  s u r f a c e  p i p e l i n e  r i g h t s  i n i t i a t i v e s  t o  t h e  s e t t i n g  
o f  f l a r i n g  l i m i t s .  T h e  N o r t h  D a k o t a  I n d u s t r i a l  C o m m i s s i o n  [ N D I C ]  ( 2 0 1 4 )  h i g h l i g h t e d  i n i t i a t i v e s  
t o  i n c l u d e  g a s  c a p t u r e  p l a n s  i n  o p e r a t o r  d e v e l o p m e n t  p l a n s ,  k e e p  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  M i n e r a l  
R e s o u r c e s  e n g a g e d  i n  p i p e l i n e  s u r f a c e  r i g h t s - o f - w a y  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  e n c o u r a g e  c o u n t y - l e v e l  
s o l u t i o n s  t o  z o n i n g  t o  a l l o w  f o r  t h e  c i t i n g  a n d  o p e r a t i o n  o f  g a s  g a t h e r i n g  a n d  p r o c e s s i n g
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i n f r a s t r u c t u r e .  S o m e  i n d u s t r y  a d v o c a t e s  h a v e  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  e x t r a  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  g a s  c a p t u r e  
p l a n s  a s  b u r d e n s o m e  a n d  p o t e n t i a l l y  l i m i t i n g  t h e  p a c e  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t .  T h e  N o r t h  D a k o t a  
P i p e l i n e  A u t h o r i t y  ( 2 0 1 4 )  n o t e d  t h a t  i f  w e l l s  a r e  c o n n e c t e d  f a s t e r  t o  g a t h e r i n g  l i n e s ,  1 0 %  o f  
f l a r e d  v o l u m e s  c o u l d  b e  c a p t u r e d .
T h e  E I A  ( 2 0 1 6 k )  h i g h l i g h t e d  a  r e d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  s h a r e  o f  n a t u r a l  g a s  p r o d u c t i o n  t h a t  w a s  f l a r e d  
d o w n  t o  1 0 %  i n  Q 1  2 0 1 6  f r o m  a  3 6 %  i n  Q 1  2 0 1 4  f o l l o w i n g  f l a r i n g  l i m i t  t a r g e t s  s e t  b y  t h e  N D  
i n d u s t r i a l  c o m m i s s i o n .  W h i l e  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  o i l  p r i c e s  h a v e  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  s l o w e r  
g r o w t h  i n  n e w  w e l l  c o u n t  g r o w t h  a n d  a s s o c i a t e d  g a s  p r o d u c t i o n ,  t h e r e  i s  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  
r e g u l a t i o n s  m a y  h a v e  p l a y e d  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  i n  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  o f  f l a r e d  g a s .  T h e  N o r t h  D a k o t a  
C e n t u r y  C o d e  a u t h o r i z e d  t h e  s t a t e  t o  c o l l e c t  p r o d u c t i o n  t a x e s  a n d  m i n e r a l  o w n e r s  t o  r e c e i v e  
r o y a l t y  o n  g a s  t h a t  i s  f l a r e d  a f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  y e a r  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  ( N D I C ,  2 0 1 7 ) .  T h e  N D I C  ( 2 0 1 4 )  
p r o p o s e d  c r u d e  o i l  p r o d u c t i o n  r a t e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  t o  w e l l s  t h a t  a r e  n o t  c o n n e c t e d  t o  g a t h e r i n g  l i n e s  
6 0  d a y s  a f t e r  b e i n g  p l a c e d  o n  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  p r e s e n t e d  p o t e n t i a l  i m p a c t s  o n  t h e  e c o n o m i c s  o f  
p r o j e c t s .  R e s t r i c t i o n s  h a v e  a l s o  b e e n  p l a c e d  o n  t h e  s h a r e  o f  t o t a l  s t a t e w i d e  p r o d u c e d  g a s  t h a t  
c o u l d  b e  f l a r e d  n o t  t o  e x c e e d  9 %  b y  N o v e m b e r  2 0 2 0  ( E I A ,  2 0 1 6 k ) .  W i t h  r e g u l a t i o n s  i n  p l a c e  a n d  
c u r r e n t  p l a n s  f o r  m o r e  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  m i d s t r e a m  a c t i v i t i e s  r a n g i n g  f r o m  p r o c e s s i n g  p l a n s  a n d  
g a t h e r i n g  l i n e s ,  t h e  s t a t e  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a  i s  p o s i t i o n e d  t o  p o t e n t i a l l y  p r o v i d e  a  t e m p l a t e  f o r  g a s  
f l a r i n g  m a n a g e m e n t  f o r  t h e  n a t i o n  a n d  o t h e r  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  o u t s i d e  t h e  U S .
Housing Crises and High Rents Solutions
I n  2 0 1 4 ,  d u e  t o  t h e  o i l  b o o m  a n d  s h o r t a g e  i n  h o u s i n g ,  r e n t a l  p r i c e s  w e r e  a t  a n  a l l - t i m e  h i g h  i n  t h e  
c i t y  o f  W i l l i s t o n ,  N D ,  s u r p a s s i n g  r e n t a l  c o s t s  i n  s o m e  o f  t h e  m o r e  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  e x p e n s i v e  c i t i e s  
i n  t h e  U S ,  e . g .  N e w  Y o r k  a n d  S a n  F r a n c i s c o  ( N Y T ,  2 0 1 4 ) .  G r o w t h  i n  n u m b e r  o f  p e r m i t t e d  
h o u s i n g  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a n d  h o u s e s  i n  c o n s t r u c t i o n  l e d  t o  a  r e d u c t i o n  i n  r e n t a l  c o s t s  b y  c l o s e  t o  
2 0 %  ( R e u t e r s ,  2 0 1 5 )  a n d  i n  s o m e  c a s e s ,  u p  t o  4 4 %  ( E n e r g y  M e d i a  G r o u p ,  2 0 1 6 ) .  T h i s  r e d u c t i o n  
i n  r e n t  c o s t s  w a s  p a r t l y  d u e  t o  i n c r e a s e d  h o u s i n g  a n d  a l s o  d u e  t o  t h e  s l u m p  i n  o i l  a n d  g a s  p r i c e s  
i n  l a t e  2 0 1 4  l e a d i n g  t o  r e d u c e d  d r i l l i n g  a n d  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  a c t i v i t i e s .
T h e  U . S .  H o u s i n g  A c t  a u t h o r i z e s  t h e  U . S .  d e p a r t m e n t  o f  H o u s i n g  a n d  U r b a n  D e v e l o p m e n t  ( U . S .  
H U D )  t o  a s s is t  f a m i l i e s  s e c u r e  a f f o r d a b l e  h o u s i n g  a t  r e n t a l  r a t e s  u p  t o  t h e  4 0 th p e r c e n t i l e  o f  g r o s s
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r e n t s  a n d  u t i l i t i e s  c o s t s  i n  p a r t s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  ( U . S .  H U D ,  2 0 1 4 ) .  T h i s  a c t  p e r m i t s  g o v e r n m e n t  
a g e n c i e s  t o  p r o v i d e  e x t r a  a s s is t a n c e  t o  p a r t s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  e x p e r i e n c i n g  s o m e  e m e r g e n c y .  O i l  
c o u n t i e s  i n  N o r t h  D a k o t a  h a v e  r e c e i v e d  e x e m p t i o n  s t a t u s  t o  m a k e  a s s is t a n c e  p a y m e n t s  t h a t  
e x c e e d  t o  t y p i c a l  l e v e l s  a l l o w e d  b y  t h i s  h o u s i n g  p r o g r a m  s o  a s  t o  r e a c t  t o  t h e  h e a t e d  h o u s i n g  
m a r k e t  d u e  t o  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  w i t h i n  t h i s  s t a t e  ( U . S .  H U D ,  2 0 1 4 ) .
I n  2 0 1 3 ,  t h e  N D  l e g i s l a t u r e  a u t h o r i z e d  i n c r e a s e d  f u n d i n g  f o r  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  1 0 0 0  a f f o r d a b l e  
h o u s i n g  u n i t s  w i t h  1 5 - y e a r  f i x e d  a f f o r d a b l e  r e n t a l  r a t e s  t o  a s s is t  w o r k e r s  c o n s i d e r e d  e s s e n t i a l  t o  
s t a t e  s e r v i c e s  s u c h  a s  w o r k e r s  i n  t h e  s c h o o l  d i s t r i c t s ,  c o u n t i e s  a n d  c i t y  s e r v i c e s ,  a n d  m e d i c a l  
p e r s o n n e l  ( U . S .  H U D ,  2 0 1 4 ) .  T h e s e  e f f o r t s  h a v e  e s p e c i a l l y  h e l p e d  l o w e r  i n c o m e  r e s i d e n t s  o f  t h e  
s t a t e  w h o  w e r e  f a c i n g  i n c r e a s e d  p r e s s u r e  o n  r e n t a l  c o s t  a n d  o t h e r  f i x e d  i n c o m e  i n d i v i d u a l s  s u c h  
a s  r e t i r e e s .
Freshwater Access Solutions
T h e  O f f i c e  o f  t h e  S t a t e  E n g i n e e r  m a n a g e s  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s  i n  N o r t h  D a k o t a  b y  a l l o c a t i n g  q u o t a s  
f o r  w a t e r  u s e  t o  p e r m i t  h o l d e r s ,  b y  m o n i t o r i n g  w a t e r  u s e ,  a n d  a l s o  b y  c o l l e c t i n g  a n n u a l  r e p o r t s  o n  
a c t u a l  w a t e r  u s e  b y  p e r m i t  h o l d e r s  ( N D  S W C ,  2 0 1 6 ) .  T h i s  o f f i c e  a l s o  m o n i t o r s  a n d  c o l l e c t s  d a t a  
o n  t h e  s t a t e ’ s w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s  t h r o u g h  o v e r  4 0 0 0  w e l l s  s c a t t e r e d  a c r o s s  t h e  s t a t e  ( N D  S W C ,
2 0 1 6 ) .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  u s e  o f  m e t e r s  i n  l o c a t i o n s  w h e r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  w a t e r  u s e  o c c u r s ,  o n s i t e  
t e l e m e t r y  s y s t e m s  a r e  b e i n g  i n t r o d u c e d  t o  e n a b l e  r e a l  t i m e  m o n i t o r i n g  o f  w a t e r  u s e  b y  i n d u s t r i a l  
u s e r s ,  p r i m a r i l y  t h o s e  o p e r a t o r s  w h o  e n g a g e  i n  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  ( N D  S W C ,  2 0 1 6 ) .  
W a t e r  u s e  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  p u b l i s h e d  o n  t h e  N D  s t a t e  w a t e r  c o m m i s s i o n  w e b s i t e  f o r  e v e r y  p e r m i t  
h o l d e r  a n d  is  m a d e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  p u b l i c .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  b e i n g  f i n e d ,  v i o l a t o r s  o f  t h e  w a t e r  
q u o t a s  f a c e  r e d u c e d  q u o t a s  t o  m a k e  u p  f o r  e x c e s s  w a t e r  u s e  ( N D  S W C ,  2 0 1 6 ) .
W a t e r  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  i n  N o r t h  D a k o t a  is  a c c o r d i n g  t o  h i e r a r c h y  e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  t h e  w a t e r  
p e r m i t t i n g  s y s t e m .  D o m e s t i c  u s e s  o f  w a t e r  r e q u i r e  n o  p e r m i t  u n l e s s  s u c h  u s e  i m p o u n d s  v o l u m e s  
o f  w a t e r  a b o v e  t h r e s h o l d s  s e t  i n  t h e  N o r t h  D a k o t a  C e n t u r y  C o d e  ( N D  C e n t u r y  C o d e ,  2 0 1 7 ) .  T h e  
N o r t h  D a k o t a  C e n t u r y  C o d e  ( 2 0 1 7 )  s t i p u l a t e s  a  h i e r a r c h y  o f  w a t e r  u s e  p r i o r i t y  t h a t  b e g i n s  w i t h  
( 1 )  d o m e s t i c ,  t h e n  ( 2 )  m u n i c i p a l ,  ( 3 )  l i v e s t o c k ,  ( 4 )  i r r i g a t i o n ,  ( 5 )  i n d u s t r i a l ,  a n d  ( 6 )  f i s h ,  w i l d l i f e  
a n d  o u t d o o r  r e c r e a t i o n a l  u s e s .  O i l  a n d  g a s  u s e  f a l l s  u n d e r  i n d u s t r i a l  u s e  o f  w a t e r .  T h i s  l e g i s l a t i o n
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a l s o  a c c o r d s  p r i o r i t y  o f  w a t e r  u s e  b y  t h e  d a t e  o n  w h i c h  w a t e r  u s e  b e g i n s  f o r  e a c h  b e n e f i c i a l  u s e r  
w h i l e  a l l o w i n g  t h i s  d a t e  a n d  t h e  h i e r a r c h y  o f  t h e  u s e r  t o  b e  u p d a t e d  w h e n  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  w a t e r  
u s e  c h a n g e s  ( N D  C e n t u r y  C o d e ,  2 0 1 7 ) .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  b e n e f i c i a l  u s e r  h a s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  
f u l l  u s e  i n  t h e  c a s e  w h e r e  w a t e r  i s  l i m i t e d ,  b u t  h i s / h e r  r i g h t  f a l l s  a t  t h e  b a c k  o f  t h e  l i n e  w h e n  t h e  
p u r p o s e  o f  h i s  u s e  o f  w a t e r  c h a n g e s .  A t  s u c h  a  t i m e ,  h i s  u s e  i s  s u b o r d i n a t e  t o  t h a t  o f  a  s e c o n d  
b e n e f i c i a l  u s e r  b e c a u s e  o n l y  t h e  d a t e  o f  t h e  l a s t  c h a n g e  o f  u s e  c o u n t s .  T h i s  p r i o r i t y  s y s t e m  
m i t i g a t e s  d i s p u t e s  b e t w e e n  d i f f e r e n t  w a t e r  u s e s .
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  w a t e r  u s e  i n  o i l  a n d  g a s  o p e r a t i o n  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  b e n e f i c i a l  a l t h o u g h  q u e s t i o n s  e x i s t  
a s  t o  t h e  r e q u i r e d  q u a l i t y  o f  w a t e r  n e e d e d  a n d  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t r e a t i n g  m o r e  a b u n d a n t  n o n ­
p o r t a b l e  w a t e r  f o r  s u c h  u s e .  S o m e  a n a l y s t s  a l s o  d e m a n d  t h e  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  o f  w a t e r  s u p p l y  t o  
e a s e  t h e  s t r e s s  o n  o t h e r  u s e s  t h a t  r e q u i r e  f r e s h w a t e r .  I t  i s  a l s o  p o s s i b l e  f o r  a n  a p p e a l  t o  b e  b r o u g h t  
b e f o r e  t h e  N o r t h  D a k o t a  S W C  t o  r e q u e s t  t h a t  a n  u n u s e d  w a t e r  p e r m i t  r i g h t  b e  r e s c i n d e d  i n  f a v o r  
o f  a  s u b s e q u e n t  b e n e f i c i a l  w a t e r  u s e r  ( N D  C e n t u r y  C o d e ,  2 0 1 7 ) .  T h i s  l e v e l  o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  
t r a n s f e r  a n d  a d j u s t m e n t  o f  w a t e r  r i g h t s  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  m i t i g a t i n g  t h e  i s s u e  o f  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  
a v a i l a b l e  w a t e r  s u p p l y .
Drilling Waste and Produced Water Handling Solutions
T h e  N o r t h  D a k o t a  I n d u s t r i a l  C o m m i s s i o n  t h r o u g h  t h e  N o r t h  D a k o t a  D i v i s i o n  o f  O i l  a n d  G a s  
r e g u l a t e s  o i l  a n d  g a s  o p e r a t i o n s ,  t h e  d i s p o s a l  o f  s a l t  w a t e r  a n d  o i l  f i e l d  w a s t e s ,  a n d  t h e  
r e c l a m a t i o n  o f  l a n d  u s e d  f o r  o i l  a n d  g a s  d e v e l o p m e n t  o p e r a t i o n s  ( N D  O i l  a n d  G a s  R u l e  B o o k ,
2 0 1 7 ) .  I t  a l s o  r e g u l a t e s  d r i l l i n g ,  c a s i n g  a n d  w e l l  o p e r a t i o n  c o n d i t i o n s  t o  p r e v e n t  p o l l u t i o n  o f  
f r e s h w a t e r  s u p p l i e s .  I n  r e g u l a t i n g  d r i l l i n g  a n d  c o m p l e t i o n  p h a s e  o f  o p e r a t i o n s ,  t h e  c o m m i s s i o n  
r e q u i r e s  t h a t  c o m p a n i e s  u s e  f r e s h w a t e r  i n  m a k i n g  d r i l l i n g  m u d  s o  a s  t o  p r e v e n t  p o s s i b l e  
c o n t a m i n a t i o n  o f  f r e s h w a t e r  f o r m a t i o n s  d u r i n g  d r i l l i n g  o r  d i s p o s a l  ( B e c k ,  2 0 1 1 ) .  T h e  r e a s o n  f o r  
t h i s  i s  t h a t ,  u p o n  c o n t a c t  w i t h  w a t e r  b e a r i n g  z o n e s  d u r i n g  d r i l l i n g  o r  d u r i n g  s u r f a c e  h a n d l i n g  o f  
d r i l l i n g  m u d ,  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i m p a c t  i s  m i n i m i z e d .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  N o r t h  D a k o t a  O i l  a n d  G a s  
R u l e  B o o k  ( 2 0 1 7 )  s u r f a c e  p i t s  a n d  r e c e p t a c l e s  u s e d  f o r  h a n d l i n g  s a l t w a t e r ,  d r i l l i n g  m u d  o r  w a s t e  
m u s t  b e  l i n e d  a n d  i m p e r m e a b l e  t o  p r e v e n t  s e e p a g e  i n t o  t h e  s u r r o u n d i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t .
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P r o d u c e d  w a t e r  f r o m  t i g h t  o i l  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  t h e  S t a t e  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a  i s  m o s t l y  d i s p o s e d  t h r o u g h  
w e l l s  t h a t  i n j e c t  w a s t e w a t e r  i n t o  d e e p  u n d e r g r o u n d  f o r m a t i o n s  i n  t h e  S t a t e  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a .  T h e  
I n y a n  K a r a  f o r m a t i o n  i s  t h e  p r i m a r y  t a r g e t  f o r  u n d e r g r o u n d  w a s t e w a t e r  d i s p o s a l  i n  N o r t h  
D a k o t a ,  t a k i n g  i n j e c t i o n  f l u i d s  f r o m  4 1 2  o f  t h e  4 3 5  s a l t w a t e r  d i s p o s a l  w e l l s  a c t i v e  i n  2 0 1 5  
( B a d e r ,  2 0 1 6 ) .  T h i s  f o r m a t i o n  i s  s u i t a b l y  t h i c k ,  p e r m e a b l e  a n d  l a t e r a l l y  c o n t i n u o u s ,  a n d  
s a n d w i c h e d  b y  t h e  r e q u i r e d  b o u n d i n g  i m p e r m e a b l e  r o c k  s t r a t a ;  t h e  P i e r r e  f o r m a t i o n  l o c a t e d  
a b o v e  t h e  I n y a n  K a r a  a n d  t h e  S w i f t  f o r m a t i o n  l o c a t e d  b e l o w .  B a d e r  ( 2 0 1 6 )  e s t i m a t e d  t h a t  o v e r  1 
b i l l i o n  b a r r e l s  o f  w a t e r  h a v e  b e e n  i n j e c t e d  i n t o  t h e  I n y a n  K a r a  f o r m a t i o n  i n  t h e  l a s t  d e c a d e .  
R e g u l a t i o n s  o n  u n d e r g r o u n d  i n j e c t i o n  c o n t r o l  i n  t h e  s t a t e  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a  a r e  f o u n d  i n  t h e  N o r t h  
D a k o t a  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  C o d e  ( N D A C )  T i t l e  3 3 ,  A r t i c l e  2 5  c h a p t e r  1 .
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  u n d e r g r o u n d  i n j e c t i o n ,  a n o t h e r  e m e r g i n g  s o l u t i o n  t o  w a s t e w a t e r  h a n d l i n g  i n  N o r t h  
D a k o t a  i s  b y  w a t e r  t r e a t m e n t  a n d  r e u s e .  N o r t h  D a k o t a  l a w  p e r m i t s  i n f i n i t e  r e u s e  o r  t r a n s f e r  o f  
w a s t e w a t e r  s o  l o n g  a s  t h e  u s e  i s  t h e  s a m e  a s  i s  a u t h o r i z e d  b y  t h e  w a t e r  u s e  p e r m i t  ( N D  S W C ,
2 0 1 7 ) .  T h e  N o r t h  D a k o t a  S t a t e  W a t e r  C o m m i s s i o n  ( 2 0 1 7 )  a l s o  a l l o w s  t h e  p e r m i t  h o l d e r  t o  u s e  
t h a t  t r e a t e d  w a t e r  i n  a n y  l o c a t i o n  u n t i l  t h e  w a t e r ,  u p o n  p r o p e r  t r e a t m e n t ,  i s  f i n a l l y  r e t u r n e d  t o  “ a  
n a t u r a l  w a t e r c o u r s e ”  a t  w h i c h  p o i n t  i t  b e c o m e s  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  s t a t e  s u b j e c t  t o  p e r m i t  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  i n  v o l u m e  a n d  u s e  ( N D  S W C ,  2 0 1 7 ) .  T h i s  p r o v i s i o n  a f f o r d s  f l e x i b i l i t y  t o  o p e r a t o r s  
b y  a l l o w i n g  t h e m  t r a n s f e r  w a t e r  a c r o s s  d i f f e r e n t  le a s e s  t h e y  o w n  o r  e n t e r  c o m m e r c i a l  
a r r a n g e m e n t s  w i t h  o t h e r s  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  w a s t e w a t e r  r e u s e .
N o r t h  D a k o t a  s t a t e  a l s o  h a s  r e g u l a t i o n s  t h a t  a d d r e s s  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  m a n a g e m e n t .  T h e s e  a r e  
f o u n d  i n  t h e  N o r t h  D a k o t a  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  C o d e  ( N D A C )  T i t l e  3 3 ,  A r t i c l e  2 4  c h a p t e r  2 .  N D  s t a t e  
l a w  p r e v e n t s  a n y o n e  f r o m  s t o r i n g ,  t r e a t i n g ,  t r a n s p o r t i n g ,  o r  o f f e r i n g  a n y  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  f o r  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  w i t h o u t  o b t a i n i n g  a n  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  n u m b e r  a n d  r e g i s t r a t i o n  c e r t i f i c a t e  f r o m  t h e  
N D  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  H e a l t h  ( N D A C ,  1 9 8 4 ) .  T h e  l a w  a l s o  r e q u i r e s  t r a n s p o r t e r s  a n d  t r e a t m e n t  
f a c i l i t i e s  t o  a c q u i r e  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  t r a n s p o r t  a n d  d i s p o s a l  p e r m i t s .  P r i o r  t o  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  o f  
h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e ,  t h e  N D  s t a t e  l a w  a l s o  r e q u i r e s  t h e  t r a n s p o r t e r  t o  f i l l  o u t  a n  E P A  w a s t e  m a n i f e s t .  
N o r t h  D a k o t a  l a w  d e s i g n a t e s  a n y  g e n e r a t o r  o f  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  a b o v e  1 0 0 0 k g  p e r  m o n t h  a s  a  
s t o r a g e  f a c i l i t y ,  a n d  r e q u i r e s  f u r t h e r  r e p o r t i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  u n l e s s  t h e y  a r e  p e r m i t t e d  b y  t h e  
d e p a r t m e n t  o f  h e a l t h  t o  k e e p  t h e  w a s t e  f o r  a  p e r i o d  o f  u p  t o  9 0  d a y s .
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5.4.2. The State of Texas: The Environment and Tight Oil 
Development
T h e  s t a t e  o f  T e x a s  i s  a m o n g  t h e  o l d e s t  o i l  a n d  g a s  d e v e l o p m e n t  s t a t e s  i n  t h e  U S .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  
T e x a s  h a s  h a d  a  l o n g  t i m e  t o  e v o l v e  i n  t e c h n o l o g y  a n d  l e g i s l a t i o n  a r o u n d  i t s  o i l  a n d  g a s  is s u e s .  
H o w e v e r ,  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t i g h t  o i l  s t i l l  r a i s e s  n e w  is s u e s  w h i l e  e m p h a s i z i n g  a g e -  o l d  is s u e s  
i n  o i l  a n d  g a s  d e v e l o p m e n t  w i t h i n  t h e  s t a t e .
T i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  T e x a s  e x i s t s  m a i n l y  i n  t h e  E a g l e  F o r d  a n d  t h e  P e r m i a n  b a s i n s .  S i n c e  t h e  
E a g l e  F o r d  i s  m o r e  f o c u s e d  o n  t i g h t  o i l  a n d  g a s  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  u n l i k e  t h e  P e r m i a n  w i t h  b o t h  t i g h t  
o i l  a n d  c o n v e n t i o n a l  o i l ,  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c h a l l e n g e s  i n  r e s o u r c e  d e v e l o p m e n t  d is c u s s e d  h e r e  
w i l l  m a i n l y  f o c u s  o n  t h e  E a g l e  F o r d .  T h e  E a g l e  F o r d  o i l  b o o m  s t a r t e d  w i t h  a  s u c c e s s f u l  w e l l  i n  
t h e  L a S a l l e  C o u n t y  o f  S o u t h  T e x a s  l e a d i n g  t o  a  f l u r r y  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  o t h e r  2 3  
c o u n t i e s  t h a t  m a k e  u p  t h e  E a g l e  F o r d  p l a y  w i t h i n  t h e  s t a t e  ( A l l e n ,  2 0 1 3 ) .  D r i l l i n g  p e r m i t s  i s s u e d  
i n  t h e  E a g l e  F o r d  r o s e  f r o m  9 4  i n  2 0 0 9  t o  o v e r  5 6 0 0  b y  2 0 1 4  ( R R C ,  2 0 1 7 ) .  T h e  E a g l e  F o r d  is  
u n i q u e  b e c a u s e ,  u n l i k e  o t h e r  p l a y s ,  i t  o f f e r s  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  g a s ,  w e t  g a s  a n d  
o i l .  T h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  m u l t i p l e  r e s o u r c e  t a r g e t s  a l s o  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  w e l l s  t h a t  c o u l d  b e  
d r i l l e d  b y  o p e r a t o r s  w h o s e  b u s i n e s s  m o d e l s  f o c u s  o n  d i f f e r e n t  r e s o u r c e  t y p e s .  T h i s  i n c r e a s e  i n  
d r i l l i n g  a n d  d e v e l o p m e n t  h a s  a l s o  l e d  t o  s e v e r a l  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  is s u e s  w i t h i n  t h i s  o i l  s t a t e .
Challenges to Tight Oil Resource Development
M o s t  o f  t h e  is s u e s  d is c u s s e d  f o r  t h e  s t a t e  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  h o l d  t r u e  f o r  t h e  
E a g l e  F o r d  i n  t h e  s t a t e  o f  T e x a s  w i t h  m o r e  e m p h a s i s  o n  s p e c i f i c  i s s u e s  l i k e  a i r  p o l l u t i o n ,  t r u c k  
t r a f f i c ,  a n d  w a t e r  a v a i l a b i l i t y  a m i d s t  d r o u g h t  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  S o u t h  T e x a s .
Severe Traffic Problems
T h e  i n t e n s i v e  n a t u r e  o f  u n c o n v e n t i o n a l  r e s o u r c e  p r o d u c t i o n  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  b y  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  
r e s o u r c e s  p u l l e d  t o g e t h e r  f o r  i t s  d e v e l o p m e n t .  T r u c k  t r a f f i c  i n  t h e  E a g l e  F o r d  is  a  m a j o r  s y m b o l  
o f  t h i s  p h e n o m e n o n .  A  r e p o r t  b y  a n  E a g l e  F o r d  S h a l e  T a s k  F o r c e  f o r  t h e  T e x a s  R a i l r o a d  
C o m m i s s i o n  ( R R C ,  2 0 1 3 )  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  b u i l d i n g  o f  b i g g e r  d r i l l i n g  p a d s  t o  h a n d l e  t h e  b r o a d e r
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f o o t p r i n t  o f  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  a n d  t h e  d r i l l i n g  o f  m o r e  w e l l s ,  w h i c h  r e q u i r e  h y d r a u l i c  
f r a c t u r i n g ,  h a s  l e d  t o  t h o u s a n d s  o f  h e a v y  t r u c k s  u s i n g  r o a d s  t h a t  w e r e  c o n s t r u c t e d  f o r  l i g h t  r o a d  
t r a f f i c .  T h i s  l e v e l  o f  t r a f f i c  p u t s  s i g n i f i c a n t  s t r a i n  o n  r o a d s  t h a t  w e r e  c o n s t r u c t e d  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  
o f  b r i n g i n g  f a r m  p r o d u c e  t o  m a r k e t  a n d  o n  c o m m u n i t i e s  t h a t  w e r e  i n h a b i t e d  b y  j u s t  a  f e w  
h u n d r e d  p e o p l e  ( R R C ,  2 0 1 3 ) .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  E a g l e  F o r d  S h a l e  T a s k  F o r c e  r e p o r t  e s t i m a t e d  
t h a t  o v e r  1 1 0 0  l o a d e d  t r u c k s  w e r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  p u t  o n e  g a s  w e l l  i n t o  p r o d u c t i o n ,  w i t h  o v e r  3 5 0  
n e e d e d  t o  s e r v i c e  t h i s  w e l l  a n n u a l l y .  T h e  f a c t  t h a t  o v e r  5 6 0 0  d r i l l i n g  p e r m i t s  w e r e  g r a n t e d  b y  t h e  
R R C  i n  2 0 1 4  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  m i l l i o n s  o f  t r u c k  t r i p s  w e r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  g e t  t h e s e  w e l l s  t o  p r o d u c t i o n ,  
l e a d i n g  t o  t h e  h u g e  r i s k s  i n  t r a f f i c  i n c i d e n t s  a n d  p o l l u t i o n  w i t h i n  m a j o r  o i l  p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t i e s  
l i k e  K a r n e s ,  L a  S a l l e ,  a n d  D e w i t t .  T h e  T e x a s  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  ( 2 0 1 4 )  n o t e d  
i n c r e a s e d  l e v e l s  o i l  a n d  g a s  t r a f f i c  i n  2 0 1 2  a n d  2 0 1 3  a n d  r e c o r d e d  o v e r  3 0 0 0  t r a f f i c  i n c i d e n t s  
w i t h i n  t h e  E a g l e  F o r d  r e g i o n  w h i c h  l e d  t o  o v e r  2 3 0  f a t a l i t i e s .
Air Pollution Issues
A i r  p o l l u t i o n  c o n c e r n s  h a v e  a l s o  b e e n  r a i s e d  i n  t h e  E a g l e  F o r d  S h a l e  a r e a  o f  S o u t h  T e x a s .  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  A l a m o  A r e a  C o u n c i l  o f  G o v e r n m e n t s  ( A A C O G )  w h i c h  h o u s e s  s o m e  o f  t h e  
m a j o r  E a g l e  F o r d  c o u n t i e s  l i k e  K a r n e s ,  D e w i t t ,  a n d  o t h e r s ,  g r o u n d - l e v e l  o z o n e  i s s u e s  c o n s t i t u t e  a  
s e r i o u s  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n c e r n  i n  t h e  a r e a  ( A A C O G ,  2 0 1 7 ) .  T h e y  r e p o r t  t h a t  t h i s  a r e a  h a s  t h r i c e  
f a i l e d  t o  m e e t  t h e  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  P r o t e c t i o n  A g e n c y ’ s N a t i o n a l  A m b i e n t  A i r  Q u a l i t y  S t a n d a r d  
d u e  t o  t h r e e - y e a r - a v e r a g e  l e v e l s  o f  g r o u n d - l e v e l  o z o n e  e x c e e d i n g  t h e  c u r r e n t  7 0  p a r t s  p e r  b i l l i o n  
t h r e s h o l d .  T h i s  i s  p r i m a r i l y  d u e  t o  n i t r o g e n  o x i d e  f r o m  e x h a u s t  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  h e a v y  d a y  t i m e  
t r u c k  t r a f f i c ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  v o l a t i l e  o r g a n i c  c o m p o u n d s  w h i c h  c a u s e  h e a l t h  p r o b l e m s  f o r  t h e  
y o u n g ,  e l d e r l y  o r  t h o s e  w i t h  b r e a t h i n g  p r o b l e m s ,  a n d  o t h e r  a d v e r s e  i m p a c t s  t o  v e g e t a t i o n  
( A A C O G ,  2 0 1 7 ;  E P A ,  2 0 1 7 a ) .
A i r  p o l l u t i o n  i s  a l s o  c o n t r i b u t e d  b y  t h e  f l a r i n g  a n d  v e n t i n g  o f  g a s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  o i l  p r o d u c t i o n .  
I n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  g a s  g a t h e r i n g  p i p e l i n e s  o r  d u r i n g  i n t e r r u p t i o n  o f  s e r v i c e  o f  g a s  h a n d l i n g  
f a c i l i t i e s ,  f l a r i n g  a n d / o r  v e n t i n g  o f  g a s  i s  p o s s i b l e .  S o m e  f l a r i n g  i s  a l l o w e d  u n d e r  c u r r e n t  
r e g u l a t i o n s ,  a s  i s  t h e  c a s e  f o r  a l m o s t  e v e r y  o i l  a n d  g a s  p r o v i n c e  g l o b a l l y .  T e x a s  S t a t e w i d e  R u l e  
3 2  s t i p u l a t e s  r u l e s  a n d  e x e m p t i o n s  a r o u n d  w h i c h  g a s  f l a r i n g  i s  p e r m i t t e d  ( R R C ,  n . d  - a ) .
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A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  R R C  ( n . d  - a )  s i n c e  2 0 0 7 ,  le s s  t h a n  1 %  o f  o v e r  0 . 5  t r i l l i o n  c u b i c  f e e t  o f  t o t a l  g a s  
p r o d u c e d  e v e r y  m o n t h  w i t h i n  t h e  s t a t e  o f  T e x a s  i s  f l a r e d  o r  v e n t e d .
Water Rights Issues in the State of Texas
U n d e r  T e x a s  l a w ,  s u r f a c e  w a t e r  b o d i e s  a n d  s u b s u r f a c e  s t r e a m s  a r e  o w n e d  b y  t h e  s t a t e ;  w h e r e a s ,  
p e r c o l a t i n g  w a t e r ,  s u c h  a s  a q u i f e r s  a c c e s s i b l e  t h r o u g h  w a t e r  w e l l s ,  a r e  o w n e d  b y  h o l d e r s  o f  t h e  
s u r f a c e  e s t a t e  ( A l l e n ,  2 0 1 3 ) .  S i n c e  i n d i v i d u a l s  c a n  o w n  m i n e r a l  e s t a t e  i n  t h e  S t a t e  o f  T e x a s ,  a n d  
a l s o  o w n  t h e  u n d e r g r o u n d  w a t e r  s o u r c e s  t h a t  a r e  r e q u i r e d  f o r  m i n e r a l  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  t h i s  s h i f t s  t h e  
p a c e  a n d  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  d e v e l o p m e n t  t o w a r d s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i n c e n t i v e s  a n d  a w a y  f r o m  t h e  s t a t e  
i n c e n t i v e s ,  w i t h  o b v i o u s l y  s e r i o u s  p o s i t i v e  b u s i n e s s  i m p l i c a t i o n s .  N o n - s t a t e  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s ,  
s u c h  a s  g r o u n d w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s ,  a r e  le s s  r e g u l a t e d  b y  t h e  s t a t e  b u t  m o r e  b y  t h e  ‘ r u l e  o f  c a p t u r e ’ 
d o c t r i n e  ( A l l e n ,  2 0 1 3 ) .  A l l e n  ( 2 0 1 3 )  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  r u l e  o f  c a p t u r e  w a s  a d o p t e d  a s  a  T e x a s  s t a t e  
l a w  i n  1 9 0 4  a n d  a l l o w s  a n y o n e  i n  m o m e n t a r y  c o n t r o l  o f  a  m i g r a n t  r e s o u r c e  s u c h  a s  g r o u n d  
w a t e r ,  t h e  r i g h t  t o  o w n e r s h i p  a n d  u s e ,  a n d  a b s o l v e s  t h e m  f r o m  l i a b i l i t y  t o w a r d s  c l a i m s  o f  
d a m a g e s ,  e x c e p t  i n  s i t u a t i o n s  o f  w i l l f u l  w a s t e  a n d  n e g l i g e n c e .  T h i s  l a w  l i m i t s  s t a t e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  
t h e  g r o u n d  w a t e r  r i g h t s  o f  p r i v a t e  c i t i z e n s  i n  t h e  s t a t e ,  w h o s e  r i g h t s  a r e  p r o t e c t e d  b y  t h e  T e x a s  
s t a t e  c o n s t i t u t i o n .
T h e  ‘ r u l e  o f  c a p t u r e ’ d o c t r i n e  p r o p o s e s  n o  l i m i t  t o  g r o u n d w a t e r  u s e  b y  i t s  o w n e r  e x c e p t  w h e n  
s u c h  u s e  i s  n o t  b e n e f i c i a l ,  i s  w a s t e f u l ,  o r  w h e n  s h o w n  t o  l e a d  t o  s u b s i d e n c e  o f  a d j o i n i n g  p r o p e r t y  
( T W D B ,  n . d  - a ) .  A l l o w e d  s u c h  f r e e d o m  t o  u s e  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s ,  a  g r o u n d w a t e r  o w n e r  m a y  
c h o o s e  t o  t r a d e  i n  w a t e r  f r o m  h i s  p r o p e r t y  f o r  t h e  f r a c t u r i n g  o f  1 0 0  w e l l s  o u t s i d e  t h a t  p r o p e r t y  
w i t h o u t  r e s t r i c t i o n ,  s o  l o n g  a s  t h e  a b o v e - s t a t e d  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  m e t .  U n d e r  t h i s  d o c t r i n e  o f  ‘ r u l e  o f  
c a p t u r e ’ a l o n e ,  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  s u c h  u s e  t o  h i s  n e i g h b o r ’ s w a t e r  w e l l  i s  n o t  a  f a c t o r  t o  c o n s i d e r  a n d  
h i s  w i t h d r a w a l  d u r i n g  a  s t a t e  d r o u g h t  i s  u n r e s t r a i n e d .  I n  a  t i g h t  o i l  p r o v i n c e  t h a t  g o e s  b y  o n l y  
s u c h  r u l e ,  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  b e c o m e s  a  m a j o r  is s u e  i f  t h o u s a n d s  o f  w e l l s  n e e d  t o  b e  d r i l l e d .  T h e  
T e x a s  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h i s  i s  d is c u s s e d  l a t e r  i n  t h i s  r e s e a r c h .
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T h e  v o l u m e  o f  w a t e r  r e q u i r e d  f o r  o i l  a n d  g a s  d e v e l o p m e n t  h a s  r a i s e d  s o m e  c o n c e r n s  a m o n g  
o b s e r v e r s  o f  o i l  i n d u s t r y  a c t i v i t y  i n  t h e  s t a t e  o f  T e x a s .  A n  E a g l e  F o r d  w e l l  r e q u i r e s  
a p p r o x i m a t e l y  4 . 8  m i l l i o n  g a l l o n s  o f  w a t e r  f o r  d r i l l i n g  a n d  c o m p l e t i o n ,  m o s t l y  d r a w n  f r o m  t h e  
s t a t e ’ s m u n i c i p a l  w a t e r  s u p p l i e s ,  w a s t e w a t e r ,  g r o u n d  w a t e r  s o u r c e s ,  o r  s u r f a c e  w a t e r  b o d i e s  
( A l l e n ,  2 0 1 3 ) .  M o s t  o f  t h i s  w a t e r  i s  u s e d  f o r  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n s .  T h e  s t a t e  o f  T e x a s  
i s  l o n g  k n o w n  f o r  w a t e r  c r i s e s  v i s i b l e  i n  s e v e r e  d r o u g h t s  w i t h i n  t h e  s t a t e  ( A l l e n ,  2 0 1 3 ) .  T h e s e  
d r o u g h t s  i m p a c t  f a r m e r s  a n d  r a n c h e r s  a n d  i n c r e a s e  w o r r i e s  a b o u t  p o r t a b l e  w a t e r  s u p p l i e s .  I n  t h e  
a b s e n c e  o f  s u f f i c i e n t  p o t a b l e  w a t e r ,  t h e  c o n s u m p t i v e  u s e  o f  c l o s e  t o  5  m i l l i o n  g a l l o n s  o f  w a t e r  
f o r  o i l  a n d  g a s  o p e r a t i o n s  i s  a n  i s s u e  o f  c o n c e r n  f o r  o t h e r  w a t e r  u s e r s .
T h e  N a t i o n a l  O c e a n i c  a n d  A t m o s p h e r i c  A s s o c i a t i o n  ( 2 0 1 1 )  d e c l a r e d  t h e  T e x a s  2 0 1 1  s u m m e r  a s  
t h e  h o t t e s t  i n  t h e  n a t i o n  a n d  t h e  d r o u g h t  o f  t h a t  y e a r  a s  t h e  w o r s t  i n  t h e  l a s t  2 2 0  y e a r s  f o r  t h e  
s t a t e .  T h e  s u m m e r  o f  y e a r  2 0 1 1  w a s  a l s o  t h e  d r i e s t  i n  T e x a s  r e c o r d s  w i t h  s t a t e w i d e  p r e c i p i t a t i o n  
a v e r a g i n g  2 . 4 4  i n c h e s  o f  r a i n  ( N O A A ,  2 0 1 1 ) .  D r o u g h t s  a r e  n o t  n e w  i n  t h e  s t a t e  o f  T e x a s ,  a s  a  
r e p o r t  b y  t h e  T e x a s  A & M  U n i v e r s i t y  ( 2 0 1 1 )  n u m b e r e d  a b o v e  1 5  d r o u g h t s  i n  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  
s t a t e  s i n c e  t h e  1 8 0 0 s ,  w i t h  s o m e  d r o u g h t s  r u n n i n g  f o r  a s  l o n g  a s  f i v e  c o n s e c u t i v e  y e a r s .  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  E I A  ( 2 0 1 6 a )  1 9 3  r i g s  w e r e  o p e r a t i n g  i n  t h e  E a g l e  F o r d  i n  J u n e  o f  2 0 1 1  a n d  a  
t y p i c a l  w e l l  d r i l l e d  w i t h i n  a  m o n t h .  A s s u m i n g  t h i s  w a s  t h e  c a s e  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  s u m m e r  o f  2 0 1 1  
( J u n e - A u g u s t ) ,  5 7 9  w e l l s  w e r e  d r i l l e d  a n d  c o m p l e t e d  a n d  u s e d  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  4  m i l l i o n  g a l l o n s  
p e r  w e l l  w i t h d r a w i n g  s o m e  2 . 3  b i l l i o n  g a l l o n s  o f  w a t e r  f r o m  t h e  s t a t e ’ s w a t e r  s u p p l y  d u r i n g  t h e s e  
d r i e s t  m o n t h s .  W i t h d r a w a l  o f  s u c h  a  v o l u m e  o f  w a t e r  f r o m  a q u i f e r s  i n  a  s t a t e  w i t h  k n o w n  is s u e s  
o f  d r o u g h t  i s  o f t e n  t h e  c e n t e r  o f  q u e s t i o n s  a r o u n d  t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  w a t e r  u s e  b y  t h e  i n d u s t r y ,  a n d  
t h e  s u s t a i n a b i l i t y  o f  t i g h t  o i l  r e s o u r c e  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  d r o u g h t  l o c a t i o n s  p r o s p e c t i v e  f o r  t i g h t  o i l  
d e v e l o p m e n t .
O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  p r o p o n e n t s  o f  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  s t i l l  s e e  t h e  u s e  o f  w a t e r  a s  b e n e f i c i a l ,  
g i v e n  t h e  h u g e  r e t u r n s  o f  o i l  a n d  g a s  t o  t h e  s t a t e  o f  T e x a s .  A l l e n  ( 2 0 1 3 )  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  i n  2 0 0 8 ,  
a l t h o u g h  o v e r  6 8  b i l l i o n  g a l l o n s  o f  w a t e r  w e r e  u s e d  i n  S o u t h  T e x a s ,  t h i s  u s e  w a s  n o t  e s t i m a t e d  t o  
c a u s e  a  m a j o r  l o n g - t e r m  r i s k  t o  t h e  s o u r c e  a q u i f e r ,  t h e  C a r r i z o  a q u i f e r ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  v o l u m e  o f
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w a t e r  w a s  r e a s o n a b l e  w h e n  c o m p a r e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  e c o n o m i c  r e t u r n  o f  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  
a g a i n s t  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  o t h e r  u s e s .
D a t a  c o m p i l e d  b y  t h e  N a t i o n a l  D r o u g h t  M i t i g a t i o n  C e n t e r  s h o w s  s i g n i f i c a n t  c h a n g e s  i n  d r o u g h t  
c o n d i t i o n s  a c r o s s  t h e  U S .  F i g u r e  7 8  s h o w s  t h a t  m o r e  t h a n  6 %  o f  t h e  U . S .  e x p e r i e n c e d  
e x c e p t i o n a l  d r o u g h t  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  2 0 1 1 .  T h i s  t r e n d  e x t e n d s  i n t o  2 0 1 2  w i t h  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  7 0 %  o f  
t h e  U . S .  e x p e r i e n c i n g  a b n o r m a l l y  d r y  c o n d i t i o n s .  T e x a s  t o o k  t h e  b r u n t  o f  t h e  d r o u g h t  a s  
a p p r o x i m a t e l y  9 0 %  o f  t h e  s t a t e  e x p e r i e n c e d  a b n o r m a l l y  d r y  c o n d i t i o n s  ( F i g u r e  7 9 ) . T h i s  s a m e  
y e a r  s a w  m a j o r  s h a le  o i l  a n d  g a s  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  t h e  s t a t e  s u g g e s t i n g  f u r t h e r  s t r a i n  i n  t h e  s t a t e ’ s 
w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s .
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F i g u r e  7 9 .  H i s t o r i c a l  D r o u g h t  L e v e l s  i n  t h e  S t a t e  o f  T e x a s  ( U . S .  D r o u g h t  M o n i t o r ,  2 0 1 5 )
F i g u r e  7 9  s h o w s  t h a t  i n  2 0 1 1  a b o v e  9 0 %  o f  t h e  s t a t e  o f  T e x a s  e x p e r i e n c e d  d r y  c o n d i t i o n s ,  a n d  
f r o m  2 0 1 1  t o  2 0 1 4 ,  a t  l e a s t  8 0 %  o f  t h e  s t a t e  e x p e r i e n c e d  v e r y  d r y  c o n d i t i o n s .  T h e  s t a t e  o f  T e x a s  
s a w  a  d e g r a d a t i o n  i n  d r o u g h t  c o n d i t i o n s  f r o m  2 0 1 0  t h r o u g h  2 0 1 1  ( F i g u r e  8 0 ) . T h e  E a g l e  F o r d  
w a s  a m o n g  t h e  6 0 %  o f  t h e  s t a t e  t h a t  e x p e r i e n c e d  e x t r e m e  o r  e x c e p t i o n a l l y  d r y  c o n d i t i o n s  a n d  i n  
l a t e  N o v e m b e r  2 0 1 1  t h r o u g h  2 0 1 2  m o s t  o f  t h e  2 6  c o u n t i e s  i n  t h e  E a g l e  F o r d  e n f o r c e d  b u r n  b a n s  
( A l l e n ,  2 0 1 3 ) .
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F i g u r e  8 0 .  M a p  o f  d r o u g h t  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  t h e  U . S .  s h o w i n g  l e v e l  o f  i m p r o v e m e n t / d e g r a d a t i o n  o f  
c o n d i t i o n s  f r o m  M a y  2 0 1 1  c o m p a r e d  t o  M a y  2 0 1 0
Texas State Level Solutions to Oil and Gas Development Issues 
Mitigating Truck Traffic
T h e  s t a t e  o f  T e x a s  a n d  o i l  a n d  g a s  c o u n t i e s  h a v e  a p p r o a c h e d  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  s e v e r e  r o a d  u s e  a n d  
n u i s a n c e  o f  t r u c k  t r a f f i c  b y  g e n e r a t i n g  m o r e  f u n d i n g  f o r  r o a d  r e p a i r s  w h i l e  t h e  o i l  a n d  g a s  
o p e r a t o r s  h a v e  g e n e r a l l y  m a d e  m o r e  e f f o r t s  t o w a r d s  m o r e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  p i p e l i n e s .  T e x a s  
c o u n t i e s  w i t h  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  h i g h  o i l  a n d  g a s  p r o d u c t i o n  a r e  m o r e  i n v o l v e d  w i t h  m o r e  r o a d  
r e p a i r  is s u e s .  T h e s e  c o u n t i e s  p r i m a r i l y  g e t  t h e i r  f u n d i n g  t h r o u g h  p r o p e r t y  t a x e s .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  
S e e l e y  ( 2 0 1 4 ) ,  t h e  D e w i t t  C o u n t y  i n  T e x a s  r e q u i r e d  o v e r  $ 4 0 0  m i l l i o n  t o  u p g r a d e  i t s  r o a d  
n e t w o r k  t o  h a n d l e  i m p a c t s  o f  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t .  T h i s  a r t i c l e  a l s o  h i g h l i g h t e d  e f f o r t s  t o
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i n c r e a s e  s t a t e  f u n d i n g  f o r  r o a d s  t h r o u g h  l e g i s l a t i v e  a l l o c a t i o n s  t o  t h e  T e x a s  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  
T r a n s p o r t ,  a n d  b y  g e n e r a t i n g  m o r e  p r o p e r t y  a n d  o t h e r  l o c a l  t a x  r e v e n u e  f r o m  a  g r o w i n g  
p o p u l a t i o n  a n d  n e w  b u s in e s s e s  c o m i n g  i n t o  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  c o u n t i e s .  O t h e r  i d e a s  b e i n g  
d is c u s s e d  f o r  i n c r e a s i n g  r e v e n u e  t o  t h e  c o u n t y  f o r  r o a d  r e p a i r s  i n c l u d e  a s s e s s i n g  w a y s  o f  s h a r i n g  
i n  t h e  r o y a l t y  r e v e n u e  c o l l e c t e d  b y  t h e  r o y a l t y  o w n e r s ,  a n d  s h a r i n g  i n  t h e  s e v e r a n c e  t a x  r e v e n u e  
c o l l e c t e d  b y  t h e  s t a t e  ( S e e l e y ,  2 0 1 4 ) .
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  r o a d  m a i n t e n a n c e ,  p i p e l i n e s  c o u l d  b e  u s e d  t o  r e p l a c e  s o m e  o f  t h e  s e r v i c e s  r e n d e r e d  
b y  t r u c k s .  T r u c k s  a r e  u s e d  t o  t r a n s p o r t  p a d  a n d  d r i l l i n g  e q u i p m e n t ,  c r u d e  o i l ,  f r e s h w a t e r  f o r  w e l l  
c o m p l e t i o n ,  s a l t w a t e r  f o r  d i s p o s a l ,  a n d  s a n d  u s e d  f o r  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  
E a g l e  F o r d  S h a l e  T a s k  F o r c e  R e p o r t  s p o n s o r e d  b y  t h e  R R C  ( 2 0 1 3 ) ,  p i p e l i n e s  c o u l d  t a k e  o f f  
t h o u s a n d s  o f  t r u c k s  a n d  s o  r e d u c e  r o a d  t r a f f i c ,  a i r  p o l l u t i o n ,  a n d  t r a f f i c  i n c i d e n t s .  T h e r e  a r e  
e x a m p l e s  o f  p r o d u c e d  w a t e r  p i p e l i n e s  w i t h  a  c a p a c i t y  o f  m o v i n g  1 5 0 , 0 0 0  b b l  o f  w a t e r  d a i l y ,  
e s t i m a t e d  t o  r e d u c e  t r u c k  t r a f f i c  b y  o v e r  1 0 0 0  w h i l e  o f f e r i n g  a  s a f e ,  q u i e t  a n d  o f t e n  c h e a p e r  w a y  
o f  w a t e r  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  ( J a c o b s ,  2 0 1 6 ) .  W a t e r  t r e a t m e n t  s o l u t i o n s  i m p l e m e n t e d  b y  A p a c h e  
C o r p o r a t i o n  h a v e  b e e n  r e p o r t e d  t o  m a n a g e  1 0  m i l l i o n  b a r r e l s  o f  p r o d u c e d  w a t e r  l e a d i n g  t o  a  
r e d u c t i o n  i n  t r u c k  t r a f f i c  b y  8 0 , 0 0 0  t r u c k l o a d s  i n  2 0 1 4  ( B o y d ,  2 0 1 5 ) .  W h i l e  t h e  u p f r o n t  c o s t  o f  
c o n s t r u c t i n g  p i p e l i n e s  a n d  t h e  c e r t a i n t y  o f  p r o d u c i b l e  v o l u m e s  is  o f t e n  a  c h a l l e n g e  t o w a r d s  
c a p i t a l  d e p l o y m e n t  i n  l o n g  t e r m  p r o j e c t s ,  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n  t h e  m a j o r  
U . S .  p l a y s  h a s  s h o w n  t h a t  o p t i o n s  f o r  p u b l i c - p r i v a t e  c o l l a b o r a t i o n s  t h a t  c o u l d  p u t  s u c h  
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  i n  p l a c e  c o u l d  b e  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  b e n e f i t  t o  l o c a l  e c o n o m i e s ,  s a f e t y  o f  l i v e s  a n d  
l o n g e v i t y  o f  o i l  a n d  g a s  f i e l d s .
Air pollution Solutions
T h e  p r o b l e m  o f  a i r  p o l l u t i o n  i n  t h e  E a g l e  F o r d  s h a l e  i s  m o s t l y  h a n d l e d  t h r o u g h  r e g u l a t i o n s .  A i r  
q u a l i t y  r e g u l a t i o n  i n  T e x a s  i s  c a r r i e d  o u t  b y  t h e  T e x a s  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  Q u a l i t y  
( T C E Q ) .  T h i s  c o m m i s s i o n  e n s u r e s  t h a t  e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t  a c t i v i t i e s  w i t h i n  t h e  s t a t e  o f  
T e x a s  o c c u r  w i t h o u t  j e o p a r d i z i n g  c l e a n  a i r  a n d  w a t e r  a n d  o t h e r  n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  
t h e  T e x a s  C l e a n  A i r  A c t  o f  1 9 8 9 ,  t h e  T C E Q  is  a u t h o r i z e d  t o  e n f o r c e  r e g u l a t i o n s  o n  c l e a n  a i r  t o  
s a f e g u a r d  p u b l i c  h e a l t h  a n d  w e l f a r e  ( S t a t e  o f  T e x a s ,  1 9 8 9 ) .  T C E Q  f i e l d  i n s p e c t o r s  v i s i t  o p e r a t o r  
s i t e s  t o  e n s u r e  c o m p l i a n c e  a n d  a l s o  a n a l y z e  f l a r i n g  p e r m i t s  a n d  w e l l  p r o d u c t i o n  r e p o r t s  w h i c h
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s h o w  t h e  v o l u m e s  o f  o i l ,  g a s ,  a n d  w a t e r  p r o d u c e d  ( R R C ,  2 0 1 3 ) .  T e x a s  S t a t e w i d e  R u l e  3 2  
r e g u l a t e s  t h e  f l a r i n g  p e r m i t  s y s t e m  w h i l e  R u l e  5 8  r e g u l a t e s  t h e  r e p o r t i n g  o f  f l a r e d  v o l u m e s  t o  
e n a b l e  a u t h o r i t i e s  k e e p  t r a c k  o f  h o w  m u c h  is  p r o d u c e d  a n d  f l a r e d  a n d  h o w  i n d u s t r y  e f f i c i e n c i e s  
a n d  d e v e l o p m e n t  p r i o r i t i e s  a f f e c t  a i r  q u a l i t y  ( R R C ,  2 0 1 3 ) .  T h e  T C E Q  a l s o  c o l l e c t s  d a t a  f r o m  
A m b i e n t  M o n i t o r i n g  S t a t i o n s  a l m o s t  i n  r e a l  t i m e ,  a n d  i t s  i n s p e c t o r s  c o l l e c t  p e r i o d i c  a i r  s a m p l e s  
w h i c h  is  f o l l o w e d  b y  l a b o r a t o r y  a n a l y s i s  o f  p o t e n t i a l l y  h a r m f u l  c o m p o u n d s  a n d  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  
t o x i c o l o g y  r e p o r t s  ( T C E Q ,  n . d . ) .  T h e y  a l s o  m a i n t a i n  a n  o n l i n e  T e x a s  A i r  M o n i t o r i n g  I n f o r m a t i o n  
S y s t e m  t h a t  a l l o w s  u s e r s  t o  q u e r y  a n d  g e n e r a t e  r e p o r t s  o f  p o l l u t a n t  l e v e l s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  r e g i o n s  a n d  
c o u n t i e s .  T h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h i s  d a t a  a l l o w s  a n  e v i d e n c e - b a s e d  s y s t e m  t h r o u g h  w h i c h  t h e  p u b l i c  
c o u l d  e x e r t  p r e s s u r e  o n  o p e r a t o r s  t o  r e i n  i n  p o l l u t a n t s  f r o m  t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n s .  A n o t h e r  m e t h o d  o f  
a i r  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  i s  b y  t h e  f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t ,  E P A  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  i f  a i r  q u a l i t y  f a i l s  t o  m e e t  
t h e  n a t i o n a l l y - s e t  s t a n d a r d s .
Water Management Solutions in the State of Texas
T h e  h i s t o r y  o f  T e x a s  W a t e r  l a w  d a t e s  b a c k  t o  t h e  1 6 0 0 s  ( T W D B ,  n . d  - a ) .  T h i s  l a w  h a s  e v o l v e d  
f r o m  S p a n i s h  W a t e r  l a w  t o  r i p a r i a n  l a w s ,  w h i c h  g o v e r n e d  w a t e r  u s e  a r o u n d  n o r m a l  s t r e a m  l e v e l  
w a t e r  a c c e s s  w i t h o u t  m u c h  s t r u c t u r e ,  a n d  t h e n  t o  a n  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  s y s t e m  t h r o u g h  w h i c h  s t a t e  
p e r m i t s  a r e  r e q u i r e d  f o r  m a j o r  n o n - d o m e s t i c  w a t e r  u s e ,  a n d  f i n a l l y  t o  t h e  c u r r e n t  m o d e r n  w a t e r  
l i c e n s i n g  s y s t e m  ( T W D B ,  n . d .  - a ) .  S i n c e  g r o u n d  w a t e r  t y p i c a l l y  b e l o n g s  t o  l a n d o w n e r s ,  t h r o u g h  
T e x a s  S u p r e m e  c o u r t  r u l i n g s ,  t h e  p o w e r  t o  r e g u l a t e  w a t e r  u s e  w a s  a c c o r d e d  t o  t h e  p e o p l e  o f  
T e x a s  a n d  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  t h e  T e x a s  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  t o  w o r k  o u t  l o c a l  s o l u t i o n s  t o  g r o u n d w a t e r  
m a n a g e m e n t .  I n  1 9 4 9 ,  t h e  T e x a s  G r o u n d  W a t e r  A c t  c r e a t e d  g r o u n d w a t e r  c o n s e r v a t i o n  d i s t r i c t s  t o  
i m p r o v e  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  g r o u n d  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s  ( A l l e n ,  2 0 1 3 ;  T W D B ,  n . d .  -
b ) .
D u e  t o  i n s u f f i c i e n t  v o l u m e  o f  s u r f a c e  w a t e r  i n  s o u t h  T e x a s ,  g r o u n d  w a t e r  i s  t h e  m a i n  s o u r c e  o f  
w a t e r  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g .  S i n c e  t h i s  g r o u n d  w a t e r  i s  l a r g e l y  p o t a b l e ,  i t s  u s e  
i n t r o d u c e s  a  s t r a i n  o n  o t h e r  c o m p e t i n g  w a t e r  u s e s  s u c h  a s  a g r i c u l t u r e .  O t h e r  n o n - p o t a b l e  w a t e r  
s o u r c e s  r e q u i r e  c o s t l y  t r e a t m e n t s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t o  d e s a l i n a t e  a n d  m a k e  t h e m  s u i t a b l e  f o r  f r a c k i n g .  
E x a m p l e s  o f  g r o u n d  w a t e r  s o u r c e s  i n c l u d e  t h e  C a r r i z o  a q u i f e r ,  t h e  E d w a r d s  a q u i f e r ,  a n d  t h e  G u l f  
C o a s t  a q u i f e r  w h i c h  a r e  m a i n l y  a c c e s s e d  v i a  w e l l s  d r i l l e d  o n  s u r f a c e  p r o p e r t y .
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T e x a s  l a w  a l l o t s  s u r f a c e  w a t e r  s u c h  a s  s t r e a m s ,  r i v e r s ,  a n d  l a k e s  a n d  s u b t e r r a n e a n  s t r e a m s  t o  t h e  
s t a t e .  L e a s e s  f o r  s u r f a c e  w a t e r  r i g h t s  a r e  r e g u l a t e d  b y  t h e  T e x a s  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
Q u a l i t y  ( T C E Q )  w h i l e  u n d e r g r o u n d  s a l i n e  o r  b r a c k i s h  w a t e r  b e l o w  p o t a b l e  w a t e r  z o n e s  is  
r e g u l a t e d  b y  t h e  R a i l r o a d  C o m m i s s i o n  o f  T e x a s  ( K u r t h  e t  a l . ,  2 0 1 2 ) .  O i l  a n d  g a s  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  
T e x a s  a r e  a l s o  r e g u l a t e d  b y  t h e  R a i l r o a d  C o m m i s s i o n  ( R R C )  o f  T e x a s .  B e s i d e s  a i r  q u a l i t y  is s u e s  
w h i c h  a r e  r e g u l a t e d  b y  t h e  T e x a s  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  Q u a l i t y  ( T C E Q ) ,  t h e  R R C  a l s o  
r e g u l a t e s  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i s s u e s  r e l a t e d  t o  o i l  a n d  g a s  o p e r a t i o n s .  K u r t h  e t  a l .  ( 2 0 1 2 )  n o t e d  t h a t ,  i n  
t h e  p a s t ,  w a t e r  u s e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  w e l l  d r i l l i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  w e r e  l a r g e l y  u n r e s t r i c t e d .  B u t  t h e  
i n c r e a s e d  u s e  o f  w a t e r  f o r  p u r p o s e s  o f  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  h a s  g e n e r a l l y  l e d  t o  r e g u l a t o r y  
e n f o r c e m e n t  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  m e a n t  t o  b a l a n c e  t h e  w a t e r  s h o r t a g e  i n  w a t e r - c h a l l e n g e d  T e x a s  
c o u n t i e s  w i t h  t h e  h i g h  w a t e r  r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  r e s o u r c e  d e v e l o p m e n t  ( K u r t h  e t  a l . ,  2 0 1 2 ) .
Waste Management Solutions in Texas State
B e s i d e s  a i r  q u a l i t y  i s s u e s  t h a t  a r e  r e g u l a t e d  b y  t h e  T e x a s  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  Q u a l i t y  
( T C E Q ) ,  o i l  a n d  g a s  o p e r a t i o n s  a n d  r e l a t e d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i s s u e s  i n  T e x a s  a r e  r e g u l a t e d  b y  t h e  
R a i l r o a d  C o m m i s s i o n  ( R R C )  o f  T e x a s .  R u l e s  g o v e r n i n g  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  o i l  a n d  g a s  i n  t h e  
s t a t e  o f  T e x a s  a r e  f o u n d  i n  t h e  T e x a s  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  C o d e  ( T A C ) ,  T i t l e  1 6 ,  P a r t  1 , c h a p t e r  3 .  
S e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s  i n v o l v i n g  w a s t e  m a n a g e m e n t  i n c l u d e  w a t e r  p r o t e c t i o n  ( 3 . 8 ) ,  d is p o s a l  
w e l l s  ( 3 . 9 ) ,  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  a d d i t i o n a l  w e l l  g u i d e l i n e s  ( 3 . 1 3 - 0 7 ) ,  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  
c h e m i c a l  d i s c l o s u r e  ( 3 . 2 9 ) ,  c l e a n u p  o f  s o i l  c o n t a m i n a t e d  w i t h  o i l  a n d  g a s  ( 3 . 9 1 ) ,  a n d  h a z a r d o u s  
o i l  a n d  g a s  w a s t e  ( 3 . 9 8 ) .
T e x a s  s t a t e  r e g u l a t i o n s  t h a t  p r o t e c t  w a t e r  s o u r c e s  f r o m  o i l  a n d  g a s  e x t r a c t i o n  w a s t e  p r o h i b i t  
d i s p o s a l  o f  d r i l l i n g  w a s t e s  i n  s u r f a c e  w a t e r s  ( T A C  1 6 - 1 - 3 . 8 ) .  T h e  R R C  h a s  r u l e s  t h a t  s p e c i f y  
d i m e n s i o n s  f o r  s t o r a g e  p i t s ,  l i n i n g  a n d  n e t t i n g  t o  p r o t e c t  w i l d l i f e  a n d  a l s o  p r o h i b i t  t h e  s t o r a g e  o f  
p e t r o l e u m  p r o d u c t s  i n  p i t s  ( E P A ,  2 0 1 4 a ) .  T h e  R R C  is  a l s o  i n v o l v e d  w i t h  p e r m i t t i n g  a n d  t e s t i n g  
o f  u n d e r g r o u n d  d is p o s a l  w e l l s  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  w e l l  a r c h i t e c t u r e  w o u l d  n o t  a l l o w  v e r t i c a l  
m i g r a t i o n  o f  i n j e c t e d  f l u i d s .  T h e  R R C  a l s o  o v e r s e e s  t h e  p l u g g i n g  a n d  a b a n d o n m e n t  o f  w e l l s .  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  T e x a s  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  C o d e  ( 1 9 7 7 a )  a n d  D r i l l i n g  W a s t e  M a n a g e m e n t  
I n f o r m a t i o n  S y s t e m  [ D W M I S ]  ( 2 0 1 5 a )  t h e  s t a t e  o f  T e x a s  R R C  a l l o w s  s o m e  d i s p o s a l s  w i t h o u t
224
p e r m i t s .  E x a m p l e s  o f  t h e s e  i n c l u d e  t h e  d i s p o s a l  o f  i n e r t  w a s t e s  i n  a n y  m a n n e r  o t h e r  t h a n  i n  
s u r f a c e  w a t e r s ,  s h a l l o w  b u r i a l  o f  f l u i d s  g e n e r a t e d  f r o m  c o m p l e t i o n  w o r k o v e r s ,  a n d  d i s p o s a l  o f  
l o w  c h l o r i d e - c o n t e n t  d r i l l i n g  f l u i d s  t h r o u g h  l a n d f a r m i n g  ( T e x a s  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  C o d e ,  1 9 7 7 a ) .
R e g u l a t i o n s  f o r  m a n a g i n g  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  i n  t h e  s t a t e  o f  T e x a s  a r e  m o r e  s t r i n g e n t  w h e n  
c o m p a r e d  a g a i n s t  r e g u l a t i o n s  f o r  n o n - h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  h a n d l i n g  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t .  T h e  T e x a s  
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  C o d e  ( T A C )  ( 1 9 7 7 b )  s t a t e s  t h a t  s m a l l  q u a n t i t y  ( < 1 0 0 0 k g / m o n t h )  a n d  l a r g e  
q u a n t i t y  ( > 1 0 0 0 k g / m o n t h )  g e n e r a t o r s  o f  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  m u s t  n o t i f y  t h e  T e x a s  R a i l r o a d  
C o m m i s s i o n  a n d  a l s o  o b t a i n  E P A  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  n u m b e r s  w i t h i n  1 0  d a y s  o f  g e n e r a t i n g  s u c h  
q u a n t i t y  o f  w a s t e .  T h i s  r e g u l a t i o n  a l s o  s t a t e s  t h a t  f a c i l i t i e s  t h a t  s t o r e  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e s  m u s t  
c o m p l y  w i t h  E P A  s t a n d a r d s  o f  c o n t a i n m e n t  a n d  l a b e l i n g ,  t r a i n i n g  o f  p e r s o n n e l ,  a n d  a l s o  d e v e l o p  
a d e q u a t e  m e a s u r e s  i n  p r e p a r e d n e s s  a n d  p r e v e n t i o n  o f  e x p l o s i o n s  o r  l e a k s .  T e x a s  l a w  g e n e r a l l y  
p r o h i b i t s  o n s i t e  t r e a t m e n t  o r  d is p o s a l  o f  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  a n d  r e q u i r e s  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  o f  t h e  w a s t e  
t o  a p p r o v e d  f a c i l i t i e s .  T h e  T A C  a l s o  p r o v i d e s  s p e c i f i c  e x e m p t i o n s  t o  o n s i t e  t r e a t m e n t  s u c h  a s  i n  
n e u t r a l i z a t i o n  u n i t s  o r  t o t a l l y  e n c l o s e d  f a c i l i t i e s  a n d  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  E P A  g u i d e l i n e s  ( T A C ,  
1 9 7 7 b ) .  H a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  d i s p o s a l  i s  o n l y  p o s s i b l e  i n  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  d i s p o s a l  w e l l s  a n d  2 3  o f  
t h e  4 4  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e  w e l l s  i n  t h e  U . S .  a r e  f o u n d  i n  T e x a s  ( E P A ,  2 0 1 5 c ) .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  
E P A  ( 2 0 1 5 c ) ,  t h e s e  w e l l s  i n j e c t  i n t o  f o r m a t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  p r o v e n  t o  h a v e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  t h i c k  s e a l i n g  
l a y e r s  a n d  a r e  e x p e c t e d  t o  k e e p  t h e  i n j e c t e d  f l u i d s  e m p l a c e d  f o r  a  p e r i o d  o f  1 0 , 0 0 0  y e a r s !
Water Management Organizations in the State of Texas
A s  a  r e s u l t  o f  s e v e r a l  h i s t o r i c  d r o u g h t s  w i t h i n  t h e  s t a t e  o f  T e x a s ,  t h i s  s t a t e  h a s  a  w i d e l y -  
d e v e l o p e d  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a r o u n d  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  t h e  s t a t e ’ s w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s .  U n d e r  t h e  g u i d a n c e  
o f  t h e  s t a t e  g o v e r n m e n t  t h r o u g h  t h e  T e x a s  W a t e r  D e v e l o p m e n t  B o a r d  ( T W D B ) ,  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  
p r i v a t e  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s  a r e  h a n d l e d  t h r o u g h  a  s y s t e m  o f  s u b - o r g a n i z a t i o n s  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  w a t e r  
c o n s e r v a t i o n  d i s t r i c t s .  S o m e  o f  t h e  b o d i e s  c h a r g e d  w i t h  T e x a s  s t a t e  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s  a r e  t h e  T e x a s  
D i v i s i o n  o f  E m e r g e n c y  M a n a g e m e n t ,  T e x a s  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  Q u a l i t y  ( T C E Q ) ,  
T e x a s  D r o u g h t  P r e p a r e d n e s s  C o u n c i l  ( T D P C ) ,  t h e  T e x a s  W a t e r  D e v e l o p m e n t  B o a r d  ( T W D B ) ,  
a n d  t h e  D r o u g h t  M o n i t o r i n g  a n d  R e s p o n s e  C o m m i t t e e  ( D M R C )  ( T e x a s  W a t e r  C o d e ,  2 0 1 6 ) .  T h e
225
k e y  l e g i s l a t i o n  t h a t  l a y s  o u t  t h e  b o d i e s  i n v o l v e d  i n  T e x a s  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e  m a n a g e m e n t  i s  t h e  
T e x a s  W a t e r  C o d e  ( F i g u r e  8 1 ) .
F i g u r e  8 1 .  O r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  W a t e r  M a n a g e m e n t  i n  t h e  S t a t e  o f  T e x a s ,  U S A  
The Texas State Water Code
T h e  T e x a s  s t a t e  w a t e r  c o d e  s p e l l s  o u t  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  b o d i e s  i n v o l v e d  i n  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  T e x a s  s t a t e  
w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s .  I t  a l s o  p u t s  f o r t h  a  c l e a r  s t r u c t u r e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  
d r o u g h t  r e s p o n s e s  a n d  w a t e r  c o n s e r v a t i o n  ( T e x a s  W a t e r  C o d e ,  2 0 1 6 ) .  T h e  c o d e  s t a t e s  t h a t  u p o n  a  
c o u n t y  b e i n g  h i g h l i g h t e d  b y  t h e  c o n s e r v a t i o n  c o u n c i l  a s  b e i n g  a t  r i s k  o f  a  d r o u g h t  d i s a s t e r ,  t h e  
c o u n t y  p u b l i s h e s  t h e  d e c l a r a t i o n  i n  a n y  w i d e l y - r e a d  n e w s p a p e r  ( m e d i a ) ,  n o t i f i e s  t h e  h e a d  o f  i t s  
p a r e n t  r e g i o n a l  p l a n n i n g  b o a r d  a n d  e a c h  e n t i t y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  d e v e l o p i n g  a n d  a c t i v a t i n g  a  w a t e r  
m a n a g e m e n t  p l a n  w i t h i n  t h e  c o u n t y .  T h e s e  e n t i t i e s  a r e  e x p e c t e d  t o  t a k e  a c t i o n  i m m e d i a t e l y  t o  
i m p l e m e n t  t h e  p r e - d e s i g n e d  d r o u g h t  c o n t i n g e n c y  o r  w a t e r  c o n s e r v a t i o n  p l a n s  ( S t a t e  o f  T e x a s ,  
1 9 9 9 ) .
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Texas Drought Preparedness Council (TDPC)
T h e  T e x a s  D r o u g h t  P r e p a r e d n e s s  C o u n c i l  ( T D P C )  w a s  c r e a t e d  i n  1 9 9 9 ,  t w o  y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  
c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  D r o u g h t  M o n i t o r i n g  a n d  R e s p o n s e  C o m m i t t e e  ( D M R C ) .  T h e  c o u n c i l  i s  h e a d e d  b y  
t h e  c h i e f  o f  T e x a s  D i v i s i o n  o f  E m e r g e n c y  M a n a g e m e n t  a l s o  k n o w n  a s  t h e  s t a t e ’ s d r o u g h t  m a s t e r  
( S t a t e  o f  T e x a s ,  1 9 9 9 ) .  T h e  c o u n c i l  i s  c o m p r i s e d  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  f r o m  s e v e r a l  d e p a r t m e n t s  a n d  
d i v i s i o n s  i n c l u d i n g  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  p a r k s  a n d  w i l d l i f e  s e r v i c e s ,  e m e r g e n c y  m a n a g e m e n t ,  e c o n o m i c  
d e v e l o p m e n t ,  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  s t a t e  s o i l  a n d  w a t e r  c o n s e r v a t i o n  b o a r d ,  a n d  a n  a p p o i n t e e  o f  t h e  
g o v e r n o r .  T h e  m i s s i o n  o f  t h e  c o u n c i l  i s  i n  a s s e s s i n g  d r o u g h t  c o n d i t i o n s ,  c o o r d i n a t i n g  r e s p o n s e s  
o f  i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s  a n d  a d v i s i n g  t h e  p u b l i c  a n d  s t a t e  l e a d e r s h i p  o n  d r o u g h t  r e l a t e d  is s u e s .  
B e s i d e s  a  m o n t h l y  r e p o r t  t o  t h e  p u b l i c ,  e v e r y  s i x  m o n t h s  t h e  c o u n c i l  p u b l i s h e s  a  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  
r e p o r t  a d v i s i n g  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  o n  d r o u g h t  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  t h e  s t a t e  ( A l l e n ,  2 0 1 3 ) .  I t  d e v e l o p s  a n d  
i m p l e m e n t s  t h e  s t a t e ’ s d r o u g h t  p r e p a r e d n e s s  p l a n  a n d  m a k e s  s p e c i f i c  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  
d r o u g h t  d i s a s t e r  r e s p o n s e  ( A l l e n ,  2 0 1 3 ) .  T h e  c o u n c i l  r e l i e s  o n  e x p e r t  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  s t u d i e s  a n d  
f o r e c a s t s  o n  s t a t e  m e t e o r o l o g y  a n d  h y d r o l o g y ,  w a t e r  d e m a n d  a n d  s u p p l y  a n d  p o t e n t i a l  e c o n o m i c ,  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  a n d  p u b l i c  h e a l t h  i m p a c t  o f  w a t e r  s h o r t a g e .
The Texas Water Development Board (TWDB)
T h e  T W D B  w a s  i n s t i t u t e d  i n  1 9 5 7  w i t h  t h e  a i m  o f  l e a d i n g ,  i n f o r m i n g ,  a n d  p r o v i d i n g  f i n a n c i a l  
a n d  p l a n n i n g  s u p p o r t  f o r  p r o j e c t s  t i e d  t o  T e x a s  s t a t e  w a t e r  d e v e l o p m e n t .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  
T W D B  ( n . d . )  t h i s  b o d y  p r o v i d e s  l o a n s  a n d  g r a n t s  t o  s u p p o r t  p r o j e c t s  i n  w a t e r  r e s e a r c h ,  w a t e r  
q u a l i t y  e n h a n c e m e n t  a n d  a g r i c u l t u r a l  w a t e r  c o n s e r v a t i o n .  I t  c o l l e c t s ,  m a i n t a i n s  a n d  d i s s e m i n a t e s  
d a t a  o n  s t a t e  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s ,  f u n d s  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a t e ’ s w a t e r  r e g i o n a l  d i s t r i c t s  a n d  
a d m i n i s t e r s  t h e  s a le ,  t r a n s f e r  o r  l e a s i n g  o f  w a t e r  r i g h t s .  T h e  T W D B  p u b l i s h e s  a n n u a l  r e p o r t s  o n  
r e g i o n a l  w a t e r  p l a n s  p r e p a r e d  b y  g r o u n d  w a t e r  d i s t r i c t s  ( A l l e n ,  2 0 1 3 ) .  S o m e  f u n d i n g  a n d  
i n f o r m a t i o n  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  m a n a g e d  b y  t h e  T W D B  i n c l u d e  t h e  T e x a s  W a t e r  B a n k ,  t h e  T e x a s  
W a t e r  T r u s t ,  t h e  T e x a s  N a t u r a l  R e s o u r c e s  I n f o r m a t i o n  S y s t e m ,  C l e a n  W a t e r  S t a t e  R e v o l v i n g  
F u n d ,  a n d  D r i n k i n g  W a t e r  S t a t e  R e v o l v i n g  F u n d .  T h r o u g h  t h e  T e x a s  W a t e r  B a n k s ,  t h e  T W D B  
l e a s e s ,  t r a n s f e r s  o r  s e l l s  w a t e r  r i g h t s .  A  t h r e e  m e m b e r  b o a r d  a p p o i n t e d  b y  t h e  g o v e r n o r  is  
c h a r g e d  w i t h  v e t t i n g  t h e  s t a t e  w a t e r  p l a n  a n d  a l s o  i n  t h e  a p p r o v a l  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  T W D B
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g r a n t s  a n d  l o a n s  ( T W D B ,  n . d . ) .  T h e  b o a r d  a l s o  a d m i n i s t e r s  t h e  s y s t e m  t h r o u g h  w h i c h  p r o j e c t s  
m e a n t  t o  a l l e v i a t e  w a t e r  s t r e s s  w i t h i n  t h e  s t a t e ’ s w a t e r  p l a n  c o u l d  b e  f u n d e d  a t  c o m p e t i t i v e  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  ( T W D B ,  n . d . ) .
Regional Ground Water Conservation Districts
T h e r e  a r e  9 8  g r o u n d w a t e r  c o n s e r v a t i o n  d i s t r i c t s  ( G C D )  i n  t h e  S t a t e  o f  T e x a s  ( S t a t e  o f  T e x a s ,  
2 0 1 5 b ;  T W D B ,  n . d . ) .  T h e s e  d i s t r i c t s  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  u n i t s  o f  w a t e r  m a n a g e m e n t  t h a t  a r e  c l o s e s t  t o  
t h e  r e s o u r c e .  T h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  o f  G C D  is  m a d e  u p  o f  e l e c t e d  a n d  a p p o i n t e d  o f f i c i a l s  w h o  
a r e  e m p o w e r e d  t o  t a k e  a c t i o n s  t o  c o n s e r v e  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s  w i t h i n  t h e i r  v a r i o u s  d i s t r i c t s  ( T W D B ,  
n . d . ) .  T h e y  a r e  a l s o  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  g r o u n d w a t e r  c o n s e r v a t i o n  d i s t r i c t s .  G r o u n d w a t e r  c o n s e r v a t i o n  
d i s t r i c t s  h a v e  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  t o  c o n s e r v e ,  p r e s e r v e ,  a n d  r e g u l a t e  t h e  u s e  o f  g r o u n d  
w a t e r  i n  t h e i r  d i s t r i c t s .  T h e y  i s s u e  d r i l l i n g  p e r m i t s  f o r  w a t e r  w e l l s ,  r e g u l a t e  s p a c i n g  a n d  p r e v e n t  
t h e  w a s t e  o f  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s .  O w n e r s  o f  t h e  w e l l s  a r e  e x p e c t e d  t o  s u b m i t  l o g s ,  c o m p l e t e  a n d  p l u g  
w a t e r  w e l l s  f o l l o w i n g  r e g u l a t i o n s  s t i p u l a t e d  b y  t h e  T e x a s  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  L i c e n s i n g  a n d  
R e g u l a t i o n  ( K u r t h  e t  a l . ,  2 0 1 2 ) .
W a t e r  c o n s e r v a t i o n  d i s t r i c t s  a r e  c h a r g e d  w i t h  d e v e l o p i n g  r e g i o n a l  g r o u n d w a t e r  m a n a g e m e n t  
p l a n s  t h a t  c l a r i f y  t h e  r e g i o n a l  w a t e r  m a n a g e m e n t  g o a l s  a n d  a l s o  t o  a d d r e s s  i s s u e s  o f  
c o n s e r v a t i o n ,  p r o t e c t i o n  a n d  r e c h a r g i n g ,  a n d  o v e r a l l  e f f i c i e n t  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  t h e  r e g i o n ’ s w a t e r  
r e s o u r c e s  ( T W D B ,  2 0 1 2 ) .  T h e s e  p l a n s  i n c l u d e  d e t a i l e d  e s t i m a t e s  o f  g r o u n d  w a t e r  v o l u m e s  
a v a i l a b l e ,  a n n u a l  u s e ,  a n d  w a t e r  s u p p l y  a n d  d e m a n d  w i t h i n  t h e  d i s t r i c t  i n c l u d i n g  f o r e c a s t s  ( S t a t e  
o f  T e x a s ,  2 0 1 5 b ) .  T h e  p l a n s  a l s o  p u t  o u t  m e a s u r e s  t a k e n  b y  t h e  d i s t r i c t  t o  a d d r e s s  i s s u e s  a r o u n d  
d r o u g h t  a n d  w a t e r  s u p p l i e s ,  h o w  is  t r a c k s  p r o g r e s s  i n  a t t a i n i n g  i t s  w a t e r  m a n a g e m e n t  g o a l s  
( T W D B ,  2 0 1 2 ) .  W a t e r  m a n a g e m e n t  p l a n s  a r e  e x p e c t e d  t o  g i v e  e s t i m a t e s  o n  f i n a n c i a l  a s s is t a n c e  
n e e d e d  f r o m  t h e  s t a t e  t o  m e e t  d r o u g h t  r e m e d i a t i o n  g o a l s  a n d  t h e  i m p a c t  i n  c o s t ,  s a f e t y  a n d  s t a t e  
e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  n o t  a d d r e s s i n g  t h e m  ( A l l e n ,  2 0 1 3 ) .  T h e s e  p l a n s  a r e  e x p e c t e d  a t  l e a s t  
e v e r y  f i v e  y e a r s  w i t h  u p d a t e s  e n c o u r a g e d  w h e n  s i t u a t i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  d i s t r i c t  m a k e  t h e m  
n e c e s s a r y .  T h e  T W D B  is  c h a r g e d  w i t h  a p p r o v a l  o f  t h e  w a t e r  d e v e l o p m e n t  p l a n s  a n d  a l s o  a s s is t s  
d i s t r i c t s  w i t h  m e e t i n g  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e i r  p l a n s .
228
T h e s e  c o n s e r v a t i o n  d i s t r i c t s  h a v e  o f t e n  r e a c t e d  t o  d r o u g h t s  i n  T e x a s  b y  i m p l e m e n t i n g  s o m e  
r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  w h i c h  r a n g e  f r o m  m o n i t o r i n g  o f  w a t e r  v o l u m e  p u m p e d  f r o m  w e l l s ,  t o  m o v i n g  w a t e r  
a c r o s s  d r i l l  s i t e s  a n d  c o n s i d e r i n g  a  b a n  o f  f r a c k i n g  i f  w a t e r  l e v e l s  i n  a q u i f e r s  d r o p  t o o  l o w  ( A l l e n ,
2 0 1 3 ) .  A l l e n  ( 2 0 1 3 )  f u r t h e r  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  l a w s  t h r o u g h  g r o u n d  w a t e r  
d i s t r i c t s  o r  l a n g u a g e  i n  o i l  a n d  g a s  le a s e s  c o u l d  p r o v i d e  l a n d  o w n e r s  t h e  m u c h - n e e d e d  c o n t r o l  
o v e r  t h e i r  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s .
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ)
T h e  T C E Q  m a n a g e s  s u r f a c e  w a t e r  r i g h t s .  T h e  d i r e c t o r  o f  t h e  T C E Q  is  c h a r g e d  t o  m a n a g e  w a t e r  
u s e  d u r i n g  d r o u g h t  s i t u a t i o n s  i n c l u d i n g  i n t e r r u p t i o n ,  s u s p e n s i o n  a n d  m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  w a t e r  r i g h t s ,  
t o  m a x i m i z e  b e n e f i c i a l  u s e  o f  w a t e r  w i t h i n  t h e  s t a t e  a n d  t o  m i n i m i z e  w a s t e .  U n d e r  t h i s  a u t h o r i t y ,  
t h e  T C E Q  m a y  a l l o w  m o r e  ‘ s e n i o r ’ w a t e r  r i g h t s  t h e  a c c e s s  t o  w a t e r  w h i l e  r e s t r i c t i n g  ‘ y o u n g e r ’ 
w a t e r  r i g h t s ,  b u t  t h e  T C E Q  is  n o t  a u t h o r i z e d  t o  r e l e a s e  w a t e r  t h a t  w a s  e a r l i e r  s t o r e d  b y  a  w a t e r  
r i g h t s  o w n e r  ( K u r t h  e t  a l . ,  2 0 1 2 ) .  K u r t h  e t  a l .  ( 2 0 1 2 )  n o t e d  t h a t ,  u n d e r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  b y  t h e  
S u n s e t  A d v i s o r y  C o m m i s s i o n  ( S A C ) ,  t h e  T C E Q  is  a l s o  p e r m i t t e d  t o  r e v i e w  r e c o r d s  o f  w a t e r  u s e  
b y  w a t e r  r i g h t  h o l d e r s  i n  r e a c h i n g  d e c i s i o n s  d u r i n g  s i t u a t i o n s  o f  w a t e r  s h o r t a g e  o r  d r o u g h t .
T h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  w a t e r  m a n a g e m e n t  i n  t h e  s t a t e  o f  T e x a s  p r o v i d e s  a  t e m p l a t e  f o r  w a t e r -  
c h a l l e n g e d  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  r e g i o n s  a r o u n d  t h e  w o r l d ,  w i t h i n  a  f r a m e w o r k  c e n t e r e d  o n  
i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s  a n d  l o c a l  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  r e s o u r c e .  I n  l i n e  w i t h  s t r o n g  a n d  s u s t a i n e d  o i l  
p r o d u c t i o n  i n  T e x a s  a m i d s t  c y c l e s  o f  d r o u g h t ,  o n e  m a y  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  r e w a r d  o f  o i l  a n d  g a s  
d e v e l o p m e n t  t o  t h e  s t a t e  o f  T e x a s  s u p e r s e d e s  t h e  f e a r  o f  w a t e r  s c a r c i t y .  A n d  o v e r  t h e  y e a r s ,  t h e  
s t a t e  o f  T e x a s  h a s  m a n a g e d  i t s  d r o u g h t  s i t u a t i o n s  e f f e c t i v e l y  b y  f u n d i n g  s t u d i e s ,  p a s s i n g  
n e c e s s a r y  l e g i s l a t i o n s  e m p o w e r i n g  l o c a l  c o n t r o l  o f  w a t e r  r e s o u r c e s ,  a n d  p u t t i n g  u p  c o n t r o l s  t o  
k e e p  t h e  s t a t e ’ s l e a d e r s  v i g i l a n t  i n  w a t e r  m o n i t o r i n g  a n d  s u s t a i n a b l e  w a t e r  m a n a g e m e n t .  T h i s  
s h o w s  t h a t  e v e n  w a t e r  c h a l l e n g e d  r e g i o n s  c a n  p u r s u e  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  i f  r e g u l a t i o n s  a n d  
g u i d e l i n e s  e x i s t  o n  w a t e r  u s e  a n d  i f  e n f o r c e m e n t  i s  s t r o n g .
T h e  f o c u s  o n  w a t e r  m a n a g e m e n t  i n  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  s t e m s  f r o m  t h e  c o n s u m p t i v e  u s e  o f  
w a t e r  i n  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g .  W i t h i n  t h e  f r a m e w o r k  o f  r e g u l a t i o n s  a n d  l a w s  a r o u n d  h y d r a u l i c
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f r a c t u r i n g ,  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  h a s  t h r i v e d  i n  t h e  s t a t e s  o f  T e x a s  a n d  N o r t h  D a k o t a .  T h e s e  
s t a t e s  h a v e  a l s o  p a s s e d  l a w s  t h a t  w o r k  i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  w a t e r  m a n a g e m e n t ,  o i l  a n d  g a s  w a s t e  
m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  f e d e r a l  r e g u l a t i o n s  t o  g u i d e  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g .  T h e  s t a t e  o f  
h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  r e g u l a t i o n s  i n  t h e  s t a t e s  o f  T e x a s  a n d  N o r t h  D a k o t a  w i l l  b e  d is c u s s e d  i n  t h e  
n e x t  s e c t i o n .
5.4.3. Hydraulic Fracturing Regulations in Texas and North
Dakota
Texas State Regulations on hydraulic Fracturing
T h e  m o s t  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n c e r n  a b o u t  t h e  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  i s  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  g r o u n d  w a t e r  
r e s o u r c e s ,  w h i c h  i f  c o n t a m i n a t e d  is  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a c c e s s  o r  c l e a n  u p .  T h e r e  a r e  a l s o  m a j o r  c o n c e r n s  
a b o u t  t h e  h a n d l i n g  o f  t h o u s a n d s  o f  g a l l o n s  o f  c h e m i c a l s  t h a t  a r e  c o m b i n e d  w i t h  w a t e r  t o  f o r m  t h e  
f r a c t u r i n g  f l u i d  p r i o r  t o  f r a c k i n g  a n d  t h e  h a n d l i n g  a n d  d i s p o s a l  o f  t h i s  s p e n t  w a t e r  a f t e r  f r a c k i n g .  
O t h e r  c o n c e r n s  a l s o  i n c l u d e  t h e  v o l u m e  o f  f r e s h w a t e r  c o n s u m e d  i n  t h i s  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  
r e d r e s s i n g  c o m p l a i n t s  o f  c o n t a m i n a t i o n ,  a n d  t h e  t r a n s p a r e n c y  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  o n  t h e  
p r a c t i c e  o f  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g .  E v e r y  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  r e g i o n  h a n d l e s  t h e s e  is s u e s  
d i f f e r e n t l y ,  a n d  T e x a s  a n d  N o r t h  D a k o t a ,  b e i n g  t h e  m a j o r  t i g h t  o i l  p r o d u c e r s  i n  t h e  U S ,  p r o v i d e  a  
u s e f u l  t e m p l a t e  t o  o t h e r  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d .
H y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  i n  T e x a s  i s  r e g u l a t e d  a l o n g s i d e  a l l  o i l  a n d  g a s  a c t i v i t i e s  b y  t h e  R a i l r o a d  
C o m m i s s i o n  ( R R C )  o f  T e x a s .  R e g u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  p r o c e s s  b e g i n s  w i t h  
r e g u l a t i o n  o f  w e l l  m e c h a n i c a l  i n t e g r i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  w e l l  o p e r a t i o n  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  a n d  e x t e n d s  
t o  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  h a n d l i n g  o f  f l o w b a c k  a n d  p r o d u c e d  w a t e r  t h r o u g h  p i t  c o n s t r u c t i o n  ( R R C ,  
n . d .  - b ) .  A s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e s e  s t e p s  t a k e n ,  t h e  R a i l r o a d  C o m m i s s i o n  o f  T e x a s  n o t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  h a s  
b e e n  n o  r e p o r t e d  c a s e  o f  u n d e r g r o u n d  w a t e r  c o n t a m i n a t i o n  d u e  t o  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  i n  t h e  6 0 -  
y e a r  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  p r a c t i c e  ( R R C ,  n . d .  - b ) .  T o  a d d r e s s  t h e  p u b l i c  d e m a n d  f o r  t r a n s p a r e n c y  o f  
h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  c h e m i c a l  d i s c l o s u r e ,  i n  F e b r u a r y  2 0 1 2 ,  t h e  S t a t e  o f  T e x a s  m a n d a t e d  
o p e r a t o r s  t o  r e p o r t  c h e m i c a l s  u s e d  i n  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  o n  t h e  p u b l i c  w e b s i t e ,  f r a c f o c u s . o r g ,
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w h i c h  is  r u n  a n d  m a i n t a i n e d  b y  t h e  g r o u n d  w a t e r  p r o t e c t i o n  c o u n c i l  i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  
I n t e r s t a t e  O i l  a n d  G a s  C o m p a c t  C o m m i s s i o n  ( R R C ,  n . d .  - b ) .  T h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e q u i r e d  f o r  
d i s c l o s u r e  o n  t h e  w e b s i t e  i n c l u d e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
1 . T h e  o p e r a t o r  a n d  d a t e  o f  t h e  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n
2 .  T h e  w e l l  A P I  n u m b e r ,  c o u n t y ,  l o n g i t u d e  a n d  l a t i t u d e  a n d  w e l l  d e p t h
3 .  T h e  v o l u m e  o f  w a t e r  u s e d  i n  t h e  o p e r a t i o n
4 .  T r a d e  n a m e ,  s u p p l i e r  a n d  f u n c t i o n  o f  e a c h  a d d i t i v e  i n  t h e  f l u i d
5 .  N a m e s  o f  e a c h  i n g r e d i e n t  i n  t h e  f l u i d  a d d e d  b y  t h e  s u p p l i e r  a n d  t h e  o p e r a t o r  a n d  
c h e m i c a l  d e t a i l s  a s  s h o w n  i n  m a t e r i a l  s a f e t y  d a t a  s h e e t s
6 .  A c t u a l  o r  m a x i m u m  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  e a c h  c h e m i c a l  i n g r e d i e n t  n a m e d
A c c o r d i n g  t o  K u r t h  e t  a l .  ( 2 0 1 2 )  a n d  T A C  ( n .  d . )  o p e r a t o r s  o r  s e r v i c e  c o m p a n i e s  b e a r  n o  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  i n a c c u r a t e  i n f o r m a t i o n  o n  c h e m i c a l s  f r o m  s u p p l i e r  c o m p a n i e s ,  a n d  s u p p l i e r s  
b e a r  n o  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  i n a c c u r a t e  i n f o r m a t i o n  o r  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  i s  u n d i s c l o s e d  b y  p r o d u c t  
m a n u f a c t u r e r s .  A n d  t h e  c o n t a c t  i n f o r m a t i o n  o f  a n y  p a r t y  c l a i m i n g  p r o t e c t i o n  u n d e r  t r a d e  s e c r e t  
l a w s  o u g h t  t o  b e  p r o v i d e d  t o  t h e  s t a t e  b y  t h e  o p e r a t o r .
North Dakota State Regulations on hydraulic Fracturing
H y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  i n  t h e  s t a t e  o f  N o r t h  D a k o t a  i s  r e g u l a t e d  b y  t h e  N o r t h  D a k o t a  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  
M i n e r a l  R e s o u r c e s  t h r o u g h  r e g u l a t i o n s  i n  t h e  s t a t e ’ s o i l  a n d  g a s  r u l e b o o k  ( N D D C ,  2 0 1 4 ) .  T h e s e  
r u l e s  g u i d e  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  s p e c i f i c a l l y .  T h e  r u l e b o o k  a l s o  c a l l s  f o r  t h e  
d i s c l o s u r e ,  w i t h i n  6 0  d a y s  o f  c a r r y i n g  o u t  a  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n s ,  o f  e v e r y  i n f o r m a t i o n  
“ m a d e  v i e w a b l e  b y  t h e  w e b s i t e ”  t h r o u g h  t h e  f r a c f o c u s . o r g .
H y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  r e g u l a t i o n s  g u i d e  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  a c t i v i t i e s ,  r e p o r t i n g  g u i d e l i n e s  a n d  
w a s t e w a t e r  h a n d l i n g  a n d  d i s p o s a l .  T h e s e  r e g u l a t i o n s  p r o v i d e  s a f e t y  g u i d e l i n e s  t o  p r e v e n t  
n o n s t a n d a r d  w e l l  c a s i n g  p r a c t i c e s ,  i n j e c t i o n  o f  f r a c t u r i n g  f l u i d  i n  u n i n t e n d e d  f o r m a t i o n s ,  o r  s p i l l s  
i n  t h e  w e l l  v i c i n i t y .  R e g u l a t i o n s  a l s o  m a n d a t e  r e p o r t i n g  o f  f r a c k  w a t e r  c h e m i c a l  c o n t e n t s  a n d  t h e  
h a n d l i n g  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  t r a d e  s e c r e t s .  O n  t h e s e  a s p e c t s ,  a  f e w  d i f f e r e n c e s  e x i s t  
b e t w e e n  r e g u l a t i o n s  i n  t h e s e  t w o  s t a t e s  t h a t  h a v e  c h a m p i o n e d  t h e  U . S .  s h a le  o i l  b o o m ,  T e x a s  a n d  
N o r t h  D a k o t a  ( T a b l e  3 0 ) .
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T a b l e  3 0 .  S u m m a r i z e d  C o m p a r i s o n  b e t w e e n  H y d r a u l i c  F r a c t u r i n g  A c t i v i t i e s  i n  T e x a s  a n d  N o r t h  
D a k o t a  ( M o d i f i e d  f r o m  T e m p l e  U n i v e r s i t y ,  2 0 1 7 ;  N D A C  §  4 3 - 0 2 - 0 3 - 2 7 ;  T A C  §  1 6 - 0 1 - 0 3 - 2 9 ;  
T A C  § 1 6 - 0 1 - 0 3 - 8 )
Criteria North Dakota Texas
Disclosure deadline 
for fracturing fluid 
chemical contents
31 to 60 days Within 30 days
Disclosure guidelines 
for frack fluid contents
Not required to report volumes; just fluid 
contents on fracfocus.org platform
Required to report volume and 
contents of fluids on fracfocus.org 
platform
Trade secret 
information 
withholding
Can’t withhold fracture fluid chemical content 
as trade secret
Can withhold. But must declare to 
health professionals in line with 
treatment when life or health risks 
exist.
Wastewater handling 
options
Surface tanks are permitted. Must be removed 
from location within a year after service. 
Impermeable material-lined dikes must be 
constructed around surface tanks/facilities. 
Dikes must be larger than the largest surface 
receptacle and one day’s volume of production.
Commercial waste disposal facilities. 
Land treatment. Lined pits/Tanks. 
Treated fluid could be used for 
hydraulic fracturing without permit.
Fracking operation, 
well requirement 
guidelines to reduce 
chance of spills and 
loss of containment.
ND Administrative code 43-02-03-27.1.
+Well casing thickness and cement integrity 
must be ascertained. Packer 100m standoff 
from treating interval is enforced. Treatment 
pressure during fracks must be at most 85% of 
pressure rating of casing. Casing must be pre­
tested to pressures above treating pressure.
+ If  casing yield pressure is not as high as 
required, an appropriate frack string must be 
used.
+ Relief valve must be used on treating lines to 
keep treating pressure at <85% of frack 
string/intermediate casing pressure rating.
+ Diversion lines must be in place to divert 
flow into pits if  there is loss in containment.
+ Director must be notified if intermediate- 
surface casing annuli pressure exceeds 350psi.
Texas Administrative Code 16-01-03­
3.13-7. (2017a)
+Yield pressure of tubulars in well that 
will be fracked must be 110% of the 
maximum fracture treatment pressure. 
Casings (fracture tubing) must be 
tested to the maximum treating 
pressure. +Casing with pressure 
actuated valves must be tested to 80% 
of actuating pressure and shown to 
hold that pressure for at least 5 mins. A 
failed test means no fracturing is 
allowed and the division director 
notified within 24 hours.
+Wells with minimum separation from 
portable water formations have stricter 
guidelines.
Hazardous waste 
treatment highlights
Treatment at designated facilities. Restrictions 
on storage.
Sent to authorized facility or treated on 
site in appropriate containers.
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Criteria North Dakota Texas
Underground disposal Class II wells allowed for injection. 
Underground Injection Control Law: ND 
administrative Code Title 33, Article 25 chapter 
1.
+Details the conditions for injection permit 
approvals and revocation 
Injection wells permit holders must prove that 
the wells have mechanical integrity and contain 
no leaks in any of the tubulars.
+Rules on injecting hazardous waste 
underground revert to Federal rules in the Code 
of the Federal Republic. 40 CFR Part 144
Class II wells allowed for injection. 
Underground Injection Control Law: 
TX administrative Code Title 16, Part 
1 chapter 3.
+Rules on mechanical integrity tests, 
monitoring, periodic reporting for 
disposal wells, packer standoff from 
interval. Monitor all casing annuli 
during disposal.
+Operator must obtain permit to inject 
and prove injection zone is protected 
from freshwater sources by bounding 
rock intervals.
+Permit could be suspended if 
injection poses harm to the 
environment.
+Operator of well must ascertain that 
wells a quarter mile from disposal well 
are properly plugged to ensure 
injection does not leak into freshwater 
sources.
T a b l e  3 0  c o n t i n u e d .
5.5. Hydraulic Fracturing and Water Management: The U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency Finding Review
I n  2 0 1 6 ,  t h e  E P A  s t u d i e d  i m p a c t s  o f  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  o n  s u r f a c e  a n d  u n d e r g r o u n d  w a t e r  
s o u r c e s  u n d e r  a  5 - s t a g e  c y c l e  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  w a t e r  a c q u i s i t i o n ,  c h e m i c a l  m i x i n g ,  w e l l  i n j e c t i o n ,  
p r o d u c e d  w a t e r  h a n d l i n g  a n d  w a s t e w a t e r  d i s p o s a l  a n d  r e u s e  ( F i g u r e  8 2 ;  E P A ,  2 0 1 6 a ) .  T h r o u g h  
s c i e n t i f i c  p a p e r s  a n d  r e s e a r c h  i n t o  t h e  p r o c e s s e s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  c y c l e ,  t h e  
E P A  i d e n t i f i e d  s u p p o r t i n g  f a c t o r s  a n d  r i s k s  t o  d r i n k i n g  w a t e r  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  e a c h  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  
c y c l e .
T h e  E P A  ( 2 0 1 6 a )  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  w a t e r  a c q u i s i t i o n  f o r  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  i s  a  r i s k  t o  
f r e s h w a t e r  a v a i l a b i l i t y  w h e n  l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  w a t e r  a r e  w i t h d r a w n  f r o m  w a t e r  s o u r c e s  d u r i n g
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d r o u g h t  o r  o t h e r  l o w  f l o w  s e a s o n s .  U n d e r g r o u n d  w a t e r  s o u r c e s  a r e  m o r e  a t  r i s k  i n  a r e a s  w h e r e  
t h o s e  w e r e  t h e  m a i n  s o u r c e s  f o r  w a t e r  w i t h d r a w a l ,  a n d  s u r f a c e  w a t e r  s o u r c e s  w e r e  m o r e  a t  r i s k  i n  
a r e a s  w i t h  l i t t l e  u n d e r g r o u n d  w a t e r  a v a i l a b l e .  T h e  l a c k  o f  s u f f i c i e n t  C l a s s  I I  w e l l s  i n  s o m e  o i l  
a n d  g a s  p l a y s  a n d  t h e  h i g h  c o s t  o f  t r a n s p o r t i n g  f l o w b a c k  w a t e r  a c r o s s  l o n g  d i s t a n c e s  t o  d i s p o s a l  
s i t e s  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  a  g r o w i n g  r e u s e  o f  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r e  w a t e r  f o r  n e w  f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n s .
L a w s  i n  s o m e  s t a t e s  a l s o  i n s i s t  t h a t  w a t e r  w i t h d r a w a l  f r o m  s t r e a m s  d o  n o t  r e d u c e  t h e  w a t e r  f l o w  
b e l o w  s e t  l e v e l s ,  a n d  t h a t  l o w e r  q u a l i t y  w a t e r ,  s u c h  a s  b r a c k i s h  w a t e r ,  b e  u s e d  i n  p l a c e  o f  o r  
a l o n g s i d e  f r e s h w a t e r  ( E P A ,  2 0 1 6 a ) .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  E P A  ( 2 0 1 6 a ) ,  t h e s e  f a c t o r s  h a v e  h e l p e d  
m i t i g a t e  s u r f a c e  a n d  u n d e r g r o u n d  f r e s h w a t e r  o v e r  u s e  i n  m o s t  a r e a s .
A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  a d d i t i v e s  t o  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r e  w a t e r  a l s o  p o s e  a  r i s k  t o  f r e s h  s u r f a c e  a n d  g r o u n d  
w a t e r  s o u r c e s  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  s p i l l s  ( E P A ,  2 0 1 6 a ) .  A l t h o u g h  w a t e r  r e m a i n s  t h e  m a i n  f l u i d  u s e d  i n  
h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n s ,  t h e  u s e  o f  o t h e r  c o n d i t i o n i n g  c h e m i c a l s  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  i m p r o v e  
t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r e s .  T h e  E P A  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  o v e r  1 0 0 0  c h e m i c a l s  h a v e  b e e n  
u s e d  i n  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  f r o m  2 0 0 5  t o  2 0 1 3  a n d  u p  t o  2 8  c o u l d  b e  u s e d  i n  a  s i n g l e  
w e l l  ( E P A ,  2 0 1 6 a ) .  T h e s e  c h e m i c a l s  a r e  b r o u g h t  t o  s i t e  i n  c o n c e n t r a t e d  f o r m  a n d  t h r o u g h  
e q u i p m e n t  o r  h u m a n  e r r o r  c o u l d  l e a k  i n t o  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t .  T h e  E P A  i d e n t i f i e d  r o c k  
p e r m e a b i l i t y  a n d  t h e  a d h e s i v e n e s s  a n d  s o l u b i l i t y  o f  c h e m i c a l s  a s  c o n t r i b u t i n g  f a c t o r s  t o  t h e  
l i k e l i h o o d  o f  c o n t a c t  w i t h  s u r f a c e  o r  u n d e r g r o u n d  w a t e r ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  i m p a c t  o r  l o n g e v i t y  o f  
s u c h  i m p a c t .
A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  s u r f a c e  a n d  u n d e r g r o u n d  s o u r c e s  c a n  a l s o  b e c o m e  c o n t a m i n a t e d  d u r i n g  t h e  p r o c e s s  
o f  i n j e c t i n g  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  w a t e r  d o w n  t h e  w e l l b o r e  ( E P A ,  2 0 1 6 a ) .  T h i s  i s  m a d e  p o s s i b l e  
w h e n  a  f a i l u r e  o c c u r s  i n  t h e  m e t a l  c a s i n g  l i n i n g  t h e  w e l l  o r  i n  t h e  c a s e d  h o l e  c e m e n t  b e t w e e n  
c a s in g s  o r  b e t w e e n  t h e  c a s i n g  a n d  t h e  f o r m a t i o n .  I n j e c t i o n  p r e s s u r e s  d u r i n g  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  
o p e r a t i o n s  c o u l d  b e  a s  h i g h  a s  1 2 0 0 0  p s i  ( 8 0 0  t i m e s  a b o v e  a t m o s p h e r i c  p r e s s u r e )  ( E P A ,  2 0 1 6 a ) .  
F a i l u r e  i n  m e c h a n i c a l  i n t e g r i t y  o f  t h e  w e l l  c o u l d  h a p p e n  f o r  r e a s o n s  r a n g i n g  f r o m  t h e  a g i n g  o f  
w e l l  e q u i p m e n t ,  t h e  p r e s s u r e  a t  w h i c h  i n j e c t i o n  o c c u r s ,  t h e  d i s t a n c e  o f  t h e  f r a c t u r e d  w e l l  f r o m  
g r o u n d w a t e r  s o u r c e s ,  f r a c t u r e s  i n  r o c k s ,  a n d  o t h e r  p o o r l y  a b a n d o n e d  w e l l s  t h a t  e a s i l y  c o n n e c t  t o  
u n d e r g r o u n d  w a t e r  s o u r c e s  ( E P A ,  2 0 1 6 a ) .
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T h e  E P A  ( 2 0 1 6 a )  a l s o  n o t e d  t h a t  d e p e n d i n g  o n  s p i l l  v o l u m e ,  s o i l  t y p e  a n d  s o l u b i l i t y  o f  s p i l l e d  
c h e m i c a l s ,  l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  p r o d u c e d  w a t e r  f r o m  o i l  a n d  g a s  o p e r a t i o n s ,  w h e n  p o o r l y  h a n d l e d ,  
a l s o  p o s e  a  r i s k  t o  f r e s h  s u r f a c e  a n d  u n d e r g r o u n d  w a t e r  s o u r c e s .  T h i s  i s  b e c a u s e  p r o d u c e d  w a t e r  
c o n t a i n s  n a t u r a l l y  e x i s t i n g  g r o u n d  c h e m i c a l s  a n d  s a l t s ,  r a d i o a c t i v e  m a t e r i a l s  a n d  s y n t h e t i c  
c h e m i c a l s  t h a t  w e r e  i n j e c t e d  i n t o  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  d u r i n g  t h e  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  p r o c e s s .  T h e  E P A  
( 2 0 1 6 a )  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  s a l i n i t y  o f  p r o d u c e d  w a t e r  c o u l d  b e  a s  h i g h  a s  3 0 0 , 0 0 0  m g / l  a n d  n o t e d  
s i t u a t i o n s  w h e r e  h u m a n  a n d  e q u i p m e n t  f a i l u r e  h a d  l e d  t o  s p i l l s  i n t o  s u r f a c e  w a t e r  b o d i e s  
r e s u l t i n g  i n  i n c r e a s e d  s a l i n i t y  a n d  c o n d u c t i v i t y  o f  t h e  c o n t a m i n a t e d  w a t e r .
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  E P A  ( 2 0 1 6 a )  o b s e r v e d  t h a t  b a s i c  w a s t e w a t e r  d i s p o s a l  p r a c t i c e s  c o u l d  l e a d  t o  
c o n t a m i n a t i o n  a n d  p o s e  a  r i s k  t o  s u r f a c e  a n d  u n d e r g r o u n d  s o u r c e s .  A b o v e  g r o u n d  p r o d u c e d  
w a t e r  r e u s e  o r  d i s p o s a l  m e t h o d s  a p p l i e d  i n  d i f f e r e n t  a r e a s  a c r o s s  t h e  U . S .  d e p e n d  o n  t h e  q u a l i t y  
o f  t h e  w a t e r ,  l a w s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s  i n  p l a c e ,  a n d  t h e  c o m p a r a t i v e  e c o n o m i c s  o f  v a r i o u s  w a t e r  
m a n a g e m e n t  o p t i o n s .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  E P A  ( 2 0 1 6 a ) ,  w a t e r  m a n a g e m e n t  o p t i o n s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  
m a n y  s t a t e s  a c r o s s  t h e  U . S .  i n c l u d e  u n d e r g r o u n d  i n j e c t i o n  i n  c l a s s  I I  w e l l s ,  t h e  u s e  o f  
e v a p o r a t i o n  p o n d s ,  p e r c o l a t i o n  p i t s ,  t r e a t m e n t ,  a n d  s u r f a c e  d i s p o s a l  t h r o u g h  m e t h o d s  l i k e  
i r r i g a t i o n .  W h e n  i m p r o p e r l y  h a n d l e d ,  s p i l l s  d o  o c c u r  a n d  d o  i m p a c t  s u r f a c e  a n d  s u b s u r f a c e  
s o u r c e s .  E v e n  w i t h  t h e s e  w i d e  s e t  o f  o p t i o n s  a v a i l a b l e ,  i t  i s  w o r t h  n o t i n g  t h a t  a n y  s e l e c t e d  o p t i o n  
p r e s e n t s  a  d i f f e r e n t  s u i t e  o f  w a t e r  h a n d l i n g  c h a l l e n g e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  p o i n t  o f  f l o w b a c k  w a t e r  
g e n e r a t i o n  t o  t h e  p o i n t  o f  u s e .
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E P A - i d e n t i f i e d  R i s k s  o f  H y d r a u l i c  
F r a c t u r i n g  o n  D r i n k i n g  W a t e r
Water Sourcing in 
low water seasons
Chemical mixing and 
risk of surface water 
contamination
Well integrity and 
underground water 
contamination risk
Produced Water 
Handling
Water Disposal 
Practices
F i g u r e  8 2 .  S u m m a r y  o f  R i s k s  t o  D r i n k i n g  W a t e r  I d e n t i f i e d  b y  t h e  E P A  H y d r a u l i c  F r a c t u r i n g  
S t u d y  ( E P A ,  2 0 1 6 a )
5.6. Economics of Wastewater Management Options for Tight Oil 
Development
S l u t z  e t  a l .  ( 2 0 1 2 )  c a t e g o r i z e d  f l o w - b a c k  w a t e r  m a n a g e m e n t  i n  s h a le  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n t o  t h e  
c a t e g o r i e s  o f  r e - u s e ,  r e c y c l e ,  a n d  d i s p o s a l .  T h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  m a n a g e m e n t  c a t e g o r i e s  c o u l d  
r a n g e  w i d e l y  d e p e n d i n g  o n  s e v e r a l  f a c t o r s .  F o r  c o n v e n t i o n a l  o i l  p r o d u c t i o n  o p e r a t i o n s ,  p r o d u c e d  
w a t e r  r e u s e  i s  t y p i c a l l y  t h e  p r e f e r r e d  o p t i o n ,  s i n c e  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  r e i n j e c t i o n  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a n d  
b e c a u s e  t h e  r o c k  q u a l i t y  a l l o w s  c o p i o u s  v o l u m e s  o f  w a t e r  t o  b e  i n j e c t e d  e a s i l y  ( T a b l e  3 1 ) . B u t  
f o r  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  w h e r e  d i r e c t  r e u s e  i s  n o t  f e a s i b l e ,  r e c y c l e  o r  d i s p o s a l  a r e  t h e  m a i n  
o p t i o n s  a v a i l a b l e .  S l u t z  e t  a l .  ( 2 0 1 2 )  i d e n t i f i e d  s i x  f a c t o r s  t h a t  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  c h e m i s t r y  o f  
f l o w b a c k  w a t e r  a n d  t h e  c o s t  o f  f l o w b a c k  w a t e r  h a n d l i n g  a s  f o l l o w s :  ( 1 )  c h e m i s t r y  o f  s o u r c e  
w a t e r ,  ( 2 )  t h e  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  p r o g r a m ,  ( 3 )  f o r m a t i o n  g e o c h e m i s t r y ,  ( 4 )  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  w i t h  
w a t e r - b e a r i n g  f o r m a t i o n s ,  ( 5 )  b l e n d i n g  f l o w b a c k  a n d  o t h e r  w a t e r s ,  a n d  ( 6 )  t h e  t i m e  t h e  w a t e r  
s t a y s  o n  t h e  s u r f a c e .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  R R C  ( n . d .  - b )  u n d e r g r o u n d  w a t e r  i n j e c t i o n  i s  g e n e r a l l y  t h e  
p r e f e r r e d  o p t i o n  f o r  m a n a g i n g  o i l  a n d  g a s  p r o d u c e d  w a s t e w a t e r .
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T a b l e  3 1 .  M a n a g e m e n t  O p t i o n s  f o r  P r o d u c e d  W a t e r  ( E P A ,  2 0 0 0 )
Method
Percent of Onshore Produced 
Water
I n j e c t e d  f o r  E n h a n c e d  R e c o v e r y 5 7 %
I n j e c t i o n  f o r  D i s p o s a l 3 6 %
B e n e f i c i a l  U s e 4 %
E v a p o r a t i o n  a n d  P e r c o l a t i o n  P o n d s 2 %
T r e a t  a n d  D i s c h a r g e 1 %
R o a d s p r e a d i n g < 1 %
5.6.1. Total Disposal Scenario
O n e  o f  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  t h e  e x e m p t i o n  o f  t h e  o i l  a n d  g a s  i n d u s t r y  w a s t e  f r o m  t h e  R C R A  r e g u l a t i o n  
i s  t h a t  i t  a l l o w s  o p e r a t o r s  t o  s t r i v e  m o r e  t o w a r d s  f i n d i n g  c h e a p e r  d i s p o s a l  o p t i o n s  ( E P A ,  n . d .  - b ) .  
C o s t  e s t i m a t e s  f o r  d is p o s a l  o f  w a s t e w a t e r  b y  c o m m e r c i a l  f a c i l i t i e s  v a r y  w i d e l y .  I n  1 9 9 7 ,  
o p e r a t o r s  q u o t e d  a  t o t a l  t r e a t m e n t  a n d  h a n d l i n g  c o s t  t h a t  r a n g e s  f r o m  $ 7 . 5  t o  $ 3 5 0 / b b l ,  w h i l e  
c o m m e r c i a l  h a n d l i n g  f a c i l i t i e s  q u o t e d  a  r a n g e  f r o m  0 . 2  t o  1 4 . 7 / b b l  f o r  w a t e r - b a s e d  o r  $ 1  -  $ 5 7  
f o r  o i l - b a s e d  d r i l l i n g  w a s t e  ( D W M I S ,  2 0 1 5 b ) .  P r o d u c e d  w a t e r  d i s p o s a l  a n d  w a t e r  o f  d i f f e r e n t  
d i r t  l e v e l s  a r e  q u o t e d  t o  r a n g e  b e t w e e n  0 . 0 1  t o  $ 8 / b b l  ( V e i l ,  1 9 9 7 ) .  A u t h o r i z e d  f a c i l i t i e s  w h o  
r e c e i v e  t h e  o i l - f i e l d  w a s t e  c o u l d  t r e a t  o r  d i s p o s e  t h e m  u s i n g  E P A - a u t h o r i z e d  m e t h o d s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
u s i n g  o n e  o r  m o r e  o f  t h e  4 4  c l a s s  1 w e l l s  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  t h a t  h a n d l e  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e s  ( E P A ,  n . d  -  
j ) .
T h e  A m e r i c a n  P e t r o l e u m  I n s t i t u t e  ( 1 9 9 7 )  e s t i m a t e d  t h a t  f o r  e a c h  b a r r e l  o f  o i l  p r o d u c e d  o n e  
b a r r e l  o f  w a t e r  i s  a l s o  p r o d u c e d .  T h e r e f o r e ,  f o r  a  w e l l  t h a t  p r o d u c e s  1 m i l l i o n  b a r r e l s  o f  o i l  o v e r  a  
2 0 - y e a r  p e r i o d ,  a n d  d is p o s e s  t h e  e n t i r e  p r o d u c e d  w a t e r  a s  h a z a r d o u s  w a s t e w a t e r  u s i n g  
c o m m e r c i a l  w a s t e  d is p o s e r s ,  a t  a  c o s t  o f  $ 1 0 / b b l  o r  n o n - h a z a r d o u s  w a t e r  a t  $ 7 / b b l ,  a  s i m p l i f i e d  
c o s t  b r e a k d o w n  s h o w s  t h a t  t h e  c o s t  o f  w a t e r  m a n a g e m e n t  f o r  t h i s  w e l l  a l o n e  c o u l d  r a n g e  
b e t w e e n  $ 7 . 5  t o  $ 1 0  m i l l i o n  i n  1 9 9 7  d o l l a r s  ( T a b l e  3 2 ,
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T a b l e  3 3 ) . E s c a l a t e d  t o  2 0 1 7  r e a l  d o l l a r s ,  a t  $ 1 3 . 7  a n d  $ 1 9 . 5  p e r  b a r r e l  f o r  n o n - h a z a r d o u s  a n d  
h a z a r d o u s  w a t e r  t r e a t m e n t ,  t h i s  c o s t  g r o w s  t o  $ 1 3 . 0  a n d  $ 1 8 . 3  m i l l i o n  r e s p e c t i v e l y  ( F e d e r a l  
R e s e r v e  B a n k  S t  L o u i s ,  2 0 1 7 ) .  I n c l u d i n g  t h e  c o s t  o f  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  b y  t r u c k s  a n d  l a b o r ,  a n d  u n d e r  
c u r r e n t  w a t e r  d i s p o s a l  p r a c t i c e s ,  W a t e r W o r l d  ( 2 0 1 3 )  p u t s  t h e  c o s t  o f  w a t e r  d i s p o s a l  f o r  t h e  e n t i r e  
l i f e  o f  a  w e l l  a t  $ 1 6 0  m i l l i o n .
T a b l e  3 2 .  C o s t  b r e a k d o w n  f o r  w a s t e w a t e r  d i s p o s a l  f o r  a  f r a c t u r e d  w e l l  a s s u m i n g  h a z a r d o u s  
p r o d u c e d  w a t e r
Parameter Volume of water or Cost
A d d i t i o n a l  f l o w b a c k  w a t e r  p r o d u c t io n  s h o r t l y  a f t e r  
f r a c k  ( 2  m i l l i o n  g a ls ;  5 0 %  o f  f r a c k  f l u i d  v o lu m e  o f  4  
m i l l i o n  g a ls ;  1 b b l=  4 2  g a ls )
5 0 , 0 0 0  b b l
T o t a l  w a t e r  p r o d u c t io n  ( i f  E U R  =  1 M M b b l ) 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  b b l
V o l u m e  o f  h a z a r d o u s  w a t e r  t h r o u g h  a u t h o r iz e d  
f a c i l i t i e s
1 , 0 5 0 , 0 0 0  b b l
A t  $ 1 0 / b b l  d is p o s a l  c o s t $10,500,000 over a period of ~20 
years
T a b l e  3 3 .  C o s t  b r e a k d o w n  f o r  w a s t e w a t e r  d i s p o s a l  f o r  a  f r a c t u r e d  w e l l  a s s u m i n g  o n l y  h a z a r d o u s  
f l o w b a c k  w a t e r
Parameter Cost
C o s t  o f  d is p o s in g  5 0 , 0 0 0 b b l  o f  h a z a r d o u s  f l o w b a c k  w a t e r  a t  
$ 1 0 / b b l
$ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0
C o s t  o f  d is p o s in g  n o n - h a z a r d o u s  1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 b b l  o f  w a t e r  p r o d u c e d  
t h r o u g h  t h e  l i f e  o f  t h e  w e l l  a t  $ 7 / b b l
$ 7 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0
C o s t  o f  d is p o s in g  1 , 0 5 0 , 0 0 0  b b l  o f  h a z a r d o u s  a n d  n o n - h a z a r d o u s  
w a t e r  t h r o u g h  a u t h o r iz e d  f a c i l i t i e s
$7,500,000 over the 
well life of ~20
years
5.6.2. Water Treatment and Reuse Scenario
A  t y p i c a l  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n  c o n s u m e s  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  4  t o  5  m i l l i o n  g a l l o n s  o f  w a t e r .  
S o u r c i n g  a n d  t r a n s p o r t i n g  t h i s  v o l u m e  c a u s e s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t r u c k  t r a f f i c  a n d  l e a d s  t o  i n c r e a s e d  
a c c i d e n t s  a n d  r o a d  n u i s a n c e  i n  t h e  t o w n s  w h e r e  t i g h t  o i l  d e v e l o p m e n t  o c c u r s .  B e s i d e s  t h e s e  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i m p a c t s ,  t h e  e c o n o m i c s  o f  w a t e r  a c q u i s i t i o n  a l s o  p u t s  p r e s s u r e  o n  t h e  b u d g e t s  o f
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a s s e t  m a n a g e r s .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  t h e  i n d u s t r y  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a c t i v i s t s  a l i k e  a r e  s e a r c h i n g  f o r  w a y s  
t o  i m p r o v e  r e c y c l i n g  a n d  r e d u c e  t h e  w a t e r  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  a n d  b y  s o  d o i n g ,  t h e  l o g i s t i c a l  b u r d e n  o f  
w a t e r  p r o c u r e m e n t  i n  s h a l e  d e v e l o p m e n t .
E c o n o m i c  a n d  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p r e s s u r e s  f r o m  w a t e r  c o n s e r v a t i o n  r e g u l a t i o n s  a r e  p r o m o t i n g  t h e  
u s e  o f  r e c y c l e d  f l o w b a c k  w a t e r  o r  b r a c k i s h  w a t e r  i n  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n s .  F u l l  
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  e f f o r t s  w i l l  r e d u c e  t h e  f r e s h w a t e r  d e m a n d s  o n  c o u n t i e s  a n d  c o m m u n i t i e s  
i n  w h i c h  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  c u r r e n t l y  o c c u r s .  E x a m p l e s  o f  w a t e r  c o n s e r v a t i o n  e f f o r t s  a r e  
a l r e a d y  h a p p e n i n g ,  l e d  b y  o i l  a n d  g a s  o p e r a t o r s ’ d r i v e  f o r  o p e r a t i o n a l  e f f i c i e n c y  a n d  p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  
T h e  A p a c h e  C o r p o r a t i o n  c o n s t r u c t e d  a  p r o c e s s i n g  f a c i l i t y  i n  I r i o n  C o u n t y ,  T e x a s ,  w i t h  a n  o v e r a l l  
d a i l y  c a p a c i t y  o f  4 0 , 0 0 0  b a r r e l s  o f  p r o d u c e d  w a t e r  ( B o y d ,  2 0 1 5 ) .
T h e  r e u s a b i l i t y  o f  f l o w b a c k  w a t e r  d e p e n d s  o n  w a t e r  c h e m i s t r y ,  a n d  t h e  l o g i s t i c a l  a n d  c o s t  
c h a l l e n g e s  i n v o l v e d  w i t h  w a t e r  a g g r e g a t i o n  a n d  t r e a t m e n t .  T h e  c h e m i s t r y  o f  f l o w b a c k  a n d  
p r o d u c e d  w a t e r  d e p e n d s  o n  t h e  o r g a n i c  a n d  i n o r g a n i c  m a t e r i a l s  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  b e i n g  
d e v e l o p e d ,  a n d  t h e  c h e m i c a l  a d d i t i v e s  t o  t h e  f l u i d  u s e d  i n  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g .  T h e s e  m a t e r i a l s  
c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  l e v e l s  o f  t o t a l  d i s s o l v e d  s o l i d s  ( T D S )  t h a t  a r e  h a n d l e d  d u r i n g  w a t e r  t r e a t m e n t .
T h e  c o s t  o f  w a t e r  t r e a t m e n t  i s  t i e d  t o  t h e  i n t e n d e d  c o n d i t i o n  o f  t h e  w a t e r  p l a n n e d  f o r  r e u s e .  
H y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  c o u l d  b e  p e r f o r m e d  u s i n g  t h r e e  b r o a d  t y p e s  o f  f l u i d s :  s l i c k w a t e r ,  l i n e a r  g e l  
f l u i d s ,  a n d  c r o s s l i n k e d  g e l  f l u i d s  ( B o s c h e e ,  2 0 1 4 ) .  T h e s e  f l u i d s  h a v e  d i f f e r e n t  i m p a c t s  o n  p u m p  
p r e s s u r e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  a n d  h a v e  d i f f e r e n t  p r o p p a n t  c a r r y i n g  c a p a b i l i t i e s .
M i n e r a l s  l i k e  c a l c i u m  a n d  b o r o n  a r e  k n o w n  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  
f l u i d s  b y  r e d u c i n g  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  c r o s s l i n k s  t o  f o r m ,  w h i c h  i n  t u r n  a f f e c t s  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  f l u i d  t o  
t r a n s p o r t  p r o p p a n t s  t h r o u g h  t h e  w e l l b o r e  i n t o  t h e  f r a c t u r e s  ( B o s c h e e ,  2 0 1 4 ) .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  
B o s c h e e  ( 2 0 1 4 )  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  s a l t - t o l e r a n t  f l u i d  s y s t e m s  h a s  i m p r o v e d  t h e  u s a b i l i t y  o f  
f l o w b a c k  w a t e r  c o n t a i n i n g  h i g h  l e v e l s  o f  d i s s o l v e d  s a l t s .  W i t h  t h e  u s e  o f  f l u i d s  t h a t  c a n  c r o s s l i n k  
i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  d i s s o l v e d  s a l t s ,  o p e r a t o r s  c a n  s a v e  c o s t s  i n  w a t e r  t r e a t m e n t .
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  a n d  t r e a t m e n t  o f  f l o w b a c k  w a t e r  a l s o  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  l o g i s t i c a l  c o s t  o f  r e c y c l i n g  a n d  
w a t e r  r e u s e .  T h e  d i s t a n c e  b e t w e e n  s t i m u l a t e d  w e l l s ,  o v e r  w h i c h  f l o w b a c k  w a t e r  n e e d s  t o  b e
239
t r a n s p o r t e d  f o r  t r e a t m e n t ,  a f f e c t  t h e  c o s t  o f  r e c y c l i n g .  W h e n  t h e  f l o w b a c k  w a t e r  i s  l a r g e  e n o u g h ,  
t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  n e a r b y  a l r e a d y - s t i m u l a t e d  w e l l s  t h a t  a r e  p r o d u c i n g  w a t e r  m a k e s  i t  e a s i e r  a n d  le s s  
e x p e n s i v e  t o  s t i m u l a t e  n e w  w e l l s .  I f  t h e  w e l l s  a r e  f a r  a p a r t ,  t h e  c o s t  o f  a g g r e g a t i n g  f l o w b a c k  
w a t e r  m a y  e r o d e  m u c h  o f  t h e  e c o n o m i e s  o f  s c a l e  b e n e f i t  t h a t  s i g n i f i c a n t  a m o u n t s  o f  f l o w b a c k  
w a t e r  w o u l d  h a v e  p r o v i d e d  t o  t h e  o p e r a t i o n .
B e s i d e s  o p t i o n s  f o r  f l o w b a c k  w a t e r  r e u s e ,  w a s t e w a t e r  d i s p o s a l  t h r o u g h  u n d e r g r o u n d  w a t e r  
i n j e c t i o n  h a s  b e e n  t h e  p r e f e r r e d  o p t i o n  f o r  s e v e r a l  o p e r a t o r s  i n  o i l  p l a y s  w i t h i n  t h e  U . S .  ( R R C ,  
n . d .  - b ) .  T h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  c o m m e r c i a l  d i s p o s a l  w e l l s  f a c i l i t a t e s  t h e  c h o i c e  o f  w a t e r  d is p o s a l  
o v e r  r e c y c l i n g .  M o s t  o f  t h e  u n d e r g r o u n d  i n j e c t i o n  a n d  d i s p o s a l  w e l l s  i n  t h e  U . S .  a r e  l o c a t e d  i n  
t h e  s t a t e  o f  T e x a s  ( P r o p u b l i c a . o r g ,  2 0 1 2 ) .  T h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  d i s p o s a l  w e l l s  
m a k e s  t h e  w a t e r  d i s p o s a l  o p t i o n  a t t r a c t i v e ,  w h i l e  f e w e r  d i s p o s a l  w e l l s  o r  s t i f f e r  r e g u l a t i o n s  o n  
w a s t e w a t e r  h a n d l i n g  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  c o s t  o f  d i s p o s a l .  T h e  c o s t  o f  d i f f e r e n t  w a t e r  m a n a g e m e n t  
o p t i o n s  a n d  t h e  u n i q u e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  a n  a s s e t  g u i d e  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  o p t i m a l  w a t e r  
m a n a g e m e n t  o p t i o n  f o r  t h a t  l o c a t i o n .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  f o r  t h e  B a k k e n ,  t h e  t o t a l  c o s t  o f  w a t e r  
m a n a g e m e n t  w h i c h  i n c l u d e s  a c q u i s i t i o n ,  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  r e c y c l i n g ,  a n d  d i s p o s a l  i s  e s t i m a t e d  t o  
r a n g e  b e t w e e n  $ 6  a n d  $ 1 5  p e r  b a r r e l  a n d  t h e  p o r t i o n  o f  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  f l u i d  t h a t  r e t u r n s  a s  
f l o w b a c k  w a t e r  c o u l d  a v e r a g e  2 7 . 5 %  ( B o s c h e e ,  2 0 1 4 ) .  B o s c h e e  ( 2 0 1 4 )  a l s o  r e p o r t s  d i f f e r e n t  
f l o w b a c k  p e r c e n t a g e s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  t i g h t  o i l  p l a y s  ( T a b l e  3 4 ) .
T a b l e  3 4 .  P e r c e n t a g e  R e t u r n  F l o w b a c k  W a t e r  i n  M a j o r  U . S .  S h a l e  P l a y s  ( B o s c h e e ,  2 0 1 4 ) .
Plays Return water%
Low high
Bakken 1 5 % 4 0 %
Permian 2 0 % 4 0 %
Niobrara 1 5 % 3 0 %
Eagle Ford < 1 5 % 1 5 %
A s s u m i n g  t h e  h y d r a u l i c  f r a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n  f o r  e a c h  w e l l  r e q u i r e s  4  m i l l i o n  g a l l o n s  o f  w a t e r ,  
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  c o s t  o f  w a t e r  m a n a g e m e n t  f o r  a  t e n - w e l l  o p e r a t i o n  w h e r e  f l o w b a c k  
w a t e r  i s  r e c y c l e d  a n d  r e u s e d  o n c e  b e f o r e  d i s p o s a l ,  a n d  a n o t h e r  o p e r a t i o n  w h e r e  f l o w b a c k  w a t e r
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i s  d i s p o s e d  d i r e c t l y  w i t h o u t  a n y  r e c y c l e  o r  r e u s e ,  c o u l d  b e  e s t i m a t e d  a c r o s s  t h e  f o u r  t i g h t  o i l  
p l a y s  o f  B a k k e n ,  E a g l e  F o r d ,  P e r m i a n ,  a n d  N i o b r a r a  ( F i g u r e  8 3 ) .
F i g u r e  8 3 .  W a t e r  M a n a g e m e n t  f o r  a  h y p o t h e t i c a l  1 0 - w e l l  a s s e t  i n  t h e  B a k k e n  T i g h t  O i l  P l a y
F o r  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  w h e r e  1 0 0 %  o f  t h e  f l o w b a c k  w a t e r  f r o m  e v e r y  w e l l  i s  r e c y c l e d  a n d  t h e  c o s t  o f  
a g g r e g a t i n g  w a t e r  a c r o s s  p r o d u c i n g  w e l l s  i s  s m a l l  c o m p a r e d  t o  a c t u a l  r e c y c l i n g  c o s t s ,  i t  i s  
p o s s i b l e  t o  c o m p a r e  a c r o s s  t w o  w a t e r  m a n a g e m e n t  s t r a t e g i e s .  T h i s  i s  a  s i m p l i f y i n g  a s s u m p t i o n  
b e c a u s e  i t  w o u l d  t a k e  c l o s e l y - s i t e d  w e l l s  a n d  e s t a b l i s h e d  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  a n  o p e r a t i o n  t o  r u n  a t  s u c h  
e f f i c i e n c y  l e v e l s .  G i v e n  t h a t  t h e s e  f a c i l i t i e s  d o  e x i s t  a n d  t h e  t o t a l  c o s t  o f  w a t e r  h a n d l i n g  f o r  t h e  
B a k k e n  is  $ 1 5  ( B o s c h e e ,  2 0 1 4 ) ,  e q u a l l y  d i v i d e d  a c r o s s  t h e  t h r e e  p r o c e s s e s  o f  w a t e r  a c q u i s i t i o n  
a n d  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  w a t e r  r e c y c l i n g ,  a n d  w a t e r  d i s p o s a l ,  e a c h  c o s t i n g  $ 5 ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i s  a  c o s t  
b r e a k d o w n  f o r  a  h y p o t h e t i c a l  1 0 - w e l l  p r o j e c t  f o r  e a c h  o f  t h e  f o u r  m a j o r  t i g h t  o i l  p l a y s  ( F i g u r e  8 4  
a n d  F i g u r e  8 5 ) .
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Per well Water Handling Cost
7 0 0 ,0 0 0  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6 0 7 ,1 4 3
Bakken P erm ian  N io b rara  Eagle Ford
T ig h t  O il P lays
■  disposal a fte r  firs t use ■  F low back recycle, reuse b e fo re  disposal
Figure 84. Comparing Water Management cost in Four U.S. Plays (Modified from Boschee,
2014)
Ex. Bakken Cost/bbl volume (bbl=gal/42) Cost ($) volume (gal/42) Cost ($)
In itial w ells  frac tu red 10 10
W a te r  Acquisition cost S 5 .0 9 5 2 ,3 8 1 4 ,7 6 1 ,9 0 5 9 5 2 ,3 8 1 4 ,7 6 1 ,9 0 5
Flowback % 28% 28%
Flow back w a te r  recycle s 5 .0 2 6 1 ,9 0 5 1 ,309 ,52 4 -
Disposal s 5 .0 7 2 ,0 2 4 3 6 0 ,1 1 9 2 6 1 ,9 0 5 1 ,309 ,52 4
T o ta l W a te r  handling cost 6 ,4 3 1 ,5 4 8 6 ,0 7 1 ,4 2 9
Additional Wells fractured 2.75 0
Total Number o f wells fractured 12.8 10
Per w ell w a te r  cost 5 0 4 ,4 3 5 60 7 ,1 43
Figure 85. Cost Comparison for Two Water Management Strategies (Adapted using Total Water 
Cost of Bakken Developments; Boschee, 2014)
The research into some water treatment options has not gone beyond pilot tests. Historically, 
high oil price periods have been associated with more investment in technology trials and oil 
field solutions including water management concepts. But lately, these advances are seen in low 
oil price times and since low oil prices from late 2014, operators are more motivated to finding 
creative ways of ensuring that costs incurred in water management do not erode the already- 
marginal economics of development in some plays.
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Several trials are ongoing in finding more ways of handling the huge water management expense 
facing producers. Rassenfoss (2013) discussed pilot efforts to reduce the amount of water used in 
fracking by the use of nitrogen as fracturing fluid. The benefit of this new approach is due to the 
character of liquid nitrogen to return to the gaseous state under reservoir temperatures, leaving 
the formation undamaged and the rock permeability unimpaired. Schmidt et al. (2015) reported 
ongoing efforts in using solely produced water for hydraulic fracturing with several advantages. 
They estimated that the ~190 million gallons of water used annually could be entirely provided 
from potential supply from wells in place, hence saving freshwater and reducing truck traffic on 
roads. They also highlighted key challenges to using produced water for hydraulic fracturing as 
ranging from storage challenges, solids and salt content of flowback water, and the high cost of 
treating the water to a useable form.
Water management will remain a major issue in tight oil development with major implications 
for cost and the environment. Lunn et al. (2014) proffered a four-step water resource 
management guide that could be used by operators of assets and city planners. These steps 
consist of (1) data gathering on water use by any operation, (2) analysis of the data through 
metrics like withdrawal, percentage use and some measure of use efficiency, (3) risk assessment 
of the source of water supply and conditions of the environment, and (4) a risk management 
profile to continue to conserve the water source. Through this management framework, each 
water-use operation is encouraged to provide vigilant stewardship of its water use and 
continuously strive for a reduction in its water footprint. Other researchers and operators have 
studied the issue of water use and find no reason for alarm in most locations where precipitation 
levels were found sufficient to provide for competing water demands (Arthur et al., n.d). While 
stakeholders may differ on the existence of a water problem or the strategy of striving for water 
conservation by way of regulations, the impact of water management on profitability of oil and 
gas assets has won the attention of business leaders and may be the most compelling argument 
for water conservation.
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5.7. Summary: Environmental Regulations and Tight Oil 
Development
In 2005, the U.S. congress removed the regulation of water-based hydraulic fracturing from the 
purview of the EPA under the Safe Drinking Water Act, contrary to a ruling by the Eleventh 
Circuit court of Appeal in 1997 (Beck, 2011). Many agree that this action is among the most 
relevant nationwide legislative protections of the tight resource development industry. Others 
argue that without this legislative protection, tight oil and gas development in the U.S. would 
have been stymied and the major economic benefits to the governments and public would have 
been lost.
The EPA in 2015, in a draft report on the impact of tight oil development on water sources, 
concluded that it could not rule out the potential of this industry’s hydraulic fracturing activities 
to affect drinking water sources. While the EPA mentioned that in a review of the technique of 
hydraulic fracturing, the chemicals used and the nature of protection of wells showed clear 
pathways for pollution, it pointed out significant gaps in data and understanding that precluded a 
categorical implication of the tight oil industry in systemic widespread water pollution (EPA, 
2016a). This leaves a key question unanswered: From the EPA’s findings, should more laws be 
put in place or new guidance be put out on how to more closely regulate the tight oil and gas 
development industry?
The precautionary principle posits that when the consequence of damage posed by a hazard to a 
system is grave, the lack of settlement in the science or the absence of a convincing case that 
irrefutably establishes a causal link, is no excuse for inaction (United Nations, 1992). There is 
still room for cost benefit analysis to establish alternative options and to select cost effective 
measures of action (United Nations, 1992). Perkins (2010) further argues that if the severity of 
damage posed by the threat is irreversible and astronomical, in line with the pillars of severity 
and probability that define the concept of risk, only a zero probability can ensure that the risk is 
managed. This suggests that, in line with tight oil development, for example, if the threat of 
damage involves major aquifers, that will take, for example, hundreds of years to run off 
radioactive or highly soluble pollutants, the only way of managing such risk is not drilling the
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well. This school of thought will suggest that wells planned for drilling around major aquifers 
around the country that service millions of people, ought not to be drilled because of the grave 
cost society will incur if contamination occurs.
The EPA (2016b) in studying the connection between hydraulic fracturing and drinking water 
concluded that it found circumstances in which fracking could impact drinking water but had 
data gaps in assessing both the severity of such impacts and frequency on a nationwide scale.
The precautionary principle recommends that even the absence of strong ties or a preponderance 
of the evidence,on the scale the study set out to find, is no reason to do nothing or argument 
against rulemaking or enforceable guideline-setting for the tight oil industry. Opponents of this 
interpretation contend that it may lead to an endless stream of legislation in a thousand issues 
backed by, in some cases, pure speculation. And this practice could be a serious burden to 
businesses. It is easy to see how a business could free itself from a regulation that could be costly 
to follow by reducing its headcount just below the threshold above which it would otherwise fall 
into the class of businesses on which the regulation applies. Perkins (2010) weighed arguments 
on both sides of the precautionary principle theory and concluded that the decision maker cannot 
seek shelter in doing nothing when faced with the argument that the facts are not entirely 
established, and argued that undeniable certainty is almost never attained. The U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers (2013) also agree that incomplete data and inconclusive scientific assessment only 
call for greater precaution in addressing potential impacts in a given situation.
Earthjustice (2011) petitioned the EPA to promulgate rules under the Toxic Substances Control 
Act sections 4 and 8, which would require operators to conduct toxicity tests on all the chemicals 
they employ in hydraulic fracturing and keep records of those. This, they argued would protect 
the public against potential harm from hydraulic fracturing chemicals. Because the states now 
enforce the disclosure of these chemicals to the public, and some states like North Dakota reject 
any arguments by operators to withhold information on chemicals as trade secrets, it is 
unarguable that the states themselves are taking the first step. This step sets the stage for more 
federal, state and private industry collaboration to continue to study the characteristics of 
chemicals and potentially find substitute chemicals with properties that are less harmful to the
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environment, less lasting in the event of spills, and that could still be as effective as their more 
harmful classes of chemicals currently being used.
In addition to produced wastewater management issues, like proper disposal and protection of 
state surface water sources, the future of shale resource development still points to significant 
use of water and the potential for pollution. In 2014, over 240 million barrels of water were 
consumed for hydraulic fracturing in North Dakota (ND SWC, 2016) and 1 billion barrels is 
projected to require handling and disposal in the years between 2015 and 2018 (Bader, 2016). 
With more baseline studies on water quality, and improvements in technology to trace 
contaminations and their correlation to tight oil development activities, it is possible there could 
be a more evidence-based link between fracking and environmental impacts. While there is room 
for promulgation of guidelines to help the states better engage with the tight oil industry, the 
presence of a large body of data could bridge the gaps in current understanding and provide 
better authority to agencies, on the national and the state-level, to engage with the industry.
Safety of water resources can be assured if states and industry collaborate to maintain strict rules 
on well architecture and surface water handling to further reduce the probability of underground 
or surface contamination of freshwater bodies. For example, most states have laws against 
surface discharge of treated wastewater, even when that water is treated to distilled water status 
(TAC, 2017b). Supporters of the industry point to similar examples of laws currently enforced as 
evidence of sufficient state regulation on industry activity. Beyond the facts against or for 
hydraulic fracturing, there is need for some concerted effort to build trust between operators and 
the public. Initiatives like the Fracfocus website are helping in this regard. And unconditional 
disclosure of chemical content information by states like North Dakota show that even strong 
supporters of the industry could still be trusted to enforce laws that protect the lives of their 
populations.
5.8. Conclusion
Environmental regulations have contributed in shaping the tight oil development experience in 
the US. Hand-in-hand with economic development is the presence and guidance provided by
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regulations. This chapter has reviewed arguments about regulations from environmentalist and 
industry perspectives and has highlighted the resilience of laws that predate the tight oil industry. 
It has also discussed the adaptations of regulation to ensure safe and sustainable tight oil 
development. In so doing, we have shown through case studies on the busiest U.S. plays, the 
potential for disruption of industry activity to the lives of local inhabitants of resource 
development regions and the role of regulations, not as hurdles for economic activity, but as 
preservers of social license required for economic activity. The section provides different 
approaches applied in tight oil and gas development that could be adapted by other tight oil 
regions around the world to guide development of these resources. Since the collage of solutions 
taken by any province is based on its local laws and economic priorities, it is important that the 
U.S. solutions be seen as possible templates which could be built upon to provide every shale 
locale with a fit-for-purpose solution to address its own needs.
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Chapter 6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1. Research Summary
The United States oil and gas industry turned the corner in the last decade and reversed a 30-year 
decline in petroleum production. This phenomenon began with tight gas production. Prior to this, 
the U.S. was a natural gas importer and several businesses on the Gulf Coast were setting up to 
become import hubs for LNG from Middle Eastern, Australian producers, and other gas rich 
provinces. These same businesses, just a few years later are now working to become LNG 
exporters thanks to massive natural gas production from tight shale plays in the U.S. (EIA, 
2016m). This was the impact of shale gas production, and a similar phenomenon is happening 
for oil production. Learnings in tight gas production were quickly transferred to liquid rich gas 
plays and later to tight oil plays. These plays have reversed the decline in U.S. oil production and 
relieved massive efforts at enhanced oil recovery in old and marginal fields. Tight plays like the 
Eagle Ford, Permian, Bakken, and Niobrara have been on the forefront of U.S. tight oil 
renaissance.
With huge national benefits in reduced oil import and accompanying international strategic 
benefits, low unemployment, and a broadening of the tax base of oil producing states, 
improvement in the lives of citizens and support industries, many experts within the U.S. and 
outside understand that tight oil development in the U.S. has been transformational. Besides this 
notional understanding, many have not assessed the many dimensions of this development in any 
detail beyond news articles, or academic conferences on select segments of the tight oil 
revolution. At that level of detail, the issues seem disparate and the insights don’t lend 
themselves for comprehensive review for business leaders, or policy makers. And for non-U.S. 
plays with similar resource types, assessing the possibility of transferring lessons from tight oil 
development is challenging. In this research, a framework for such assessment has been 
provided.
This research evaluated the engineering, environmental, and economic dimensions of the U.S. 
tight oil phenomenon. It reviewed the key drivers that contributed to U.S. tight oil industry
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successes as learnings for new and promising tight oil provinces around the world. The 
geological properties of non-U.S. plays, as provided by the U.S. Energy Information and 
Administration/Advanced Resources International (2013) report, were also used to draw 
comparisons between major U.S. plays and non-US frontier plays. It further developed 
preliminary economic assessments for non-U.S. plays, at the project level.
On the engineering front, this research produced a crude oil production forecast for seven tight 
oil regions; the Permian, Bakken, Eagle Ford, Niobrara, Haynesville, Marcellus, and Utica 
formations, under scenarios of high or low oil prices. We reviewed tight oil well production 
forecasting techniques, and by applying a hybrid technique of statistical type well derivation and 
the empirical modified Duong tight oil forecasting model, we developed 20-year well profiles for 
tight oil wells. This analysis used the commercially available software, Drillinginfo for type well 
derivation. The method developed for this analysis applied steady state well counts from 
historical low and high oil price periods to develop projections for crude oil production for high 
and low oil price scenarios. This result was shown to be comparable to production projections by 
the Energy Information Administration developed using the EIA’s National Economic Modeling 
Software Tool.
On the environmental front, this research reviewed the role of U.S. federal and state 
environmental regulations in tight oil development. Our analysis of these regulations in relation 
to tight oil development showed the level of resilience of most laws that predated this 
development and the level of modifications that have enabled their enforcement. The need for a 
clean environment, in the midst of tight oil prosperity is highlighted by strong state enforcements 
and federal oversight through institutions like the EPA. We also assessed the environmental 
issues around tight oil development with the help of case studies within the busiest tight oil plays 
in the US: the Bakken and Eagle Ford. These case studies provided concrete circumstances 
where environmental regulations intersect with industry practices and the practice of hydraulic 
fracturing. We reviewed the regulations on hydraulic fracturing in these areas and highlighted 
ongoing efforts by state governments in preventing environmental contamination, ensuring 
transparency and public participation. Through the challenges and local solutions, these case 
studies also highlight the fact that regulations and smart enforcement, rather than stifling industry
250
could be key tools for preserving the social license to operate for oil firms, and ensuring the 
sustainability of the tight oil industry. I also conducted a quantitative evaluation of the potential 
economic impact of different solutions to the problem of water consumption and disposal in tight 
oil industry practice.
On the economic front, I applied an econometric technique in making sense of the impact of oil 
price and drilling activity levels on oil production. This assessment employed the Auto 
Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model in highlighting the relationship among key variables 
within the tight oil development industry over the last decade. The framework used in this 
analysis, to the best of my knowledge, is the first time that insights from geological and play 
production and development characteristics were used within an econometric framework 
alongside the ARDL technique to understand the behavior of oil and gas operators in different oil 
plays. This analysis shows long run and short run behavior of oil production in response to oil 
price signals as different for different oil plays, based on the rock quality and commercial 
arrangements that operators have in these plays.
In addition, this research also reviewed the U.S. oil and gas industry to highlight key supporting 
factors for tight oil development. It also provides policy makers with a template from which to 
engage in capacity building and modification to support oil and gas development within their 
locales. This review, in addition to specific economic assessment of oil and gas projects in non- 
U.S. tight oil plays, provides business stakeholders interested in pursuing oil development 
opportunities, a framework for assessing projects. This work produced an easy way to compare 
qualities of tight oil plays and confirms that other locations where tight oil development projects 
could be economic. This research illustrates oil price and well cost as key determinants of play 
economics but also shows that projects are as economically attractive as fiscal systems will make 
them. The absence of good quality rock with high resource concentration is a major hurdle to 
development, but the profitability of the enterprise also depends on what share of the profit the 
operator is allowed to keep. Key elements within the tax system could be arranged to attract 
investment in frontier tight oil plays and ultimately upend the economic ranking of plays shown 
in this work.
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6.2. Research Limitations and Major Exclusions
While this work evaluated the U.S. tight oil development phenomenon within an 
interdisciplinary framework, it is by no means exhaustive of every possible aspect of the issue. I 
acknowledge some limitations of the research that fall within and outside the defined scope.
Firstly, the economic assessment of tight oil development in non-U.S. plays has not looked into 
water and other operational logistics that enable tight oil development to occur. Peter Zeihan 
(2014) in The Accidental Superpower points out the importance of geography and the presence 
of water as a key factor in the development of nations. The availability of water has powered the 
tight oil and gas revolution in the US. The contiguous U.S. land has 2110 watersheds draining 
the U.S. mainland into thousands of streams and lakes (ND SWC, 2014). This work did not focus 
on an exhaustive review of the water-readiness of the non-US shale nations discussed in this 
work. Water requirements for hydraulic fracturing is a key issue excluded by this research. The 
U.S. mainland has waterways and bodies that enable operators to meet their water needs for 
hydraulic fracturing. This may not be the case for other countries or regions in which tight oil 
resources exist.
The Rails network constitutes a major portion of oil transportation within the US. The Bakken 
and Eagle Ford have growing networks of railroads and pipelines, to different degrees, taking 
crude out of oil fields. This is important because it affects the revenue of sovereign or royalty 
owners, as well as operators, even as the netback pricing scheme used by many regions protects 
the operator and reduces the royalty value of the resource by the cost of taking it to market. This 
makes development in some plays more attractive than others. Especially in nations without very 
good pipeline network, the cost and logistical challenges of development may be quite onerous 
and erode the profitability of some marginal producers. This work did not look into the 
availability of a viable transportation network by non-U.S. nations in this analysis.
252
6.3. Recommendations for Future Work
This research built on the work of the EIA/ARI (2013) that provided a broad review of shale oil 
resources in 41 countries and evaluated over 137 shale formations. A potential for future study 
would be to further the search for new areas of tight resource development; this could build on 
the rapidly changing development techniques and exploration outcomes of some of these non- 
U.S. plays based on data from new exploration wells and pilot projects. Such work may use new 
recovery factors based on tested development pilots. In addition, the future work could apply the 
fiscal system specific to the location of the tight oil play to assess scenarios for economic 
viability that include the unique infrastructural, regulatory, and water availability conditions of 
the non-U.S. tight oil locations.
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